Replace AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier (a security hole for X.509) with verifier selection by PeerEntry presence (ADR-034 §3, OQ-29): - build_client_auth presents the Ed25519 key as an RFC 7250 raw public key client cert (replaces with_no_client_auth), activating the PeerEntry fingerprint -> peer_id resolution path on quinn. - select_server_verifier: Some(fingerprint) -> FingerprintPinVerifier (fingerprint match for known peers); None -> WebPkiServerVerifier (CA verification for public X.509 endpoints). None + Ed25519 raw key fails closed at handshake (no CA to fall back to). - FingerprintPinVerifier matches ed25519:<hex> (raw key extraction) and SHA256:<hex> (DER hash); verifies handshake signatures via verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key / verify_tls12/13_signature. - Extract shared fingerprint logic into alknet_core::fingerprint (pub module) reused by endpoint (server-side) and call_client (client-side). - remote_identity: None is load-bearing (not defaulted to placeholder). - Integration tests updated to pin the self-signed server cert fingerprint (the known-peer path).
265 lines
9.6 KiB
Rust
265 lines
9.6 KiB
Rust
//! TLS certificate fingerprint extraction (ADR-030 §6, ADR-034 §3).
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//!
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//! Fingerprint formats:
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//! - **Ed25519 raw key** (RFC 7250 SPKI): `ed25519:<hex of 32-byte pub key>`.
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//! The fingerprint IS the trust anchor — raw-key remotes have no CA, so the
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//! fingerprint is the identity (ADR-034 §2 assumption 1). Normalized to
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//! `ed25519:<hex>` across quinn and iroh (ADR-030 §6).
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//! - **X.509 cert**: `SHA256:<hex of DER>`. Used by the hub X.509 path
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//! (ADR-034 §3 — fingerprint pinning for known hubs with a prior P2P trust
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//! relationship). Not used for arbitrary public APIs (those use CA
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//! verification via `WebPkiServerVerifier`, not fingerprint pinning).
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//!
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//! Shared by the server-side endpoint (`alknet_core::endpoint`, which extracts
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//! the fingerprint from the presented client cert for `PeerEntry` resolution)
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//! and the client-side `FingerprintPinVerifier` in `alknet_call::client`
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//! (which matches the server's presented cert against a pinned fingerprint).
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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/// Compute the fingerprint of a TLS certificate DER (RFC 7250 raw public key
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/// SPKI or X.509 cert). Returns `ed25519:<hex>` when `cert_der` is an Ed25519
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/// SPKI, otherwise `SHA256:<hex of full DER>`. Returns `None` only when the
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/// input is empty (a non-Ed25519 SPKI or a malformed DER still hashes to a
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/// `SHA256:` fingerprint — the hash is the fallback).
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pub fn fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
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if let Some(raw_key) = extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der) {
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return Some(format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key)));
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}
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(cert_der);
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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Some(format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(digest)))
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}
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/// `SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }`
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/// `AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY OPTIONAL }`
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/// For Ed25519 the algorithm OID is `1.3.101.112` (DER bytes `2b 65 70`), with
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/// no parameters, and `subjectPublicKey` is a BIT STRING containing one
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/// unused-bits byte (`0x00`) followed by the 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key.
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/// Returns the 32 raw key bytes when `cert_der` is an RFC 7250 raw public key
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/// (SPKI) with the Ed25519 algorithm identifier; returns `None` otherwise
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/// (X.509 cert, non-Ed25519 SPKI, or malformed DER), in which case callers
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/// should fall back to hashing the full DER.
