alknet/docs/architecture/secret-service.md

status, last_updated

status	last_updated
reviewed	2026-06-10

Secret Service (alknet-secret)

What

The alknet-secret crate provides BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key derivation, AES-256-GCM encryption for external credentials, and the SecretProtocol irpc service. It is the only component that holds the master seed phrase.

Why

Operations like SSH key generation, API key storage, and Ethereum transaction signing all need deterministic key derivation from a single root of trust. The seed phrase is the single recovery mechanism — from it, all self-generated secrets can be derived on demand. External credentials (third-party API keys, OAuth tokens) cannot be derived and must be stored encrypted, with the encryption key itself derived from the seed.

The secret service isolates this responsibility: no other crate sees the seed, and derived keys are provided on demand through an irpc service interface. This follows ADR-027 (crate decomposition) — alknet-secret is fully independent of alknet-core and alknet-storage.

Architecture

Crate Structure

alknet-secret/
├── Cargo.toml
├── src/
│   ├── lib.rs           # Crate root, re-exports
│   ├── mnemonic.rs       # BIP39: phrase generation, validation, seed derivation
│   ├── derivation.rs     # SLIP-0010: HD key derivation, path constants
│   ├── encryption.rs     # AES-256-GCM: encrypt/decrypt, EncryptedData type
│   ├── protocol.rs       # SecretProtocol irpc service enum, DerivedKey, KeyType
│   ├── service.rs        # SecretServiceImpl: in-memory seed, Unlock/Lock lifecycle
│   └── cache.rs          # Key caching: LRU cache with TTL, derivation path as key
└── tests/
    ├── derivation_tests.rs  # Path derivation, coin type 74' consistency
    ├── encryption_tests.rs  # Round-trip encrypt/decrypt, key version
    ├── service_tests.rs     # Unlock/Lock lifecycle, derive on locked = error
    └── vectors_tests.rs     # Known-answer tests: BIP39, SLIP-0010, AES-256-GCM

Dependencies

[dependencies]
bip39 = "2"
ed25519-bip32 = "0.x"       # IOHK SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD derivation
aes-gcm = "0.10"             # AES-256-GCM
sha2 = "0.10"                 # SHA-256 (also used for HMAC-SHA512 in password derivation)
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
thiserror = "2"
irpc = "0.x"                  # Always-on, not feature-gated (ADR-027)
zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }  # Secure memory wiping (ADR-038)
base64 = "0.22"               # Base64url encoding for derived passwords

[dependencies.libsecp256k1]
version = "0.7"
optional = true               # BIP-0032 secp256k1 derivation (behind feature flag)

[features]
default = []
secp256k1 = ["libsecp256k1"]  # Enable Ethereum/secp256k1 key derivation

# Future (Phase B): key rotation via KDF
# hkdf = "0.12"               # HKDF for salt-based key stretching (deferred)
# pbkdf2 = "0.12"             # PBKDF2 for password-based key derivation (deferred)

irpc is always a dependency (not behind a feature flag). Per ADR-027, irpc in alknet-secret and alknet-storage is not feature-gated because these crates are used in production deployments where the service layer is always active.

The libsecp256k1 crate is feature-gated behind secp256k1 because Ethereum/BIP-0032 derivation is not needed in minimal deployments. Only deployments that require DeriveEthereumKey should enable this feature.

The hkdf and pbkdf2 crates are deferred to Phase B. They will be needed for salt-based key stretching when key rotation is implemented (see EncryptedData.salt).

Crate Interface (Public API)

The crate exposes these types as its stable public interface:

// Core types (always available)
pub use mnemonic::{Mnemonic, Language, Seed};
pub use derivation::{ExtendedPrivKey, DerivationPath, PATHS};
pub use encryption::{EncryptedData, EncryptionError};
pub use protocol::{SecretProtocol, DerivedKey, KeyType, SecretMessage};
pub use service::{SecretService, SecretServiceHandle, SecretServiceError};

// secp256k1 types (behind feature flag)
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
pub use derivation::Secp256k1ExtendedPrivKey;

Other crates consume this interface:

• alknet-storage references EncryptedData for wire format compatibility (type-level, not a crate dependency)
• alknet (CLI binary) assembles SecretService and wires it to the OperationEnv
• alknet-core never depends on alknet-secret; CredentialProvider stub returns None until Phase A wiring

Security Model

Per ADR-038 (seed lifecycle and memory security):

State	What's in memory	What's on disk
Locked	Nothing	Encrypted database, derivation path metadata
Unlocked	Master seed in zeroize-protected RAM	Same (seed is never persisted)
After use	Derived keys cached in zeroize-protected RAM	Derivation paths only

The seed phrase is entered once (at node startup or via Unlock), held only in RAM, and never written to disk. Lock calls zeroize() on the seed and all cached derived keys. The SecretService uses Zeroize-derived types for all sensitive material.

