51 KiB
status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-07-19 |
call-channels-unification — Findings: openable ALPNs are operations
Status: Draft findings, iterating. Per the research-then-sync
pattern (see docs/research/stream-unification/findings.md for the
precedent), this doc iterates in docs/research/; we fix
inter-document drift here, then sync to docs/architecture/ and the
ADRs only after it settles.
Scope: The control plane for channels-served ALPNs — how
channel/open is authorized, how per-ALPN ACLs are expressed, how the
quota lifecycle is accounted, and how the ALPN categorization from
ADR-086 reframes under "an openable ALPN is an operation." This is
above the channels wire format (ADR-071/093, settled) and below
the ALPN handler's data-plane protocol (each handler's own wire
format). The transport leaf (BiStream as the handler-facing duplex
type) is settled in ADR-092 and is not re-litigated here. The
channels wire format (8-byte header, no stream_type) is settled in
ADR-093 and is not re-litigated here.
Date: 2026-07-19
Origin: An outside review surfaced three high-value gaps in the channels control plane
after ADR-094 (per-identity channel cap) landed. Working through the
first gap — channel/open ACL granularity — surfaced a larger
unification: channels is call with a binary data plane — the same
protocol, two chunk formats (JSON vs binary). The ALPN crates served
under channels are call apps in the same shape alknet-docker is a call
app. This doc records both the
gaps and the unification.
TL;DR
The previous framing — "channel lifecycle goes through one generic
channel/open operation, and AccessControl::check on that op is
the ACL" — was a symptom. The actual question is the separation of
concerns between the call protocol (which already has per-op ACL,
identity, composition, ownership, and subscriptions) and the channels
layer (which provides binary framing for ops whose response isn't
JSON), and the resolution is an openable ALPN is an operation:
each openable ALPN registers its own open op
(channels/tty/open, channels/tunnel/open, etc.) on the call
OperationRegistry, with its own access_control, input_schema,
resource_id_path, and a channel_open marker that tells the call
adapter "this op's response is a binary stream, not a JSON response."
This dissolves the channel/open ACL granularity gap (each ALPN has
its own ACL — checked by the existing OperationRegistry::invoke
before the handler runs, like every other op), makes the
resource_id_path from ADR-050 work for channel-open ops (the path
is per-op, not per-ALPN-branch-of-a-single-op), and lets the two
direction values (initiator-to-responder vs responder-to-initiator)
become two verbs (channels/<alpn>/open and
channels/<alpn>/expose) with separate ACLs. Both are specced; the
call protocol's subscription model is the matching mechanism between
them — a worker exposing a resource and a consumer opening it are
matched by (op_name, params_hash) on the hub, which proxies the
data plane between them.
Channels is call with a binary data plane. The call protocol already has the subscription model, ACL, identity, composition, and ownership. Channels adds one thing: binary framing (8-byte headers, channel multiplexing) for ops whose response isn't JSON. A call connection has two modes:
- Default call (
alknet/call): all ops return JSON on a single stream. The subscription model works — events are JSON chunks. - Channels (
alknet/channels): call on channel 0 (JSON control plane), binary streams on channels 1..N (data plane). The subscription model works identically — the only difference is the chunk format on the data-plane channels.
The ALPN crates served under channels (tty, tunnel, socks5, fs, sftp)
stop being "just ALPNs" and become call apps with binary-stream
ops — the same shape as alknet-docker (a call app with JSON ops),
but where some ops carry the channel_open marker and produce a
binary stream instead of a JSON response. The hub/worker composition
story unifies: a hub composes call apps, full stop; some ops return
JSON, some ops carry the channel_open marker and produce a binary
stream.
Three further gaps fall out of this framing:
-
Quota lifecycle leaks (ADR-094 amendment). The per-identity cap's
on_closeis called from thechannel/closehandler withop_ctx.identity(the closer, not the opener) and is not called at all on transport drop (REQ-CH-02 clears the channel map without touching the policy). A peer whose connection dies at cap is permanently at cap — a self-DoS. Fix: decouple the decrement fromchannel/closeand tie it to channel-state deallocation on the side that counted, via a per-connection opener ledger inchannels-call(keepingchannels-coreauth-blind) decremented on every teardown path. -
Connection-count DoS is an unowned layer (new OQ against
alknet-endpoint). The per-identity cap bounds channels, but each transport connection still costs a channel-0 buffer, aCallAdapter, and demux tasks before anychannel/open— and ADR-094 explicitly says connections are unbounded. This is not a channels-ACL problem; it belongs at the endpoint/accept layer (per-identity connection cap, analogous shape toChannelLifecyclePolicy). No doc owns it today. Naming it as a separate layer stops it from re-tangling every channels-ACL conversation. -
ALPN category reframe (ADR-086 amendment). ADR-086 §4 split the foundational handlers into "channels data-channel ALPNs" and "SSH (endpoint ALPN wrapping channels)." Under the unified model, the first category is reframed: they're not "ALPNs gated by channels" — they're call apps with binary-stream ops. They inherit call's auth/composition/identity by construction (they are call apps); the binary-stream part is the
channel_openmarker on the op spec. The "flat ALPN list" re-implementation problem dissolves because they're call apps, not a separate category that each re-implements auth. SSH stays distinct (endpoint ALPN wrapping channels).
No production/backward-compat constraint. The develop branch is a rewrite of main (pre-alpha). The decision is purely "what's cleanest," not "what's least disruptive." ADR-073's four op names are declared one-way doors, but there's no code and no deployments; ADR-093/094 just demonstrated that amendment is the normal mode here. This is the cheapest moment to amend.
