fix: resolve review #004 findings W1-W4 + close review gate

W1 (call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring): wire AbortCascade into
CallAdapter handle_stream for EVENT_ABORTED. Cascades with
AbortPolicy::AbortDependents, aborts root, no descendant frames on
wire (ADR-016 Decision 2). Two integration tests added.

W2 (core/endpoint-client-fingerprint): extract TLS client cert
fingerprint in dispatch_quinn (SHA256:<hex> of leaf cert DER via
peer_identity) and dispatch_iroh (ed25519:<hex> of peer NodeId).
Fingerprint format documented in auth.md. Server config change
(with_no_client_auth → request-but-don't-require) deferred to new
follow-up task core/endpoint-request-client-cert.

W3 (vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction): replace Mnemonic derive(Debug)
with manual redacting impl (phrase: "[REDACTED]"). Seed confirmed
no Debug impl. Redaction test added.

W4 (core/auth-apikey-resources): Option B — drop entry.resources from
spec. External identities (token/fingerprint) grant scopes only;
resource-scoped ACLs are composition-internal (ADR-015/022). auth.md
corrected + limitation documented. Two tests confirm empty resources.

review-post-impl-fixes: all 4 verified, workspace green (326 tests,
0 failures, 0 clippy warnings). Review #004 status → resolved.

Graph: 34 tasks, 12 gens.

crates/alknet-call/src/protocol/adapter.rs

@@ -16,10 +16,11 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
 use tracing::{debug, warn};
 
+use super::abort::AbortCascade;
 use super::connection::CallConnection;
 use super::wire::{
     CallError, EventEnvelope, FrameFramedReader, FrameFramedWriter, ResponseEnvelope,
-    EVENT_REQUESTED,
+    EVENT_ABORTED, EVENT_REQUESTED,
 };
 use crate::registry::context::{AbortPolicy, OperationContext, ScopedOperationEnv};
 use crate::registry::env::{CompositeOperationEnv, LocalOperationEnv, OperationEnv};
@@ -207,22 +208,34 @@ impl CallAdapter {
                 }
             };
 
-            if envelope.r#type != EVENT_REQUESTED {
-                debug!(event_type = %envelope.r#type, id = %envelope.id, "ignoring non-requested event on inbound stream");
-                continue;
-            }
+            match envelope.r#type.as_str() {
+                EVENT_REQUESTED => {
+                    let request_id = envelope.id.clone();
+                    let payload = envelope.payload.clone();
 
-            let request_id = envelope.id.clone();
-            let payload = envelope.payload.clone();
+                    let response = self
+                        .dispatch_requested(&connection, request_id.clone(), payload)
+                        .await;
 