Key Caching

Per OQ-SVC-04 (resolved), derived keys are cached in RAM with the following properties:

• Cache key: The derivation path string (e.g., m/74'/0'/0'/0'). This uniquely identifies a derived key — the same path always produces the same key from the same seed.
• TTL: 1 hour (configurable). Cached entries expire after the TTL elapses, forcing re-derivation from the seed on next access.
• Eviction policy: LRU (least recently used). When the cache exceeds its maximum size, the least recently accessed entry is evicted.
• Clearing: The entire cache is cleared on Lock, and all entries are zeroized before removal per ADR-038.
• Implementation: The cache lives in cache.rs as an LRU map from derivation path to Zeroize-protected key bytes.

The cache avoids redundant derivation for frequently used keys (identity, encryption) while ensuring that Lock purges all sensitive material.

Key Derivation

BIP39 Mnemonic and Seed Derivation

let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_phrase(&phrase, Language::English)?;
let seed = mnemonic.to_seed(Some(&passphrase));
let master_key = ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Alknet, &seed)?;

SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD Key Derivation

The 74' coin type is unallocated per SLIP-0044 and reserved for alknet.

Derivation Path Constants

Path	Purpose	Curve/Algorithm
m/74'/0'/0'/0'	Primary identity keypair	Ed25519 (alknet auth)
m/74'/0'/0'/{n}'	Worker/device identity	Ed25519
m/74'/0'/1'/0'	SSH host key	Ed25519
m/74'/1'/0'/{hash}'	Site-specific password	Deterministic (HMAC-SHA512)
m/74'/2'/0'/0'	Encryption key for external credentials	AES-256-GCM
m/44'/60'/0'/0/0	Ethereum signing key	secp256k1

These constants are defined in derivation::PATHS for programmatic access.

Password Derivation

DerivePassword produces a deterministic password from the seed using the following algorithm:

1. Derive the extended private key at path m/74'/1'/0'/{hash}' using SLIP-0010 (HMAC-SHA512 with key "ed25519 seed"), where {hash}' is a site-specific hardened index derived from the site identifier.
2. Take the HMAC-SHA512 output (64 bytes) at that derivation level.
3. Truncate to the requested length bytes.
4. Encode as Base64url (RFC 4648 §5, no padding).

This produces a URL-safe, deterministic password of the requested length. v1 does not impose a special character set — the Base64url alphabet (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, -, _) provides sufficient entropy. If a specific character set is required in the future, a versioned path can be introduced (e.g., m/74'/1'/1'/{hash}').

secp256k1 Derivation (Ethereum)

DeriveEthereumKey uses BIP-0032 (not SLIP-0010) at path m/44'/60'/0'/0/0. This is a fundamentally different derivation algorithm from Ed25519:

• SLIP-0010 (Ed25519) uses HMAC-SHA512 with key "ed25519 seed" and only supports hardened child derivation.
• BIP-0032 (secp256k1) uses HMAC-SHA512 with key "Bitcoin seed" and supports both hardened and unhardened child derivation.

The Ethereum path contains unhardened indices (0/0), which are invalid under SLIP-0010. The alknet-secret crate gates secp256k1 derivation behind a secp256k1 feature flag, which pulls in the libsecp256k1 crate. Deployments that do not need Ethereum signing can omit this feature to avoid the dependency.

DerivedKey Security Properties

Per ADR-038, the private_key field of DerivedKey must derive Zeroize and use #[zeroize(drop)] to ensure sensitive key material is overwritten before deallocation:

#[derive(Zeroize)]
#[zeroize(drop)]
pub struct DerivedKey {
    pub key_type: KeyType,
    #[zeroize]
    pub private_key: Vec<u8>,
    pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
}

Because private_key is zeroized on drop, DerivedKey cannot derive Clone directly on the private_key field. Instead, Clone is implemented manually with a custom clone() that zeroizes the source's private_key after copying it, ensuring no two DerivedKey instances share the same Vec<u8> allocation.

AES-256-GCM Encryption for External Credentials

External credentials (API keys, OAuth tokens) that cannot be derived are encrypted using a key derived from the seed at path m/74'/2'/0'/0'. The EncryptedData type stores the key version, salt, IV, and ciphertext.