Terminology (three axes, not one)
The doc uses three independent role axes. They overlap in common cases but are not the same thing — a hub can be a responder on one leg and an initiator on another, a producer on one channel and a consumer on another.
| Axis | Roles | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Deployment | hub, worker (spoke), browser | Where the code runs. Hub relays; worker/spoke hosts resources; browser is the end-user client. |
| Call protocol | initiator, responder | Who sends the call op. The initiator calls channels/tty/open; the responder receives it. |
| Data plane | producer, consumer | Who runs the ProtocolHandler (produces the data stream) vs who receives it. The producer is the side that spawns the handler on the BiStream. |
The old "ALPN-server"/"ALPN-client" vocabulary is retired. Call++ apps
are not TLS-layer ALPNs; "producer"/"consumer" describes the data-plane
role without implying a TLS ALPN. The ChannelDirection enum uses
Open (initiator is consumer, responder is producer — the common case)
and Expose (initiator is producer, responder is consumer).
Assembly layer is the CLI binary that wires crates together at startup (ADR-019, ADR-024). It constructs backends, injects capabilities, registers ops, and builds the ALPN lists. It is the trust boundary — handlers never hold vault references or construct their own transports. In this doc, "assembly time" means "at startup, in the CLI binary, before any connections exist."
Layering (to keep the questions separate)
The outsider's layer map, plus the ALPN-category layer this doc adds:
| Layer | Question it answers | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Endpoint accept | May this identity hold N connections? | alknet-endpoint |
Unowned (Gap 3). ADR-094 explicitly says connections are unbounded. New OQ against alknet-endpoint. |
channels-core |
Byte routing; per-connection memory bounds | ADR-075/076 | Decided, coherent. Auth-blind by design (ADR-075). |
channels-call, op-level |
May you call channel/open at all? |
AccessControl::check |
Decided. (Under the unified model: per-ALPN ops, each with its own ACL — Gap 1 resolved.) |
channels-call, quota |
How many slots may you hold? | ADR-094 | Decided, lifecycle buggy (Gap 2). Trait shape survives; the change is where on_close is called from and where the opener identity comes from. |
channels-call, per-ALPN/direction |
May you open this ALPN, this direction? | Per-ALPN op's access_control (this doc) |
Resolved. Each openable ALPN is its own op; the op's access_control is the per-ALPN/direction ACL. |
| ALPN handler (data plane) | May you touch container abc123? | ADR-050 ownership, handler-internal | Decided (call/docker land). Unchanged under the unified model. |
The tangle was that layers 5 and 6 got blurred ("ACL is checked on
channel/open" is true but only for layer 3, because the single
generic op couldn't see alpn/direction/params), and layer 1 got
silently assumed away.
The structural tangle (the actual gaps)
Gap 1 — channel/open ACL granularity is underspecified
The call crate's ACL is per-operation: OperationSpec.access_control,
checked before the handler runs by OperationRegistry::invoke. But
channel/open is one operation whose input decides what's really
being requested (alpn, params, direction). One op-level
AccessControl cannot express "peer X may open alknet/tty but not
alknet/tunnel."
The specs gesture at per-ALPN ACLs —
channel/resources/subscribe returns access: { required_scopes: ["tty:open"] } per ALPN, "advisory... the real check happens on
channel/open" (channel-operations.md:150) — but no mechanism is
specified for that real check. HandlerRegistry carries no
AccessControl. Nobody registers alpn → required_scopes anywhere.
Three candidate shapes were considered (the outsider's analysis):
(a) A per-ALPN ACL map held by ChannelOperations, checked inside the
channel/open handler after the op-level check. Parallel to how the
quota policy slots in.
(b) A ChannelOpenSpec registry (alpn → AccessControl + params schema + resource_id_path + allowed directions) consulted inside the
handler after the op-level check.
(c) Delegate to the ALPN handler — it gets AuthContext and can
refuse.
(c) is the worst: allocation and handler spawn happen before authorization, refusal semantics diverge per ALPN, and every handler crate reimplements scope checking.
(b) looks like minimal churn, but notice what the registry actually
is: a parallel structure holding ACLs, input schemas, resource
pointers, and discovery data, with its own check invocation — a shadow
OperationRegistry. The repo has been here before: ADR-028 was
superseded by ADR-029 exactly because "a parallel authorization system
duplicated the existing AccessControl," and ADR-029's whole thesis
is that peer authorization is just AccessControl::check on the
existing path. (b) re-commits that structural miss one layer down.
Gap 2 — The quota's accounting lifecycle leaks
ADR-094 increments in the channel/open handler and decrements in
the channel/close handler via policy.on_close(&op_ctx.identity).
Two problems:
-
Responder-initiated close decrements the wrong ledger. If A opens (counted against A on B's policy) and B later sends
channel/close(e.g., TTY exit happens on B's side — REQ-CH-06 makes B the closer), the close handler runs on A withop_ctx.identity = B. B's count for A is never decremented; A's policy decrements a channel it never counted. -
Transport drop leaks the quota. REQ-CH-02 clears the channel map on transport EOF, but nothing calls
on_close. Since the policy is shared across connections (that's the whole point), a peer whose connection dies at 256 open channels is permanently at cap — a self-DoS.
The conceptual fix: decouple the decrement from the channel/close
operation and tie it to channel-state deallocation on the side that
counted. channels-call keeps its own channel_id → opener PeerId
ledger per connection (keeping channels-core auth-blind) and
decrements on any teardown path — close received, close sent locally,
handler exit, or connection drop. The ledger entry must be removed
atomically with its decrement: handler-exit, close-received,
close-sent-locally, and connection-drop can race, and a
double-decrement under-counts and weakens the cap.
