Update four existing specs (overview, server, napi-and-pubsub, call-protocol) to reflect Phase 0 decisions: three-layer model, IdentityProvider, ForwardingPolicy, OperationEnv, static/dynamic config split. Review all 9 Phase 0a ADRs (026-034) for consistency. Fix 4 critical issues from architecture review: missing OQ-SVC-05 in open-questions.md, deprecated hub terminology, undefined AuthService and noq terms. Replace inline OQ text with cross-references per format rules. Add ConfigServiceImpl definition to configuration.md. Port absolute workspace paths to project-relative links by copying referenced docs (feasibility, certbot, fail2ban, event_source_types) into docs/research/.
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status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-06-07 |
Open Questions
Transport
OQ-01: TLS certificate management strategy
- Origin: server.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-008 — Support both domain-based and IP-based ACME/Let's Encrypt auto-provisioning, plus manual certs. Domain-based uses standard certbot-style flow with HTTP-01/TLS-ALPN-01 challenges. IP-based uses short-lived certs via TLS-ALPN-01 on port 443. Manual certs via
--tls-cert/--tls-keyalways supported. Implementation usesrustls-acmeor similar pure-Rust ACME client. - Cross-references: ADR-008, Server spec, TlsTransport implementation
OQ-02: iroh relay configuration defaults
- Origin: transport.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-009 — Default to n0's free relay servers. Allow override via
--iroh-relay <url>. Document self-hosted relay setup. This matches iroh's own defaults and minimizes friction for testing/development. - Cross-references: ADR-009, Transport spec
OQ-05: Transport chaining support in CLI
- Origin: transport.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-010 — Support
--transport iroh --proxy socks5://...natively in the CLI. iroh's endpoint builder accepts proxy configuration directly, so the implementation is minimal. Other transport combinations (TCP+TLS) are already implicit. - Cross-references: ADR-010, Transport spec
Client
OQ-06: SSH config file parsing
- Origin: client.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-011 — No
~/.ssh/configparsing, no custom config file. Configuration is programmatic-first: CLI flags, library API structs (ConnectOptions,ServeOptions), and environment variables. Cross-platform path issues (~expansion) are avoided. The library API is the primary interface; if config files are needed later, they can be a separate layer. - Cross-references: ADR-011, Client spec
Server
OQ-07: ACME/Let's Encrypt support
- Origin: server.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-008 — Same resolution as OQ-01. Both domain-based (standard, domain-bound, auto-renewing) and IP-based (short-lived, no domain required) ACME flows are supported. The domain-based path requires port 80 or DNS access for challenges. The IP-based path uses TLS-ALPN-01 on port 443 and requires the ACME client to run continuously.
- Cross-references: ADR-008, Server spec, TlsTransport
OQ-08: Connection limits and rate limiting
- Origin: server.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-013 — Two-layer approach: (1) Structured logging of auth attempts and connections at INFO level for fail2ban integration on Linux — matches our production fail2ban setup with nftables and systemd journal. (2) Built-in rate limiting:
--max-connections-per-ipand--max-auth-attemptsflags providing platform-independent abuse protection. - Cross-references: ADR-013, Server spec, Production fail2ban docs
OQ-04: Authentication beyond Ed25519 keys
- Origin: client.md, server.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-012 — Ed25519 public key (default, unchanged) + OpenSSH certificate authority support (new, important for multi-user). No password authentication over SSH channels. If a local SOCKS5 proxy needs its own auth, that's a separate concern. Cert-authority makes multi-user management practical: one CA entry in
authorized_keysinstead of N individual keys. Certificates support expiry and restrictions. - Cross-references: ADR-012, Client spec, Server spec
TUN
OQ-03: Windows TUN support scope
- Origin: tun-shim.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-014 — TUN is deferred entirely from the alknet project. For VPN-like behavior, users run
tun2proxy --proxy socks5://127.0.0.1:1080alongside alknet. This eliminates all TUN-related scope questions (Windows, TCP reconstruction, etc.). - Cross-references: ADR-014
OQ-09: TCP reconstruction approach for TUN
- Origin: tun-shim.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-014 — TUN is deferred from alknet. tun2proxy (external tool) handles this if users need VPN-like behavior.