1. The secret service derives an AES-256-GCM key via path m/74'/2'/0'/0'
2. External credentials are encrypted with this key
3. The encrypted data is stored as a SecretNode in the metagraph
4. Only the derivation path and key version are stored in plain attributes
5. The seed phrase (or derived encryption key) is held only by the secret service — never in the database

EncryptedData.salt — Reserved for Future KDF-Based Key Rotation

In v1, the encryption key is derived directly from the seed at path m/74'/2'/0'/0' without any salt-based key derivation. The salt field in EncryptedData is reserved for future KDF-based key rotation (Phase B):

• The salt is generated randomly (32 bytes) and stored in EncryptedData.salt for forward compatibility, but it is not used in the v1 key derivation process.
• When key rotation is implemented, the salt will be used as input to HKDF or PBKDF2 for stretch-based key derivation, allowing the same seed to produce different encryption keys without changing the derivation path.
• This design ensures that the wire format does not need to change when key rotation is introduced — the salt field is already present and populated.

The hkdf and pbkdf2 crates are listed as future dependencies in the Dependencies section but are not included in v1.

SecretProtocol irpc Service

#[rpc_requests(message = SecretMessage)]
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
enum SecretProtocol {
    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<DerivedKey>)]
    #[wrap(DeriveEd25519)]
    DeriveEd25519 { path: String },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<DerivedKey>)]
    #[wrap(DeriveEncryptionKey)]
    DeriveEncryptionKey { path: String },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<DerivedKey>)]
    #[wrap(DeriveEthereumKey)]
    DeriveEthereumKey { path: String },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<Vec<u8>>)]
    #[wrap(DerivePassword)]
    DerivePassword { path: String, length: usize },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<EncryptedData>)]
    #[wrap(Encrypt)]
    Encrypt { plaintext: String, key_version: u32 },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<String>)]
    #[wrap(Decrypt)]
    Decrypt { encrypted: EncryptedData },

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<()>)]
    #[wrap(Lock)]
    Lock,

    #[rpc(tx=oneshot::Sender<()>)]
    #[wrap(Unlock)]
    Unlock { passphrase: String },
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct DerivedKey {
    key_type: KeyType,
    private_key: Vec<u8>,
    public_key: Vec<u8>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
enum KeyType {
    Ed25519,
    Aes256Gcm,
    Secp256k1,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct EncryptedData {
    key_version: u32,
    salt: String,   // Base64-encoded (reserved for future KDF, not used in v1)
    iv: String,     // Base64-encoded
    data: String,   // Base64-encoded
}

irpc Integration Model

The SecretProtocol enum defines the wire protocol — the set of operations the secret service supports. The #[rpc_requests(message = SecretMessage)] macro generates SecretMessage as the irpc wire type, which comes in two variants:

• SecretMessage::Request: serialized form for remote (QUIC) communication, using postcard encoding.
• SecretMessage::RequestWithChannels: local form with oneshot::Sender channels for in-process communication.

There are two dispatch paths for consuming the secret service:

1. Local (in-process): SecretServiceHandle wraps SecretServiceInner behind Arc<RwLock<>> and provides direct method calls (derive_ed25519(), encrypt(), etc.) without any serialization overhead. This is the path used by the CLI binary and single-node deployments. No irpc message passing is involved — the handle calls the implementation directly.

2. Remote (in-cluster): Client<SecretProtocol> connects to the secret service node via irpc over QUIC. The client sends SecretMessage::Request messages (postcard-serialized) and receives responses. Workers on remote nodes use this path. The seed never leaves the secret service node — only derived keys are transmitted.

The SecretService type owns the irpc service handler and a SecretServiceHandle. It dispatches incoming SecretMessage variants to the handle's methods. For call protocol exposure (e.g., /head/secrets/derive), the service is wrapped in an operation that serializes to JSON.

Wire Format Compatibility with alknet-storage

The EncryptedData type (key_version, salt, iv, data) is the stable wire format shared with alknet-storage. This is type-level compatibility — not a crate dependency. alknet-storage stores encrypted nodes using this format; alknet-secret encrypts and decrypts using this format.

The Rust EncryptedData struct in alknet-secret is a superset of the TypeScript EncryptedDataSchema from @alkdev/storage. Migration path: re-encrypt TypeScript-encrypted data using the Rust secret service with a new key version. The wire format is stable — future key rotation will use the existing salt field rather than adding new fields (see OQ-SVC-03).

Deployment Topologies

Minimal (single node, CLI): Secret service runs in the same process. Seed phrase entered at startup. All keys derived locally via SecretServiceHandle. No irpc overhead.

Production (head node): Secret service runs on a dedicated node or as a local irpc service. Workers request derived keys via Client<SecretProtocol> over QUIC. The seed never leaves the secret service node.

