Land the storage and auth strategy research (findings.md) as four
accepted ADRs and amend the core and call specs to match:
- ADR-030: PeerEntry and Identity.id decoupling. Replaces
authorized_fingerprints with peers: Vec<PeerEntry>; Identity.id becomes
the stable peer_id, decoupled from the rotating fingerprint. Supersedes
ADR-029 Assumption 1's UUID source (one-way door preserved, source
changes). Resolves OQ-33 and the storage-boundary half of OQ-34. Records
the API-key asymmetry as deliberate (OQ-35).
- ADR-031: CredentialStore repo trait + InMemoryCredentialStore default
adapter in core. Second repo trait alongside IdentityProvider. Vault
encrypts; the store persists the EncryptedData blob; assembly layer
loads into Capabilities. EncryptedData core mirror includes salt for
wire-format compat.
- ADR-032: Forwarded-for identity. forwarded_for field on call.requested
and OperationContext — metadata only, never read by AccessControl::check
(enforced structurally via the check signature). The from_call handler
populates it. Wire-format one-way door, folded into the ADR-029
migration window.
- ADR-033: Storage boundary and repo/adapter pattern. Core defines repo
traits + in-memory defaults; persistence adapters are separate crates;
assembly layer wires. Resolves OQ-34. Concrete adapter shapes deferred
for exploration (OQ-36).
Amends auth.md, config.md, operation-registry.md, client-and-adapters.md,
open-questions.md, README.md, crates/core/README.md. Marks ADR-029
Accepted (Assumption 1 carries the ADR-030 superseded note). Marks the
research findings doc reviewed.
OQ-26 (resolved): AdapterError variants decided — DiscoveryFailed,
SchemaParse, Transport, Unauthorized, SamePeerCollision (replaces flat
Conflict per ADR-029 §5). #[non_exhaustive] for downstream extension.
Two-way door; the initial set is the code's return type.
OQ-33 (resolved): PeerId is a logical identifier, NOT Identity.id. The
research's v1 default (PeerId = fingerprint) is overridden: coupling PeerId
to crypto material breaks every in-flight PeerRef::Specific and every ACL
entry on key rotation. v1 source is a connection-assigned UUID — a
no-storage workaround that works for the immediate use case (head→workers,
reconnect produces fresh PeerRef, in-flight gets NOT_FOUND which is correct).
The one-way door: PeerId is logical, not crypto — this determines
PeerCompositeEnv key type and PeerRef::Specific payload. The id source
(UUID vs configured name vs peer registry) is the two-way-door remainder.
OQ-34 (new): the storage dimension OQ-33 surfaced. The core crates are
deliberately DB-free (smaller, fewer deps, simpler testing) — this served
local-only state (vault, registry) well, but peer identity is the first
cross-node state that wants persistence. The real solution (a persistent
peer registry mapping stable logical name → current crypto material,
surviving key rotation) is not a v1 blocker (UUID works), but tracked so the
no-DB posture's limit is deliberate, not accidental. The storage boundary
(core gets a PeerRegistry trait vs stays storage-free) is the one-way door;
the backend choice is two-way. Key-rotation/ACL note: decoupling PeerId from
crypto keeps the door open for ACL entries that persist across key rotation
— when the peer registry is built, ACLs key on the logical name and key
rotation becomes vault-only with no remote-side ACL update.
ADR-028's remote_safe/trusted_peer was a parallel, weaker authorization system
that duplicated the existing AccessControl/Identity machinery and couldn't
express the head→N-workers pattern (the primary use case). The flat-namespace
single-peer overlay model (one connection layer in CompositeOperationEnv)
structurally breaks the moment a head has two workers both exposing
/container/exec.
ADR-029 replaces it with:
- Peer-keyed overlays: PeerCompositeEnv { connections: HashMap<PeerId, ...> }
replaces CompositeOperationEnv's singular connection layer. A head node
routes invoke_peer() to the right peer via PeerRef::Specific / PeerRef::Any.
- AccessControl-based peer authorization: the existing AccessControl::check
(peer_identity) gates peer calls — the same mechanism that gates every other
call. remote_safe/trusted_peer/RemoteFilter/list_operations_peer_scoped/
services_list_handler_peer_scoped are retired. The op's AccessControl IS the
peer-authorization policy; no parallel system.
- ScopedPeerEnv: peer-qualified reachability (peer-pinned allowlist) replaces
from_call's namespace_prefix as the disambiguation mechanism. Cross-peer
collision dissolves (separate sub-overlays); same-peer collision stays error.
- services/list-peers opt-in for peer-attributed re-export listing.
POC-validated against real types (scratch module written, type-checked,
removed; build clean, 207 tests pass). Petgraph not needed for v1 (one-hop,
shallow); nested HashMap suffices; extends to multi-hop without redesign (OQ-32).
OQ impact: OQ-25 dissolved (no marking); OQ-28 cross-peer dissolved / same-peer
stays; OQ-26/27/29 stay; new OQ-30 (Any routing policy), OQ-31 (list-peers
semantics), OQ-32 (multi-hop federation).
Research: docs/research/alknet-call-peer-routing/findings.md (POC shapes,
prior art — Ray.io actors, Dapr service invocation, full ADR draft).
ADR-028 marked Superseded; ADR-017 DC-1 amendment updated to point at ADR-029.
