The #2 gap in alknet-call: discovers the remote peer's External operations
via services/list + services/schema and registers them in the connection's
Layer 2 overlay as FromCall-provenance leaves with forwarding handlers. The
discovery mechanism was already implemented in registry/discovery.rs;
from_call is the client-side consumer of that API.
src/client/from_call.rs:
- from_call(connection, FromCallConfig) -> Result<Vec<HandlerRegistration>,
AdapterError>. Calls services/list then services/schema for each op,
rebuilds OperationSpec from the schema JSON (parsing op_type, visibility,
error_schemas, access_control), constructs a forwarding handler that calls
the remote op via CallConnection::call(), and returns FromCall-provenance
bundles (composition_authority: None, scoped_env: None, empty capabilities,
remote_safe: false per ADR-028 §4).
- FromCallConfig { namespace_prefix: Option<String>, operation_filter:
Option<HashSet<String>> } with builder methods.
- v1 defaults (two-way doors recorded in client-and-adapters.md):
- error-on-collision (DC-3/OQ-28): applying the (possibly empty) prefix
produces a name already seen -> AdapterError::Conflict, not silent
overwrite.
- auto-on-reconnect (DC-2/OQ-27): the overlay is per-connection (Layer 2,
ADR-024), so re-import on reconnect is naturally scoped; the assembly
layer calls from_call immediately after connect().
- Forwarding handler captures an Arc<CallConnection> and, on invocation,
calls the remote op and returns its ResponseEnvelope. The
parent_request_id participates in the cross-node abort cascade
(ADR-016 §6) — if the parent is aborted, the cascade reaches this handler
which sends call.aborted to the remote node; cross-node abort is
transparent.
- Trust is transitive (recorded in spec): a from_call-imported op executes
the remote node's code; scoped_env bounds which ops are reachable, not
what they do.
OperationContext.internal is now pub (was pub(crate)) so downstream
consumers (assembly layer, integration tests) can construct contexts for
overlay-env dispatch.
Tests (207 lib + 2 integration):
- Unit: rebuild_spec name/prefix/op_type/visibility/error_schemas/acl;
unknown op_type -> SchemaParse; missing op_type -> SchemaParse;
FromCallConfig builder; from_call against a mock connection returns
DiscoveryFailed (no transport); FromCall provenance + leaf fields + remote_safe false.
- Integration (tests/two_node_call.rs): from_call over a real QUIC loopback
— CallClient connects, from_call discovers server/echo, registers the
bundle in the overlay, and the forwarding handler round-trips an input
through the overlay env to the remote op and back.
clippy + fmt + test all green.
Refs: tasks/call/client/from-call.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/017-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md §3, §6
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md §from_call
The #1 gap in alknet-call: the outbound connection opener. Every downstream
consumer (runner, container service, bilateral exchange, NAPI, agent
cross-node dispatch) is blocked on it.
Shared dispatch loop (ADR-017 §1 — the architectural commitment that keeps
CallClient from becoming a parallel protocol implementation):
- Extracts the accept-path dispatch (sweeper, accept_bi loop, handle_stream,
dispatch_requested, build_root_context, compose_root_env, fail_all on
close) out of CallAdapter into a new protocol/dispatch.rs Dispatcher struct.
Both CallAdapter::handle and CallClient::connect produce a CallConnection
and hand it to Dispatcher::run_loop — the loop is genuinely shared
(refactored, not duplicated).
- CallAdapter keeps its public API and test-facing wrappers (pub(crate),
#[cfg(test)]-gated) that delegate to the Dispatcher.
Peer-scoped default-deny (ADR-028 — the one-way-door security dimension):
- RemoteFilter { trusted_peer: bool } on the Dispatcher. In default-deny
mode (CallClient::new), an incoming call to an op with remote_safe: false
returns NOT_FOUND *before* any capability material reaches the handler —
a remote peer's call must not populate OperationContext.capabilities from
the local registration bundle unless the op is explicitly remote-safe
(ADR-028 Context). Trusted-peer mode (CallClient::trusted_peer, explicit
opt-in) bypasses the filter.
- The accept path (CallAdapter) uses RemoteFilter::trusted() by convention: a
direct QUIC client is not a filtered CallClient peer in the ADR-028 sense.
