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+# Review 008 — First HTTP-door consumer evidence: shared auth vs LFS Basic, and the extras route-fallback constraint
+
+## Status
+
+Open — filed 2026-10-17. Report-only consumer input from alkgit's LFS
+POC (POC-L, 2026-10-16; findings at
+`/workspace/@alkdev/alkgit/docs/research/pocl-findings.md`; the POC
+crate is `/workspace/lfs-poc`, which served a real `git-lfs` 3.7.0
+client through `with_extra_routes` doors). Ask ledger source: alkgit's
+`docs/research/substrate-recomposition.md` §Upstream-push
+candidates #6/#9 (the alkhttp-named items; the gateway-dispatch half
+of #6 is filed where it belongs — alkcall review 012).
+
+## Scope
+
+Two findings, both from the same consumption round (an LFS batch-API
+door on the extras router). Neither was discovered by a source sweep;
+both anchors were re-verified by targeted read this session. Severity
+and shape are the consumer seat's; the disposition belongs to this
+crate's own session.
+
+## AH-1 [small, contract-visible] — The shared bearer middleware is Bearer-only; LFS clients authenticate with Basic on the batch
+
+**Anchor.** `src/server/auth.rs` — the shared identity middleware
+(`bearer_auth_middleware`); the module doc states the semantics
+explicitly: *"Malformed `Authorization` header (not `Bearer <token>`)
+→ `None` (treated as no-token, not an error — Bearer-only is the auth
+mechanism)"* (lines 1–20, verified this session).
+
+**Evidence.** Real `git-lfs` 3.7.0 authenticates the batch endpoint
+with **Basic** credentials (URL userinfo — the spec-shape behavior of
+the official client; its config is `http://user:pass@host/repo`). An
+extras door mounted on the shared middleware therefore receives the
+batch request with the middleware already having resolved `None`
+(the Basic header is not `Bearer`) — the door had to parse the
+Authorization header a second time (Basic *or* Bearer) to get any
+identity at all. The POC's door resolved both schemes locally and
+passed the real client; the shared middleware contributed nothing on
+this request shape.
+
+**Why it matters beyond LFS.** The middleware is shared by gateway
+endpoints and `to_mcp`; any HTTP-door surface whose
+real-world client authenticates with Basic (LFS today; git's
+smart-HTTP transport's basic auth is tomorrow's `git` door) silently
+loses identity resolution at the middleware and every door
+re-implements the fallback — the exact quiet-bypass shape review 012
+(alkcall) records for the ownership seam, one layer up in the same
+stack.
+
+**Recommended shape (own session, to be re-derived)**: tolerate Basic
+userinfo in the shared middleware — parse `Basic base64(user:pass)`
+into the identity provider's resolve path (or expose a documented
+per-door hook that receives the raw header before the None fold-in),
+keeping the current "resolve fails → None" fallback semantics. The
+doc line "Bearer-only is the auth mechanism" should flip to match
+whatever lands. Small surface; the decision is whether Basic
+resolution belongs in the shared middleware (uniform) or stays a
+door concern (explicit).
+
+**Verification status**: middleware semantics re-read this session;
+the client behavior is POC-L's recorded route-shape fact (real
+client, live). Re-verify by pointing a stock `git-lfs` at a
+shared-middleware door during resolution.
+
+## AH-2 [recorded constraint, no ask yet] — Extras doors cannot carry a route fallback; door route tables must be static shapes
+
+**Anchor/evidence.** POC-L, live: the merged extras router already
+owns a fallback route (the decoy), and axum refuses a second merge —
+a door attempting `fallback_layer`/merge fallback on the merged
+router panics **at construction**. Consequence: door route tables
+must be statically enumerated; multi-segment repo namespaces
+(`/user/repo/objects/batch` style) need enumerated pattern routes
+(`/{user}/{repo}/...` shape), not a dynamic-fallback match. The POC
+door's static shapes worked for every e2e case.
+
+**Disposition space.** This is a structural fact of the current
+router assembly, currently undocumented on the door-facing surface —
+worth one doc line in the extras/hooks documentation ("route tables
+are static; no second fallback; enumerate multi-segment patterns
+explicitly") regardless of whether any mechanism change is ever
+wanted. Not a mechanism ask today; recorded so the next door author
+does not rediscover the construction panic.
+
+## What this review asks for
+
+| # | Item | Class |
+|---|---|---|
+| AH-1 | Basic tolerance (or a documented pre-resolution hook) in the shared identity middleware | small change + doc flip, own session |
+| AH-2 | doc line: extras route tables are static; no second fallback | docs-only, ride-along |
+
+Nothing here blocks any door surface that resolves identity
+door-side (the proven compensation), but the shared-middleware trap
+(AH-1) compounds alkcall review 012's gateway trap for every future
+External-facing door — the two are worth one resolution round each.
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