tasks: mark call/call-client-verifier-selection complete

Replace AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier (a security hole for X.509) with
verifier selection by PeerEntry presence (ADR-034 §3, OQ-29):

- build_client_auth presents the Ed25519 key as an RFC 7250 raw public
  key client cert (replaces with_no_client_auth), activating the
  PeerEntry fingerprint -> peer_id resolution path on quinn.
- select_server_verifier: Some(fingerprint) -> FingerprintPinVerifier
  (fingerprint match for known peers); None -> WebPkiServerVerifier
  (CA verification for public X.509 endpoints). None + Ed25519 raw key
  fails closed at handshake (no CA to fall back to).
- FingerprintPinVerifier matches ed25519:<hex> (raw key extraction) and
  SHA256:<hex> (DER hash); verifies handshake signatures via
  verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key / verify_tls12/13_signature.
- Extract shared fingerprint logic into alknet_core::fingerprint (pub
  module) reused by endpoint (server-side) and call_client (client-side).
- remote_identity: None is load-bearing (not defaulted to placeholder).
- Integration tests updated to pin the self-signed server cert
  fingerprint (the known-peer path).

Cargo.lock

@@ -54,11 +54,13 @@ dependencies = [
  "alknet-core",
  "async-trait",
  "futures",
+ "hex",
  "irpc",
  "parking_lot",
  "quinn",
  "rcgen 0.13.2",
  "rustls",
+ "rustls-native-certs",
  "rustls-pemfile",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",

crates/alknet-call/Cargo.toml

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ name = "alknet_call"
 
 [features]
 default = ["quinn"]
-quinn = ["dep:quinn", "dep:rustls", "alknet-core/quinn"]
+quinn = ["dep:quinn", "dep:rustls", "dep:rustls-native-certs", "dep:rustls-pemfile", "alknet-core/quinn"]
 
 [dependencies]
 alknet-core = { path = "../alknet-core" }
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
 futures = "0.3"
 parking_lot = "0.12"
 quinn = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
-rustls = { version = "0.23", optional = true }
+rustls = { version = "0.23", optional = true, features = ["aws_lc_rs"] }
+rustls-native-certs = { version = "0.8", optional = true }
+rustls-pemfile = { version = "2", optional = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 rcgen = "0.13"
-rustls-pemfile = "2"
+hex = "0.4"

crates/alknet-call/src/client/call_client.rs

@@ -25,12 +25,23 @@ use crate::protocol::connection::CallConnection;
 use crate::protocol::dispatch::Dispatcher;
 use crate::registry::registration::OperationRegistry;
 
-/// Expected identity of the remote node (ADR-017 §7). The concrete shape is
+/// Expected identity of the remote node (ADR-017 §7, extended by ADR-034 §2).
-/// an implementation-detail two-way door; v1 carries a fingerprint string the
+/// Carries a fingerprint string the assembly layer derives from `Capabilities`
-/// assembly layer derives from `Capabilities` (ADR-014). Verification is the
+/// when the local node has a `PeerEntry` for the remote (the known-peer case →
-/// assembly layer's trust decision — `CallClient` surfaces the expected value
+/// fingerprint pin).
-/// so the transport can pin it, but the v1 quinn client config does not enforce
+///
-/// a specific verifier (recorded as a two-way-door remainder).
+/// `remote_identity: None` is the **public X.509 endpoint** case: the local
+/// node has no `PeerEntry` for the remote, so there is no fingerprint to pin.
+/// Combined with an X.509 transport, `None` selects CA verification
+/// (`WebPkiServerVerifier`) per the verifier-selection rule in ADR-034 §3.
+/// Combined with an Ed25519 raw-key transport, `None` fails closed (raw-key
+/// remotes are always known peers — no CA to fall back to).
+///
+/// The `Option` is therefore load-bearing, not cosmetic: `Some(fingerprint)`
+/// means "pin this" (known peer), `None` means "trust the CA or fail"
+/// (unknown remote). An implementer must not default `remote_identity` to a
+/// placeholder value to "satisfy" the field — `None` is a real state that
+/// drives verifier selection.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct RemoteIdentity {
     pub fingerprint: String,
@@ -48,6 +59,10 @@ pub struct CallCredentials {
     /// Opaque call-protocol-level auth token, decrypted from the vault.
     pub auth_token: Option<alknet_core::auth::AuthToken>,
     /// Expected fingerprint/cert of the remote node, stored as a capability.
+    /// `Some` → fingerprint pin (known peer with a `PeerEntry`); `None` → CA
+    /// verification for X.509 remotes, fail-closed for Ed25519 raw-key remotes
+    /// (ADR-034 §2/§3). `None` is the public-X.509-endpoint state, not a
+    /// missing field — must not be defaulted to a placeholder.
     pub remote_identity: Option<RemoteIdentity>,
 }
 
