alknet/tasks/core/endpoint-request-client-cert.md

id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level

id	name	status	depends_on	scope	risk	impact	level
core/endpoint-request-client-cert	Switch rustls ServerConfig from with_no_client_auth to request-but-don't-require client certs	completed	core/endpoint-client-fingerprint	narrow	medium	component	implementation

Description

core/endpoint-client-fingerprint landed the extraction logic: when a client certificate is presented, dispatch_quinn / dispatch_iroh extract the fingerprint and populate AuthContext. However, the server still builds rustls::ServerConfig with with_no_client_auth() in all three TlsIdentity branches (endpoint.rs:477, 490, 501), so the server never requests a client cert. Extraction is a safe no-op until this task changes the server-side TLS config.

This follow-up switches from with_no_client_auth() to a request-but-don't-require mode so that peers presenting a client cert (X.509 or RFC 7250 raw Ed25519 key) flow through the extraction path landed in the predecessor task, while peers without a cert still connect without regression.

Design decision: how to request-but-not-require

rustls does not have a direct with_optional_client_auth() builder. The standard approach is:

1. Build the config with .with_client_auth(verifier) where verifier is a custom ServerCertVerifier that accepts any presentation (returns Ok(Certified::yes()) when a cert is presented, Ok(Certified::no()) when none is presented — rustls 0.23's WebPkiServerVerifier cannot be used directly for optional auth).
2. Alternatively, use rustls::server::WebPkiServerVerifier with a NoClientAuth fallback — check the exact rustls API available in the pinned version before implementing.

Read the rustls API docs for the pinned version (rustls::server::ServerConfig::builder_with_provider) and confirm the correct verifier construction. The key property: a peer may present a cert, and if it does, peer_identity() returns it; if it doesn't, the connection still succeeds.

iroh path

iroh's Endpoint builder uses its own TLS session internally. For the raw-key path (TlsIdentity::RawKey), iroh already advertises only_raw_public_keys() via RawKeyCertResolver — the server-side half of RFC 7250. The client-side presentation is set by the client's rustls::ClientConfig, not the server. So the iroh path may already receive peer identities when the client is an iroh node (the NodeId is always in the TLS cert). Verify: does Connection::remote_node_id() already work for iroh connections today, or does it require the server to request client certs? If iroh always presents a cert (raw-key mode), no server-side change is needed for the iroh path — only quinn/X.509 needs this task. Confirm before implementing.

Acceptance Criteria

• build_rustls_server_config uses request-but-don't-require client auth (not with_no_client_auth()) for at least the X.509 path
• Peer presenting a client cert: peer_identity() returns the cert chain → fingerprint extraction works end-to-end
• Peer without a client cert: connection still succeeds, tls_client_fingerprint is None (no regression)
• iroh path: confirm whether a server-side change is needed; if yes, apply it; if no, document why
• Integration test: quinn endpoint with a client that presents a cert → AuthContext.tls_client_fingerprint is Some(SHA256:...)
• Integration test: quinn endpoint with a client that presents no cert → AuthContext.tls_client_fingerprint is None and connection succeeds
• cargo test -p alknet-core --all-features succeeds
• cargo clippy -p alknet-core --all-features --all-targets succeeds with no warnings
• auth.md updated: server-config decision documented (request-but-don't-require, not no-client-auth)

References

• tasks/core/endpoint-client-fingerprint.md — predecessor task (landed extraction, deferred this config change)
• crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs:477, 490, 501 — the three with_no_client_auth() sites
• crates/alknet-core/src/endpoint.rs — extract_quinn_client_fingerprint / extract_iroh_client_fingerprint (already landed, waiting for certs to flow)
• docs/architecture/crates/core/auth.md — fingerprint format table and endpoint-level resolution flow
• docs/architecture/decisions/004-auth-as-shared-core.md — ADR-004 (hybrid resolution)
• docs/architecture/open-questions.md — OQ-12 (TLS identity provisioning)

Notes

Split from core/endpoint-client-fingerprint per the task's own suggestion: extraction is correct either way (returns None when no cert), so landing it first is a safe no-op. This task is the behavioral change that makes fingerprints actually flow. The risk is medium because it alters the TLS handshake for every connection — ensure the no-cert-peer case has explicit test coverage.