Gap 3 — Connection-count DoS is an unowned layer
The per-identity cap bounds channels, but each transport connection
still costs a channel-0 buffer, a CallAdapter, and demux tasks
before any channel/open — and ADR-094 explicitly says connections
are unbounded. This is not a channels-ACL problem and shouldn't be
solved there; it belongs at the endpoint/accept layer (per-identity
connection cap, analogous shape to ChannelLifecyclePolicy). Right
now no doc owns it. Naming it as a separate layer stops it from
re-tangling every channels-ACL conversation.
Gap 4 — ALPN category blur (the user's insight)
ADR-086 §4 split the foundational handlers into "channels data-channel
ALPNs" (gated by channels, opened via channel/open, inherit ACL +
bidirectionality) and "SSH" (endpoint ALPN wrapping channels). The
"channels data-channel ALPNs" framing implies they're a separate kind
of thing that channels happens to gate — and each would re-implement
auth in a flat ALPN list. Under the unified model, they're not a
separate category: they're call apps with binary-stream ops. They
inherit call's auth by construction (they are call apps). The gating
is a consequence, not the definition.
This also touches the HTTP/ WebSocket path: ADR-048 says "WebSocket
carries the native call-protocol session." Under the unified model, a
browser that wants to open a TTY channel needs to call
channels/tty/open, which lives on channel 0 inside a channels
connection. So WebSocket may carry either alknet/call (bare, for
call-only clients) or alknet/channels (8-byte chunk framing, with
call on channel 0 inside). Channels framing is required for
binary-stream clients; a call-only client (e.g. a dashboard doing
docker JSON ops) can use bare alknet/call over WebSocket. OQ-65
("WebSocket carrying channels, not just call?") is resolved: WebSocket
may carry either; channels required for binary streams.
The resolution: openable ALPNs are operations
The core observation: ADR-073's claim is "no new auth machinery —
channel lifecycle goes through the existing AccessControl::check."
But the single generic channel/open operation is precisely what
breaks that promise: it hides the authorization-relevant facts
(alpn, direction, params) inside one op's input, where the call
ACL machinery can't see them. Consequences:
- Per-ALPN scopes (
tty:openvstunnel:open) have no enforcement home. - ADR-050's
resource_id_path(ownership via JSON pointer into input) is declared perOperationSpec— a singlechannel/opencan't use it because the pointer differs per ALPN (/params/containerfor tty-docker,/params/targetfor tunnel). - The two
directionvalues are wildly different grants ("may you consume my TTY" vs "may you register a service I will consume as a client") squeezed under one ACL.
The fix that requires new machinery is keeping the generic op; the fix that requires none is the opposite of what's specced. An openable ALPN is an operation.
The marker on OperationSpec
OperationSpec gains a channel_open field:
pub struct OperationSpec {
// ... existing fields ...
pub access_control: AccessControl,
pub resource_id_path: Option<String>,
/// Marker consumed by layers that manage binary streams. When set,
/// the op produces a binary stream alongside (or instead of) the JSON
/// response. The marker is registry metadata, not auth machinery —
/// it's how layers like channels-call know an op is a channel-open
/// op, parallel to how `resource_id_path` is how ADR-050 knows where
/// to find the resource id. The op's `access_control` is the ACL
/// (unchanged); the marker is the dispatch hint.
pub channel_open: Option<ChannelOpenSpec>,
}
pub struct ChannelOpenSpec {
pub alpn: &'static str, // e.g., "alknet/tty"
pub direction: ChannelDirection, // Open or Expose
}
pub enum ChannelDirection {
/// Initiator wants to consume a resource the responder will produce.
/// Initiator is the consumer; responder is the producer (runs the
/// data-plane handler). Common case: "open me a TTY on your docker
/// container."
Open,
/// Initiator is the producer (runs the data-plane handler);
/// responder is the consumer. The worker-expose case: "I'm exposing
/// a TTY for you to consume."
Expose,
}
The marker is registry metadata, not auth machinery — it doesn't
violate ADR-073's "no new auth machinery" promise. The op's
access_control is the ACL (unchanged, checked by
OperationRegistry::invoke before the handler runs); the marker is
the dispatch hint that tells channels-call to wrap the handler with
the channel machinery.
The marker is wire-visible. channel_open must survive discovery
serialization — it is part of the services/schema payload, not just
the in-process struct. Otherwise the hub (and any from_call importer)
can't see it. The services/schema handler already serializes the full
OperationSpec to JSON; channel_open is included in that
serialization.
from_call relay wrapper. A FromCall-imported marked op cannot
be the standard forwarding stub. The hub's version must do forward +
allocate local-leg channel + record id mapping + start the byte-forward
pumps. When from_call imports a marked op on a channels-backed
connection, it wraps it with relay machinery instead of the plain
forwarding stub. ADR-022's provenance table (leaves are forwarding
stubs, no composition authority) gets a note for this case: a
FromCall-imported marked op is a leaf for composition purposes but
carries relay machinery that allocates channels and spawns byte-forward
tasks. This is the load-bearing piece of the relay under the unified
model.
Marked ops invoked outside a channels session. channels/tty/open
is registered on the call registry — which means it's also
visible/invocable on a bare top-level alknet/call connection, where
there is no ChannelManager and no data plane. The wrapper resolves
OperationEnv::channel_manager() at invocation time; if it returns
None, the wrapper returns channel:no_channels_session. Relatedly,
the HTTP-side adapters (to_openapi, to_mcp) must exclude marked
ops — "produces a binary stream" is not expressible over a
request/response export.