-            let response = self
-                .dispatch_requested(&connection, request_id.clone(), payload)
-                .await;
-
-            let event: EventEnvelope = response.into();
-            if let Err(err) = writer.write_frame(&event).await {
-                warn!(error = %err, "failed to write response frame; closing stream");
-                break;
+                    let event: EventEnvelope = response.into();
+                    if let Err(err) = writer.write_frame(&event).await {
+                        warn!(error = %err, "failed to write response frame; closing stream");
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                EVENT_ABORTED => {
+                    let request_id = envelope.id.clone();
+                    let mut pending = connection.pending().lock();
+                    let mut cascade = AbortCascade::new(&mut pending);
+                    let aborted = cascade.cascade_abort(&request_id, AbortPolicy::AbortDependents);
+                    pending.handle_aborted(&request_id);
+                    if !aborted.is_empty() {
+                        debug!(count = aborted.len(), "abort cascade evicted descendants");
+                    }
+                }
+                other => {
+                    debug!(event_type = %other, id = %envelope.id, "ignoring non-requested/non-aborted event on inbound stream");
+                }
             }
         }
     }
@@ -312,6 +325,7 @@ mod tests {
     use std::collections::HashMap;
     use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
     use std::sync::Mutex as StdMutex;
+    use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
     struct StaticIdentityProvider {
         tokens: StdMutex<HashMap<String, Identity>>,
@@ -946,4 +960,92 @@ mod tests {
             other => panic!("expected NOT_FOUND, got {other:?}"),
         }
     }
+
+    fn encode_frame(envelope: &EventEnvelope) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let body = serde_json::to_vec(envelope).unwrap();
+        let mut buf = (body.len() as u32).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&body);
+        buf
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handle_stream_aborted_cascades_parent_and_child() {
+        let registry = registry_with(
+            "parent/run",
+            Visibility::External,
+            AccessControl::default(),
+            echo_handler(),
+        );
+        let provider: Arc<dyn IdentityProvider> = Arc::new(StaticIdentityProvider::new());
+        let adapter = CallAdapter::new(registry, provider);
+        let conn = Arc::new(CallConnection::new(stub_connection()));
+
+        {
+            let mut pending = conn.pending().lock();
+            pending.register_call(
+                "parent-1".to_string(),
+                Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(30),
+                None,
+            );
+            pending.register_call(
+                "child-1".to_string(),
+                Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(30),
+                Some("parent-1".to_string()),
+            );
+        }
+
+        let frame = encode_frame(&EventEnvelope::aborted("parent-1"));
+        let recv = tokio::io::BufReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(frame));
+        let (send, _recv_sink) = tokio::io::duplex(64);
+        let send = alknet_core::types::SendStream::from_mock(send);
+        let recv = alknet_core::types::RecvStream::from_mock(recv);
+
+        adapter.handle_stream(conn.clone(), send, recv).await;
+
+        let pending = conn.pending().lock();
+        assert!(
+            !pending.contains("parent-1"),
+            "parent entry must be removed after abort"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !pending.contains("child-1"),
+            "child entry must be removed by cascade"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn handle_stream_aborted_unknown_request_id_is_noop() {
+        let registry = registry_with(
+            "parent/run",
+            Visibility::External,
+            AccessControl::default(),
+            echo_handler(),
+        );
+        let provider: Arc<dyn IdentityProvider> = Arc::new(StaticIdentityProvider::new());
+        let adapter = CallAdapter::new(registry, provider);
+        let conn = Arc::new(CallConnection::new(stub_connection()));
+
+        {
+            let mut pending = conn.pending().lock();
+            pending.register_call(
+                "unrelated-1".to_string(),
+                Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(30),
+                None,
+            );
+        }
+
+        let frame = encode_frame(&EventEnvelope::aborted("does-not-exist"));
+        let recv = tokio::io::BufReader::new(std::io::Cursor::new(frame));
+        let (send, _recv_sink) = tokio::io::duplex(64);
+        let send = alknet_core::types::SendStream::from_mock(send);
+        let recv = alknet_core::types::RecvStream::from_mock(recv);
+
+        adapter.handle_stream(conn.clone(), send, recv).await;
+
+        let pending = conn.pending().lock();
+        assert!(
+            pending.contains("unrelated-1"),
+            "unrelated entry must survive abort of unknown id"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/alknet-core/src/config.rs

@@ -318,4 +318,52 @@ mod tests {
         let s = format!("{e}");
         assert!(s.starts_with("tls config error:"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_api_key_returns_empty_resources() {
+        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+        let token = "alk_test_secret";
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(token.as_bytes());
+        let hash = format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize()));
+
+        let entry = ApiKeyEntry {
+            prefix: "alk_tes".to_string(),
+            hash,
+            scopes: vec!["admin".to_string()],
+            description: "test key".to_string(),
+            expires_at: None,
+        };
+        let policy = AuthPolicy {
+            authorized_fingerprints: HashSet::new(),
+            api_keys: vec![entry],
+        };
+
+        let identity = policy.resolve_api_key(token);
+        assert!(identity.is_some(), "api key with matching prefix and hash should resolve");
+        let identity = identity.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(identity.id, "alk_tes");
+        assert_eq!(identity.scopes, vec!["admin"]);
+        assert!(
+            identity.resources.is_empty(),
+            "token-resolved identities must have empty resources (Option B — scopes only)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_identity_from_fingerprint_returns_empty_resources() {
+        let policy = AuthPolicy {
+            authorized_fingerprints: HashSet::from(["SHA256:known".to_string()]),
+            api_keys: vec![],
+        };
+
+        let identity = policy
+            .resolve_identity_from_fingerprint("SHA256:known")
+            .expect("known fingerprint should resolve");
+        assert_eq!(identity.id, "SHA256:known");
+        assert!(
+            identity.resources.is_empty(),
+            "fingerprint-resolved identities must have empty resources (Option B — scopes only)"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs

