docs(tasks): decompose review-002 into 24 tasks (23 implementation + 1 bracketed follow-up)

Decomposition of docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md per its
5-unit remediation plan:

- Unit 1 (security-critical): gw15-publish-body-cap,
  prj16-schema-via-call (CF-004 filed alkcall-side), fwd13-dot-segments,
  fwd16-missing-capability, oai11-ref-memoization
- Unit 2 (timeout/terminality): ws13-idle-progress,
  fwd15-stream-timeout, cli01-retry-after-budget, con17-mcp-pagination,
  con18-wss-sweep-exit
- Unit 3 (projection/docs): projection-truthfulness, mcp-batch-cap,
  gw16-status-drift
- Unit 4 (spec-import): yaml-normalization, oai13-path-item-wildcards,
  import-loudness-cluster, js01-placeholder-check,
  fwd17-19-contract-decisions
- Unit 5 (WS polish + tests): con18b-ws-polish,
  client-policy-wire-tests, cov-deployment-knobs, cov13-dead-code,
  srv11-srv12-router-ordering
- review-002-bracketed-followup: tentatively planned post-bulk pass
  (stale-check, OQA-18 enforcement decision, CON-08/09 close() lever,
  cross-crate re-checks) — deliberately not serialized against the
  bulk

Also: review-002 numbering repair (CON-14 was double-booked; MCP
pagination now CON-14, from_wss monitor renumbered CON-18, missing
CON-14 section added).

taskgraph: 66 valid, no cycles; 24 pending (all review-002);
gen-1/gen-2 parallel waves identified; workflow-cost hotspots are
prj16 (12.8) and ws13 (11.1), both carrying the reviewed slicing
guidance in their Notes.

tasks/adapters/review-002-fwd16-missing-capability.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+id: review-002-fwd16-missing-capability
+name: Loud error on missing capability instead of silent unauthenticated request (FWD-16)
+status: pending
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+tags: [adapters, review-002, security, from-openapi]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Review 002 FWD-16 [major]. The FWD-08 remediation made every
+*malformed* credential fail loudly, but the **missing-capability arm
+stays silent**: `forward.rs:200-238` —
+
+```rust
+if let Some(scheme) = auth_scheme {
+    if let Some(secret) = context.capabilities.get(namespace) {
+        // ... four loud arms for malformed names/values
+    }
+    // capability == None → falls through: the request is sent
+    // with NO credential and NO diagnostic
+}
+```
+
+`Capabilities::get` keys on `api_key:`/`http_token:` prefixes
+(alkcall `core/types.rs:97-107`), so an assembly layer that registered
+the secret under a wrong key form (or forgot) produces corrupted
+upstream 401s at call time with zero local diagnostics. This is the
+*most probable* misconfiguration shape and the one inconsistent arm in
+an otherwise-loud match — every other arm was made loud by review-001's
+FWD-08 fix (tested at forward.rs:1646-1736).
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] When `auth_scheme.is_some()` and the capability is absent, the
+      request is NOT sent; the caller gets an `INTERNAL`-family error
+      naming the missing capability key (e.g. "capability
+      `http_token:{namespace}` is absent; refusing to send the request
+      unauthenticated") — message contains no secret material
+- [ ] When `auth_scheme.is_none()` the behavior is unchanged
+      (unauthenticated ops stay unauthenticated)
+- [ ] Wire test: authed op, empty capabilities → error envelope (and
+      the test asserts via the existing `spawn_responder`-style seam
+      that the upstream received zero requests)
+- [ ] Existing FWD-08 loud-arm tests unchanged and passing
+- [ ] Doc note in the module doc: the loud-missing matrix now covers
+      malformed name/value AND absent capability
+- [ ] `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
+      `cargo fmt --check` pass
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md (Part D', FWD-16)
+- src/adapters/forward.rs:200-238 (the silent arm), :1646-1736 (the FWD-08 test family to mirror)
+- docs/architecture/decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md
+- tasks/adapters/review-001-forward-url-safety.md (FWD-08's loud-error work this completes)
+
+## Notes
+
+Error class choice: `INTERNAL` (misconfiguration, not caller fault) —
+matches the FWD-08 precedent. Non-retryable, since re-sending cannot
+succeed without the assembly layer changing. If a deployment legitimately
+runs authed-ops with *optionally*-present credentials (none known
+today), that would be a new config flag — do not preemptively add one;
+the invariant (ADR-014: credentials flow only via Capabilities) argues
+loud-and-closed.