Two verbs: open and expose
direction becomes two verbs, not a field:
channels/<alpn>/open— the initiator wants to consume a resource the responder will produce. Responder is the producer. The common case: "open me a TTY on your docker container." Consumer → hub → producer: both legs arechannels/tty/open. Specced.channels/<alpn>/expose— the initiator wants to produce a resource for the responder to consume. Initiator is the producer. The worker-expose case: worker → hub, worker is making a resource available for the hub to proxy to consumers. Specced.
Separate verbs → separate ACLs. A peer that may expose a TTY is not the same grant as a peer that may open one. The verb split also enables the hub-as-proxy pattern: a worker exposes a resource to the hub, the hub owns it, and consumers open it from the hub.
Matching: the call protocol's subscription model. The hub matches
expose and open by (op_name, params_hash). When a worker calls
channels/tty/expose, the hub records the exposed resource keyed by
the hash of the op name + params. When a consumer calls
channels/tty/open with matching params, the hub finds the exposed
resource and proxies the data plane between them. This is a pubsub
model where the topic is (op_name, params_hash) — the call protocol's
existing subscription mechanism (OperationType::Subscription) is the
natural fit for the expose side: the worker subscribes to consumer
demand for that resource, and the hub delivers matching open requests
as subscription events. Stream deduplication falls out naturally: if
two consumers open the same resource, the hub fans out from one
producer stream rather than opening duplicate channels to the worker.
The ChannelCore seam (wrapper shape — flag for POC)
The ALPN crate's open-op handler does ALPN-specific work (validate
params, consult ownership, prepare the backend) and returns a
"channel plan." channels-call wraps it: the wrapper allocates the
channel_id, gets the BiStream from ChannelManager, records the
opener in the ledger (Gap 2), consults ChannelLifecyclePolicy,
spawns the ProtocolHandler on the BiStream with the plan's
backend, returns {channel_id}.
The ALPN crate provides:
- The
OperationSpec(withchannel_openmarker,access_control,input_schema,resource_id_path). - The open handler (the ALPN-specific work — validate params, consult ownership, prepare the backend, return a plan).
- The
ProtocolHandlerfor the data plane (unchanged — used by both direct connections and channels-opened sessions; both paths converge at theBiStream).
channels-call provides:
- The
ChannelCore(channel-id allocation,ChannelManagerintegration, per-connection opener ledger,ChannelLifecyclePolicyconsultation, teardown hooks). - A
register_openable(spec, open_handler, channel_core)helper that wraps the ALPN's open handler with the channel machinery and registers the op on the callOperationRegistry.
This keeps the ALPN crate's handler focused on ALPN concerns (params,
backend) and lets channels-call own the channel machinery. The
alternative (invoke shape — the handler calls
context.channel_core.open(...) itself) requires either
OperationContext to carry a channel_core reference (inverting
the call → channels-call dependency) or a generic extension mechanism
on OperationContext (more complexity than the wrapper). The wrapper
shape is preferred; the exact API shape (plan vs callback) is
POC-worthy — flag this as the thing to pressure-test in a small POC
(one ALPN crate, one open op, one channels connection, prove the
wrapper allocates the channel and spawns the handler).
Per-connection state plumbing (POC-critical). register_openable
registers ops "at assembly time" (Layer 0, curated, static per
ADR-024). But the wrapper needs the per-connection ChannelManager
— the op arrives on channel 0 of one specific channels connection, and
the channel must be allocated on that connection's manager. A
globally-registered handler closing over a static ChannelCore has no
way to know which channels connection invoked it.
The resolution: the OperationEnv trait (already on
OperationContext.env) gains an optional
fn channel_manager(&self) -> Option<&ChannelManager>. The wrapper
handler resolves it at invocation time — static registration, dynamic
resolution. This also handles the "no channels session" case (Issue 3):
if channel_manager() returns None, the wrapper returns
channel:no_channels_session. The OperationEnv is already the
integration point for per-connection state (ADR-024); adding a
ChannelManager accessor is the natural extension.
This also affects recursive channels (inner connection needs its own
binding): each channels connection's OperationEnv overlay carries its
own ChannelManager reference, so nested connections resolve
correctly.
The discovery split
Under the unified model, the discovery question splits cleanly:
- "What may I open" (static, per-op):
services/list(visibility- filtered +AccessControl::check(calling_peer_identity)server-side, per ADR-029 §6) +services/schema(per-opaccess_control). The existing server-side ACL-filtered discovery is preserved; the spec is the authority.channel:forbiddenon the open op is the real check; the preview is "here's what the spec says, you can fail fast." - "What is currently there" (dynamic, ALPN-level):
channel/resources/subscribe. Each ALPN crate that registers open ops also provides a resource enumerator (which containers are running, which TTY sessions are active).channel/resources/subscribeaggregates across all registered openable ALPNs. This is the data source the outsider's Gap 1(c) was missing — and it naturally lives in the ALPN crate, not in channels-call.
The access preview in resources/subscribe (ADR-073) becomes
redundant — it's on the op spec, available via services/schema. We
drop it from the resources/subscribe payload; the spec is the
authority, and carrying a preview in a different shape invites
staleness.
The exact aggregation shape (per-ALPN channels/<alpn>/resources/ subscribe ops merged by the generic channel/resources/subscribe,
vs. callbacks registered with channels-call at registration time) is a
POC-worthy detail. The architectural point is that the data source
lives in the ALPN crate.
