# ADR-011: AuthContext Structure and Resolution Flow ## Status Proposed ## Context ADR-004 establishes the hybrid auth model: the endpoint resolves what it can (TLS client certificate fingerprint), handlers resolve what they must (AuthToken in the first frame, Bearer header, SSH key fingerprint). The `AuthContext` passed to `handle()` may be partial. The reference implementation's `Identity` struct is: ```rust pub struct Identity { pub id: String, pub scopes: Vec, pub resources: HashMap>, } ``` And `ConfigIdentityProvider` resolves fingerprints and API keys to `Identity`. This works well and carries forward. But the reference implementation has no `AuthContext` type — auth resolution happens inside the SSH handler before calling `IdentityProvider`. The new model needs a type that represents "what the endpoint knows about this connection's identity before the handler starts," plus a way for handlers to enrich it. This is a one-way door: once handlers depend on `AuthContext`'s structure, changing it affects every handler. The structure must be right. ### Design considerations 1. **Handlers need identity information to make authorization decisions.** A handler that requires authentication needs to know: is the peer authenticated? Who are they? What scopes do they have? 2. **The endpoint may have zero, partial, or complete identity information.** A plain QUIC connection with no TLS client cert gives the endpoint nothing. A TLS connection with a client cert gives the endpoint a fingerprint that may resolve to an Identity. A handler that extracts an AuthToken from the first frame can complete the resolution. 3. **AuthContext must not be SSH-specific.** The reference implementation's auth types are tangled with russh (SSH key fingerprints, certificate authorities). The new model needs to be ALPN-agnostic. 4. **AuthContext is constructed by the endpoint and enriched by handlers.** The endpoint creates it from TLS-level information. The handler mutates or replaces it with protocol-level information. 5. **AuthContext must be cheap to construct.** Every incoming connection gets one, even if authentication ultimately fails. ## Decision ### AuthContext is a struct with optional fields ```rust pub struct AuthContext { /// The peer's authenticated identity, if resolved. /// None means the endpoint has no identity information for this connection. /// Some(Identity) means the endpoint resolved the peer's identity. pub identity: Option, /// The negotiated ALPN for this connection. /// Always present — the endpoint sets this from the TLS handshake. pub alpn: Vec, /// The peer's remote address, if available. pub remote_addr: Option, /// TLS client certificate fingerprint, if the client presented a certificate. /// Set by the endpoint during TLS handshake. Handlers may use this for /// SSH host key verification or other fingerprint-based auth. pub tls_client_fingerprint: Option, } ``` Key design points: - `identity: Option` — not `Identity` with optional fields, not a separate `PartialAuthContext`. The endpoint sets it to `None` if it has no identity information, or `Some(identity)` if it resolved one. Handlers that need to complete auth call `IdentityProvider` themselves and store the resolved identity in a local variable — they do NOT mutate AuthContext (see immutability section below). - `alpn` is always present — every connection has a negotiated ALPN. - `remote_addr` is informational. It's available from the QUIC connection and useful for logging and rate limiting, but it's not authoritative (clients can be behind NATs/proxies). - `tls_client_fingerprint` captures the TLS-level credential. If present, it's the SHA-256 fingerprint of the client's TLS certificate. This is separate from `identity` because a handler might need the fingerprint even when `IdentityProvider::resolve_from_fingerprint()` returns `None` (e.g., unknown cert, but the handler wants to log it). ### AuthContext is Clone `AuthContext` derives `Clone`. Handlers can clone it for per-stream or per-channel contexts within a connection. The `Identity` inside is also `Clone`. ### Handler-level auth enrichment pattern Handlers that need to complete authentication do so inside `handle()`: ```rust async fn handle(&self, connection: Connection, auth: &AuthContext) -> Result<(), HandlerError> { let identity = if let Some(id) = &auth.identity { id.clone() // Endpoint already resolved identity } else { // Extract credentials from the protocol, resolve via IdentityProvider let token = self.extract_auth_token(&connection).await?; self.identity_provider.resolve_from_token(&token) .ok_or(HandlerError::AuthRequired)? }; // ... proceed with authenticated identity } ``` Handlers that don't need authentication (e.g., DNS resolver, health check) can ignore `auth.identity` entirely. ### Identity carries over from reference implementation ```rust pub struct Identity { pub id: String, pub scopes: Vec, pub resources: HashMap>, } ``` This is the same structure from the reference implementation, minus the russh dependency. It's ALPN-agnostic: - `id`: A unique identifier string. For SSH key auth, this is the SHA-256 fingerprint. For API key auth, this is the key prefix. For certificate auth, this is the principal name. - `scopes`: Authorization scopes. `["relay:connect", "secrets:derive"]` etc. - `resources`: Named resource lists. `{"service": ["gitea", "registry"]}` etc. ### AuthToken carries raw bytes ```rust pub struct AuthToken { pub raw: Vec, } ``` Unchanged from the reference implementation. Opaque bytes — the handler that extracted it knows its encoding. ### IdentityProvider carries over with minor adaptation ```rust pub trait IdentityProvider: Send + Sync + 'static { fn resolve_from_fingerprint(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Option; fn resolve_from_token(&self, token: &AuthToken) -> Option; } ``` The implementation (`ConfigIdentityProvider`) changes from the reference: it no longer depends on russh types for key storage. Instead, it stores fingerprint strings and API key entries, drawing from `DynamicConfig` via `ArcSwap`. ### AuthContext is NOT mutable inside handle() The `handle()` signature passes `&AuthContext` (immutable reference). Handlers that resolve identity create a local variable with the resolved identity — they don't mutate the AuthContext. This prevents accidental cross-contamination between streams on the same connection. ## Consequences **Positive:** - `AuthContext` is a value type — cheap to construct, clone, and pass around - Handlers that don't need auth can ignore it entirely - The endpoint provides what it can for free (TLS client cert fingerprint), handlers complete what they need - No russh dependency in AuthContext — it's ALPN-agnostic - `Option` is explicit — there's no "partially authenticated" state that handlers have to interpret - Handlers that need to enrich auth create local variables, not mutation — clean data flow **Negative:** - Handlers that need auth must call `IdentityProvider` themselves — this is intentional (ADR-004 hybrid model) but means each handler has its own auth extraction logic - `tls_client_fingerprint` is separate from `identity` — a handler might wonder "why do I have a fingerprint but no identity?" This happens when the client presents a cert that's not in the authorized keys. The handler can log the fingerprint for debugging. - `AuthContext` doesn't carry protocol-specific auth state (e.g., SSH auth method, HTTP auth scheme). This is by design — protocol-specific details belong inside the handler, not in the shared auth context. ## References - ADR-002: ProtocolHandler trait - ADR-004: Auth as shared core (IdentityProvider, hybrid auth model) - ADR-007: BiStream type definition (Connection parameter) - ADR-010: ALPN router and endpoint (where AuthContext is created) - Reference implementation: `alknet-main/crates/alknet-core/src/auth/identity.rs`