- OperationRegistry::list_operations_peer_scoped(trusted_peer) +
services_list_handler_peer_scoped for the CallClient's services/list
serving path (ADR-028 Assumption 2: a peer should not see ops it cannot
call, so discovery and dispatch filters agree).
CallClient (src/client/call_client.rs):
- CallClient { registry, identity_provider, trusted_peer: bool }.
- new() default-deny; trusted_peer() explicit opt-in (ADR-028 §3).
- connect(addr, CallCredentials) dials QUIC on ALPN alknet/call (quinn
feature), spawns Dispatcher::run_loop, returns a live CallConnection.
- spawn_dispatch(connection) shared path for connect + tests.
- CallCredentials { tls_identity, auth_token, remote_identity } — all from
Capabilities (ADR-014), never env vars (no-env-vars invariant). v1
connects without client-auth TLS identity (server uses
AcceptAnyCertVerifier); RawKey client-auth is a two-way-door remainder.
- RemoteIdentity { fingerprint } — concrete shape is a two-way door (OQ-25
remainder); the one-way constraint is it comes from Capabilities.
- ClientError { Transport, TlsSetup, ConnectionClosed }.
- CallConnection is now Clone (shares the inner Arcs) so connect can hand
the caller a live clone while the dispatcher task keeps its clone.
Tests (199 lib + 1 integration):
- Unit: default-deny NOT_FOUND for non-remote-safe; remote_safe dispatches;
trusted-peer dispatches all External; default-deny does NOT populate
capabilities (the load-bearing security assertion — verified by a handler
that inspects context.capabilities and the fact that the handler is never
reached for non-remote-safe ops); remote_safe op populates capabilities;
services/list peer-scoped hide/trusted variants; CallClient constructors;
CallCredentials builder; Send+Sync.
- Integration (tests/two_node_call.rs): real QUIC loopback — CallAdapter
server (self-signed cert via rcgen) accepts, CallClient connects,
client.call() round-trips to server/echo. Proves the connect path +
shared dispatch loop work end-to-end.
clippy + fmt + test all green.
Refs: tasks/call/client/call-client.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/017-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md §1, §2, §7
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/028-callclient-peer-scoped-registry-filtering.md
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md
Adds the v1 data shape for peer-scoped default-deny registry filtering,
the one-way-door piece of the call-completion batch (ADR-028):
- HandlerRegistration gains pub remote_safe: bool, defaulting false across
all provenance (Local, Session, FromOpenAPI, FromMCP, FromCall,
FromJsonSchema) per ADR-028 §4. HandlerRegistration::new() keeps its
existing 6-arg signature (defaults remote_safe: false), so all current
call sites compile unchanged.
- Chainable HandlerRegistration::remote_safe(bool) setter + a
OperationRegistryBuilder::remote_safe() helper that marks the
most-recently-registered op (tracked via last_name, not HashMap
iteration order which is unspecified).
- Field is data-only here — the filtering behavior (dispatch path +
services/list hide) is wired in call/client/call-client, not this task.
services/list is unchanged.
- Tests: default false, setter flips field, all six provenance variants
default false, builder setter marks last op, existing call sites
unchanged. 178 tests pass, clippy clean.
Refs: tasks/call/registry/remote-safe-marking.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/028-callclient-peer-scoped-registry-filtering.md
Resolves the four gap-analysis decisions (DC-1..4) blocking the alknet-call
client/adapter surface specced in ADR-017:
- ADR-028 (new): locks the one-way door for DC-1 — CallClient registry is
default-deny (remote_safe: bool on HandlerRegistration, default false across
all provenance); share-global is an explicit trusted-peer opt-in; filtering
is a dispatch-time read over the single Layer-0 registry, not a copy.
- client-and-adapters.md (new spec): operationally fills the gap ADR-017 left
to implementation — CallClient, from_call, from_jsonschema, OperationAdapter
trait, adapter location map, no-env-vars invariant, exchange-of-operations
pattern. Keeps call-protocol.md and operation-registry.md under the
700-line split threshold.
- ADR-017 amended: records DC-2/3/4 v1 defaults (auto-on-reconnect,
error-on-collision, Result error type) and points DC-1 at ADR-028.
- OQ-25..28 (new): two-way-door remainders (remote_safe shape, AdapterError
variants, re-import trigger, namespace collision) with v1 defaults recorded.
- Index/cross-ref updates across READMEs and the two existing call specs.
