---
id: review-001-client-config-and-cert-coverage
name: Client config API cleanup (HY-06) + mTLS/CA-bundle test coverage (COV-02)
status: completed
depends_on: []
scope: narrow
risk: low
impact: component
level: implementation
tags: [client, review-001, follow-up, coverage]
---

## Description

Two deferred client-host items, grouped (same file, `src/client/http_client.rs`):

- **HY-06**: `HttpClientConfig.retry_policy` exposes
  `reqwest_retry::ExponentialBackoff` in the public API (`:116`) — a
  semver anchor to an upstream concrete type and an awkward construction
  surface. The post-remediation config (RetryGate, TotalRetryBudget,
  attempt counts, backoff bounds, budget deadline) is exactly why this
  should now be an owned config struct (e.g. `max_retries`,
  `max_retry_interval`, `initial_backoff`, `max_total_retry_duration`)
  from which the middleware stack builds the internal backoff. Breaks
  the public type — fine pre-publish; do it once, now, while the
  surface is small.
- **COV-02 residue**: no test constructs a client with a working CA
  bundle or client cert — only the missing-file error paths are tested
  (`new_with_missing_ca_bundle_errors`). Post-remediation the
  redirect/retry gates hang off this client, so the TLS-config paths
  should be exercised: a test server with a self-signed cert + client
  presenting its own cert, happy path through the full middleware stack.

## Acceptance Criteria

- [x] `HttpClientConfig` no longer exposes `ExponentialBackoff`; owned field set covers what the remediation made configurable; module docs updated
- [x] Existing config-construction call sites migrated (adapters' test fixtures included)
- [x] TLS test: client built with a CA bundle connects to a private-roots server; client-cert path exercised end-to-end (COV-02's uncovered build paths)
- [x] Feature matrix green (default, `--all-features`, `--no-default-features`)
- [x] `cargo test` and `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass

## References

- docs/reviews/001-initial-implementation-review.md (Part H, HY-06; Part I, COV-02)
- tasks/client/review-001-client-timeout-retry.md (the retry policy work this builds on)

## Notes

**HY-06 shape chosen**: `HttpClientConfig.retry_policy:
ExponentialBackoff` → `HttpClientConfig.retry: RetryConfig`, an owned
struct of plain scalars `{ max_retries: u32, initial_backoff: Duration,
max_retry_interval: Duration }` (debug-clone, `Default` =
3 retries / 100 ms / 2 s — the previous `ExponentialBackoff` default
exactly). The jitter (`Bounded`) and exponential base (`2`) stay
internal policy constants, not config — they were never surfaced
before either. `RetryGateMiddleware::new` builds the internal
`ExponentialBackoff` from the `RetryConfig` at client-construction
time; `max_total_retry_duration` remains its own `HttpClientConfig`
field (unchanged; it was already a plain scalar). `reqwest-retry`
stays a private implementation detail of the middleware stack — no
`reqwest_retry` type appears in the public API.

Call-site audit: `retry_policy` had **zero** external construction
sites — every `HttpClientConfig` consumer (from_jsonschema,
from_openapi, openapi_spec, forward.rs, full_surface test) uses
`HttpClientConfig::default()`; only `http_client.rs`'s own tests
constructed the field. Those were migrated to `RetryConfig { .. }`
literals, and the default-config assertions now pin `max_retries`,
`initial_backoff`, and `max_retry_interval` on the owned struct.
`ClientCertConfig` doc comments added (it had none — caught by the
`missing_docs` gate re-measure this task unblocks).

**COV-02 shape chosen**: new integration test file
`tests/client_tls.rs` (kept out of the lib's test module — it needs
`tokio-rustls`, `rustls`, `rcgen` as dev-deps only, so the base crate
and its feature matrix stay lean). Per test it mints a throwaway
private PKI with rcgen (CA + server leaf SAN `127.0.0.1`/`localhost` +
client leaf with ClientAuth EKU), serves HTTPS/1.1 via tokio-rustls
(`WebPkiClientVerifier` when mTLS is required), and drives the **real
`SharedHttpClient`** through `HttpClientConfig` file paths — same
encode path as production (PEM read → `add_root_certificate` /
`Identity::from_pem` via `concat_pem`). Five tests:

- CA-bundle client ↔ private-roots server: 200 + body intact + exactly
  1 handshake (success path through the full middleware stack);
- no-CA-bundle client rejected by private-roots server — asserts the
  TLS verification failure surfaces in the error **source chain**
  (`invalid peer certificate: UnknownIssuer`; the retry middleware
  wraps it, so the chain is walked, not the top-level Display);
- mTLS: client presents identity → handshake completes end-to-end;
- mTLS server rejects a client with no identity (TLS-level rejection);
- `reload()` to a CA-bundle-backed client makes a previously
  unreachable server trusted (hot-reload × TLS interplay).

The negative-path assertions mirror the retry-stack reality: the first
attempt fails at the TLS layer and 3 retries surface a
`Middleware(...)` wrapper — the source chain carries the answer.

## Summary

- `src/client/http_client.rs`: `RetryConfig` (new public struct)
  replaces the `ExponentialBackoff` exposure; retry backoff built
  internally; `ClientCertConfig` fields documented; tests migrated
  (minimal_config, reload-swap, default assertions).
- `tests/client_tls.rs` (new): private-PKI test server + 5 TLS tests
  (2 success-path TLS builds, 1 reload×TLS, 2 negative
  verification/mTLS rejections with chain-aware assertions).
- `Cargo.toml`: dev-deps `rcgen 0.14`, `tokio-rustls 0.26`,
  `rustls 0.23` (no default features; aws_lc_rs + std + tls12),
  `rustls-pki-types 1`, `uuid` (v4 already a main dep).
- Verified: `cargo test` (288 + 5 TLS), `cargo test --all-features`
  (359 + all suites), `cargo test --no-default-features` (288; same 4
  pre-existing lib warnings as the base commit, nothing new),
  `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` (default +
  all-features), `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo doc --no-deps` clean.