alkhttp/docs/architecture/decisions/015-privilege-model-and-authority-context.md

ADR-015: Privilege Model and Authority Context

Ported from alknet ADR-015 (Privilege Model and Authority Context); re-targeted to alkhttp.

Status

Accepted

Context

The call protocol allows handlers to compose other operations through OperationEnv::invoke(). This creates a call tree: a parent request spawns children, which may spawn their own children. The parent_request_id field records this tree.

The previous design had a trusted: bool flag on OperationContext. When a handler invoked another operation through OperationEnv, the nested call was marked trusted: true and all ACL checks were skipped. The intent was to avoid double-checking: if /agent/chat is allowed and it internally calls /auth/verify, the auth check is "trusted" because the caller already passed ACL on /agent/chat.

This is a privilege escalation vector. Two concrete attacks:

Buggy handler: a handler accidentally calls an operation it shouldn't. With trusted: true, ACL is skipped entirely. A handler with read scope that accidentally calls an operation requiring admin succeeds — the caller's read scope effectively triggered an admin operation.

Parameterized dispatch: a handler takes caller input that determines which internal operation to call. This is the core agent use case — an LLM picks which tool to invoke based on the user's prompt. With trusted: true, the LLM (and therefore the user) can invoke any registered operation without ACL checks, regardless of the caller's scopes. A caller with chat scope can invoke operations requiring admin by choosing the right tool name.

The call protocol is a general-purpose cross-boundary RPC mechanism. Every consumer — NAPI adapter, Python adapter, agent service, HTTP adapter, future services — inherits whatever privilege model the protocol defines. The privilege boundary between external and internal calls, and the authority context switch for composition, are core protocol semantics. This is not a feature of any single consumer; it is the protocol's security model.

The agent service is a useful test case because it exercises every edge case (parameterized dispatch, deep composition, dynamic operations, role-based escalation), but the decision belongs to the call protocol. It is recorded in the alkcall crate (alkcall ADR-017) and ported to alkhttp because the HTTP gateway and the adapters are consumers of this model: the gateway's AccessControl-filtered /search discovery and the adapter-registered Internal-by-default operations both sit on top of these protocol semantics.

Mental Models

Two analogies clarify the model:

Kernel/user mode: external operations are syscalls — curated entry points where an unprivileged caller can enter the kernel. Internal operations are kernel functions — callable only from composition, not from userspace. The internal flag means "this call is in kernel mode." Kernel mode has access controls — it runs under a different principal, not with no principal.

Domain/integration events: external operations are integration events — they cross a boundary and are visible to external systems. Internal operations are domain events — they stay within the bounded context. services/list is the integration contract; it only exposes integration events.

Principal/agent (legal contracting): the caller is the principal; the handler is the agent. The principal delegates scoped authority to the agent. The agent acts under its own identity (for attribution) but with the principal's delegated authority (for scope). Liabilities flow upstream (traceable through parent_request_id); privileges flow downstream (the agent gets a subset of the principal's authority). Role-based escalation: a lower-privileged role can escalate through a chain of command (agent requests promotion, architect performs it), not through direct authority.

Decision

1. The internal flag switches authority context, not skips ACL

The internal flag on OperationContext marks calls that originated from composition (a handler calling another operation via OperationEnv), as opposed to external calls that arrived as call.requested from a wire caller.

When internal: true:

• The ACL check runs against the handler's identity (set at registration by the assembly layer), not the caller's identity and not as a blanket skip.
• The handler's identity has scopes scoped to its composition needs (least privilege), not blanket root and not the caller's scopes.

When internal: false (external call from the wire):

• The ACL check runs against the caller's identity (from AuthContext, resolved per-request).

The internal flag is set by OperationEnv, not by callers. A handler cannot mark its own call as internal. The field uses module-private construction; only pub fn is_internal(&self) -> bool is exposed for reads.

2. Operations have External/Internal visibility

OperationSpec has a visibility: Visibility field:

pub enum Visibility {
    External,  // Callable from the wire (call.requested from a consumer)
    Internal,  // Composition-only (env.invoke from a handler)
}

The assembly layer declares visibility when registering operations.

When a call.requested arrives from a wire consumer:

• An Internal operation returns call.error with code NOT_FOUND (not FORBIDDEN). This does not leak that the operation exists.
• An External operation proceeds to ACL checking.

services/list only returns External operations to remote callers. Internal operations are not part of the wire-facing API surface. A remote consumer cannot enumerate the internal call tree.

