Files
alknet-firewall/docs/architecture/decisions/009-last-token-extraction.md
glm-5.1 cf464c2296 feat: initial architecture specification and research
Phase 0→1 setup for alknet-firewall — a behavioral signal detection
library that screens untrusted LLM inputs using small model activations.

Architecture docs (5 specs, 10 ADRs, 7 open questions):
- overview: vision, scope, dependencies, package structure
- firewall: core API, alarm protocol, score composition, error handling
- codebook: SVD basis, spline distributions, calibration, tensor format
- model: activation extraction, model-agnostic interface, lazy loading
- configuration: thresholds, model selection, detection tuning

Research reports:
- modern-python-project-setup: uv, pyproject.toml, src layout, ruff, CI
- python-ml-packaging: optional PyTorch, HF Hub download, safetensors
- llm-input-safety-landscape: threat taxonomy, defenses, academic evidence

Agent role adaptations for Python project (replaced Rust conventions).
2026-06-13 05:17:40 +00:00

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ADR-009: Last-Token Activation Extraction

Status

Accepted

Context

To extract behavioral signals from the detector model, we must choose which token's hidden state to use from the sequence of hidden states produced during inference. Options:

  • Last token: The hidden state at the final position, which has attended to the entire sequence. Standard for sequence classification (used by BERT pools, GPT-style models naturally aggregate at the last position).
  • Mean pooling: Average hidden states across all positions. Smooths out position-specific effects but dilutes signal from safety-relevant tokens.
  • CLS token: A dedicated classification token (BERT-style). SmolLM2-135M (LLaMA architecture) does not use a CLS token.
  • First token: Has seen only the beginning of the sequence. Misses context from later tokens.
  • Max pooling: Per-dimension maximum across positions. Noisy — a single position with extreme activation can dominate.

Last-token extraction is the standard for autoregressive (GPT/LLaMA-style) models because the last position's hidden state has attended to the full sequence via causal attention. For safety detection, this means the last token's representation contains the model's "conclusion" about the entire input.

Decision

Extract the last token's hidden state at each configured layer. This is standard for LLaMA-family models and provides full-sequence context.

Consequences

Positive:

  • Standard approach for autoregressive models — well-validated
  • Full sequence context via causal attention
  • Single vector per layer — simple to project and score
  • No padding sensitivity (unlike mean pooling with attention masks)

Negative:

  • Position-dependent — the last token's representation is influenced by its position in the sequence, not just its content
  • Very short inputs (12 tokens) may not have enough context for meaningful activation patterns
  • May miss patterns in long inputs where the adversarial payload is in the middle rather than the end

References