Files
alknet/docs/architecture/crates/call
glm-5.2 7dda6eec68 docs(architecture): add ADR-025 — vault local-only dispatch, drop irpc
Drops irpc from alknet-vault entirely. The vault's dispatch is now direct
method calls on VaultServiceHandle — no VaultProtocol enum, no
VaultMessage, no VaultServiceActor, no mpsc channel, no Service trait, no
RemoteService trait, no postcard serialization. The vault is local-only by
construction.

The core security argument: irpc made the vault remote-capable by default
(RemoteService generated unless no_rpc is passed). The IrohProtocol handler
forwards all messages without auth. The docs framed 'register an ALPN' as a
server-setup change. This is the default-insecure anti-pattern — security
should be opt-in, not opt-out. ADR-025 inverts the default: local-only is
the only mode, and remote access requires building a separate vault-server
crate (a visible architectural act, not a flag flip).

The actor path was already dead code — service.md said 'prefer
VaultServiceHandle directly — no channel, no serialization.' The actor
existed only to make irpc's Service trait work, which existed only to make
RemoteService work, which was the footgun. VaultServiceHandle's
Arc<RwLock> provides concurrent reads and exclusive writes — better
throughput than the actor's sequential processing.

DerivedKey serialization simplifies: always redact on serialize (for
logging safety), reject '[REDACTED]' on deserialize with an error. No
'postcard preserves bytes' path. This resolves review #002 W8 (silent
corruption on JSON-deserialized DerivedKey).

Resolves:
- OQ-21: remote vault access — resolved (not deferred). Not a vault crate
  feature; if needed, a separate vault-server crate with its own ADR.
- C7: vault-server-crate question decided — not created now, not precluded.
- C8: operation access policy table dissolved — all operations local-only
  by default; if a vault-server crate exposes some remotely, that crate
  defines the policy.
- W8: DerivedKey JSON deserialization — resolved (reject redacted payloads).

Amends ADR-005 (irpc remains for alknet-call, not for alknet-vault),
ADR-018 (vault is even more standalone — zero RPC framework deps),
ADR-019 (vault is the only layer, not just the only direct-caller layer),
ADR-008 (vault integration point unchanged, but now local-only by
construction).
2026-06-22 14:53:52 +00:00
..

status, last_updated
status last_updated
draft 2026-06-22-22

alknet-call

Structured RPC over QUIC: operations, request/response, streaming subscriptions, and service discovery. Implements ProtocolHandler on ALPN alknet/call.

Documents

Document Status Description
call-protocol.md draft CallAdapter, EventEnvelope framing, stream model, PendingRequestMap, bidirectional calls
operation-registry.md draft OperationSpec, Handler, OperationRegistry, AccessControl, service discovery, irpc integration

Applicable ADRs

ADR Title Relevance
001 ALPN-Based Protocol Dispatch CallAdapter registers on ALPN alknet/call
002 ProtocolHandler Trait CallAdapter implements ProtocolHandler
003 Crate Decomposition alknet-call depends on alknet-core and irpc
013 Rust as Canonical Implementation Language Adapter traits defined in Rust; TS is reference/browser adaptation
004 Auth as Shared Core AuthContext passed to call handlers
005 irpc as Call Protocol Foundation irpc provides framing and service dispatch
006 ALPN String Convention alknet/call ALPN, one ALPN per connection
007 BiStream Type Definition CallAdapter receives Connection, not BiStream
008 Vault Integration Point Vault accessed at assembly layer, not on the wire
010 ALPN Router and Endpoint Static handler registration
012 Call Protocol Stream Model Bidirectional streams, EventEnvelope, ID-based correlation
014 Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection Call protocol carries no secret material; capabilities injected at assembly layer
015 Privilege Model and Authority Context internal = authority switch not ACL skip; External/Internal visibility; handler identity + scoped env
016 Abort Cascade for Nested Calls call.aborted cascades to descendants; default abort-dependents, continue-running opt-in
017 Call Protocol Client and Adapter Contract CallClient opens connections; from_call imports remote ops; connection direction independent of call direction
022 Handler Registration, Provenance, and Composition Authority Registration bundle carries provenance, composition authority, scoped env, capabilities
023 Operation Error Schemas Operations declare domain errors; call.error carries typed details; adapter fidelity
024 Operation Registry Layering Curated (static) + session/connection overlays (dynamic); OperationEnv as trait-object integration point; OperationContext.env split into scoped_env (data) and env (dispatch trait)

Relevant Open Questions

OQ Title Status Relevance
OQ-07 Call protocol scope within a connection resolved (ADR-012) Stream model, multiplexing, scope
OQ-13 Operation path format and routing scope resolved /{service}/{op} is the correct design; remote dispatch is a separate layer
OQ-14 Batch operation semantics resolved Correlated call.requested events is the correct protocol design
OQ-16 Safe vault operations for call protocol exposure resolved (ADR-014) None exposed for now
OQ-19 Session-scoped operation registries resolved Agent-written operations overlaid on curated registry via OperationEnv trait layering. Protocol doesn't need changes; OperationEnv must remain a trait. Generalized by ADR-024 to cover connection-scoped overlays.

Key Design Principles

  1. One connection, full access: An alknet/call connection gives access to the entire operation registry — calls, subscriptions, batch, schema.
  2. Protocol is symmetric: Both sides can initiate calls. The server calling a client uses the same EventEnvelope format and correlation.
  3. Stream-agnostic correlation: PendingRequestMap correlates by request ID, not by stream. The protocol works with any stream arrangement.
  4. Operation registry is layered: The curated layer (Local provenance) is static — registered at startup by the CLI binary, immutable for the process lifetime. Session (Session) and imported (FromCall etc.) ops are dynamic overlays at their respective scopes (per-session, per-connection). The registry supports JSON Schema discovery. See ADR-024.
  5. irpc is one dispatch backend: Local operations dispatch directly. irpc service calls (in-process, type-safe) are internal. The call protocol is the external interface.
  6. Local dispatch only: The operation registry dispatches to local handlers. Remote dispatch (federation, head/worker routing) would be a separate mechanism at a different layer, not a modification to alknet-call's path format.
  7. No secret material on the wire: The call protocol carries no private keys, API keys, mnemonics, or decrypted credentials. Handlers receive outbound credentials through OperationContext.capabilities, injected at the assembly layer. See ADR-014.
  8. Abort cascades to descendants: call.aborted for a parent request cascades to all non-terminal descendants. Default abort-dependents; continue-running opt-in. See ADR-016.
  9. Internal calls switch authority context, not skip ACL: The internal flag marks composition-originated calls. ACL runs against the handler's composition authority, not the caller's and not as a blanket skip. Operations have External/Internal visibility. Scoped composition env bounds reachability. See ADR-015, ADR-022.
  10. Provenance determines composition capability: Only Local and Session ops can compose. Leaves (FromOpenAPI, FromMCP, FromCall) are forwarding stubs — they don't get composition authority or a scoped env. The assembly layer is the sole grantor of composition authority. See ADR-022.