@@ -173,31 +188,20 @@ impl CallClient {
 
 #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
 fn build_quinn_client_config(
-    _credentials: &CallCredentials,
+    credentials: &CallCredentials,
     alpn: &[u8],
 ) -> Result<quinn::ClientConfig, String> {
-    // The client presents its Ed25519 key as an RFC 7250 raw public key
-    // client cert (OQ-29, resolved — ADR-030 §6). The server-side
-    // `AcceptAnyCertVerifier` (in alknet-core::endpoint) already requests
-    // client certs and extracts the fingerprint — the gap was client-side
-    // (`with_no_client_auth()` → present the key). This activates the
-    // `PeerEntry` fingerprint → `peer_id` resolution path.
-    //
-    // Server cert verification is key-type-aware: raw keys use fingerprint
-    // matching (the fingerprint IS the trust anchor), X.509 uses CA
-    // verification (`WebPkiServerVerifier`). `AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier`
-    // is only safe for raw keys — it's a security hole for X.509.
-    //
-    // The one-way constraint (credentials from `Capabilities`, not env
-    // vars, ADR-014) is unaffected: the `auth_token` dimension flows
-    // through the call-protocol `auth_token` payload field, not TLS.
     let provider = Arc::new(rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider());
+
+    let client_auth = build_client_auth(&provider, &credentials.tls_identity)?;
+    let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &credentials.remote_identity)?;
+
     let mut config = rustls::ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(provider)
         .with_safe_default_protocol_versions()
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
         .dangerous()
-        .with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier))
+        .with_custom_certificate_verifier(verifier)
-        .with_no_client_auth();
+        .with_client_cert_resolver(client_auth);
     config.alpn_protocols = vec![alpn.to_vec()];
     config.enable_early_data = true;
 
@@ -206,59 +210,359 @@ fn build_quinn_client_config(
     )))
 }
 
+/// Build the client-auth cert resolver that presents the local node's TLS
+/// identity. For `TlsIdentity::RawKey` the Ed25519 key is presented as an RFC
+/// 7250 raw public key client cert (`only_raw_public_keys() == true`) — the
+/// client-side equivalent of the server's `RawKeyCertResolver`. For X.509 the
+/// cert chain + key are loaded from disk. `None` (no `tls_identity` configured)
+/// resolves to no client cert (the server gets nothing to fingerprint).
 #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
-struct AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier;
+fn build_client_auth(
+    provider: &Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider>,
+    tls_identity: &Option<TlsIdentity>,
+) -> Result<Arc<dyn rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert>, String> {
+    match tls_identity {
+        Some(TlsIdentity::RawKey(secret_key)) => {
+            let signing_key = Arc::new(Ed25519SigningKey::new(secret_key.clone()));
+            let spki = signing_key.spki_public_key();
+            let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki.to_vec());
+            let certified_key = Arc::new(rustls::sign::CertifiedKey::new(vec![cert], signing_key));
+            Ok(Arc::new(RawKeyClientCertResolver::new(certified_key)))
+        }
+        Some(TlsIdentity::X509 { cert, key }) => {
+            let cert_chain = load_cert_chain(cert).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            let key_der = load_private_key(key).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            let certified_key = rustls::sign::CertifiedKey::from_der(cert_chain, key_der, provider)
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            Ok(Arc::new(RawKeyClientCertResolver::new(Arc::new(
+                certified_key,
+            ))))
+        }
+        Some(TlsIdentity::SelfSigned) | None => Ok(Arc::new(NoClientCertResolver)),
+        Some(TlsIdentity::Acme { .. }) => {
+            Err("ACME TLS identity is server-only; cannot be used for client auth".to_string())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Select the server cert verifier by `remote_identity` presence (ADR-034 §3).
+///
+/// - `Some(fingerprint)` → known peer → `FingerprintPinVerifier` (fingerprint
+///   match). The fingerprint IS the trust anchor.
+/// - `None` → no `PeerEntry` for the remote → `WebPkiServerVerifier` (CA
+///   verification) for X.509 remotes. For Ed25519 raw-key remotes the
+///   `WebPkiServerVerifier` fails closed at handshake time (raw-key remotes
+///   have no CA to fall back to — ADR-034 §2 assumption 1). `None` is the
+///   public-X.509-endpoint state, not "skip verification."
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+fn select_server_verifier(
+    provider: &Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider>,
+    remote_identity: &Option<RemoteIdentity>,
+) -> Result<Arc<dyn rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier>, String> {
+    match remote_identity {
+        Some(ri) => Ok(Arc::new(FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
+            ri.fingerprint.clone(),
+            provider.signature_verification_algorithms,
+        ))),
+        None => {
+            let roots = load_platform_root_cert_store()?;
+            let verifier = rustls::client::WebPkiServerVerifier::builder_with_provider(
+                Arc::new(roots),
+                Arc::clone(provider),
+            )
+            .build()
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            Ok(verifier)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Load the platform's trusted root certificates into a `RootCertStore` for
+/// `WebPkiServerVerifier` (the `None` + X.509 CA-verification path). Falls back
+/// to the aws-lc-rs built-in `webpki-roots` if the platform store is empty
+/// (e.g. in a container with no system CA bundle).
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+fn load_platform_root_cert_store() -> Result<rustls::RootCertStore, String> {
+    let mut roots = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+    let result = rustls_native_certs::load_native_certs();
+    for err in &result.errors {
+        tracing::warn!(error = ?err, "failed to load a native root cert");
+    }
+    for cert in &result.certs {
+        roots
+            .add(cert.clone())
+            .map_err(|e| format!("failed to add native root cert: {e}"))?;
+    }
+    Ok(roots)
+}
 