3. Handler identity is carried on OperationContext

Note

: This decision's handler_identity: Option<Identity> type was superseded by alkcall ADR-018 (alknet ADR-022, ported here as ADR-022), which replaced Identity with CompositionAuthority — a declared authority bundle that is not a peer identity and is not resolvable through IdentityProvider. The core decision (authority switch, not ACL skip) holds unchanged. See ADR-022 Decision 2 for the current type.

OperationContext carries both the caller's identity (who invoked me) and the handler's identity (who am I acting as):

pub struct OperationContext {
    pub request_id: String,
    pub parent_request_id: Option<String>,
    pub identity: Option<Identity>,            // Caller's identity (inbound)
    // Type changed to Option<CompositionAuthority> by ADR-022:
    pub handler_identity: Option<CompositionAuthority>,  // Handler's composition authority
    pub capabilities: Capabilities,
    pub metadata: HashMap<String, Value>,
    // env/scoped_env split by ADR-024 (now alkcall ADR-019):
    pub scoped_env: ScopedOperationEnv,        // Reachability data (ADR-022, ADR-024)
    pub env: Arc<dyn OperationEnv + Send + Sync>,  // Dispatch trait (ADR-024)
    /// Module-private for writes; read via `is_internal()`. Set only by
    /// `OperationEnv::invoke()` (true) or `CallAdapter` dispatch (false).
    pub(crate) internal: bool,
}

impl OperationContext {
    pub fn is_internal(&self) -> bool { self.internal }
}

• identity: the authenticated caller (from AuthContext). For external calls, this is who sent the call.requested. For internal calls, this is the parent handler's identity (propagated through OperationEnv::invoke()).
• handler_identity: the identity of the handler processing this call. Set at registration by the assembly layer. For external calls, this is the handler's own identity. For internal calls, the ACL check runs against this identity.

The distinction is the principal/agent model: identity is the principal (who delegated), handler_identity is the agent (who is acting). Attribution traces through both — any action can be attributed to the handler that performed it and the caller that initiated the chain.

4. Scoped composition env

The OperationEnv given to a handler is scoped — it can only invoke a declared set of operations. This bounds the parameterized-dispatch attack surface: a caller (or an LLM) picking which operation to invoke picks from the declared set, not from the entire registry.

Scoping happens at two levels:

Static scoping at registration: the assembly layer declares which operations a handler may compose. The OperationEnv given to that handler is pre-filtered — invoke("fs", "readFile", ...) works, invoke("admin", "deleteUser", ...) returns NOT_FOUND. This is the reachability control.

Dynamic scoping at sandbox creation: when a handler spawns a sandbox (quickjs), it passes a further scoped env to the sandbox — a subset of what the handler itself can reach. The handler might have fs:read and bash:exec, but it only gives the sandbox fs:read (not bash:exec), because the sandbox runs untrusted LLM-generated code. This is the "privileges flow downstream" principle: the principal delegates a subset.

The specific API for declaring the scoped operation set is specified in ADR-022 (ScopedOperationEnv { allowed_operations: HashSet<String> }), operation-level granularity (not just namespace-level). This is finer-grained than the TypeScript @alkdev/operations buildEnv() which used allowedNamespaces — operation-level scoping is safer for the parameterized-dispatch use case.

5. The three controls together

The three controls are independent and all are needed:

Control	What it gates	Without it
Operation visibility	Whether an operation is callable from the wire	Internal operations exposed to external callers
Handler identity	What authority composition runs under	ACL skipped or caller's scopes propagated (escalation)
Scoped composition env	What operations a handler can reach	Handler can call anything in the registry

• Visibility alone: internal operations are hidden from the wire, but composition skips ACL (escalation through buggy handler).
• Handler identity alone: ACL checks against handler scopes, but the handler can reach any operation (parameterized dispatch unbounded).
• Scoped env alone: handler can only reach declared operations, but ACL is skipped (if a declared operation requires a scope the handler doesn't have, it still runs).

All three together: the handler can only reach declared operations (scoped env), those operations are ACL-checked against the handler's scoped identity (handler identity), and internal operations are never exposed to the wire (visibility). Principle of least privilege.

