# ADR-054: Outgoing-Only X.509 and the Three Remote Roles (Re-Owned In-Crate)

## Status

Accepted (re-owns the verifier-selection rule for alkcall's surface;
provenance: alknet ADR-034, not ported)

## Context

alkcall's connection surface depends on a verifier-selection rule and a
role taxonomy that were decided while this crate was a subdirectory of
the alknet mono-repo. The deciding ADR (alknet ADR-034, "Outgoing-Only
X.509 and Three Peer Roles") was never ported, so the rule's authority
lives in a cross-repo link — a dependency on a document outside this
crate for a constraint that binds this crate's public surface:

- `ConnectionCredentials.remote_identity: None` semantics (ADR-022 §7,
  (ADR-022 §7; alknet ADR-034 §2/§3, provenance): `None` is a load-bearing state — the
  public-X.509-endpoint path, not a missing field.
- Client-side `ServerCertVerifier` selection is by `PeerEntry`
  presence, not by key type alone (OQ-14 #2).
- `PeerEntry` asymmetry: a pure-client connection to a public X.509
  endpoint is not in the call-protocol peer graph on the client side
  (no `PeerEntry`, no `PeerId`, no `PeerRef::Specific` routing).

The alknet mono-repo is being rewritten as a thin glue layer over this
crate and its siblings; cross-repo ADR links will not survive that
rewrite as authority. The rule must be owned here.

## Decision

alkcall re-owns the rule in-crate. Three things are adopted:

### 1. Three remote roles

The single label "X.509 endpoint" conflated three structurally
different remote roles:

- **Public X.509 endpoint** — a remote server reachable by domain
  name, authenticated by a CA-issued X.509 cert. The local node is a
  *client* of it (a third-party API, a public hub dialed over the
  open internet, a peer that exposes domain + X.509 instead of an
  Ed25519 raw key). The client authenticates to the server by bearer
  token (`auth_token` payload field when riding the call protocol);
  the server authenticates to the client by CA verification
  (WebPKI), not fingerprint pinning.
- **Transport relay** — a connectivity-assistance node
  (iroh's DERP-equivalent) that forwards encrypted datagrams between
  peers who cannot directly connect. It is infrastructure, not an
  application peer: no registered operations, no peer graph
  participation, no `PeerEntry`. Its identity is the transport's
  concern, not this crate's.
- **Hub / hosting node** — an application peer acting as a hub in a
  hub-and-spoke topology. An ordinary `PeerEntry` holding mixed
  fingerprints (Ed25519 raw key and/or X.509) — fingerprint pinning
  applies on both cert paths.

### 2. Verifier selection is by `PeerEntry` presence, not key type

The client-side `ServerCertVerifier` is selected by whether the local
node holds a `PeerEntry` for the remote:

| Local `PeerEntry` for remote? | Remote cert | Verifier | Peer graph? |
|-------------------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| yes | Ed25519 or X.509 | fingerprint pin | in (`PeerId` resolved from client-cert fingerprint — ADR-025 §5) |
| no | X.509 | `WebPkiServerVerifier` (CA) | **not in** (no `PeerId`) |
| no | Ed25519 raw key | fail closed (no CA to fall back to) | not in |

### 3. `remote_identity: None` is load-bearing

`Some(fingerprint)` means "pin this" (known peer). `None` means "no
`PeerEntry` for this remote" — CA verification for X.509 remotes,
hard failure for Ed25519 raw-key remotes. An implementation must not
default `remote_identity` to a placeholder to satisfy the field, and
must not treat `None` as "skip verification."

### 4. Scope of the re-own

This ADR is the deciding authority for alkcall's surface
(`ConnectionCredentials`, `RemoteIdentity`, the `ServerCertVerifier`
selection the dial-composer implements, `PeerEntry` asymmetry in the
peer graph). It does not re-own alknet ADR-034's other content (ACME
issuance, cert rotation, the alktls config surface) — those remain
properties of the transport/composition layer (see OQ-43, composition
layer). alknet ADR-034 is demoted to provenance: historical origin of
this rule, cited as such.

## Consequences

Positive:

- The constraint binding alkcall's public surface is decided in this
  crate's decision log; cross-repo link rot cannot strip the authority.
- OQ-21's "deciding ADR (alknet ADR-034, not ported)" caveat is
  resolved — the surviving surfaces (`client-and-adapters.md`
  §credentials, ADR-025's `PeerEntry` asymmetry) now cite an in-crate
  ADR.
- The alknet rewrite can proceed without a documentation dependency
  from this crate on the old repo's ADR numbering.

Negative:

- One more rule with a historical origin story in a different numbering
  space; the provenance note (README §References) is the single place
  that maps old to new.

## References

- [client-and-adapters.md](../client-and-adapters.md) — the working
  spec carrying these semantics (§Credential sources for connections,
  §Constraints "Pure-client X.509 connections", `remote_identity`
  load-bearing rule)
- [ADR-022](022-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md) §7 —
  transport-identity dimensions on the call protocol
- [ADR-025](025-peerentry-and-identity-id-decoupling.md) —
  `PeerEntry` asymmetry, `PeerId` source, client-cert fingerprint →
  `peer_id` resolution
- [ADR-012](012-connectioncredentials-decouple-dial-from-call.md) —
  `ConnectionCredentials` shape (the dial consumes it; verifier
  selection is applied there)
- OQ-21 (resolved by this ADR), OQ-43 (composition-layer ownership —
  the transport/composition half mentioned in §4's scope carve-out)
- Provenance: alknet ADR-034, "Outgoing-Only X.509 and Three Peer
  Roles" (`/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/docs/architecture/decisions/`),
  retained as history, not authority