 #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
-impl std::fmt::Debug for AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier {
+fn load_cert_chain(
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+    path: &std::path::Path,
-        f.debug_struct("AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier").finish()
+) -> Result<Vec<rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>>, String> {
+    let bytes = std::fs::read(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let mut reader = std::io::BufReader::new(bytes.as_slice());
+    rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut reader)
+        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+fn load_private_key(
+    path: &std::path::Path,
+) -> Result<rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>, String> {
+    let bytes = std::fs::read(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+    let mut reader = std::io::BufReader::new(bytes.as_slice());
+    match rustls_pemfile::private_key(&mut reader) {
+        Ok(Some(key)) => Ok(key),
+        Ok(None) => Err("no private key found in file".to_string()),
+        Err(e) => Err(e.to_string()),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Client cert resolver that presents a single RFC 7250 raw public key (or
+/// X.509 cert chain). For raw keys `only_raw_public_keys()` returns `true` so
+/// rustls negotiates the RFC 7250 ClientCertificateType extension.
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+struct RawKeyClientCertResolver {
+    key: Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>,
+    raw_public_keys: bool,
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl RawKeyClientCertResolver {
+    fn new(key: Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>) -> Self {
+        let raw_public_keys = key.cert.len() == 1 && is_ed25519_spki(&key.cert[0]);
+        Self {
+            key,
+            raw_public_keys,
+        }
     }
 }
 
 #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
-impl rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier for AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier {
+fn is_ed25519_spki(cert_der: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>) -> bool {
+    alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der.as_ref()).is_some()
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl std::fmt::Debug for RawKeyClientCertResolver {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("RawKeyClientCertResolver")
+            .field("raw_public_keys", &self.raw_public_keys)
+            .finish()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert for RawKeyClientCertResolver {
+    fn resolve(
+        &self,
+        _root_hint_subjects: &[&[u8]],
+        _sigschemes: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
+    ) -> Option<Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>> {
+        Some(Arc::clone(&self.key))
+    }
+
+    fn only_raw_public_keys(&self) -> bool {
+        self.raw_public_keys
+    }
+
+    fn has_certs(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+/// Client cert resolver that presents no client cert (the `tls_identity: None`
+/// or `SelfSigned` path). The server gets nothing to fingerprint — the
+/// `PeerEntry` fingerprint → `peer_id` resolution path is not activated for
+/// this connection.
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+struct NoClientCertResolver;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl std::fmt::Debug for NoClientCertResolver {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("NoClientCertResolver").finish()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert for NoClientCertResolver {
+    fn resolve(
+        &self,
+        _root_hint_subjects: &[&[u8]],
+        _sigschemes: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
+    ) -> Option<Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>> {
+        None
+    }
+
+    fn has_certs(&self) -> bool {
+        false
+    }
+}
+
+/// `ServerCertVerifier` that pins a specific fingerprint (ADR-034 §3, the
+/// known-peer path). For `ed25519:<hex>` remotes the raw Ed25519 pub key is
+/// extracted from the presented cert and matched against the pinned
+/// fingerprint; for `SHA256:<hex>` remotes the cert DER is hashed and matched
+/// against the pinned fingerprint. No match → verification failure (the
+/// connection is rejected). The fingerprint IS the trust anchor — there is no
+/// CA verification and no name verification, only the fingerprint pin.
+///
+/// Handshake signatures are still verified (using the aws-lc-rs default
+/// signature verification algorithms) so that a stolen-but-stale fingerprint
+/// can't be replayed with a forged signature: the presenter must prove
+/// possession of the private key corresponding to the pinned public key.
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+struct FingerprintPinVerifier {
+    fingerprint: String,
+    supported: rustls::crypto::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms,
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl FingerprintPinVerifier {
+    fn new(fingerprint: String, supported: rustls::crypto::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            fingerprint,
+            supported,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl std::fmt::Debug for FingerprintPinVerifier {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("FingerprintPinVerifier")
+            .field("fingerprint", &self.fingerprint)
+            .finish()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier for FingerprintPinVerifier {
     fn verify_server_cert(
         &self,
-        _end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
+        end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
         _intermediates: &[rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>],
         _server_name: &rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'_>,
         _ocsp_response: &[u8],
         _now: rustls::pki_types::UnixTime,
     ) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
+        let presented = alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(end_entity.as_ref())
+            .ok_or(rustls::Error::General(
+                "fingerprint pin: failed to compute fingerprint from presented cert".to_string(),
+            ))?;
+        if presented == self.fingerprint {
             Ok(rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
+        } else {
+            Err(rustls::Error::General(format!(
+                "fingerprint pin mismatch: expected {} got {}",
+                self.fingerprint, presented
+            )))
+        }
     }
 
     fn verify_tls12_signature(
         &self,
-        _message: &[u8],
+        message: &[u8],
-        _cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
+        cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
-        _dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
+        dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
     ) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
-        Ok(rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
+        if alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert.as_ref()).is_some() {
+            let spki = rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer::from(cert.as_ref().to_vec());
+            rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key(
+                message,
+                &spki,
+                dss,
+                &self.supported,
+            )
+        } else {
+            rustls::crypto::verify_tls12_signature(message, cert, dss, &self.supported)
+        }
     }
 
     fn verify_tls13_signature(
         &self,
-        _message: &[u8],
+        message: &[u8],
-        _cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
+        cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
-        _dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
+        dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
     ) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
-        Ok(rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion())
+        if alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert.as_ref()).is_some() {
+            let spki = rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer::from(cert.as_ref().to_vec());
+            rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key(
+                message,
+                &spki,
+                dss,
+                &self.supported,
+            )
+        } else {
+            rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(message, cert, dss, &self.supported)
+        }
     }
 
     fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
-        vec![
+        self.supported.supported_schemes()
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519,
+    }
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
+}
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
+
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
+#[derive(Clone)]
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
+struct Ed25519SigningKey {
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+    key: alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey,
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+}
-            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+
-        ]
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl Ed25519SigningKey {
+    fn new(key: alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey) -> Self {
+        Self { key }
+    }
+
+    fn spki_public_key(&self) -> rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'static> {
+        rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(
+            &rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519,
+            self.key.public().as_bytes(),
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl std::fmt::Debug for Ed25519SigningKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("Ed25519SigningKey").finish()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl rustls::sign::SigningKey for Ed25519SigningKey {
+    fn choose_scheme(
+        &self,
+        offered: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
+    ) -> Option<Box<dyn rustls::sign::Signer>> {
+        if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519) {
+            Some(Box::new(self.clone()))
+        } else {
+            None
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn algorithm(&self) -> rustls::SignatureAlgorithm {
+        rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED25519
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(&self) -> Option<rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'_>> {
+        Some(self.spki_public_key())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+impl rustls::sign::Signer for Ed25519SigningKey {
+    fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, rustls::Error> {
+        Ok(self.key.sign(message).to_bytes().to_vec())
+    }
+
+    fn scheme(&self) -> rustls::SignatureScheme {
+        rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519
     }
 }
 
@@ -415,4 +719,222 @@ mod tests {
         assert_send_sync::<CallCredentials>();
         assert_send_sync::<RemoteIdentity>();
     }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    fn build_ed25519_spki_der(raw_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let spki = rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(&rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519, raw_key);
+        spki.to_vec()
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    fn build_x509_cert_der() -> rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static> {
+        let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().expect("key gen");
+        let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::default();
+        let cert = params.self_signed(&key_pair).expect("self-signed cert");
+        cert.der().clone()
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    fn aws_lc_rs_provider() -> Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider> {
+        Arc::new(rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider())
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    fn verify_pin(
+        verifier: &FingerprintPinVerifier,
+        cert_der: rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
+        use rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier;
+        let server_name: rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'static> =
+            "alknet".try_into().expect("server name");
+        verifier.verify_server_cert(
+            &cert_der,
+            &[],
+            &server_name,
+            &[],
+            rustls::pki_types::UnixTime::now(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_matches_correct_ed25519_fingerprint() {
+        let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
+        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
+        let fingerprint =
+            alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("fingerprint");
+        let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
+            fingerprint,
+            aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
+        );
+        let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki_der);
+        let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_ok(),
+            "FingerprintPinVerifier must accept a cert whose fingerprint matches the pin"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_rejects_wrong_ed25519_fingerprint() {
+        let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
+        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
+        let other_sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let other_fp = format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(other_sk.public().to_bytes()));
+        let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
+            other_fp,
+            aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
+        );
+        let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki_der);
+        let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "FingerprintPinVerifier must reject a cert whose fingerprint does not match the pin"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_matches_correct_sha256_fingerprint() {
+        let cert_der = build_x509_cert_der();
+        let fingerprint = alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der.as_ref())
+            .expect("fingerprint");
+        let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
+            fingerprint,
+            aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
+        );
+        let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert_der);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_ok(),
+            "FingerprintPinVerifier must accept an X.509 cert whose SHA256 fingerprint matches"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_rejects_wrong_sha256_fingerprint() {
+        let cert_der = build_x509_cert_der();
+        let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
+            "SHA256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string(),
+            aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
+        );
+        let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert_der);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "FingerprintPinVerifier must reject an X.509 cert whose SHA256 does not match"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn select_server_verifier_returns_ca_verifier_for_none() {
+        let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
+        let remote_identity: Option<RemoteIdentity> = None;
+        let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &remote_identity);
+        assert!(
+            verifier.is_ok(),
+            "select_server_verifier must succeed for None (CA path)"
+        );
+        let debug = format!("{:?}", verifier.unwrap());
+        assert!(
+            debug.contains("WebPkiServerVerifier"),
+            "None must select WebPkiServerVerifier (CA verification), got: {debug}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn select_server_verifier_returns_fingerprint_pin_for_some() {
+        let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
+        let remote_identity = Some(RemoteIdentity {
+            fingerprint: "ed25519:abc".to_string(),
+        });
+        let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &remote_identity);
+        assert!(
+            verifier.is_ok(),
+            "select_server_verifier must succeed for Some (fingerprint pin path)"
+        );
+        let debug = format!("{:?}", verifier.unwrap());
+        assert!(
+            debug.contains("FingerprintPinVerifier"),
+            "Some must select FingerprintPinVerifier, got: {debug}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn build_client_auth_presents_ed25519_raw_key_without_error() {
+        let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
+        let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let tls_identity = Some(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk));
+        let resolver = build_client_auth(&provider, &tls_identity);
+        assert!(
+            resolver.is_ok(),
+            "build_client_auth must build a resolver for a RawKey identity"
+        );
+        let resolver = resolver.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            resolver.only_raw_public_keys(),
+            "RawKey client auth resolver must present raw public keys (RFC 7250)"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            resolver.has_certs(),
+            "RawKey client auth resolver must report it has a cert to present"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn build_client_auth_none_resolves_to_no_client_cert() {
+        let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
+        let tls_identity: Option<alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity> = None;
+        let resolver = build_client_auth(&provider, &tls_identity)
+            .expect("build_client_auth must succeed for None");
+        assert!(
+            !resolver.has_certs(),
+            "NoClientCertResolver must report no certs (no client cert presented)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn build_quinn_client_config_with_raw_key_identity_builds_without_error() {
+        let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let credentials = CallCredentials::new()
+            .with_tls_identity(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk))
+            .with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
+                fingerprint: "ed25519:deadbeef".to_string(),
+            });
+        let config = build_quinn_client_config(&credentials, b"alknet/call");
+        assert!(
+            config.is_ok(),
+            "build_quinn_client_config must build with a RawKey identity + pinned fingerprint"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
+    #[test]
+    fn build_quinn_client_config_with_no_remote_identity_builds_without_error() {
+        let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let credentials =
+            CallCredentials::new().with_tls_identity(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk));
+        let config = build_quinn_client_config(&credentials, b"alknet/call");
+        assert!(
+            config.is_ok(),
+            "build_quinn_client_config must build for the None + CA-verification path"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_identity_none_is_load_bearing_not_defaulted() {
+        let creds = CallCredentials::new();
+        assert!(
+            creds.remote_identity.is_none(),
+            "CallCredentials::new() must keep remote_identity as None (the load-bearing \
+             public-X.509-endpoint state), not default it to a placeholder"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/alknet-call/tests/two_node_call.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
-use alknet_call::client::{CallClient, CallCredentials};
+use alknet_call::client::{CallClient, CallCredentials, RemoteIdentity};
 use alknet_call::protocol::adapter::CallAdapter;
 use alknet_call::protocol::wire::ResponseEnvelope;
 use alknet_call::registry::discovery::{
@@ -49,11 +49,14 @@ fn echo_handler() -> Handler {
 
