Add ADR-026 (vault key model — HD derivation) recording the foundational HD-derivation decision, 74' coin type reservation, SLIP-0010/Ed25519 default, secp256k1 feature-gating, and AES-256-GCM cipher choice. These were previously inline rationale with no ADR (W9). Extend ADR-018 with an explicit EncryptedData wire format lock — fields, encoding, and semantics are frozen; no removal without a format-version migration (W10). Resolve the remaining guard clauses and spec decisions: - W2: Capabilities must be immutable after construction (no interior mutability). Makes the Arc vs deep-copy clone semantics genuinely two-way. - W5: Published to_* specs are compatibility contracts — best-effort mappings are two-way before first publication, one-way after. Version generated specs. - W6: Salt field clarification — v2 salt is permanently unused; a future KDF is a different derivation family, not a version-indexed path; the field saves a wire-format change only. - W7: unlock_new returns Zeroizing<String> — the mnemonic is the root of trust and must not linger in freed memory. - W17: OQ-09 WASM — server-side dispatch door is honestly closed (Connection is concrete, tokio-bound), not implicitly preserved. - W18: OQ-10 git — composability fork (raw smart protocol vs call-protocol projection) is a separate decision from ERC721 scope. - W20: from_openapi must prefix imported error codes (HTTP_404) to avoid collision with protocol-level codes (NOT_FOUND). Normative rule, not naming convention. - W21: ScopedOperationEnv field is private — construction via new()/ empty(), query via allows(). Makes the future subgraph refactor non-breaking. - C13: Connection::set_identity — the endpoint does not read identity() after handle() returns (Connection is moved into the spawned task). Observability is handler-side logging. Simplest honest answer. - W1: OperationAdapter trait is async, returns Vec<HandlerRegistration>. from_call requires async discovery; ADR-022 changed the return type. - W11: CompositionAuthority::as_identity() defined — constructs a synthetic Identity (label as id, scopes, resources) not resolvable via IdentityProvider. Second Identity construction path, acknowledged. - W14: SecretKey is iroh::SecretKey (Ed25519) — consistent with the endpoint's iroh dependency. - W19: Grandchild abort propagation is inherit-by-default (option a) — invoke() with no explicit policy inherits parent's policy. ContinueRunning auto-propagates to grandchildren unless explicitly overridden.
10 KiB
status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-06-22-21 |
Configuration
StaticConfig, DynamicConfig, ArcSwap, and ConfigReloadHandle.
StaticConfig
Immutable configuration resolved at startup. Cannot be changed without restarting the endpoint.
pub struct StaticConfig {
/// Bind address for the quinn endpoint (e.g., "0.0.0.0:4433").
/// None if the quinn endpoint is not configured (iroh-only node).
pub listen_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
/// TLS identity mode for the quinn endpoint.
/// Required if listen_addr is Some.
pub tls_identity: Option<TlsIdentity>,
/// iroh relay URL (e.g., "https://relay.iroh.network/").
/// None if the iroh endpoint is not configured.
pub iroh_relay: Option<RelayUrl>,
/// Drain timeout for graceful shutdown (default: 2 seconds).
pub drain_timeout: Duration,
}
/// TLS identity configuration for the quinn endpoint.
pub enum TlsIdentity {
/// X.509 certificate for domain-facing identity.
/// Required for browser/WebTransport clients.
X509 {
cert: PathBuf,
key: PathBuf,
},
/// RFC 7250 raw Ed25519 public key.
/// No domain, no CA, no cert renewal. Key = identity.
/// Same model as iroh's NodeId, but for direct QUIC connections.
/// `SecretKey` is `iroh::SecretKey` (Ed25519) — re-exported from iroh,
/// which alknet-core already depends on (feature-gated, ADR-010). The
/// key can be derived from alknet-vault at the assembly layer
/// (endpoint.md) or generated fresh. See OQ-12, W14.
RawKey(iroh::SecretKey),
/// Self-signed X.509 cert for development.
/// Generated on startup, not validated by external clients.