- Cross-references: ADR-014
NAPI / PubSub
OQ-10: NAPI wrapper API surface
- Origin: napi-and-pubsub.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-016 — Expose both
connect()andserve()from the start. Both are fundamental operations needed by the pubsub event target system (spokes useconnect(), hubs could useserve()). The NAPI layer is transport-agnostic — it doesn't know about pubsub'sEventEnvelope. The pubsub adapter wraps theDuplexstream. This ensures the NAPI wrapper is reusable for any stream-based protocol, not tied specifically to pubsub. - Cross-references: ADR-016, napi-and-pubsub.md
OQ-11: napi-rs vs uniffi for FFI bridge
- Origin: napi-and-pubsub.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-015 — Use napi-rs. It's the standard for Node.js native addons, matches our primary consumer (TypeScript/Node.js), and has the best ecosystem and documentation. If future Python or mobile consumers are needed, a separate uniffi layer can be added — the Rust core doesn't change.
- Cross-references: ADR-015, napi-and-pubsub.md
Configuration
OQ-12: Per-user forwarding scope vs global rules
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-031 — Start with global rules + principal matching from
Identity.scopes. Per-user scope frompeer_credentials.metadata.scopesviaIdentityProvider. TheForwardingPolicyevaluates rules againstIdentity.idandIdentity.scopesfrom the authenticated identity. - Cross-references: ADR-031, configuration.md
OQ-13: Config file auto-reload via file watching
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status: resolved
- Priority: low
- Resolution: No file watching. CLI loads once at startup; NAPI/head reload explicitly. File watching is a potential attack vector and unnecessary complexity for a security tool.
- Cross-references: configuration.md
OQ-14: ArcSwap vs RwLock for dynamic config
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status: resolved
- Priority: low
- Resolution: ArcSwap. Lock-free reads on the hot path (every auth check, every channel open).
RwLockadds contention.arc-swapis small (~500 lines) and well-maintained. - Cross-references: configuration.md
OQ-15: TLS + WebTransport + iroh QUIC listener coexistence
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status: open
- Priority: medium
- Resolution: (deferred to Phase 4 — needs R&D in WebTransport transport session)
- Cross-references: auth.md, OQ-19, interface.md
OQ-16: Transport-specific forwarding policy (e.g., WebTransport clients restricted to alknet-* channels)
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: ADR-031 — Add
TransportKindmatch inForwardingRule. WebTransport clients can be restricted toalknet-*channels viaTargetPattern::AlknetPrefixcombined with aTransportKind::WebTransportfilter. - Cross-references: ADR-031, configuration.md
OQ-17: Transport-aware auth layer (SSH keys vs API keys for non-SSH transports)
- Origin: research/configuration.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-023 — Unified auth with shared key material. SSH transports use SSH pubkey auth. Non-SSH transports (WebTransport) use Ed25519-signed timestamp tokens. Both verify against the same
authorized_keysset. The presentation differs per transport, but the identity is unified.AuthPolicyholds bothSshAuthConfigandTokenAuthConfig, withTokenKeySource::Sharedas the default (same keys for both paths).IdentityProvidertrait decouples alknet-core from identity storage. - Cross-references: ADR-023, identity.md, OQ-15
OQ-23: irpc dependency — always or behind feature flag?
- Origin: research/integration-plan.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority: medium —
- Resolution: ADR-027 — Feature flag. Nodes that only do SSH tunneling don't need the service layer. irpc is behind a feature flag in alknet-core and an independent dependency in alknet-secret and alknet-storage.
- Cross-references: ADR-027
OQ-24: DNS control channel scope for initial implementation?