The ALPN three-category reframe (ADR-086 amendment)
ADR-086 §4 split the foundational handlers into two categories. Under the unified model, the first category is reframed. The three categories become:
| Category | TLS-layer? | Identity at TLS? | How they're reached | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Entry points | yes | no | TLS ALPN negotiation | h2, http/1.1, alknet/register |
| Endpoints | yes | yes | TLS ALPN negotiation | alknet/channels, alknet/call, alknet/ssh |
| Binary-stream call apps (was "channels data-channel ALPNs") | no | n/a (inside channels) | channels/<alpn>/open / expose op on channel 0 |
alknet/tty, alknet/tunnel, alknet/socks5, alknet/fs, alknet/sftp |
The third category changes description. Previously "ALPNs gated by
channels" (implying they're a separate kind of thing that channels
happens to gate, and each re-implements auth in a flat ALPN list).
Now "call apps with binary-stream ops" (they are call apps; they
inherit call's auth/composition/identity by construction; the
binary-stream part is the channel_open marker). The gating is a
consequence, not the definition.
Direct registration remains possible. The category table says
binary-stream call apps are not TLS-layer ALPNs, but the
ProtocolHandler is still usable by both direct connections
(HandlerRegistry → ProtocolHandler → BiStream) and
channels-opened sessions. ADR-077's two-mode survives at the mechanism
level; the canonical composition is through the call protocol. The
table describes the canonical path, not a prohibition on direct use.
Naming. "Binary-stream call apps" is the working name. "Channels-served ALPNs" is descriptive. The final naming is a separate (cosmetic) decision tracked as an OQ; this doc uses "binary-stream call apps" as the working name.
What this means for the ALPN crates (the lineage)
The lineage makes the unification obvious in retrospect: call → docker → tty → channels. Docker was the first call-consuming app (wraps bollard in JSON ops — ADR-058). Working docker surfaced TTY (exec needs a terminal). Working TTY surfaced channels (terminal output isn't JSON). The loop closes: the ALPN crates that channels serves become channels-consuming apps in the same shape docker is a call-consuming app. The only difference is that some ops produce a binary stream instead of (or alongside) a JSON response.
The dependency split parallels channels-core / channels-call
(ADR-081):
- Data-plane core (the
ProtocolHandler, wire format, backend trait) — depends onalknet-coreonly. No call dep. ADR-057's "tty does not depend on call" property survives here. - Control-plane layer (the open/expose ops, registration helper)
— depends on the data-plane core +
alknet-call+alknet-channels-call(for the channel machinery). ADR-057 is amended: the data plane stays call-free; the control plane is call by construction.
Whether that's a sub-crate split (alknet-tty-core + alknet-tty)
or a feature flag (alknet-tty with a channels feature) is a
packaging choice — two-way-door, not architecture. The architectural
point is the dependency boundary.
SSH stays distinct
SSH is an endpoint ALPN that wraps channels. Under the unified model,
the channels inside SSH have call on channel 0, and the call registry
has the open ops. An SSH client opens an SSH channel; the SSH server
translates that to channels/<alpn>/open on channel 0 internally
(SSH server as translator, same shape as the hub relay — ADR-079).
The SSH client doesn't know about call; it just opens SSH channels.
SSH's category (endpoint ALPN wrapping channels) is unchanged. This
is SSH-implementation detail and SSH is deferred, but the shape
holds.
The hub-relay flow (walked end-to-end)
This is the flow the outsider flagged as "where ADR-073's single-op design was doing the most implicit work." Walking it under the unified model to verify it holds.
Consumer → hub → producer, "open me a TTY" (the common case)
- Consumer (browser, another worker, another hub) sends
channels/tty/openwith{params: {backend: docker, cmd: ["bash"], container: "abc123"}}on its channel 0 (call op on the consumer→hub leg). - Hub's
CallAdapterreceiveschannels/tty/open. TheOperationRegistrychecks the op'saccess_controlagainst the consumer's identity. The op's spec haschannel_open: Some(ChannelOpenSpec { alpn: "alknet/tty", direction: Open }). Consumer is the initiator / consumer. - Hub's
CallAdapterrecognizes thechannel_openmarker. The hub does NOT run a localTtyAdapter— the hub never runs protocol-specific handlers (ADR-079). It forwards to the producer (spoke/worker) viafrom_call: hub re-issueschannels/tty/openon the producer leg withforwarded_for = consumer. - Producer's
CallAdapterreceiveschannels/tty/open.OperationRegistrychecks the op'saccess_controlagainst the hub's identity (the direct caller per ADR-032). The producer's ownership store verifies the hub ownscontainer:abc123(per ADR-050). The producer consultsChannelLifecyclePolicy::check_open(hub)(Gap 2 — keyed by direct caller, opener recorded in the per-connection ledger). - Producer's
ChannelCoreallocateschannel_id, spawnsTtyAdapteron the channel'sBiStreamwith the docker backend, records opener (hub) in the ledger, returns{channel_id}. - Hub receives the producer's
{channel_id}, opens a matching channel on the consumer's side (hub is the responder for the consumer leg), records thechannel_idmappingconsumer_id ↔ producer_id, returns{channel_id: consumer_id}to the consumer. - Hub byte-forwards between
consumer_idandproducer_idwith 4-bytechannel_idrewrite (ADR-079 unchanged).
The hub ran zero protocol-specific auth and zero protocol-specific
data-plane work. It ran channels/tty/open's access_control
(call-protocol machinery) and forwarded. The relay contract from
ADR-079 holds unchanged in shape; only the op name changed (from
generic channel/open to per-ALPN channels/tty/open).
Worker → hub → consumer, "worker exposes a resource" (the proxy case)
The expose verb is specced alongside open. The call protocol's
subscription model is the matching mechanism between them.