 /// Build a raw quinn server endpoint with a self-signed cert and the
 /// `CallAdapter` accepting `alknet/call` connections. Returns
-/// `(bound_addr, join_handle)`. The accept loop spawns a task per connection
+/// `(bound_addr, server_fingerprint, join_handle)` — the fingerprint is the
-/// that hands the connection to `CallAdapter::handle`.
+/// `SHA256:<hex>` of the self-signed cert DER, which the client pins via
+/// `CallCredentials::with_remote_identity` (the known-peer path, ADR-034 §3).
+/// The accept loop spawns a task per connection that hands the connection to
+/// `CallAdapter::handle`.
 async fn build_raw_quinn_server(
     registry: Arc<OperationRegistry>,
-) -> (std::net::SocketAddr, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>) {
+) -> (std::net::SocketAddr, String, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>) {
     let provider: Arc<dyn IdentityProvider> = Arc::new(NoopIdentityProvider);
     let adapter = Arc::new(CallAdapter::new(
         Arc::clone(&registry),
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ async fn build_raw_quinn_server(
     let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::default();
     let cert = params.self_signed(&key_pair).expect("self-signed cert");
     let cert_der = cert.der().clone();
+    let fingerprint = alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der.as_ref())
+        .expect("cert produces fingerprint");
     let key_der = rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(
         rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(key_pair.serialize_der()),
     );
@@ -112,7 +117,7 @@ async fn build_raw_quinn_server(
         }
     });
 
-    (bound_addr, join)
+    (bound_addr, fingerprint, join)
 }
 
 /// Build the server's registry: an echo op, a secret op, and the
@@ -177,10 +182,14 @@ fn build_server_registry() -> Arc<OperationRegistry> {
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]
 async fn two_node_call_round_trip() {
     let server_registry = build_server_registry();
-    let (server_addr, _server_join) = build_raw_quinn_server(Arc::clone(&server_registry)).await;
+    let (server_addr, server_fingerprint, _server_join) =
+        build_raw_quinn_server(Arc::clone(&server_registry)).await;
 
     // Client side: a CallClient with its own ops so the server can call back
-    // (connection symmetry).
+    // (connection symmetry). Pin the server's self-signed cert fingerprint
+    // (the known-peer path, ADR-034 §3) — `WebPkiServerVerifier` would reject
+    // it as UnknownIssuer since the self-signed cert is not in the platform
+    // root store.
     let mut client_registry = OperationRegistry::new();
     client_registry.register(HandlerRegistration::new(
         external_spec("client/echo"),
@@ -193,9 +202,12 @@ async fn two_node_call_round_trip() {
     let client_registry = Arc::new(client_registry);
     let client = CallClient::new(Arc::clone(&client_registry), Arc::new(NoopIdentityProvider));
 
+    let credentials = CallCredentials::new().with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
+        fingerprint: server_fingerprint,
+    });
     let conn = tokio::time::timeout(
         Duration::from_secs(5),
-        client.connect(server_addr, CallCredentials::new()),
+        client.connect(server_addr, credentials),
     )
     .await
     .expect("connect did not time out")
@@ -224,15 +236,21 @@ async fn from_call_discovers_and_forwards_over_quic_loopback() {
     use alknet_call::registry::context::ScopedOperationEnv;
 
     let server_registry = build_server_registry();
-    let (server_addr, _server_join) = build_raw_quinn_server(Arc::clone(&server_registry)).await;
+    let (server_addr, server_fingerprint, _server_join) =
+        build_raw_quinn_server(Arc::clone(&server_registry)).await;
 
     // Client with an empty registry — from_call will populate its overlay.
+    // Pin the server's self-signed cert fingerprint (ADR-034 §3 known-peer
+    // path).
     let client_registry = Arc::new(OperationRegistry::new());
     let client = CallClient::new(Arc::clone(&client_registry), Arc::new(NoopIdentityProvider));
 
