docs(tasks): decompose review-002 into 24 tasks (23 implementation + 1 bracketed follow-up)

Decomposition of docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md per its
5-unit remediation plan:

- Unit 1 (security-critical): gw15-publish-body-cap,
  prj16-schema-via-call (CF-004 filed alkcall-side), fwd13-dot-segments,
  fwd16-missing-capability, oai11-ref-memoization
- Unit 2 (timeout/terminality): ws13-idle-progress,
  fwd15-stream-timeout, cli01-retry-after-budget, con17-mcp-pagination,
  con18-wss-sweep-exit
- Unit 3 (projection/docs): projection-truthfulness, mcp-batch-cap,
  gw16-status-drift
- Unit 4 (spec-import): yaml-normalization, oai13-path-item-wildcards,
  import-loudness-cluster, js01-placeholder-check,
  fwd17-19-contract-decisions
- Unit 5 (WS polish + tests): con18b-ws-polish,
  client-policy-wire-tests, cov-deployment-knobs, cov13-dead-code,
  srv11-srv12-router-ordering
- review-002-bracketed-followup: tentatively planned post-bulk pass
  (stale-check, OQA-18 enforcement decision, CON-08/09 close() lever,
  cross-crate re-checks) — deliberately not serialized against the
  bulk

Also: review-002 numbering repair (CON-14 was double-booked; MCP
pagination now CON-14, from_wss monitor renumbered CON-18, missing
CON-14 section added).

taskgraph: 66 valid, no cycles; 24 pending (all review-002);
gen-1/gen-2 parallel waves identified; workflow-cost hotspots are
prj16 (12.8) and ws13 (11.1), both carrying the reviewed slicing
guidance in their Notes.

tasks/client/review-002-cli01-retry-after-budget.md

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+---
+id: review-002-cli01-retry-after-budget
+name: Budget-aware Retry-After sleep — stop re-arming a full ceiling per attempt (CLI-01)
+status: pending
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+tags: [client, review-002]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Review 002 CLI-01 [major]. The `Retry-After` middleware sleeps outside
+the retry budget and re-arms a full ceiling on every throttled retry —
+middleware order is `RetryGateMiddleware` **outside**
+`RetryAfterMiddleware` (`http_client.rs:511-520`), so every retry
+attempt re-enters `RetryAfterMiddleware::handle`:
+
+1. attempt 1 → `429` + `Retry-After: 300` → deadline recorded `t₀+300`
+2. reqwest-retry sleeps ≤ 2 s, retries
+3. attempt 2 re-sleeps until `t₀+300` (inside maybe_sleep_for), gets a
+   fresh `429` → deadline **re-armed to `t₀+302`** (a full new 300 s)
+4. … for up to `max_retries` more → ~15 min wall time inside one
+   `forward()` call
+
+`TotalRetryBudget` gates only its own backoff sleeps; the 30 s request
+timeout never covers this window (the sleep happens before the reqwest
+request is constructed, so the timer never starts).
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `maybe_sleep_for` is budget-aware: caps the sleep by the
+      remaining `max_total_retry_duration` (check inside the sleep —
+      the pending sleeps, clamped, or checks-and-skips when the budget
+      is spent; implementer's choice, but a deadline that would extend
+      past the budget must be truncated to it)
+- [ ] Re-arm clamp: `record_if_throttled` keeps the *earliest* deadline
+      (or otherwise does not extend past the first-seen deadline for
+      the same URL within one logical request) — a retry storm cannot
+      push the wall clock out ceiling-per-attempt
+- [ ] Wire test: counting responder that always answers
+      `429`/`Retry-After: N` with the test's ceiling set small → the
+      caller's total wall time is bounded by max_total_retry_duration
+      + one attempt's request time (assert the bound, not the exact
+      count)
+- [ ] The per-URL deadline map semantics for *separate* logical
+      requests are unchanged (a fresh request still honors the
+      recorded throttle window — that feature stays)
+- [ ] Fix the misspelled test name `malware_records_under_the_effective_url` while touching the file
+- [ ] `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
+      `cargo fmt --check` pass
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md (Part D', CLI-01)
+- src/client/http_client.rs:511-520 (stack order), 370-395 (TotalRetryBudget), src/client/retry_after.rs:44-62 (ceiling), :127-211 (record/maybe_sleep)
+- tasks/client/review-001-client-timeout-retry.md (the Retry-After machinery)
+- tasks/client/review-002-client-policy-wire-tests.md (the counting-responder seam this test family shares)
+
+## Notes
+
+Keep the semantics decision narrow: the goal is "one logical request's
+Retry-After waits are bounded by the retry budget," NOT changing the
+cross-request throttle map (FWD-11's eviction/jitter behavior is
+already fixed and correct). The natural seam is threading the budget
+handle into the middleware order so RetryAfter sees it — small,
+testable, no public API change (the budget is already a
+`HttpClientConfig` field).

