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alkblobs/tasks/ops-json-ops.md
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id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level, tags
id name status depends_on scope risk impact level tags
ops-json-ops the JSON control plane — blobs/stat, blobs/have (+ the token-renewal form), blobs/delete pending
ops-foundation
ops-call-harness
moderate medium component implementation
wave-7
ops
json
acl
tokens

Description

The three JSON control ops (ops-surface.md §Op family), each exported as a spec/handler pair the embedder assembles — riding alkcall's OperationSpec + JSON Schema validation (alkcall ADR-016) and its ACL machinery at op entry (convention 6: this module never re-implements an authorization check):

  • blobs/stat {namespace, digest} → {len} — Query; the read action; the handler calls Store::stat (the fall-through general rule, ADR-012 §6.1); a miss is the typed missing-error schema (not a {len: null}).
  • blobs/have {namespace, digests[], token?} → {present[]} — Query; read-gated (an existence probe over arbitrary digests is a discovery surface — gated exactly like fetch, not public); present[] corresponds to digests[] by index; content never traverses this op (hashes only). The renewal form (ADR-012 §2): when token is present, exactly one digest accompanies it — the handler verifies the token maps to that digest's pin row (the foundation's token layer), calls the crate-internal pin_renew(key, owner) via the foundation's store-core access, and answers present[] as usual; an expired or foreign row answers present: false and no renewal occurs — the putter's backstop is re-put. Without token, the pure existence probe (ADR-008's has discipline) over the facade's has. The non-fleet renewal form: the token is the held guard's handle — the probe answers present from the custody (nothing expires; ADR-012 §2's generalization); the custody/conversion lifecycle is the foundation's.
  • blobs/delete {namespace, digests[]} — Mutation; Visibility::Internal, evaluated under the internal authority context per alkcall ADR-017 (internal calls switch authority context, never skip ACL): requires the embedder's operator/admin authority context, not a namespace grant; the namespace field exists for audit/triage scoping, not gating. The handler calls Store::delete (the arbitration-then-delete path; a GcRefuse refusal surfaces as the typed error schema). External discovery of an Internal op returns NOT_FOUND (alkcall ADR-017's visibility discipline).
  • The ACL mapping (ops-surface.md §ACL mapping; OQ-09's resolution): namespace = resource — resource_type: "blob-namespace", resource_id_path selecting the payload's namespace field; stat/have = the read action; unlisted namespaces deny by default (closed-by-default: no ACL entry ⇒ no read, no write — a grant per namespace is the deferred cost, deliberately paid over accidental exposure).
  • Schemas (alkcall ADR-016): input/output JSON Schema per op + typed error schemas; the namespace field's syntax (non-empty UTF-8 string, embedder-validated — the minting of namespaces is the embedder's act); the digest wire form is hex (the canonical digest hex — the same form blobs/put's response returns; parsed via the key layer's hex ingress, malformed → the typed invalid error, rejects-never-guesses).
  • Tests through the harness (ops-call-harness): stat round-trip
    • the miss shape; have's index correspondence (present/absent mixed); the renewal form's three answers (live row renews → present: true; expired row → present: false, no renewal; foreign token → present: false); delete under the internal authority context (an external caller gets NOT_FOUND; an internal operator-context call deletes); the closed-by-default ACL matrix (an unlisted namespace denies read; a granted identity reads).

Acceptance Criteria

  • Three spec/handler pairs exported (stat, have, delete); input/ output schemas + typed error schemas per alkcall ADR-016
  • The ACL mapping: namespace-as-resource with the resource_id_path; the read action on stat/have; closed-by-default verified by test (unlisted namespace denies)
  • delete: Visibility::Internal, the internal-authority-context requirement (not namespace-gated), external discovery NOT_FOUND
  • have's renewal form: one digest + token; verify-mapping → pin_renew; expired/foreign → present: false with no renewal; the non-fleet form answers from the held custody
  • The handlers touch only the store facade + the foundation's crate-internal renewal access (no backend side-door — the ADR-001 §4 rule)
  • Harness tests green; cargo test (default) green; cargo test --features ops green; clippy/fmt green on both shapes; cargo doc --no-deps clean

References

  • docs/architecture/ops-surface.md (§Op family — the three JSON ops; §ACL mapping)
  • docs/architecture/decisions/001-substrate-posture-and-ops-placement.md §2/§4
  • docs/architecture/decisions/012-pre-decomposition-consistency-rulings.md §2 (the have payload shape + the renewal form's three-step handler duty)
  • docs/architecture/decisions/008-trait-size-probe-fleet-gc-and-large-engines.md (the has discipline the non-token form preserves)
  • docs/architecture/open-questions.md OQ-09 (closed-by-default, the risk-asymmetry rationale)
  • alkcall (upstream checkout): ADR-016 (operation error schemas), ADR-017 (the privilege model — internal switches context, never skips ACL), src/registry/spec.rs (AccessControl, resource_id_path)
  • tasks/ops-foundation.md (the token layer + the renewal access the have handler rides), tasks/ops-call-harness.md (the harness)

Notes

To be filled by implementation agent

Summary

To be filled on completion