Untangles the conflation of three distinct remote roles under 'X.509 endpoint': (1) public X.509 endpoint — a remote HTTPS/call-over-TLS server the local node is a client of (no PeerEntry, no PeerId, not in the peer graph; CA verification + bearer token); (2) transport relay — iroh's DERP-equivalent, infrastructure, not an alknet peer; (3) hub / hosting node — an alknet peer that also exposes a public domain + X.509 for browsers (mixed-fingerprint PeerEntry, already supported by ADR-030). The load-bearing one-way door is the client-side verifier selection rule: known peer (PeerEntry present) → fingerprint pin; unknown X.509 remote → CA verification (WebPkiServerVerifier); unknown Ed25519 remote → fails closed. This closes the AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier security hole OQ-29 flagged, with the peer-model criterion (PeerEntry presence) made explicit. The 'make PeerEntry symmetric' instinct is rejected — pure-client connections to public APIs have no stable logical identity to pin. Documents that CallCredentials.remote_identity: None is load-bearing (None = public X.509 endpoint → CA path, not a missing field; Some = known peer → fingerprint pin), closing a subtle gap where an implementer could have defaulted to a placeholder or treated None as skip-verify. Records WebTransport relay-as-proxy (deferred with h3/WebTransport, new OQ-HTTP-07) and on-chain/smart-contract peer discovery (fits the OQ-36 repo/adapter pattern, no auth-model change) so they aren't lost. Amends auth.md and client-and-adapters.md with the three-role naming, the verifier selection rule, and the Option semantics; updates OQ-37 to resolved in open-questions.md, README.md, and both crate READMEs.
status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-06-27 |
alknet-core
Core library for ALPN-based protocol dispatch. Every handler crate depends on alknet-core.
Documents
| Document | Status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| core-types.md | draft | ProtocolHandler trait, HandlerError, Connection, BiStream, StreamError |
| endpoint.md | draft | ALPN router, HandlerRegistry, accept loop, graceful shutdown |
| auth.md | draft | AuthContext, Identity, IdentityProvider, AuthToken, resolution flow, PeerEntry, CredentialStore |
| config.md | draft | StaticConfig, DynamicConfig, ArcSwap, ConfigReloadHandle, AuthPolicy.peers |
Applicable ADRs
| ADR | Title | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| 001 | ALPN-Based Protocol Dispatch | Core architectural model |
| 002 | ProtocolHandler Trait | The trait every handler implements |
| 003 | Crate Decomposition | alknet-core's position in the crate graph |
| 004 | Auth as Shared Core | IdentityProvider in core |
| 006 | ALPN String Convention | ALPN format, one-ALPN-per-connection |
| 007 | BiStream Type Definition | Connection, BiStream trait, SendStream, RecvStream |
| 009 | One-Way Door Framework | Decision classification |
| 010 | ALPN Router and Endpoint | Endpoint, HandlerRegistry, accept loop |
| 011 | AuthContext Structure | AuthContext fields and resolution flow |
| 015 | Privilege Model and Authority Context | Per-request identity on OperationContext; admin scope for config reload |
| 030 | PeerEntry and Identity.id Decoupling | authorized_fingerprints → peers: Vec<PeerEntry>; Identity.id = peer_id (stable) |
| 031 | CredentialStore Repo Trait | Second repo trait in core; InMemoryCredentialStore default adapter |
| 033 | Storage Boundary and Repo/Adapter Pattern | Core defines traits + in-memory defaults; persistence adapters are separate crates |
Relevant Open Questions
| OQ | Title | Status | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| OQ-04 | Dynamic handler registration | resolved (start static) | HandlerRegistry is immutable at startup |
| OQ-05 | Multi-connectivity endpoint | resolved (quinn + iroh) | AlknetEndpoint supports both, both feature-gated |
| OQ-11 | Handler-level auth resolution observability | resolved | Handlers store resolved identity on Connection; two identity scopes (connection-level for observability, per-request for ACL) |
| OQ-33 | PeerId — logical id vs crypto identity | resolved by ADR-030 | PeerId = Identity.id = PeerEntry.peer_id (stable across key rotation) |
| OQ-34 | Persistent peer registry (storage boundary) | resolved by ADR-030+031+033 | Core defines repo traits + in-memory defaults; persistence adapters are separate crates |
| OQ-35 | dissolved | PeerEntry supports multiple credential paths; ApiKeyEntry is for tokens that ARE the identity |
|
| OQ-36 | Concrete persistence adapter shapes | open (deferred for exploration) | The repo/adapter pattern is committed (ADR-033); in-memory adapters ship with core; persistence adapters deferred |
| OQ-37 | X.509 outgoing-only case | resolved by ADR-034 | Three remote roles (public X.509 endpoint, transport relay, hub); PeerEntry asymmetry correct; client-side verifier by PeerEntry presence (CA vs fingerprint pin) |
Key Design Principles
- One trait, one dispatch point:
ProtocolHandleris the only abstraction handlers implement. No StreamInterface/MessageInterface split. - ALPN does the routing: The endpoint dispatches by ALPN string. No byte-peeking, no ListenerConfig enum.
- Handlers own their wire format: Each handler manages its own protocol parsing. alknet-core provides the Connection, not the framing.
- Auth is hybrid: The endpoint provides what it can (TLS-level auth). Handlers complete what they need. AuthContext may be partial.
- WASM door preserved: BiStream is a trait, Connection is an opaque type. Core types don't assume tokio or quinn in public APIs.