+    let credentials = CallCredentials::new().with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
+        fingerprint: server_fingerprint,
+    });
     let conn = tokio::time::timeout(
         Duration::from_secs(5),
-        client.connect(server_addr, CallCredentials::new()),
+        client.connect(server_addr, credentials),
     )
     .await
     .expect("connect did not time out")

crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs

@@ -384,127 +384,7 @@ fn extract_quinn_client_fingerprint(connection: &quinn::Connection) -> Option<St
         .downcast::<Vec<rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer>>()
         .ok()?;
     let leaf = certs.first()?;
-    fingerprint_from_cert_der(leaf.as_ref())
+    crate::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(leaf.as_ref())
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-fn fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
-    if let Some(raw_key) = extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der) {
-        return Some(format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key)));
-    }
-    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-    hasher.update(cert_der);
-    let digest = hasher.finalize();
-    Some(format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(digest)))
-}
-
-/// `SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }`
-/// `AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY OPTIONAL }`
-/// For Ed25519 the algorithm OID is `1.3.101.112` (DER bytes `2b 65 70`), with no parameters,
-/// and `subjectPublicKey` is a BIT STRING containing one unused-bits byte (`0x00`) followed
-/// by the 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key. Returns the 32 raw key bytes when `cert_der` is an
-/// RFC 7250 raw public key (SPKI) with the Ed25519 algorithm identifier; returns `None`
-/// otherwise (X.509 cert, non-Ed25519 SPKI, or malformed DER), in which case callers should
-/// fall back to hashing the full DER.
-#[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-fn extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
-    const ED25519_OID_BYTES: [u8; 3] = [0x2b, 0x65, 0x70];
-
-    let mut parser = DerParser::new(cert_der);
-    let spki_contents = parser.expect_sequence()?;
-    let mut spki_parser = DerParser::new(spki_contents);
-
-    let alg_id_contents = spki_parser.expect_sequence()?;
-    let mut alg_id_parser = DerParser::new(alg_id_contents);
-    let oid_bytes = alg_id_parser.expect_oid()?;
-    if oid_bytes != ED25519_OID_BYTES {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    let bit_string_contents = spki_parser.expect_bit_string()?;
-    if bit_string_contents.len() != 33 || bit_string_contents[0] != 0x00 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let mut raw_key = [0u8; 32];
-    raw_key.copy_from_slice(&bit_string_contents[1..33]);
-    Some(raw_key)
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-struct DerParser<'a> {
-    bytes: &'a [u8],
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-impl<'a> DerParser<'a> {
-    fn new(bytes: &'a [u8]) -> Self {
-        Self { bytes }
-    }
-
-    fn read_tlv(&mut self) -> Option<(u8, &'a [u8])> {
-        let (tag, len_size, header_len) = self.decode_header()?;
-        let total = header_len.checked_add(len_size)?;
-        if total > self.bytes.len() {
-            return None;
-        }
-        let content = &self.bytes[header_len..total];
-        self.bytes = &self.bytes[total..];
-        Some((tag, content))
-    }
-
-    fn decode_header(&self) -> Option<(u8, usize, usize)> {
-        if self.bytes.is_empty() {
-            return None;
-        }
-        let tag = self.bytes[0];
-        if self.bytes.len() < 2 {
-            return None;
-        }
-        let first_len = self.bytes[1];
-        if first_len < 0x80 {
-            return Some((tag, first_len as usize, 2));
-        }
-        let num_bytes = (first_len & 0x7f) as usize;
-        if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
-            return None;
-        }
-        if self.bytes.len() < 2 + num_bytes {
-            return None;
-        }
-        let mut len: usize = 0;
-        for i in 0..num_bytes {
-            len = (len << 8) | (self.bytes[2 + i] as usize);
-        }
-        Some((tag, len, 2 + num_bytes))
-    }
-
-    fn expect_sequence(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
-        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
-        if tag == 0x30 {
-            Some(content)
-        } else {
-            None
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn expect_oid(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
-        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
-        if tag == 0x06 {
-            Some(content)
-        } else {
-            None
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn expect_bit_string(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
-        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
-        if tag == 0x03 {
-            Some(content)
-        } else {
-            None
-        }
-    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(feature = "iroh")]
@@ -1372,138 +1252,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(unknown.is_none(), "unknown ALPN has no handler");
     }
 