tasks/client/review-002-client-policy-wire-tests.md

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+---
+id: review-002-client-policy-wire-tests
+name: Wire tests — redirect policy, retry gate/budget, streaming terminal arms, TLS error arms (CLI-02/03, COV-10/11)
+status: pending
+depends_on: [review-002-fwd15-stream-timeout, review-002-cli01-retry-after-budget]
+scope: moderate
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+tags: [client, review-002, coverage, adapters]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The crate's highest-value coverage gap: the outbound client's policy
+stack — the code that protects credentials — has never run against a
+redirect or a retry on the wire, and `forward_stream`'s terminal arms
+are dark end-to-end (review 002 COV-11: `same_host_redirect_policy`
+100% dark; COV-10: SSE terminal arms dark). Concretely:
+
+- **CLI-02 (redirect)**: no test in the crate sends any 3xx. Add:
+  (a) same-host 302 → followed, credential headers forwarded;
+  (b) cross-host 302 → response surfaced (HTTP_302-family), the second
+  endpoint receives **zero requests** (count at the attacker server) —
+  the FWD-03 property, pinned. Hop-cap (>10) → loud error, third test.
+  The `spawn_responder` seam at forward.rs:1415-1477 already speaks
+  raw HTTP and can emit `location:`.
+- **CLI-03 (retry)**: counting-responder tests: POST + 500 ⇒ exactly
+  1 upstream hit (method gate, :362-366); GET + 500×2 ⇒ 3 hits then
+  success; budget exhaustion (`max_total_retry_duration` small) stops
+  retries even under a generous attempt cap (:381); PEM
+  parse-failure arms (:487-507) via garbage-PEM files asserting
+  `CaBundleParse`/`ClientCertParse` + path (never key material).
+- **COV-10 (streaming/forward terminal arms)**: (a) upstream SSE line
+  > 1 MiB without newline through the real `forward_stream` → single
+  INTERNAL terminal envelope, stream ends; (b) responder sends
+  `data: a\n\n` then aborts the socket → terminal error envelope;
+  (c) responder ends without trailing blank line → pending event
+  dispatched at EOF; (d) dead-port transport failure through both
+  `forward` (:719-722) and `forward_stream` (:851-853) → INTERNAL
+  envelope; (e) binary `application/octet-stream` 200 → byte-array
+  envelope (:638-643); (f) `application/json` 200 with malformed body
+  → INTERNAL decode envelope (:656-658).
+- Plus the small dark arms from COV-12 that live in this seam:
+  ApiKey/Basic malformed-credential loud arms (extend the FWD-08 test
+  family), declared-header-param invalid name/value rejections, and
+  `SharedHttpClient::config()` reflecting a reloaded config
+  (FWD-12's atomicity assertion).
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Redirect: 3 tests (same-host follow, cross-host refuse +
+      zero-contact assert, hop-cap error) passing
+- [ ] Retry: 3 tests (POST single-hit, GET retry-to-success with
+      counted hits, budget-bounded) passing
+- [ ] TLS: 2 parse-failure tests (CaBundleParse, ClientCertParse) +
+      config()-after-reload assertion
+- [ ] Streaming: 6 terminal-arm tests (oversized line, socket abort,
+      EOF-flush, dead-port×2, binary decode, malformed-JSON decode)
+      passing
+- [ ] Credential arms: ApiKey/Basic malformed-value tests land
+- [ ] `cargo test --all-features`, `cargo clippy --all-features
+      --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo fmt --check` pass
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md (Part D', CLI-02/03; Part G', COV-09/10/11/12)
+- src/client/http_client.rs:300-316 (redirect policy), :354-395 (retry gate/budget), :487-507 (PEM arms)
+- src/adapters/forward.rs:1415-1477 (spawn_responder seam), :887-925 (stream terminal arms)
+- tests/client_tls.rs (the TLS harness pattern)
+- tasks/client/review-002-fwd15-stream-timeout.md and review-002-cli01-retry-after-budget.md (land first — these tests pin their new behavior too)
+
+## Notes
+
+Pure test-addition task (plus any test-seam helpers). Land after the
+two client behavior tasks so the tests assert final semantics, not
+interim ones. Slice: (1) redirect tests, (2) retry tests, (3)
+streaming terminal arms, (4) TLS + config arms — independent commits.
+If `spawn_responder` needs a "count requests per host" surface, build
+it once and reuse — the cross-host zero-contact assertion is the
+load-bearing one.