Test Vectors

Known-answer tests are required against published test vectors to verify correctness of the cryptographic implementations:

BIP39 Test Vectors

The mnemonic module must produce identical output to the BIP39 reference test vectors:

• Given a known mnemonic phrase and passphrase, the derived seed must match the reference output byte-for-byte.
• Test vectors from BIP39 reference and the bip39 crate's own test suite.

SLIP-0010 Test Vectors

The derivation module must produce identical output to the SLIP-0010 reference test vectors:

• Given a known seed, the derived master key (private key + chain code) must match the SLIP-0010 reference output.
• Given a known master key, the derived child key at path m/74'/0'/0'/0' must match the reference output.
• Test vectors from SLIP-0010 reference.

AES-256-GCM Test Vectors

The encryption module must produce identical results to published AES-256-GCM test vectors:

• Given a known key, IV, and plaintext, the ciphertext must match the reference output.
• Use IEEE P802.1ASck or NIST SP 800-38D test vectors.
• Round-trip encryption/decryption must always succeed for valid inputs.

These tests ensure that the implementation is correct and compatible with other BIP39/SLIP-0010/AES-256-GCM implementations. They are placed in tests/vectors_tests.rs.

Constraints

• The seed phrase is never persisted to disk. It is entered at startup or via Unlock and held only in Zeroize-protected RAM (ADR-038).
• Lock calls zeroize() on the seed and all cached derived keys. The key cache is fully cleared and zeroized on Lock (OQ-SVC-04, resolved).
• alknet-secret does not depend on alknet-core or alknet-storage. It is fully independent (ADR-027).
• The EncryptedData wire format is shared with alknet-storage for type-level compatibility, not a crate dependency.
• Per ADR-032, secret service domain events (key derivation notifications) stay within the service boundary. External consumers use irpc calls or call protocol operations projected to integration events.
• irpc is always a dependency (not feature-gated) per ADR-027.
• SecretProtocol defines the wire format for in-cluster communication (postcard serialization). For call protocol exposure (e.g., /head/secrets/derive), the service is wrapped in an operation that serializes to JSON.
• DerivedKey.private_key must derive Zeroize per ADR-038. Clone is implemented manually to zeroize the source on clone.
• secp256k1 (Ethereum) derivation is gated behind the secp256k1 feature flag because it requires a different derivation algorithm (BIP-0032) and an additional dependency (libsecp256k1).

Phase Progression

Phase	Scope	Notes
Phase 3 (now)	Basic crate: mnemonic, derivation, encryption, irpc protocol, service lifecycle, key caching	Core key management
Phase A	Integration with alknet-storage via EncryptedData wire format. CLI commands for unlock/lock/derive. SecretStoreCredentialProvider wiring.	Full service integration
Phase B	Memory hardening: mlock/VirtualLock for seed RAM, constant-time comparison, audit logging of derivation requests. Key rotation: KDF-based key derivation using EncryptedData.salt with HKDF/PBKDF2.	Security hardening
Phase C	Multi-seed support (tenant isolation): indexed Unlock with tenant ID.	Multi-tenancy

Open Questions

• OQ-SVC-01: Should the secret service support multiple seed phrases (one per tenant)? See open-questions.md.

• OQ-SVC-03: How does the secret service integrate with the existing EncryptedDataSchema from @alkdev/storage? Resolution: The wire format is stable. EncryptedData (key_version, salt, iv, data) is shared type-level between alknet-secret and alknet-storage. The migration path is re-encryption with a new key version. The salt field is reserved for future KDF-based key rotation (see Phase B). See open-questions.md.

• OQ-SVC-04: Should workers cache derived keys locally? Resolution: Yes. Derived keys are cached in RAM using an LRU cache keyed by derivation path, with a TTL of 1 hour (configurable). The cache is fully cleared and zeroized on Lock. This avoids redundant derivation for frequently used keys while ensuring that Lock purges all sensitive material. See open-questions.md.

• OQ-SEC-01: Should alknet-secret use mlock/VirtualLock to prevent seed RAM from being paged to disk? See open-questions.md. Deferred to Phase B per ADR-038.

Design Decisions

ADR	Decision	Summary
027	Crate decomposition	alknet-secret is independent of core and storage
032	Event boundary	Secret service domain events stay internal
038	Seed lifecycle and memory security	Zeroize for sensitive material, mlock deferred to Phase B

References

• research/services.md — SecretProtocol definition, DerivedKey, KeyType
• research/storage.md — Secrets section, derivation paths, EncryptedData
• research/integration-plan.md — Phase 3.1
• credentials.md — CredentialProvider (outbound auth, consumes SecretProtocol::Decrypt)
• SLIP-0010 — https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0010.md
• BIP39 — https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki
• BIP-0032 — https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki
• NIST SP 800-38D — AES-GCM test vectors