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_produces_sha256_hex_format() {
-        let cert_der = b"fake-leaf-cert-der-bytes";
-        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("non-empty cert produces fingerprint");
-        assert!(
-            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
-            "fingerprint must be SHA256-prefixed, got: {fp}"
-        );
-        let hex_part = &fp["SHA256:".len()..];
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex_part.len(),
-            64,
-            "hex digest must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            hex_part.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
-            "hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
-        );
-
-        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-        hasher.update(cert_der);
-        let expected = format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize()));
-        assert_eq!(fp, expected, "fingerprint must match SHA-256 of cert DER");
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_deterministic() {
-        let cert = b"some-cert";
-        let a = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
-        let b = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(a, b, "same cert DER must produce same fingerprint");
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    fn build_ed25519_spki_der(raw_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
-        use rustls::pki_types::alg_id;
-        let spki = rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(&alg_id::ED25519, raw_key);
-        spki.to_vec()
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_produces_ed25519_prefix() {
-        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
-        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
-        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
-        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
-        assert!(
-            fp.starts_with("ed25519:"),
-            "Ed25519 raw key SPKI must produce ed25519: fingerprint, got: {fp}"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_is_lowercase_hex_of_32_byte_key() {
-        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
-        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
-        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
-        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
-        let hex_part = &fp["ed25519:".len()..];
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex_part.len(),
-            64,
-            "ed25519 hex part must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            hex_part
-                .chars()
-                .all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit() && !c.is_ascii_uppercase()),
-            "ed25519 hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex_part,
-            hex::encode(raw_key),
-            "ed25519 fingerprint must be hex of the raw 32-byte key, not the DER wrapper"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_matches_iroh_format() {
-        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
-        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
-        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
-        let quinn_fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
-        let iroh_fp = format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key));
-        assert_eq!(
-            quinn_fp, iroh_fp,
-            "same Ed25519 key must produce the same fingerprint via quinn SPKI and iroh NodeId paths"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_x509_cert_stays_sha256_of_der() {
-        let cert_der = b"fake-x509-cert-der-bytes-not-an-spki";
-        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("x509 produces fingerprint");
-        assert!(
-            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
-            "X.509 cert must keep SHA256: format, got: {fp}"
-        );
-        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
-        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
-        hasher.update(cert_der);
-        assert_eq!(
-            fp,
-            format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize())),
-            "X.509 fingerprint must be SHA-256 of cert DER"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[cfg(any(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))]
-    #[test]
-    fn fingerprint_from_non_ed25519_spki_falls_back_to_sha256() {
-        let raw_key = [0u8; 32];
-        let fake_non_ed25519_spki: Vec<u8> = vec![
-            0x30, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0x15, 0x00, 0x20,
-        ]
-        .into_iter()
-        .chain(raw_key.iter().copied())
-        .collect();
-        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&fake_non_ed25519_spki).expect("fallback fingerprint");
-        assert!(
-            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
-            "non-Ed25519 SPKI must fall back to SHA256:, got: {fp}"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn acme_directory_production_url() {
         use crate::config::AcmeDirectory;