tasks/client/review-002-fwd15-stream-timeout.md

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+---
+id: review-002-fwd15-stream-timeout
+name: Subscriptions must not inherit the 30s total request timeout (FWD-15) + stream byte cap (FWD-14)
+status: pending
+depends_on: []
+scope: moderate
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+tags: [client, review-002, adapters]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Review 002 FWD-15 [major] + FWD-14. Two streaming-path defects, same
+code region (`src/adapters/forward.rs:824-934`):
+
+1. **FWD-15**: `forward_stream` sends through the shared client whose
+   `DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` is 30 s — verified against reqwest 0.13.4
+   that the total-timeout sleep rides into the response body stream.
+   A healthy subscription dies at 30 s with `SSE stream error:
+   operation timed out` — even keep-alive-emitting sources (the
+   gateway deliberately runs subscriptions unbounded per ADR-021;
+   dispatch.rs:28). The outbound half of the same subscription is
+   mortally capped.
+2. **FWD-14**: the streaming branch has no size accounting — the 1 MiB
+   cap bounds a single SSE *line*, not the stream. A hostile upstream
+   emits well-formed 1-MiB-line events forever: 30 s of those is
+   ~GB/s into envelope allocation (mitigated only by the timeout —
+   which FWD-15's fix then removes, so **both must land together or
+   the fix makes FWD-14 worse**).
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] FWD-15: `HandlerKind::Stream` forwards send with
+      `request_timeout: None` while keeping connect + read timeouts
+      (implementer's choice: per-request extension override verified
+      against reqwest 0.13, or a second derived client built from the
+      same config minus the total timeout) — a >30 s healthy
+      subscription survives
+- [ ] FWD-15 wire test: responder trickling `: keepalive` comments past
+      30 s (scaled: use a configurable short client timeout in the
+      test) → stream still delivering events after the old deadline
+- [ ] FWD-14: a total byte cap on the streaming path (accumulate
+      across `feed`; per-subscription total, default documented) and
+      the line-cap check moved to *before* `extend_from_slice` so the
+      overshoot cannot exceed cap + one chunk
+- [ ] FWD-14 test: a stream exceeding the total cap terminates with a
+      single terminal error envelope (the stream-ends semantics)
+- [ ] Cap value + no-timeout decision documented in the module doc and
+      http-server.md (ADR-049/021 note: unbounded *time* by design for
+      subscriptions, bounded *bytes* per subscription)
+- [ ] `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
+      `cargo fmt --check` pass
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md (Part D', FWD-14, FWD-15; Unit 2 rationale)
+- src/adapters/forward.rs:824-934 (send + streaming branch), :969-1082 (SSE parser), http_client.rs:69-95/:149-150/:164-178 (timeout config + read-timeout doc claim)
+- docs/architecture/decisions/049-streaming-handler-for-subscriptions.md
+- tasks/client/review-001-client-timeout-retry.md (the timeout defaults this revises)
+
+## Notes
+
+Order matters **within** this task: land FWD-15 with FWD-14 in the same
+commit-series — removing the total timeout without the byte cap opens
+an unbounded-memory window. The read-timeout (10/30 s stall guard)
+stays: it bounds upstream *staleness*; the doc at http_client.rs:149-150
+already correctly describes read-timeout as the stall guard (the total
+timeout's "stalled upstream" claim there is the thing being fixed).
+Coordinate with review-002-cli01-retry-after-budget (same file) and
+review-002-client-policy-wire-tests (which should follow this to test
+the new behavior) — sequence those.