Drops irpc from alknet-vault entirely. The vault's dispatch is now direct
method calls on VaultServiceHandle — no VaultProtocol enum, no
VaultMessage, no VaultServiceActor, no mpsc channel, no Service trait, no
RemoteService trait, no postcard serialization. The vault is local-only by
construction.
The core security argument: irpc made the vault remote-capable by default
(RemoteService generated unless no_rpc is passed). The IrohProtocol handler
forwards all messages without auth. The docs framed 'register an ALPN' as a
server-setup change. This is the default-insecure anti-pattern — security
should be opt-in, not opt-out. ADR-025 inverts the default: local-only is
the only mode, and remote access requires building a separate vault-server
crate (a visible architectural act, not a flag flip).
The actor path was already dead code — service.md said 'prefer
VaultServiceHandle directly — no channel, no serialization.' The actor
existed only to make irpc's Service trait work, which existed only to make
RemoteService work, which was the footgun. VaultServiceHandle's
Arc<RwLock> provides concurrent reads and exclusive writes — better
throughput than the actor's sequential processing.
DerivedKey serialization simplifies: always redact on serialize (for
logging safety), reject '[REDACTED]' on deserialize with an error. No
'postcard preserves bytes' path. This resolves review #002 W8 (silent
corruption on JSON-deserialized DerivedKey).
Resolves:
- OQ-21: remote vault access — resolved (not deferred). Not a vault crate
feature; if needed, a separate vault-server crate with its own ADR.
- C7: vault-server-crate question decided — not created now, not precluded.
- C8: operation access policy table dissolved — all operations local-only
by default; if a vault-server crate exposes some remotely, that crate
defines the policy.
- W8: DerivedKey JSON deserialization — resolved (reject redacted payloads).
Amends ADR-005 (irpc remains for alknet-call, not for alknet-vault),
ADR-018 (vault is even more standalone — zero RPC framework deps),
ADR-019 (vault is the only layer, not just the only direct-caller layer),
ADR-008 (vault integration point unchanged, but now local-only by
construction).
Resolve the contradiction between ADR-008's "capability source" model
and operation-registry.md showing vault operations on the wire. ADR-014
establishes: vault is assembly-layer only, capabilities carry outbound
credentials (distinct from inbound identity), call protocol carries no
secret material, adapters take credential sources not static tokens.
- Add ADR-014 (Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection)
- Remove vault/derive, vault/unlock, vault/decrypt from call protocol
registration examples and all spec examples
- Add Capabilities field to OperationContext, propagate through
LocalOperationEnv nested calls
- Add Capability Injection section to operation-registry.md
- Add no-secret-material wire constraint to call-protocol.md
- Add streaming subscribe example (LLM chat with Vercel UI chunks)
- Add Security Model section to overview.md (identity vs capabilities)
- Trim WASM treatment from ~20 lines to a design-constraint note
- Add OQ-16 (resolved: no vault ops on wire), update OQ-08, OQ-15
- Update ADR-003, ADR-008, ADR-013 to remove stale "via call protocol"
vault references
Rename the crate from alknet-secret to alknet-vault to better reflect its
purpose as a local key vault (seed management, key derivation, encryption)
rather than a network service.
Symbol renames:
- SecretService → VaultService
- SecretServiceHandle → VaultServiceHandle
- SecretServiceActor → VaultServiceActor
- SecretServiceError → VaultServiceError
- SecretProtocol → VaultProtocol
- SecretMessage → VaultMessage
- ServiceLocked → VaultLocked
- alknet_secret → alknet_vault (crate name)
Update ADR-008 with vault access pattern: the vault is a capability source,
not a service endpoint. The CLI injects derived/decrypted material into
operation contexts — handlers never hold vault references.