@@ -303,7 +303,8 @@ fn dispatch_quinn(
     };
 
     let remote_addr = Some(connection.remote_address());
-    let auth = build_auth_context(&alpn, remote_addr, None, identity_provider);
+    let fingerprint = extract_quinn_client_fingerprint(&connection);
+    let auth = build_auth_context(&alpn, remote_addr, fingerprint, identity_provider);
     let conn = Connection::from_quinn_with_alpn(connection, alpn.clone());
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         if let Err(e) = handler.handle(conn, &auth).await {
@@ -325,6 +326,25 @@ fn extract_quinn_alpn(connection: &quinn::Connection) -> Vec<u8> {
     Vec::new()
 }
 
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+fn extract_quinn_client_fingerprint(connection: &quinn::Connection) -> Option<String> {
+    let identity = connection.peer_identity()?;
+    let certs = identity
+        .downcast::<Vec<rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer>>()
+        .ok()?;
+    let leaf = certs.first()?;
+    fingerprint_from_cert_der(leaf.as_ref())
+}
+
+#[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
+fn fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
+    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(cert_der);
+    let digest = hasher.finalize();
+    Some(format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(digest)))
+}
+
 #[cfg(feature = "iroh")]
 async fn run_iroh_accept_loop(
     iroh: iroh::Endpoint,
@@ -393,7 +413,8 @@ fn dispatch_iroh(
         }
     };
 
-    let auth = build_auth_context(&alpn, None, None, identity_provider);
+    let fingerprint = extract_iroh_client_fingerprint(&connection);
+    let auth = build_auth_context(&alpn, None, fingerprint, identity_provider);
     let conn = Connection::from_iroh(connection);
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         if let Err(e) = handler.handle(conn, &auth).await {
@@ -402,6 +423,12 @@ fn dispatch_iroh(
     });
 }
 
+#[cfg(feature = "iroh")]
+fn extract_iroh_client_fingerprint(connection: &iroh::endpoint::Connection) -> Option<String> {
+    let node_id = connection.remote_node_id().ok()?;
+    Some(format!("ed25519:{}", node_id))
+}
+
 #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
 fn build_auth_context(
     alpn: &[u8],
@@ -979,4 +1006,40 @@ mod tests {
         let unknown = registry.get(b"alknet/unknown");
         assert!(unknown.is_none(), "unknown ALPN has no handler");
     }
+
+    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_produces_sha256_hex_format() {
+        let cert_der = b"fake-leaf-cert-der-bytes";
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("non-empty cert produces fingerprint");
+        assert!(
+            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
+            "fingerprint must be SHA256-prefixed, got: {fp}"
+        );
+        let hex_part = &fp["SHA256:".len()..];
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex_part.len(),
+            64,
+            "hex digest must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            hex_part.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+            "hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
+        );
+
+        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(cert_der);
+        let expected = format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize()));
+        assert_eq!(fp, expected, "fingerprint must match SHA-256 of cert DER");
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_deterministic() {
+        let cert = b"some-cert";
+        let a = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
+        let b = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(a, b, "same cert DER must produce same fingerprint");
+    }
 }

crates/alknet-vault/src/mnemonic.rs

@@ -32,12 +32,19 @@ impl From<Language> for bip39::Language {
 ///
 /// Wraps the `bip39` crate's `Mnemonic` type and provides seed derivation.
 /// The internal phrase is zeroized on drop.
-#[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct Mnemonic {
     inner: Bip39Mnemonic,
     phrase: String,
 }
 
+impl std::fmt::Debug for Mnemonic {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("Mnemonic")
+            .field("phrase", &"[REDACTED]")
+            .finish()
+    }
+}
+
 impl Mnemonic {
     /// Generate a new random mnemonic with the given word count.
     ///
@@ -163,4 +170,20 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(seed.len(), 64);
         assert!(!seed.is_empty());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_mnemonic_debug_redacts_phrase() {
+        let mnemonic = Mnemonic::generate(24).unwrap();
+        let debug_output = format!("{:?}", mnemonic);
+        assert!(
+            debug_output.contains("[REDACTED]"),
+            "Debug must show [REDACTED] for phrase, got: {debug_output}"
+        );
+        for word in mnemonic.phrase().split_whitespace() {
+            assert!(
+                !debug_output.contains(word),
+                "Debug must not leak phrase word '{word}', got: {debug_output}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }

docs/architecture/crates/core/auth.md

@@ -150,10 +150,41 @@ The "Config" prefix indicates that identities are resolved from configuration (a
 