SelfSigned,
}
Why TlsIdentity instead of tls_cert/tls_key options
TLS identity in alknet has two distinct use cases, not one. The original tls_cert: Option<PathBuf> / tls_key: Option<PathBuf> assumed X.509 was the only TLS identity model. RFC 7250 raw public keys (used by iroh, supported by rustls) provide a fundamentally different mode: Ed25519 key as identity, no X.509, no CA, no domain. This is the default for most alknet nodes — it works natively with SSH auth and git. X.509 certs are for domain-hosted services and browser/WebTransport clients, which don't support RFC 7250.
The TlsIdentity enum captures both use cases plus a development mode. See OQ-12 for the full rationale.
Key differences from reference implementation
The reference StaticConfig (in alknet-main/crates/alknet-core/src/config/static_config.rs) is SSH-centric: it holds host_key, host_key_algorithm, proxy_config, stealth, transport_mode, and listeners. The new model removes all of these:
- No
host_key/host_key_algorithm: SSH host keys are managed by the SSH handler, not by core config. The endpoint uses TLS certs, not SSH host keys. - No
proxy_config: Outbound proxy is an SSH-specific concern (SOCKS5/HTTP CONNECT forwarding). Not in core config. - No
stealth: ALPN eliminates the need for stealth/byte-peeking. See ADR-001. - No
transport_mode/listeners: The oldServeTransportModeandListenerConfigenum are replaced bylisten_addr(quinn) andiroh_relay(iroh). Both are optional — a node can use either or both. See ADR-010.
Construction
StaticConfig is constructed by the CLI binary from CLI arguments or a config file. The exact shape of StartupOptions (or whatever the CLI uses) is a CLI concern, not a core concern. alknet-core provides StaticConfig as a data structure; the CLI is responsible for populating it.
// The CLI binary constructs StaticConfig from its own options/config.
// StartupOptions is NOT a core type — it belongs to the alknet CLI binary.
// alknet-core receives a fully populated StaticConfig.
// P2P / key-based identity (default for most nodes)
let p2p_config = StaticConfig {
listen_addr: Some("0.0.0.0:4433".parse()?),
tls_identity: Some(TlsIdentity::RawKey(iroh::SecretKey::generate())),
iroh_relay: None,
drain_timeout: Duration::from_secs(2),
};
// Domain-hosted service (relays, public services, browsers)
let domain_config = StaticConfig {
listen_addr: Some("0.0.0.0:4433".parse()?),
tls_identity: Some(TlsIdentity::X509 {
cert: "/path/to/cert.pem".into(),
key: "/path/to/key.pem".into(),
}),
iroh_relay: None,
drain_timeout: Duration::from_secs(2),
};
DynamicConfig
Runtime-reloadable configuration. Hot-reloaded via ArcSwap without restarting the endpoint.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct DynamicConfig {
pub auth: AuthPolicy,
pub rate_limits: RateLimitConfig,
}
AuthPolicy
Authorization policy derived from authorized keys, certificate authorities, and API keys.
pub struct AuthPolicy {
/// SHA-256 fingerprints of authorized keys (SSH keys, TLS client certs).
/// Stored as strings to avoid russh dependency in core.
pub authorized_fingerprints: HashSet<String>,
/// API keys for token-based auth.
pub api_keys: Vec<ApiKeyEntry>,
}
Certificate authority entries for cert-based auth will be added when
alknet-ssh is implemented. The cert_authorities field is omitted from v1
to avoid referencing an undefined type. Adding it back is additive (a new
field on AuthPolicy is non-breaking for existing config files that don't
use it). alknet-ssh will define CertAuthorityEntry with the necessary
fields (public key, principals, options).
This replaces the reference implementation's AuthPolicy which depended on russh::keys::PublicKey. The new version stores fingerprints as strings, not russh types. This removes the russh dependency from alknet-core.