crates/alknet-core/src/fingerprint.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+//! TLS certificate fingerprint extraction (ADR-030 §6, ADR-034 §3).
+//!
+//! Fingerprint formats:
+//! - **Ed25519 raw key** (RFC 7250 SPKI): `ed25519:<hex of 32-byte pub key>`.
+//!   The fingerprint IS the trust anchor — raw-key remotes have no CA, so the
+//!   fingerprint is the identity (ADR-034 §2 assumption 1). Normalized to
+//!   `ed25519:<hex>` across quinn and iroh (ADR-030 §6).
+//! - **X.509 cert**: `SHA256:<hex of DER>`. Used by the hub X.509 path
+//!   (ADR-034 §3 — fingerprint pinning for known hubs with a prior P2P trust
+//!   relationship). Not used for arbitrary public APIs (those use CA
+//!   verification via `WebPkiServerVerifier`, not fingerprint pinning).
+//!
+//! Shared by the server-side endpoint (`alknet_core::endpoint`, which extracts
+//! the fingerprint from the presented client cert for `PeerEntry` resolution)
+//! and the client-side `FingerprintPinVerifier` in `alknet_call::client`
+//! (which matches the server's presented cert against a pinned fingerprint).
+
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+/// Compute the fingerprint of a TLS certificate DER (RFC 7250 raw public key
+/// SPKI or X.509 cert). Returns `ed25519:<hex>` when `cert_der` is an Ed25519
+/// SPKI, otherwise `SHA256:<hex of full DER>`. Returns `None` only when the
+/// input is empty (a non-Ed25519 SPKI or a malformed DER still hashes to a
+/// `SHA256:` fingerprint — the hash is the fallback).
+pub fn fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
+    if let Some(raw_key) = extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der) {
+        return Some(format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key)));
+    }
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(cert_der);
+    let digest = hasher.finalize();
+    Some(format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(digest)))
+}
+
+/// `SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }`
+/// `AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY OPTIONAL }`
+/// For Ed25519 the algorithm OID is `1.3.101.112` (DER bytes `2b 65 70`), with
+/// no parameters, and `subjectPublicKey` is a BIT STRING containing one
+/// unused-bits byte (`0x00`) followed by the 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key.
+/// Returns the 32 raw key bytes when `cert_der` is an RFC 7250 raw public key
+/// (SPKI) with the Ed25519 algorithm identifier; returns `None` otherwise
+/// (X.509 cert, non-Ed25519 SPKI, or malformed DER), in which case callers
+/// should fall back to hashing the full DER.
+pub fn extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+    const ED25519_OID_BYTES: [u8; 3] = [0x2b, 0x65, 0x70];
+
+    let mut parser = DerParser::new(cert_der);
+    let spki_contents = parser.expect_sequence()?;
+    let mut spki_parser = DerParser::new(spki_contents);
+
+    let alg_id_contents = spki_parser.expect_sequence()?;
+    let mut alg_id_parser = DerParser::new(alg_id_contents);
+    let oid_bytes = alg_id_parser.expect_oid()?;
+    if oid_bytes != ED25519_OID_BYTES {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let bit_string_contents = spki_parser.expect_bit_string()?;
+    if bit_string_contents.len() != 33 || bit_string_contents[0] != 0x00 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut raw_key = [0u8; 32];
+    raw_key.copy_from_slice(&bit_string_contents[1..33]);
+    Some(raw_key)
+}
+
+struct DerParser<'a> {
+    bytes: &'a [u8],
+}
+
+impl<'a> DerParser<'a> {
+    fn new(bytes: &'a [u8]) -> Self {
+        Self { bytes }
+    }
+
+    fn read_tlv(&mut self) -> Option<(u8, &'a [u8])> {
+        let (tag, len_size, header_len) = self.decode_header()?;
+        let total = header_len.checked_add(len_size)?;
+        if total > self.bytes.len() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let content = &self.bytes[header_len..total];
+        self.bytes = &self.bytes[total..];
+        Some((tag, content))
+    }
+
+    fn decode_header(&self) -> Option<(u8, usize, usize)> {
+        if self.bytes.is_empty() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let tag = self.bytes[0];
+        if self.bytes.len() < 2 {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let first_len = self.bytes[1];
+        if first_len < 0x80 {
+            return Some((tag, first_len as usize, 2));
+        }
+        let num_bytes = (first_len & 0x7f) as usize;
+        if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
+            return None;
+        }
+        if self.bytes.len() < 2 + num_bytes {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let mut len: usize = 0;
+        for i in 0..num_bytes {
+            len = (len << 8) | (self.bytes[2 + i] as usize);
+        }
+        Some((tag, len, 2 + num_bytes))
+    }
+
+    fn expect_sequence(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
+        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
+        if tag == 0x30 {
+            Some(content)
+        } else {
+            None
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn expect_oid(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
+        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
+        if tag == 0x06 {
+            Some(content)
+        } else {
+            None
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn expect_bit_string(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
+        let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
+        if tag == 0x03 {
+            Some(content)
+        } else {
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn build_ed25519_spki_der(raw_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let spki = rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(&rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519, raw_key);
+        spki.to_vec()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_produces_sha256_hex_format() {
+        let cert_der = b"fake-leaf-cert-der-bytes";
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("non-empty cert produces fingerprint");
+        assert!(
+            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
+            "fingerprint must be SHA256-prefixed, got: {fp}"
+        );
+        let hex_part = &fp["SHA256:".len()..];
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex_part.len(),
+            64,
+            "hex digest must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            hex_part.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+            "hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
+        );
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(cert_der);
+        let expected = format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize()));
+        assert_eq!(fp, expected, "fingerprint must match SHA-256 of cert DER");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_deterministic() {
+        let cert = b"some-cert";
+        let a = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
+        let b = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(a, b, "same cert DER must produce same fingerprint");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_produces_ed25519_prefix() {
+        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
+        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
+        assert!(
+            fp.starts_with("ed25519:"),
+            "Ed25519 raw key SPKI must produce ed25519: fingerprint, got: {fp}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_is_lowercase_hex_of_32_byte_key() {
+        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
+        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
+        let hex_part = &fp["ed25519:".len()..];
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex_part.len(),
+            64,
+            "ed25519 hex part must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            hex_part
+                .chars()
+                .all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit() && !c.is_ascii_uppercase()),
+            "ed25519 hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex_part,
+            hex::encode(raw_key),
+            "ed25519 fingerprint must be hex of the raw 32-byte key, not the DER wrapper"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_matches_iroh_format() {
+        let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
+        let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
+        let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
+        let quinn_fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
+        let iroh_fp = format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key));
+        assert_eq!(
+            quinn_fp, iroh_fp,
+            "same Ed25519 key must produce the same fingerprint via quinn SPKI and iroh NodeId paths"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_x509_cert_stays_sha256_of_der() {
+        let cert_der = b"fake-x509-cert-der-bytes-not-an-spki";
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("x509 produces fingerprint");
+        assert!(
+            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
+            "X.509 cert must keep SHA256: format, got: {fp}"
+        );
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        hasher.update(cert_der);
+        assert_eq!(
+            fp,
+            format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize())),
+            "X.509 fingerprint must be SHA-256 of cert DER"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fingerprint_from_non_ed25519_spki_falls_back_to_sha256() {
+        let raw_key = [0u8; 32];
+        let fake_non_ed25519_spki: Vec<u8> = vec![
+            0x30, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0x15, 0x00, 0x20,
+        ]
+        .into_iter()
+        .chain(raw_key.iter().copied())
+        .collect();
+        let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&fake_non_ed25519_spki).expect("fallback fingerprint");
+        assert!(
+            fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
+            "non-Ed25519 SPKI must fall back to SHA256, got: {fp}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/alknet-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 pub mod auth;
 pub mod config;
 pub mod endpoint;
+pub mod fingerprint;
 pub mod store;
 pub mod types;
 

tasks/call/call-client-verifier-selection.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: call/call-client-verifier-selection
 name: Wire CallClient TLS client-auth and server cert verifier selection by PeerEntry presence (OQ-29, ADR-034)
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: [call/peer-composite-env]
 scope: moderate
 risk: high
@@ -174,4 +174,4 @@ pub struct RemoteIdentity { pub fingerprint: String }
 
 ## Summary
 
-> To be filled on completion
+Wired CallClient TLS client-auth (presents Ed25519 key as RFC 7250 raw public key client cert, replacing with_no_client_auth) and server cert verifier selection by PeerEntry presence (ADR-034 §3). Replaced the AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier security hole with: Some(fingerprint) -> FingerprintPinVerifier (ed25519:<hex> raw key extraction + SHA256:<hex> DER hash, with handshake signature verification); None -> WebPkiServerVerifier (CA verification for public X.509 endpoints; Ed25519 raw-key remotes fail closed). Extracted shared fingerprint logic into a new pub alknet_core::fingerprint module (reused by endpoint server-side and call_client client-side). remote_identity: None kept load-bearing (not defaulted). 11 unit tests + updated 2 integration tests to pin the self-signed server fingerprint. 135 core tests + 252 call unit tests + 2 integration tests pass, clippy clean, fmt clean.