 How it resolves:
 - **Fingerprint**: Look up in `DynamicConfig::auth::authorized_keys_fingerprints`. If found, return `Identity { id: fingerprint, scopes: ["relay:connect"], resources: {} }`.
-- **Token**: Parse as UTF-8. If it starts with `alk_`, look up in `DynamicConfig::auth::api_keys` by prefix match + SHA-256 hash. If found and not expired, return `Identity { id: prefix, scopes: entry.scopes, resources: entry.resources }`.
+- **Token**: Parse as UTF-8. If it starts with `alk_`, look up in `DynamicConfig::auth::api_keys` by prefix match + SHA-256 hash. If found and not expired, return `Identity { id: prefix, scopes: entry.scopes, resources: {} }`.
+
+> **Resource-scoped ACLs and external identities.** `Identity.resources` is
+> populated only by the composition path (`CompositionAuthority::as_identity`,
+> ADR-015/022) — never by token or fingerprint resolvers. API keys and
+> fingerprints grant **scopes only**; resource-scoped access is an
+> internal-composition concern. An `OperationSpec` that declares
+> `resource_type`/`resource_action` will return `FORBIDDEN` when the caller
+> authenticated via token or fingerprint, because `Identity.resources` is
+> empty. This is a documented limitation, not a bug: if a future crate needs
+> per-key resource binding, it must earn a dedicated ADR that adds a
+> `resources` field to `ApiKeyEntry` and the fingerprint config path, rather
+> than silently widening the external-auth contract.
 
 Changes to `DynamicConfig` via `ConfigReloadHandle` are reflected immediately — `ConfigIdentityProvider` reads from `ArcSwap` on every call.
 
+### Fingerprint string format
+
+`tls_client_fingerprint` and `authorized_fingerprints` use a prefixed-hex
+format. The prefix identifies the key type; the body is the hex-encoded
+hash or raw key bytes. `AuthPolicy::resolve_identity_from_fingerprint`
+does a literal `HashSet::contains()` — no normalization — so the extractor
+and the operator config must use the same format.
+
+| Transport | Source | Format |
+|-----------|--------|--------|
+| quinn (X.509) | leaf client cert DER | `SHA256:<hex of SHA-256(cert_der)>` |
+| iroh (raw Ed25519) | peer `NodeId` | `ed25519:<lowercase hex of 32-byte pub key>` |
+
+When no client cert is presented (the current default — server uses
+`with_no_client_auth()`), the fingerprint is `None` and identity remains
+unresolved at the endpoint layer. A follow-up task will switch the server
+config to request-but-not-require client certs so fingerprints flow for
+peers that present them.
+
 ## Resolution Flow
 
