Files
alknet/docs/architecture/crates/call
glm-5.2 400c60e7f4 docs(architecture): security constraints from security review
Address security review findings by adding explicit constraints to specs
and implementation specialist role:

Architectural constraints (spec updates):
- metadata does not propagate through OperationEnv::invoke() — fresh
  HashMap for nested calls, closes the back-door leak channel where a
  handler that puts a secret in metadata would leak it to children and
  across from_call to remote nodes (ADR-014)
- Config reload must be authenticated/local-only — malicious reload =
  root-equivalent privilege grant (config.md)
- from_call trust is transitive — scoped env bounds reachability, not
  what the remote op does (operation-registry.md)
- Token entropy ≥128 bits — prefix is lookup aid not secret, offline
  hash verification requires high-entropy tokens (auth.md)

Implementation constraints (auth.md security constraints section + role spec):
- OsRng for cryptographic nonces (AES-GCM IV reuse is catastrophic)
- CachedKey derives Zeroize/ZeroizeOnDrop (no secrets in freed heap)
- No unwrap()/expect() outside tests (poisoned lock recovery, not crash)
- Implementation specialist role spec updated with all four constraints
2026-06-19 06:55:54 +00:00
..

status, last_updated
status last_updated
draft 2026-06-21

alknet-call

Structured RPC over QUIC: operations, request/response, streaming subscriptions, and service discovery. Implements ProtocolHandler on ALPN alknet/call.

Documents

Document Status Description
call-protocol.md draft CallAdapter, EventEnvelope framing, stream model, PendingRequestMap, bidirectional calls
operation-registry.md draft OperationSpec, Handler, OperationRegistry, AccessControl, service discovery, irpc integration

Applicable ADRs

ADR Title Relevance
001 ALPN-Based Protocol Dispatch CallAdapter registers on ALPN alknet/call
002 ProtocolHandler Trait CallAdapter implements ProtocolHandler
003 Crate Decomposition alknet-call depends on alknet-core and irpc
004 Auth as Shared Core AuthContext passed to call handlers
005 irpc as Call Protocol Foundation irpc provides framing and service dispatch
006 ALPN String Convention alknet/call ALPN, one ALPN per connection
007 BiStream Type Definition CallAdapter receives Connection, not BiStream
008 Vault Integration Point Vault accessed at assembly layer, not on the wire
010 ALPN Router and Endpoint Static handler registration
012 Call Protocol Stream Model Bidirectional streams, EventEnvelope, ID-based correlation
014 Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection Call protocol carries no secret material; capabilities injected at assembly layer
015 Privilege Model and Authority Context internal = authority switch not ACL skip; External/Internal visibility; handler identity + scoped env
016 Abort Cascade for Nested Calls call.aborted cascades to descendants; default abort-dependents, continue-running opt-in
017 Call Protocol Client and Adapter Contract CallClient opens connections; from_call imports remote ops; connection direction independent of call direction

Relevant Open Questions

OQ Title Status Relevance
OQ-07 Call protocol scope within a connection resolved (ADR-012) Stream model, multiplexing, scope
OQ-13 Operation path format and routing scope resolved /{service}/{op} is the correct design; remote dispatch is a separate layer
OQ-14 Batch operation semantics resolved Correlated call.requested events is the correct protocol design
OQ-16 Safe vault operations for call protocol exposure resolved (ADR-014) None exposed for now
OQ-19 Session-scoped operation registries resolved Agent-written operations overlaid on global registry via OperationEnv trait layering. Protocol doesn't need changes; OperationEnv must remain a trait

Key Design Principles

  1. One connection, full access: An alknet/call connection gives access to the entire operation registry — calls, subscriptions, batch, schema.
  2. Protocol is symmetric: Both sides can initiate calls. The server calling a client uses the same EventEnvelope format and correlation.
  3. Stream-agnostic correlation: PendingRequestMap correlates by request ID, not by stream. The protocol works with any stream arrangement.
  4. Operation registry is static: Operations are registered at startup by the CLI binary. The registry supports JSON Schema discovery.
  5. irpc is one dispatch backend: Local operations dispatch directly. irpc service calls (in-process, type-safe) are internal. The call protocol is the external interface.
  6. Local dispatch only: The operation registry dispatches to local handlers. Remote dispatch (federation, head/worker routing) would be a separate mechanism at a different layer, not a modification to alknet-call's path format.
  7. No secret material on the wire: The call protocol carries no private keys, API keys, mnemonics, or decrypted credentials. Handlers receive outbound credentials through OperationContext.capabilities, injected at the assembly layer. See ADR-014.
  8. Abort cascades to descendants: call.aborted for a parent request cascades to all non-terminal descendants. Default abort-dependents; continue-running opt-in. See ADR-016.
  9. Internal calls switch authority context, not skip ACL: The internal flag marks composition-originated calls. ACL runs against the handler's identity, not the caller's and not as a blanket skip. Operations have External/Internal visibility. Scoped composition env bounds reachability. See ADR-015.