Tasks: 6 task files under tasks/call/ decomposing the completion work along
the gap-analysis priority order — remote-safe-marking (one-way door, first)
→ call-client (phase-risk) → from-call → operation-adapter-trait →
from-jsonschema (parallel with call-client) → review-completion. Graph
validated with taskgraph; parallelism designed in (from-jsonschema runs
concurrent with call-client/from-call once the trait lands).
Three tasks implementing ADR-027:
1. core/rawkey-decouple-from-iroh: TlsIdentity::RawKey now uses
Ed25519SecretKey (alknet-core-owned wrapper over ed25519_dalek)
instead of iroh::SecretKey. RawKeyCertResolver and Ed25519SigningKey
un-gated from #[cfg(all(quinn, iroh))] to #[cfg(quinn)] only.
Quinn-only builds (default) now support RFC 7250 raw-key identity.
iroh transport converts via iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes.
2. core/endpoint-request-client-cert: replaced with_no_client_auth()
with AcceptAnyCertVerifier — a custom ClientCertVerifier that
requests client certs but doesn't require them or verify against
a CA. alknet's identity model is fingerprint-based (the
authorized_fingerprints set is the trust anchor), not PKI-based.
Peer certs are extracted at the TLS layer for fingerprinting;
peers without certs connect normally.
3. core/acme-integration: TlsIdentity::Acme variant (domains,
cache_dir, directory, contact) + AcmeDirectory enum. TlsSetup
two-phase construction: synchronous for X509/RawKey/SelfSigned,
async for Acme (spawns AcmeState event loop, builds ServerConfig
with ResolvesServerCertAcme). acme-tls/1 ALPN added when ACME is
active; dispatch_quinn guard closes challenge connections
gracefully (challenge is TLS-layer-handled). acme feature gate
keeps rustls-acme out of non-ACME builds.
Workspace: build/test/clippy green across all 3 feature configs
(quinn-only, quinn+iroh, quinn+acme, all-features). 331 tests, 0
failures, 0 warnings.
ADR-027 resolves the architectural gap surfaced when ACME integration
became a concrete target:
1. TlsIdentity::Acme variant — static config data (domains, cache_dir,
directory, contact) with async AcmeState constructed at endpoint
setup via two-phase TlsSetup (not stuffed into the Clone-able enum).
2. TlsIdentity::RawKey decoupled from the iroh feature — uses
Ed25519SecretKey (alknet-core-owned wrapper over ed25519_dalek)
instead of iroh::SecretKey. Raw-key TLS identity (RFC 7250, the
default for most alknet nodes) now works in quinn-only builds.
iroh transport converts via SecretKey::from_bytes.
3. ACME feature-gated behind new acme feature (rustls-acme optional
dep). Non-ACME builds don't compile it.
4. dispatch_quinn guard for acme-tls/1 challenge connections — TLS-ALPN-01
is handled at the rustls cert resolver layer during the handshake;
the guard closes challenge connections gracefully instead of logging
a misleading "no handler" warning.
Research confirmed QUIC (quinn) handles ACME challenges differently than
TCP (reverse-proxy): quinn gives no ClientHello peek hook, but the
challenge is fully answered at the cert resolution step before the
connection surfaces to the application. No handler registration needed.
Spec updates: config.md, endpoint.md, open-questions.md (OQ-12),
overview.md + README.md (ADR index), ADR-010 (cross-ref).
Tasks: core/rawkey-decouple-from-iroh (gen 1, no deps),
core/acme-integration (gen 2, depends on rawkey). Graph: 36 tasks.
W1 (call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring): wire AbortCascade into
CallAdapter handle_stream for EVENT_ABORTED. Cascades with
AbortPolicy::AbortDependents, aborts root, no descendant frames on
wire (ADR-016 Decision 2). Two integration tests added.
W2 (core/endpoint-client-fingerprint): extract TLS client cert
fingerprint in dispatch_quinn (SHA256:<hex> of leaf cert DER via
peer_identity) and dispatch_iroh (ed25519:<hex> of peer NodeId).
Fingerprint format documented in auth.md. Server config change
(with_no_client_auth → request-but-don't-require) deferred to new
follow-up task core/endpoint-request-client-cert.
W3 (vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction): replace Mnemonic derive(Debug)
with manual redacting impl (phrase: "[REDACTED]"). Seed confirmed
no Debug impl. Redaction test added.