 ### Endpoint-level (before `handle()`)

docs/reviews/004-post-implementation-sanity-check.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
-status: open
-last_updated: 2026-06-23
+status: resolved
+last_updated: 2026-06-24
 reviewed_artifacts:
   - crates/alknet-vault/src/{lib,cache,derivation,encryption,ethereum,mnemonic,protocol,service}.rs
   - crates/alknet-core/src/{lib,auth,config,endpoint,types}.rs
@@ -566,4 +566,44 @@ flagged them as high-risk, and the implementation got them right:
 Review #004 is open. Zero critical findings; four warnings, all local; five
 suggestions. The implementation is sound, the spec drift is bounded, and the
 one wiring gap (W1) has all the hard logic already written and tested — it
-just needs to be called.
+just needs to be called.
+
+---
+
+## Resolution (2026-06-24)
+
+All four warnings (W1–W4) resolved. Workspace green:
+`cargo build --workspace --all-features`, `cargo test --workspace
+--all-features` (326 tests, 0 failures), `cargo clippy --workspace
+--all-features --all-targets` (0 warnings).
+
+- **W1 (abort cascade wiring)**: `CallAdapter::handle_stream` now
+  matches `EVENT_ABORTED`, invokes `AbortCascade::cascade_abort` with
+  `AbortPolicy::AbortDependents`, and aborts the root. No descendant
+  `call.aborted` frames sent on the wire (ADR-016 Decision 2). Two
+  integration tests cover the cascade + unknown-id no-op paths.
+  (`tasks/call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring.md` → completed)
+
+- **W2 (fingerprint extraction)**: `dispatch_quinn` extracts the leaf
+  client cert DER via `peer_identity()` → `SHA256:<hex>`; `dispatch_iroh`
+  extracts the peer `NodeId` → `ed25519:<hex>`. Fingerprint format
+  documented in `auth.md`. Server config still uses
+  `with_no_client_auth()` — extraction is a safe no-op until the
+  follow-up task `core/endpoint-request-client-cert` switches to
+  request-but-don't-require. Two unit tests cover fingerprint format +
+  determinism.
+  (`tasks/core/endpoint-client-fingerprint.md` → completed)
+
+- **W3 (Mnemonic Debug redaction)**: `#[derive(Debug)]` replaced with
+  manual redacting impl matching the `DerivedKey` pattern. `Seed`
+  confirmed to have no `Debug` impl. Test asserts no phrase word leaks.
+  (`tasks/vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction.md` → completed)
+
+- **W4 (ApiKeyEntry resources)**: Option B chosen — spec corrected to
+  drop `entry.resources`; `auth.md` now documents that external
+  identities (token/fingerprint) grant scopes only, resource-scoped
+  ACLs are a composition-internal concern (ADR-015/022). Two tests
+  confirm both resolvers return empty resources.
+  (`tasks/core/auth-apikey-resources.md` → completed)
+
+S1–S5 (suggestions) remain opportunistic; not gated by this review.

tasks/call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring
 name: Wire AbortCascade into CallAdapter inbound event path (ADR-016)
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: [call/protocol/abort-cascade]
 scope: narrow
 risk: medium
@@ -127,4 +127,14 @@ frame actually reaches `cascade_abort`.
 > criteria likewise omitted "inbound `call.aborted` triggers cascade."
 > This task closes that integration gap — all the hard logic already
 > exists and is tested; this task adds the ~30-line bolt and the one
-> integration test that would have caught the gap.
+> integration test that would have caught the gap.
+
+## Summary
+
+`handle_stream` now matches `EVENT_ABORTED` → invokes
+`AbortCascade::cascade_abort` with `AbortPolicy::AbortDependents`, then
+aborts the root. Non-requested/non-aborted events still log at `debug!`.
+No descendant `call.aborted` frames sent on the wire. Two integration
+tests: cascade removes parent + child from `PendingRequestMap`; unknown
+request_id is a no-op. `cargo test -p alknet-call` (161 tests) and
+clippy clean.

tasks/core/auth-apikey-resources.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: core/auth-apikey-resources
 name: Reconcile ApiKeyEntry.resources — add field to type and populate in resolve_api_key, or drop from spec
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: []
 scope: narrow
 risk: low
@@ -114,4 +114,17 @@ applied to handler-internal composition identities
 > decision first, then implement. If the decision is A and the
 > implementation is more than ~30 lines, split a follow-up
 > `level: implementation` task (`core/auth-apikey-resources-impl`)
-> depending on this one.
+> depending on this one.
+
+## Summary
+
+Decision: **Option B** — dropped `entry.resources` from the spec.
+Rationale: `Identity.resources` is populated only by
+`CompositionAuthority::as_identity` (the composition path, ADR-015/022).
+All architecture examples use scope-based ACLs for external identities
+(`fs:read`, `vastai:query`, `llm:call`). Adding a second
+resource-population path for API keys would muddy the external/internal
+separation without a demonstrated downstream need. `auth.md:153`
+corrected to `resources: {}`; documented limitation added. Two tests
+confirm both `resolve_api_key` and `resolve_identity_from_fingerprint`
+return empty resources. `cargo test -p alknet-core` and clippy clean.