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pub fn extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
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const ED25519_OID_BYTES: [u8; 3] = [0x2b, 0x65, 0x70];
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let mut parser = DerParser::new(cert_der);
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let spki_contents = parser.expect_sequence()?;
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let mut spki_parser = DerParser::new(spki_contents);
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let alg_id_contents = spki_parser.expect_sequence()?;
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let mut alg_id_parser = DerParser::new(alg_id_contents);
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let oid_bytes = alg_id_parser.expect_oid()?;
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if oid_bytes != ED25519_OID_BYTES {
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return None;
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}
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let bit_string_contents = spki_parser.expect_bit_string()?;
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if bit_string_contents.len() != 33 || bit_string_contents[0] != 0x00 {
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return None;
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}
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let mut raw_key = [0u8; 32];
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raw_key.copy_from_slice(&bit_string_contents[1..33]);
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Some(raw_key)
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}
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struct DerParser<'a> {
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bytes: &'a [u8],
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}
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impl<'a> DerParser<'a> {
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fn new(bytes: &'a [u8]) -> Self {
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Self { bytes }
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}
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fn read_tlv(&mut self) -> Option<(u8, &'a [u8])> {
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let (tag, len_size, header_len) = self.decode_header()?;
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let total = header_len.checked_add(len_size)?;
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if total > self.bytes.len() {
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return None;
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}
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let content = &self.bytes[header_len..total];
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self.bytes = &self.bytes[total..];
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Some((tag, content))
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}
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fn decode_header(&self) -> Option<(u8, usize, usize)> {
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if self.bytes.is_empty() {
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return None;
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}
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let tag = self.bytes[0];
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if self.bytes.len() < 2 {
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return None;
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}
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let first_len = self.bytes[1];
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if first_len < 0x80 {
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return Some((tag, first_len as usize, 2));
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}
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let num_bytes = (first_len & 0x7f) as usize;
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if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
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return None;
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}
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if self.bytes.len() < 2 + num_bytes {
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return None;
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}
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let mut len: usize = 0;
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for i in 0..num_bytes {
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len = (len << 8) | (self.bytes[2 + i] as usize);
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}
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Some((tag, len, 2 + num_bytes))
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}
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fn expect_sequence(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
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let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
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if tag == 0x30 {
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Some(content)
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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fn expect_oid(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
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let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
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if tag == 0x06 {
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Some(content)
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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fn expect_bit_string(&mut self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
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let (tag, content) = self.read_tlv()?;
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if tag == 0x03 {
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Some(content)
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn build_ed25519_spki_der(raw_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
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let spki = rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(&rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519, raw_key);
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spki.to_vec()
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_produces_sha256_hex_format() {
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let cert_der = b"fake-leaf-cert-der-bytes";
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let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("non-empty cert produces fingerprint");
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assert!(
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fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
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"fingerprint must be SHA256-prefixed, got: {fp}"
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);
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let hex_part = &fp["SHA256:".len()..];
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assert_eq!(
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hex_part.len(),
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64,
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"hex digest must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
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);
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assert!(
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hex_part.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
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"hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
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);
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(cert_der);
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let expected = format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize()));
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assert_eq!(fp, expected, "fingerprint must match SHA-256 of cert DER");
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_cert_der_deterministic() {
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let cert = b"some-cert";
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let a = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
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let b = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(a, b, "same cert DER must produce same fingerprint");
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_produces_ed25519_prefix() {
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let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
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let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
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let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
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let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
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assert!(
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fp.starts_with("ed25519:"),
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"Ed25519 raw key SPKI must produce ed25519: fingerprint, got: {fp}"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_is_lowercase_hex_of_32_byte_key() {
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let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
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let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
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let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
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let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
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let hex_part = &fp["ed25519:".len()..];
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assert_eq!(
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hex_part.len(),
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64,
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"ed25519 hex part must be 64 chars (32 bytes), got: {fp}"
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);
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assert!(
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hex_part
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.chars()
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.all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit() && !c.is_ascii_uppercase()),
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"ed25519 hex part must be lowercase hex, got: {fp}"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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hex_part,
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hex::encode(raw_key),
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"ed25519 fingerprint must be hex of the raw 32-byte key, not the DER wrapper"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_ed25519_spki_matches_iroh_format() {
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let sk = crate::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
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let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
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let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
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let quinn_fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("spki produces fingerprint");
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let iroh_fp = format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(raw_key));
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assert_eq!(
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quinn_fp, iroh_fp,
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"same Ed25519 key must produce the same fingerprint via quinn SPKI and iroh NodeId paths"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_x509_cert_stays_sha256_of_der() {
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let cert_der = b"fake-x509-cert-der-bytes-not-an-spki";
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let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der).expect("x509 produces fingerprint");
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assert!(
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fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
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"X.509 cert must keep SHA256: format, got: {fp}"
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);
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(cert_der);
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assert_eq!(
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fp,
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format!("SHA256:{}", hex::encode(hasher.finalize())),
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"X.509 fingerprint must be SHA-256 of cert DER"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fingerprint_from_non_ed25519_spki_falls_back_to_sha256() {
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let raw_key = [0u8; 32];
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let fake_non_ed25519_spki: Vec<u8> = vec![
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0x30, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0x15, 0x00, 0x20,
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]
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.into_iter()
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.chain(raw_key.iter().copied())
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.collect();
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let fp = fingerprint_from_cert_der(&fake_non_ed25519_spki).expect("fallback fingerprint");
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assert!(
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fp.starts_with("SHA256:"),
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"non-Ed25519 SPKI must fall back to SHA256, got: {fp}"
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);
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}
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}
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