W4 (core/auth-apikey-resources): Option B — drop entry.resources from
spec. External identities (token/fingerprint) grant scopes only;
resource-scoped ACLs are composition-internal (ADR-015/022). auth.md
corrected + limitation documented. Two tests confirm empty resources.
review-post-impl-fixes: all 4 verified, workspace green (326 tests,
0 failures, 0 clippy warnings). Review #004 status → resolved.
Graph: 34 tasks, 12 gens.
W1 (call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring): wire AbortCascade into CallAdapter
handle_stream for EVENT_ABORTED. W2 (core/endpoint-client-fingerprint):
extract TLS client cert fingerprint in dispatch_quinn/dispatch_iroh.
W3 (vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction): replace Mnemonic derive(Debug) with
redacting impl. W4 (core/auth-apikey-resources, level: research): decide
whether ApiKeyEntry should carry resources, then implement or drop from
spec. review-post-impl-fixes gates on all four. Graph: 33 tasks, 12 gens.
Break down the three initial crates (alknet-vault, alknet-core, alknet-call)
into dependency-ordered task files for implementation agents.
Structure:
- tasks/vault/ (10 tasks) — drift fixes from ADR-025/026 refactor, review,
spec sync. Vault is independent and can run fully in parallel with core/call.
- tasks/core/ (6 tasks) — crate init, core types, config, auth, endpoint,
review. Core is foundational; call depends on it.
- tasks/call/ (12 tasks) — split into registry/ and protocol/ topic subdirs
reflecting the two subsystems. CallAdapter is the merge point.
Key decisions:
- Drifts 3+9+10 grouped as one task (key-versioning-rotation) — the complete
ADR-021 rotation feature that doesn't compile in pieces
- Reviews injected at end of each crate phase (vault, core, call)
- Vault spec-sync task removes the drift table and bumps doc status to stable
- ACME deferred in core/endpoint (noted as TODO; X509 manual certs for now)
- OperationEnv kept as a trait (load-bearing for ADR-024 layering)
Validated: 28 tasks, no cycles, 11 generations of parallel work.
Critical path runs through call (11 tasks). Vault completes by generation 4.
6 high-risk tasks identified (21%): irpc-removal, endpoint, operation-context,
operation-env, call-adapter, abort-cascade.
The Unlock variant had a single field used as the
mnemonic, with no way to convey the BIP39 password extension (25th word).
The actor handler silently passed for the passphrase, making it
impossible to unlock with a BIP39 passphrase via irpc.
Split into + to match
the spec and SecretServiceHandle::unlock() signature.
Update secret-service.md to reflect the actual alknet-secret implementation:
- Fix dependency names/versions: secp256k1 (not libsecp256k1), version 0.29,
add tokio/irpc-derive/hmac/rand, use workspace refs
- Add SecretServiceActor and CacheConfig to public API
- Add ethereum.rs module to crate structure, fix test_vectors.rs filename
- DerivedKey is move-only (not Clone), matching the stronger security impl
- Update BIP39 pseudocode to actual derive_path_from_seed() API
- Document derive_password_string() convenience method
- Document SecretServiceActor::spawn() in irpc integration model
- Update Unlock variant to target state: { mnemonic, passphrase: Option }
- Add implementation gap note pointing to unlock-passphrase-gap task
Add tasks/integration/phase3/secret-service/unlock-passphrase-gap.md:
- Fix Unlock protocol variant to carry both mnemonic and BIP39 passphrase
- Currently the irpc message only has passphrase: String (used as mnemonic)
- The handle supports both parameters but the protocol can't convey them
- Add irpc (0.16) and irpc-derive (0.16) as workspace dependencies
- Add irpc, irpc-derive, and secp256k1 (optional) to alknet-secret Cargo.toml
- Clarify encryption-salt-kdf task: Option B (document salt as reserved) is the
chosen path per spec update, removing Option A acceptance criteria
- Update irpc-secret-protocol-integration task with concrete irpc crate details:
real crate on crates.io v0.16, #[rpc_requests] macro, workspace config,
AuthProtocol pattern reference, DerivedKey serialization considerations
- Fix secp256k1-ethereum-derivation task: correct crate name is secp256k1
(not libsecp256k1), add version pin 0.29