ApiKeyEntry
pub struct ApiKeyEntry {
/// Key prefix (first 8 chars of the key). Used for O(1) lookup.
pub prefix: String,
/// SHA-256 hash of the full key. Used for verification.
pub hash: String,
/// Authorization scopes granted by this key.
pub scopes: Vec<String>,
/// Human-readable description.
pub description: String,
/// Unix timestamp when the key expires. None = never expires.
pub expires_at: Option<u64>,
}
Carries forward from the reference implementation with no changes.
RateLimitConfig
pub struct RateLimitConfig {
pub max_connections_per_ip: usize,
pub max_auth_attempts: usize,
}
Carries forward from the reference implementation. Rate limits are entirely dynamic — StaticConfig does not contain rate limit fields. The CLI binary sets initial RateLimitConfig values when constructing the initial DynamicConfig. Hot-reloading via ConfigReloadHandle replaces rate limits immediately without restart.
ArcSwap Pattern
DynamicConfig is wrapped in Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>> for lock-free reads and atomic swaps.
let dynamic = Arc::new(ArcSwap::new(Arc::new(DynamicConfig::default())));
- Reads:
dynamic.load()returnsArc<DynamicConfig>. Multiple readers can hold references simultaneously without blocking. - Writes:
dynamic.store(Arc::new(new_config))atomically replaces the config. All subsequent reads see the new config. - No locks:
ArcSwapuses atomic operations. No reader is ever blocked by a writer.
This pattern carries forward directly from the reference implementation (alknet-main/crates/alknet-core/src/config/dynamic_config.rs).
ConfigReloadHandle
pub struct ConfigReloadHandle {
dynamic: Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>>,
}
impl ConfigReloadHandle {
pub fn reload(&self, new_config: DynamicConfig);
pub fn dynamic(&self) -> Arc<DynamicConfig>;
}
reload(): Atomically replaces the dynamic config. All subsequent reads (including in-flightIdentityProvidercalls) see the new config.dynamic(): Returns the current config asArc<DynamicConfig>.
The CLI binary creates a ConfigReloadHandle and passes it to a config watcher (file watcher, SIGHUP handler, or call protocol operation) that calls reload() when config changes are detected.
Config reload is a privilege-escalation path. ConfigIdentityProvider reads from ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>, so a reload that adds an authorized fingerprint or API key grants access immediately. A malicious reload is equivalent to root-level privilege grant. The reload trigger must be authenticated/local-only: SIGHUP (local signal), local file watch, or an admin call protocol operation with the same auth treatment as any other mutation (requires admin scope, ADR-015). The implementation must not ship a reload endpoint with no auth "for convenience."
ConfigError
pub enum ConfigError {
InvalidFlag { name: String },
KeyFileNotFound { path: String },
BindFailed(io::Error),
TlsConfig(io::Error),
IncompatibleOptions,
}
Simplified from the reference implementation. Removes proxy-specific errors (now an SSH concern) and listener validation errors (no more ListenerConfig enum).
Key Differences from Reference Implementation
| Aspect | Reference | New Model |
|---|---|---|
| StaticConfig fields | SSH host key, stealth, transport_mode, listeners, proxy | listen_addr, TLS cert/key, drain_timeout |
| DynamicConfig.auth | HashSet<PublicKey> (russh types) |
HashSet<String> (fingerprint strings) |
| ListenerConfig | Enum with Stream/Http/Dns variants | Eliminated — single endpoint, ALPN dispatch |
| TransportMode | Tcp/Tls/Iroh | Eliminated — always QUIC+TLS |
| Stealth mode | Byte-peeking HTTP/SSH detection | Eliminated — ALPN handles protocol detection |
| ForwardingPolicy | In DynamicConfig | Moved to handler-specific config (SSH) |
Design Decisions
| Decision | ADR | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| No russh dependency in core | ADR-003 | Core is ALPN-agnostic; russh is an alknet-ssh dependency |
| ArcSwap for dynamic config | Carry-forward from reference | Lock-free reads, atomic swaps |
| No ListenerConfig | ADR-001 | Single endpoint, ALPN replaces multiple listener types |