Files
alknet/tasks/vault/poisoned-lock-recovery.md
glm-5.2 098fd8b9b9 tasks: decompose vault, core, call crates into 28 atomic implementation tasks
Break down the three initial crates (alknet-vault, alknet-core, alknet-call)
into dependency-ordered task files for implementation agents.

Structure:
- tasks/vault/ (10 tasks) — drift fixes from ADR-025/026 refactor, review,
  spec sync. Vault is independent and can run fully in parallel with core/call.
- tasks/core/ (6 tasks) — crate init, core types, config, auth, endpoint,
  review. Core is foundational; call depends on it.
- tasks/call/ (12 tasks) — split into registry/ and protocol/ topic subdirs
  reflecting the two subsystems. CallAdapter is the merge point.

Key decisions:
- Drifts 3+9+10 grouped as one task (key-versioning-rotation) — the complete
  ADR-021 rotation feature that doesn't compile in pieces
- Reviews injected at end of each crate phase (vault, core, call)
- Vault spec-sync task removes the drift table and bumps doc status to stable
- ACME deferred in core/endpoint (noted as TODO; X509 manual certs for now)
- OperationEnv kept as a trait (load-bearing for ADR-024 layering)

Validated: 28 tasks, no cycles, 11 generations of parallel work.
Critical path runs through call (11 tasks). Vault completes by generation 4.
6 high-risk tasks identified (21%): irpc-removal, endpoint, operation-context,
operation-env, call-adapter, abort-cascade.
2026-06-23 12:41:47 +00:00

3.3 KiB

id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level
id name status depends_on scope risk impact level
vault/poisoned-lock-recovery Replace unwrap() on RwLock acquisition with poisoned-lock recovery via unwrap_or_else pending
vault/irpc-removal
narrow low component implementation

Description

Fix drift item #2: VaultServiceHandle methods use unwrap() on every RwLock acquisition (read and write locks). A poisoned lock (caused by a panic while the lock was held) would brick the vault for all subsequent operations. Replace with unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) to recover the inner data from a poisoned lock, or explicit error propagation where appropriate.

Current state

service.rs uses .unwrap() on RwLock read and write acquisitions at approximately lines 142, 161, 182, 191, 196, 227, 264, 307, 340, 367 (line numbers may shift after the irpc removal task — match by pattern: every .read().unwrap() and .write().unwrap() call in VaultServiceHandle method bodies).

Target state

For read locks:

let inner = self.inner.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());

For write locks:

let mut inner = self.inner.write().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());

The rationale: a poisoned lock means a panic occurred while the lock was held. The data may be in an inconsistent state, but bricking the vault (panicking on every subsequent call) is worse than attempting to continue. The vault's operations are idempotent reads (derive) and state transitions (lock/unlock) — recovering the inner data and continuing is the pragmatic choice. If the data is truly corrupted, the next operation will fail with a normal error, not a panic.

No unwrap() or expect() outside tests

This is a general constraint for the vault: no unwrap() or expect() outside test code. After fixing the RwLock acquisitions, audit the rest of service.rs for any remaining unwrap()/expect() calls and replace them with proper error propagation (? operator, explicit Result returns, or unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) for lock recovery).

Scope

This task touches service.rs only. It depends on the irpc removal task (drift #4) because that task restructures service.rs — doing this first would cause merge conflicts.

Acceptance Criteria

  • All .read().unwrap() calls in VaultServiceHandle methods replaced with .read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
  • All .write().unwrap() calls in VaultServiceHandle methods replaced with .write().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
  • No unwrap() or expect() calls remain in service.rs outside of test code
  • Unit test: vault remains usable after a simulated panic (poison the lock, verify next call recovers)
  • cargo test succeeds
  • cargo clippy succeeds with no warnings

References

  • docs/architecture/crates/vault/README.md — Known Source Drift table item #2
  • docs/architecture/crates/vault/service.md — Security Constraints: No unwrap() outside tests
  • docs/architecture/decisions/025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md — ADR-025

Notes

A panic in one vault operation must not brick the vault for all other operations. The poisoned-lock recovery via unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) is the standard Rust pattern for this. This task depends on the irpc removal task because both modify service.rs heavily.

Summary

To be filled on completion