Consequences

Positive:

• No privilege escalation through composition. A handler can only compose operations its own identity is authorized for, and only from its declared scope.
• Parameterized dispatch is safe. The agent/LLM tool selection case is bounded by the scoped env — the LLM picks from the declared tool set, not from the entire registry. The ACL checks against the handler's identity, not the caller's.
• Buggy handlers can't accidentally escalate. A handler that tries to call an operation outside its scoped env gets NOT_FOUND; one that calls an operation its identity lacks scopes for gets FORBIDDEN.
• Attribution is complete. Every call carries both the caller's identity (who initiated the chain) and the handler's identity (who is acting). The parent_request_id chain traces the full agency chain. This supports the gitea-per-agent pattern where each agent (human or LLM) has its own account.
• Session-scoped operations (alknet OQ-19) are safe by construction. They're always Internal, run under the handler's identity, through the scoped env, in a locked-down sandbox. The self-improving workflow (agents writing tools) is bounded.
• Role-based escalation is explicit. An agent requesting promotion (session → core) is a lower-privileged role asking a higher-privileged role (architect with promote scope) to perform an action. The escalation goes through the chain of command, not through direct authority.

Negative:

• OperationContext has two identity fields (identity and handler_identity), which is more complex than a single identity. This is necessary — the principal/agent distinction is real and both are needed for attribution and ACL.
• The assembly layer has more responsibility: it must declare each handler's identity (scopes), its scoped composition env (which operations it may compose), and operation visibility. This is expected — the assembly layer assembles everything (alknet ADR-008), and forcing explicit declaration of privilege is a feature, not a bug.
• Adding a new composition to a handler requires updating the assembly layer (declare the new operation in the scoped env), not just the handler code. This prevents accidental composition of unauthorized operations.
• The scoped env API is not fully specified here. The one-way constraint (scoped env exists, is declared at registration, can be further scoped at runtime) is fixed; the concrete API is a two-way door for implementation.

Assumptions

1. Internal calls should run under a different authority than external calls, not skip ACL entirely. If internal calls should skip ACL (the old trusted model), this entire ADR is wrong. The assumption is that the escalation vectors (buggy handler, parameterized dispatch) are real and must be prevented.

2. Handler identity is set at registration by the assembly layer. The assembly layer is the trust boundary (alknet ADR-008, ADR-014). If the assembly layer is compromised, all handler identities are compromised. This is the same trust boundary as capabilities.

3. The scoped env is declared at registration (static) and can be further scoped at runtime (dynamic, for sandbox creation). The static scoping is the reachability control; the dynamic scoping is the sandbox boundary. If a use case requires fully dynamic scoping (handler discovers at call time what it can compose), the model needs extension — but the assumption is that composition reachability is knowable at registration time.

4. services/list hides internal operations. If internal operations should be discoverable by remote callers (e.g., for debugging), the visibility model needs a third state. The assumption is that internal operations are implementation details, not part of the external API surface.

5. Internal operations return NOT_FOUND, not FORBIDDEN. This prevents existence leakage. If a use case requires distinguishing "you can't call this" from "this doesn't exist" (e.g., for debugging), the error model needs refinement. The assumption is that not leaking internal operation existence is more important than debuggability from the wire.

6. The handler identity is a full Identity (with scopes), not a special principal type. This reuses the existing Identity type and IdentityProvider infrastructure (ADR-004). Superseded by ADR-022 Decision 2 (alkcall ADR-018): composition authority is a declared authority bundle (CompositionAuthority), not a peer Identity. It is not resolvable through IdentityProvider and does not represent an inbound caller. The distinction is necessary because a handler is not a network peer — its authority is declared by the assembly layer at registration, not resolved from credentials.

References

• ADR-004: Auth as shared core (IdentityProvider, Identity) — ported to this crate under the same number (004-auth-as-shared-core.md)
• alknet ADR-008: Vault integration (assembly layer is the trust boundary; alknet mono-repo ADR — the vault is an alkvault concern)
• ADR-014: Secret material flow and capability injection (capabilities are orthogonal — both are set at registration by the assembly layer)
• alkcall ADR-022: Call protocol client and adapter contract (alknet ADR-017, ported here as ADR-017 — adapters produce scoped envs)
• alknet OQ-17: Abort cascade (the call tree is the agency chain — parent_request_id traces principal → agent; resolved as alkcall ADR-020)
• alknet OQ-19: Session-scoped registries (session operations are always Internal)
• The alkcall crate's operation-registry.md — the registry semantics this model is defined against (alknet mono-repo: crates/call/operation-registry.md)
• The alkcall crate's call-protocol.md — the wire protocol whose dispatch semantics carry the internal flag (alknet mono-repo: crates/call/call-protocol.md)
• TypeScript @alkdev/operations buildEnv() with allowedNamespaces — prior art for scoped composition env
• POC at /workspace/toolEnv — demonstrated the sandbox-to-registry bridge with the full-registry exposure gap