tasks/core/endpoint-client-fingerprint.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: core/endpoint-client-fingerprint
 name: Extract TLS client certificate fingerprint in endpoint dispatch (ADR-004)
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: []
 scope: narrow
 risk: medium
@@ -115,4 +115,17 @@ in the codebase before committing.
 > client certs. The extraction code is correct either way — it returns
 > `None` when no cert was presented, which is the current behavior, so
 > landing extraction first is a safe no-op until the server config
-> changes.
+> changes.
+
+## Summary
+
+Added `extract_quinn_client_fingerprint` (leaf cert DER → `SHA256:<hex>`
+via `peer_identity()` downcast) and `extract_iroh_client_fingerprint`
+(peer `NodeId` → `ed25519:<hex>`). Both dispatch functions now pass the
+extracted fingerprint to `build_auth_context`. Fingerprint format
+documented in `auth.md` (table: quinn X.509 vs iroh raw Ed25519).
+Server config still uses `with_no_client_auth()` — extraction is a safe
+no-op. Follow-up task `core/endpoint-request-client-cert` created for the
+server config change. Two unit tests cover fingerprint format +
+determinism. `cargo test -p alknet-core --all-features` (59 tests) and
+clippy clean.

tasks/core/endpoint-request-client-cert.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+id: core/endpoint-request-client-cert
+name: Switch rustls ServerConfig from with_no_client_auth to request-but-don't-require client certs
+status: pending
+depends_on: [core/endpoint-client-fingerprint]
+scope: narrow
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`core/endpoint-client-fingerprint` landed the extraction logic: when a
+client certificate *is* presented, `dispatch_quinn` / `dispatch_iroh`
+extract the fingerprint and populate `AuthContext`. However, the server
+still builds `rustls::ServerConfig` with `with_no_client_auth()` in all
+three `TlsIdentity` branches (`endpoint.rs:477`, `490`, `501`), so the
+server never *requests* a client cert. Extraction is a safe no-op until
+this task changes the server-side TLS config.
+
+This follow-up switches from `with_no_client_auth()` to a
+request-but-don't-require mode so that peers presenting a client cert
+(X.509 or RFC 7250 raw Ed25519 key) flow through the extraction path
+landed in the predecessor task, while peers without a cert still connect
+without regression.
+
+### Design decision: how to request-but-not-require
+
+rustls does not have a direct `with_optional_client_auth()` builder.
+The standard approach is:
+
+1. Build the config with `.with_client_auth(verifier)` where `verifier`
+   is a custom `ServerCertVerifier` that accepts any presentation (returns
+   `Ok(Certified::yes())` when a cert is presented, `Ok(Certified::no())`
+   when none is presented — rustls 0.23's `WebPkiServerVerifier` cannot
+   be used directly for optional auth).
+2. Alternatively, use `rustls::server::WebPkiServerVerifier` with a
+   `NoClientAuth` fallback — check the exact rustls API available in the
+   pinned version before implementing.
+
+Read the rustls API docs for the pinned version
+(`rustls::server::ServerConfig::builder_with_provider`) and confirm the
+correct verifier construction. The key property: a peer *may* present a
+cert, and if it does, `peer_identity()` returns it; if it doesn't, the
+connection still succeeds.
+
+### iroh path
+
+iroh's `Endpoint` builder uses its own TLS session internally. For the
+raw-key path (`TlsIdentity::RawKey`), iroh already advertises
+`only_raw_public_keys()` via `RawKeyCertResolver` — the server-side half
+of RFC 7250. The client-side presentation is set by the client's
+`rustls::ClientConfig`, not the server. So the iroh path may already
+receive peer identities when the client is an iroh node (the `NodeId` is
+always in the TLS cert). Verify: does `Connection::remote_node_id()`
+already work for iroh connections today, or does it require the server to
+request client certs? If iroh always presents a cert (raw-key mode), no
+server-side change is needed for the iroh path — only quinn/X.509 needs
+this task. Confirm before implementing.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `build_rustls_server_config` uses request-but-don't-require client auth (not `with_no_client_auth()`) for at least the X.509 path
+- [ ] Peer presenting a client cert: `peer_identity()` returns the cert chain → fingerprint extraction works end-to-end
+- [ ] Peer without a client cert: connection still succeeds, `tls_client_fingerprint` is `None` (no regression)
+- [ ] iroh path: confirm whether a server-side change is needed; if yes, apply it; if no, document why
+- [ ] Integration test: quinn endpoint with a client that presents a cert → `AuthContext.tls_client_fingerprint` is `Some(SHA256:...)`
+- [ ] Integration test: quinn endpoint with a client that presents no cert → `AuthContext.tls_client_fingerprint` is `None` and connection succeeds
+- [ ] `cargo test -p alknet-core --all-features` succeeds
+- [ ] `cargo clippy -p alknet-core --all-features --all-targets` succeeds with no warnings
+- [ ] `auth.md` updated: server-config decision documented (request-but-don't-require, not no-client-auth)
+
+## References
+
+- tasks/core/endpoint-client-fingerprint.md — predecessor task (landed extraction, deferred this config change)
+- crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs:477, 490, 501 — the three `with_no_client_auth()` sites
+- crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs — `extract_quinn_client_fingerprint` / `extract_iroh_client_fingerprint` (already landed, waiting for certs to flow)
+- docs/architecture/crates/core/auth.md — fingerprint format table and endpoint-level resolution flow
+- docs/architecture/decisions/004-auth-as-shared-core.md — ADR-004 (hybrid resolution)
+- docs/architecture/open-questions.md — OQ-12 (TLS identity provisioning)
+
+## Notes
+
+> Split from `core/endpoint-client-fingerprint` per the task's own
+> suggestion: extraction is correct either way (returns `None` when no
+> cert), so landing it first is a safe no-op. This task is the
+> behavioral change that makes fingerprints actually flow. The risk is
+> medium because it alters the TLS handshake for every connection —
+> ensure the no-cert-peer case has explicit test coverage.