Concrete example. A worker runs on a remote instance (vastai,
runpod, a docker container). It wraps an opencode server's OpenAPI spec
via from_openapi (call ops, JSON) and registers channels/tty/open
for terminal access. The worker connects to a hub and calls
channels/tty/expose as a Subscription — "I have this resource;
notify me when a consumer wants it." The hub records the exposed
resource keyed by (op_name, params_hash). Later, a consumer (browser,
another worker, another hub) calls channels/tty/open with matching
params. The hub matches by hash, delivers the open request to the
worker's subscription, the worker allocates the channel, and the hub
proxies the data plane between them.
Step-by-step:
- Worker calls
channels/tty/expose(Subscription) with{params: {backend: docker, container: "abc123", cmd: ["bash"]}}on its channel 0. Worker is the initiator / producer. - Hub's
CallAdapterreceiveschannels/tty/expose.OperationRegistrychecks the op'saccess_controlagainst the worker's identity. The op's spec haschannel_open: Some(ChannelOpenSpec { alpn: "alknet/tty", direction: Expose }). - Hub recognizes the
channel_openmarker. The hub records the exposed resource in its subscription table keyed by("channels/tty/expose", hash(params)). The subscription is held open — no channel is allocated yet. The worker is waiting for a consumer. - Later, a consumer calls
channels/tty/open(Query/Mutation) with matching params{container: "abc123", cmd: ["bash"]}. - Hub checks
access_controlagainst the consumer's identity. Hub computesparams_hashand looks up the expose subscription table. Finds the worker's subscription. - Hub delivers the open request to the worker's subscription as an
event. The worker's expose handler runs: validates params, consults
ownership (ADR-050 — the hub owns the container), prepares the
TtyBackend. Worker'sChannelCoreallocateschannel_idon the worker→hub leg, spawnsTtyAdapter, records opener (hub) in the ledger, returns{channel_id}. - Hub receives the worker's
{channel_id}, allocates a matching channel on the consumer→hub leg, records the mappingconsumer_id ↔ worker_id, returns{channel_id: consumer_id}to the consumer. - Hub byte-forwards between
consumer_idandworker_idwith 4-bytechannel_idrewrite (ADR-079 unchanged).
Stream deduplication (single-producer, N-consumer). If a second
consumer calls channels/tty/open with the same params, the hub
matches the same worker subscription. The hub does NOT deliver another
event to the worker — it already has the producer channel. Instead, it
allocates a second consumer leg and fans out from the existing producer
channel: worker_channel → consumer_1_channel and
worker_channel → consumer_2_channel. One producer stream, N consumer
streams, hub fans out. The (op_name, params_hash) key naturally
deduplicates — it's a pubsub topic, and the hub is the broker.
The hub-as-proxy pattern. The hub is a consumer of the worker's
resource and a producer for downstream consumers. The relay is
protocol-agnostic: swap channel IDs, tunnel reads/writes between
BiStreams. From the worker's perspective, the hub is the sole
consumer — the hub owns the resource and re-exposes it under its own
authority (the forwarded_for chain carries attribution, not
authority; ADR-032). From the downstream consumer's perspective, the
hub is the producer — it doesn't know or care that the real backend is
on a worker.
Teardown. If the worker disconnects before a consumer arrives, the subscription is cancelled (connection drop → subscription teardown). If a consumer disconnects, the hub closes that consumer leg but keeps the producer channel open for other consumers. When the last consumer disconnects, the hub may close the producer channel or keep it (subscription stays open for future consumers — policy decision, not architecture).
The channel_id allocation symmetry
In both cases, channel_id allocation is by the responder (DP-1,
unchanged). In the open case, the responder is the spoke (spoke
allocates). In the expose case, the responder is the hub on the
worker→hub leg (hub allocates) and the downstream consumer on the
hub→consumer leg (consumer allocates). The hub relay records the
mapping across legs. This preserves ADR-073's "channel_id allocation
is always by the responder" invariant.
What goes where (ADR plan)
| ADR | Scope | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ADR-095 (new) | "Openable ALPNs are operations" — channels is call with a binary data plane. The mental model, the channel_open marker on OperationSpec, the ChannelCore seam (wrapper shape, POC-flagged), the two-verb split, the subscription-based expose/open matching, the discovery split, the three-category ALPN reframe. The unifying ADR. |
Ready to draft. |
| ADR-073 amendment | channel/open dissolves into per-ALPN ops in channels/<alpn>/open and channels/<alpn>/expose. channel/close, channel/control, channel/resources/subscribe stay generic (keyed by channel_id). The direction field is removed (becomes the verb). Error codes: channel:unknown_alpn becomes "operation not found"; channel:invalid_params becomes ordinary schema rejection. |
Ready to draft. |
| ADR-094 amendment (Gap 2) | The per-connection opener ledger in channels-call. The decrement is keyed by the opener (from the ledger), not the closer. The decrement is called from every teardown path (close received, close sent, handler exit, connection drop), not just channel/close. The trait shape (check_open, on_close) survives. The teardown hooks (connection-drop, handler-exit) are new structural requirements on channels-call. |
Ready to draft. |
| ADR-086 §4 amendment | "Channels data-channel ALPNs" → "binary-stream call apps" (or whatever the naming OQ settles). The category distinction holds (them vs SSH); the description changes from "gated by channels" to "call apps with binary-stream ops." | Ready to draft. |
| ADR-048 amendment + OQ-65 resolution | WebSocket may carry either alknet/call (bare, for call-only clients) or alknet/channels (8-byte chunk framing, call on channel 0 inside). Channels framing required for binary-stream clients. OQ-65 resolved. "Native session, not gateway" survives (the decision). |
Ready to draft. |
| ADR-057 amendment | TTY data plane stays call-free; control plane (open/expose ops) depends on call. "Self-contained negotiation framing" becomes the data-plane negotiation (the 5-byte format's negotiation frame); the control-plane negotiation is the call op. | Ready to draft. |
| ADR-058 clarification | The boundary criterion (EventEnvelope-compatible → call op; incompatible → binary stream with call control plane) is preserved and sharpened. Probably a note, not a full amendment. | Ready to draft. |
| New OQ (Gap 3) | Per-identity connection cap against alknet-endpoint. Named, deferred(scope) — the deployment shape that needs it isn't concrete yet. Owned by alknet-endpoint, not channels. |
Ready to open. |
What changes in each crate
alknet-call
OperationSpecgainschannel_open: Option<ChannelOpenSpec>(the marker). This is a one-way-door API change (every spec-constructing code adds the field, defaulting toNone).- No other change. The
OperationRegistryis unchanged — it still invokes ops by name, checksaccess_control, runs the handler. The marker is opaque to the registry; it's channels-call that reads it.