tasks/review-post-impl-fixes.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: review-post-impl-fixes
 name: Review the four post-implementation sanity-check #004 fixes for spec conformance
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: [call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring, core/endpoint-client-fingerprint, vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction, core/auth-apikey-resources]
 scope: moderate
 risk: low
@@ -93,4 +93,23 @@ check.md`, does not introduce new spec drift, and is adequately tested.
 > at the end of a fix batch, with `scope: moderate`, `risk: low`,
 > `impact: phase`. It does not need to re-derive the findings — review
 > #004 already did that work. It only needs to confirm the fixes land
-> correctly and the workspace stays green.
+> correctly and the workspace stays green.
+
+## Summary
+
+All four fixes verified against acceptance criteria:
+- W1: `handle_stream` handles `EVENT_ABORTED`, cascades with
+  `AbortDependents`, no descendant frames on wire, root removed, two
+  integration tests pass.
+- W2: both dispatch paths extract fingerprints, format documented in
+  `auth.md`, no-cert case returns `None` (no regression), server-config
+  change deferred to `core/endpoint-request-client-cert`.
+- W3: `Mnemonic` has manual redacting `Debug`, `Seed` has no `Debug`,
+  redaction test passes.
+- W4: Option B — spec corrected, limitation documented, both resolvers
+  return empty resources, tests pass.
+
+Workspace green: `cargo build --workspace --all-features` ✓, `cargo test
+--workspace --all-features` (326 tests, 0 failures) ✓, `cargo clippy
+--workspace --all-features --all-targets` (0 warnings) ✓. Review #004
+status updated to `resolved`.

tasks/vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction
 name: Replace Mnemonic derive(Debug) with redacting impl to prevent seed phrase leak
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: []
 scope: single
 risk: low
@@ -107,4 +107,12 @@ fn test_mnemonic_debug_redacts_phrase() {
 
 > Small fix, but eliminates a latent root-of-trust leak. The same
 > pattern (custom redacting `Debug`) is already established in three
-> other places in this codebase — this task brings `Mnemonic` in line.
+> other places in this codebase — this task brings `Mnemonic` in line.
+
+## Summary
+
+Replaced `#[derive(Debug)]` on `Mnemonic` with a manual redacting impl
+(`phrase: "[REDACTED]"`). Added `test_mnemonic_debug_redacts_phrase`
+asserting no phrase word appears in `format!("{:?}", mnemonic)`.
+Confirmed `Seed` has no `Debug` impl (derives only `Clone, Zeroize`).
+`cargo test -p alknet-vault` and clippy clean.