alknet-channels-call
- Gains the
ChannelCore(channel-id allocation,ChannelManagerintegration, per-connection opener ledger,ChannelLifecyclePolicyconsultation, teardown hooks). - Gains the
register_openable(spec, open_handler, channel_core)helper that wraps the ALPN's open handler with the channel machinery and registers the op on the callOperationRegistry. - The
channel/closehandler no longer callspolicy.on_close(&op_ctx.identity)directly; instead, the per-connection ledger is walked on every teardown path andon_closeis called per opener. (Gap 2.) - The generic ops (
channel/close,channel/control,channel/resources/subscribe) stay in channels-call, keyed bychannel_id. - The teardown hooks (connection-drop, handler-exit) are new. The
connection-drop hook needs to interpose before
channels-core's REQ-CH-02 clears the channel map — channels-call walks its ledger and decrements every opener before the map is cleared.
alknet-channels-core
- Unchanged. The pure multiplexer (ADR-075/093) is auth-blind by
design and stays that way. The per-connection opener ledger lives
in
channels-call, notchannels-core.
alknet-tty (the first binary-stream call app)
- Data plane (the
TtyAdapter, the 5-byte wire format, theTtyBackendtrait) is unchanged. Used by both direct connections (HandlerRegistry→ProtocolHandler→BiStream) and channels-opened sessions (channels/tty/open→ allocate channel → spawnTtyAdapteron the channel'sBiStream). Both paths converge at theBiStream. - Control plane (new): registers
channels/tty/openandchannels/tty/exposeon the callOperationRegistryat assembly time, alongside itsProtocolHandleron theHandlerRegistryfor direct connections. The op specs carry thechannel_openmarker, theaccess_control(e.g.,required_scopes: ["tty:open"]andrequired_scopes: ["tty:expose"]), theinput_schema(theNegotiateRequest), and theresource_id_path(e.g.,/params/containerfor docker-backed TTY).channels/tty/exposeis registered as aSubscriptionop type — the worker subscribes to consumer demand; the hub delivers matching open requests as subscription events. - The open handler validates params, consults ownership (ADR-050),
prepares the
TtyBackend, returns a "channel plan" to theChannelCorewrapper, which spawns theTtyAdapter. - Dependency: data-plane core depends on
alknet-coreonly (ADR-057's property survives); control plane depends onalknet-core+alknet-call+alknet-channels-call. - Optional: registers
channels/tty/list-sessionsetc. if session management is wanted. The ALPN gets a full management plane over the call protocol — which it didn't have before.
alknet-tunnel, alknet-socks5, alknet-fs, alknet-sftp
- Same shape as TTY: data plane (ProtocolHandler) unchanged; control plane (open/expose ops) new. Each registers its open ops on the call registry at assembly time.
- These crates are not yet specced (per ADR-085). When specced, they follow the binary-stream call app pattern from the start.
alknet-hub
- Unchanged in shape. The hub composes call apps — docker (JSON ops),
tty (open op + binary stream), tunnel (open op + binary stream),
agent, etc. All register ops on the call registry. The hub's
assembly layer wires them uniformly. The hub doesn't distinguish
"call app" from "channels app" — both are just apps with ops
registered. Some ops return JSON; some ops carry the
channel_openmarker and produce a binary stream. The composition model is uniform. - The relay contract (ADR-079) is unchanged in shape. The op name
changes (from generic
channel/opento per-ALPNchannels/<alpn>/open); the marker (not prefix-matching) is how the hub recognizes and translates channel-open ops. from_callrelay wrapper. Whenfrom_callimports a marked op on a channels-backed connection, it wraps it with relay machinery (forward + allocate local-leg channel + record id mapping + start byte-forward pumps) instead of the plain forwarding stub. ADR-022's provenance table gets a note: aFromCall-imported marked op is a leaf for composition purposes but carries relay machinery.
alknet-worker
- Same as hub. A worker registers its ops on its call registry. The worker's assembly layer wires them uniformly.
alknet-endpoint
- Unchanged (for now). Gap 3 (per-identity connection cap) is a new
OQ against
alknet-endpoint, deferred until a deployment forces it. Named now to stop the re-tangle.
alknet-http
- WebSocket may carry either
alknet/call(bare, for call-only clients) oralknet/channels(8-byte chunk framing, call on channel 0 inside). Channels framing required for binary-stream clients. ADR-048 amended; OQ-65 resolved. - The HTTP adapter's call-protocol surface (registration, browser API routes) is unchanged — it's call ops, not channels ops.
- The MCP/OpenAPI adapters (
to_openapi,to_mcp) must exclude marked ops — "produces a binary stream" is not expressible over a request/response export.
Open questions
-
Per-connection state plumbing (POC-critical). The
OperationEnv::channel_manager()accessor is the proposed resolution for per-connectionChannelManagerresolution. The exact trait shape (return type, whether it's onOperationEnvor a separate extension trait) is POC-worthy. The architectural point is that theOperationEnvis the integration point for per-connection state (ADR-024), and the wrapper resolves theChannelManagerat invocation time — static registration, dynamic resolution. -
ChannelCore seam: wrapper vs invoke. This doc specs the wrapper shape (the ALPN's open handler returns a "channel plan"; channels- call's wrapper does the allocation/ledger/policy/spawn). The alternative (invoke — the handler calls
context.channel_core.open(...)itself) inverts the call → channels-call dependency or requires a generic extension mechanism onOperationContext. The wrapper is preferred. The exact API shape (plan vs callback) is POC-worthy — flag for a small POC during implementation. Not a blocker for the architecture decision. -
Resource enumeration aggregation shape. Each ALPN crate provides a resource enumerator. The generic
channel/resources/subscribeaggregates. Exact shape (per-ALPNchannels/<alpn>/resources/subscribeops merged by the generic op, vs. callbacks registered with channels-call at registration time) is a POC-worthy detail. The architectural point is that the data source lives in the ALPN crate. -
Naming the third category. "Binary-stream call apps" (the working name) vs "channels-served ALPNs" (descriptive) vs "data-channel call apps." Cosmetic but in a lot of tables. Tracked as an OQ.
-
Op naming vs OQ-13.
channels/tty/openimplies the ops belong to the channels service, but the TTY crate registers them — the docker precedent (docker/container/list) suggeststty/open. Since relay recognition is via the marker (not name prefix), nothing constrains the name; but the ALPN→path-segment mapping (alknet/tty→tty) needs pinning either way, including what non-alknet/*ALPNs do. -
Expose subscription matching. The
(op_name, params_hash)key is the proposed matching mechanism between expose and open. The exact hash function, collision handling, and the subscription lifecycle (when does the hub tear down an expose subscription with no consumers?) are POC-worthy details. The architectural point is that the call protocol'sSubscriptionop type is the natural fit for the expose side, and the hub is the broker. -
Does
ProtocolHandlerwant channel-context? Probably not for TTY/tunnel/ssh (they just want aBiStream), but maybe for ALPNs that want the opener's identity for per-session logging/ACL. An optional channel-context passed alongside theBiStream. Not a blocker; defer. Two-way-door implementation detail. -
Per-identity connection cap (Gap 3). A per-identity connection cap at the endpoint/accept layer, analogous to
ChannelLifecyclePolicybut before anyChannelsAdapter/CallAdapter/ channel-0 buffer exists. Lives inalknet-endpoint.deferred(scope)— the deployment shape that needs it isn't concrete yet. Named now to stop the re-tangle. -
channel-operations.md§ACL-flowforwarded_forinconsistency. Step 4 says "the spoke's ownership store verifies the hub (or theforwarded_forbrowser, per policy) ownscontainer:abc123." This contradicts ADR-032 (forwarded_foris metadata, not authority —AccessControl::checknever reads it) and ADR-050 §4c ("the spoke sees the hub as the owner"). The "(or theforwarded_forbrowser, per policy)" clause is a spec inconsistency. Fix while editing. The spoke authorizes the hub, full stop; the hub's per-browser ACL is the hub's own layer.
References
- ADR-073: channel lifecycle operations (amended by this resolution
—
channel/opendissolves into per-ALPN ops; generic ops stay) - ADR-094: per-identity channel cap (amended by this resolution — the ledger + teardown hooks; the trait shape survives)
- ADR-079: hub relay — translate, not forward (unchanged in shape; the op name changes, the marker replaces prefix-matching)
- ADR-050: dynamic resource ownership (the
resource_id_pathmechanism that works again under per-ALPN ops) - ADR-028: the "parallel authorization system" precedent (superseded by ADR-029 for exactly the structural miss this resolution avoids re-committing one layer down)
- ADR-029: peer-graph routing (the existing
AccessControl::checkpath this resolution preserves) - ADR-086: endpoint types and entry points (§4 amended — the "channels data-channel ALPNs" category reframed to "binary-stream call apps")
- ADR-048: WebSocket native session (amended — WebSocket may carry
either
alknet/calloralknet/channels; channels framing required for binary-stream clients; OQ-65 resolved) - ADR-057: alknet-tty does not depend on call (amended — the data plane stays call-free; the control plane depends on call)
- ADR-058: alknet-docker on alknet/call (the boundary criterion preserved and sharpened — EventEnvelope-compatible → call; incompatible → binary stream with call control plane)
- ADR-075: ChannelsAdapter and ChannelManager (the auth-blindness this resolution preserves — the ledger lives in channels-call, not channels-core)
- ADR-092: BiStream as the handler leaf (the transport-leaf layer, settled; this doc is the layer above it)
- ADR-093: channels pure channel multiplexing (the wire format, the handler-owns-sub-multiplexing property — both preserved)
docs/research/stream-unification/findings.md— the precedent for this research-then-sync patterndocs/architecture/crates/channels/channel-operations.md— the spec this resolution rewrites (per-ALPN open ops; generic close/control/resources; the ACL-flowforwarded_forfix)docs/architecture/crates/call/operation-registry.md—OperationSpec,AccessControl,OperationRegistry::invoke(the machinery this resolution reuses verbatim, with thechannel_openmarker added)