- Origin: research/integration-plan.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority: medium —
- Resolution: ADR-026 — DNS control channel carries call protocol frames only (no SSH tunneling over DNS). The (DNS transport, raw framing interface) pair sends
EventEnvelopedirectly. SSH-over-DNS is a future possibility but out of scope. - Cross-references: ADR-026, interface.md
OQ-25: alknet-storage and alknet-secret irpc dependency
- Origin: research/integration-plan.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority: low —
- Resolution: ADR-027 — Independently. They're separate crates. irpc is a shared library they both use as an independent dependency.
- Cross-references: ADR-027
Auth
OQ-18: Source of Identity.scopes — ForwardingPolicy, IdentityProvider, or both?
- Origin: auth.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-029 and ADR-031 —
IdentityProviderowns scopes. TheIdentitystruct includesscopesandresourcesfields populated by theIdentityProviderimplementation (config-based or database-backed).ForwardingPolicyuses scopes fromIdentity— it consumes them, it doesn't produce them. - Cross-references: ADR-029, ADR-031, identity.md
OQ-19: Separate TLS identity for WebTransport vs shared with SSH-over-TLS?
- Origin: auth.md
- Status: open
- Priority: low
- Resolution: (deferred to Phase 4 — QUIC is UDP, TLS-over-TCP is TCP, they can share port 443 without conflict)
- Cross-references: OQ-15, interface.md
Call Protocol
OQ-20: Worker registration and discovery on connect/disconnect
- Origin: call-protocol.md
- Status: open
- Priority: medium
- Resolution: (pending — registration on connect / cleanup on disconnect is the leading approach but needs spec in call-protocol.md)
- Cross-references: ADR-024, ADR-025
OQ-21: Routing calls to specific workers with same-service operations
- Origin: call-protocol.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
medium— - Resolution: ADR-024, ADR-025 — Operation paths use
/{node}/{service}/{op}format. The first path segment identifies the node and routes the call to the correct connected node. Multiple workers exposing the same service are differentiated by the node prefix (/dev1/fs/readFilevs/dev2/fs/readFile). The head maintains a routing table mapping node identity to connection. - Cross-references: call-protocol.md, ADR-024, ADR-025
OQ-22: Client streaming (streaming inputs) in the call protocol?
- Origin: call-protocol.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority:
low— - Resolution: Deferred. Current model (single request, optional streaming response) covers all identified use cases. Client streaming can be added later if needed.
- Cross-references: ADR-024
Services
OQ-SVC-01: Should the secret service support multiple seed phrases (one per tenant)?
- Origin: secret-service.md
- Status: open
- Priority: low
- Resolution: (deferred — one seed per node is simplest; multi-seed can be added later by indexing
Unlockwith a tenant ID) - Cross-references: secret-service.md
OQ-SVC-02: Should service protocols use postcard (binary) or JSON for remote calls?
- Origin: research/services.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority: low —
- Resolution: Postcard for irpc (Rust-to-Rust, efficient). JSON for call protocol (cross-language, universal). The irpc remote path naturally uses postcard.
- Cross-references: services.md
OQ-SVC-03: How does the secret service integrate with the existing EncryptedDataSchema from @alkdev/storage?
- Origin: secret-service.md
- Status: open
- Priority: medium
- Resolution: (pending — Rust implementation replaces PBKDF2 password-based encryption with derived AES-256-GCM keys; EncryptedData format is a superset; migration by re-encrypting)
- Cross-references: secret-service.md, storage.md
OQ-SVC-04: Should workers cache derived keys locally?
- Origin: secret-service.md
- Status:
resolved - Priority: low —
- Resolution: Yes, with a TTL (default: 1 hour). The head can revoke by invalidating the session.
- Cross-references: secret-service.md
OQ-SVC-05: How does the NFT-based ACL smart contract interact with the secret service?
- Origin: storage.md
- Status: open
- Priority: low
- Resolution: The Ethereum signing key (
m/44'/60'/0'/0/0) is derived from the same seed as the secret service. The smart contract is a separate concern — it reads on-chain ACL state, it doesn't call the secret service. - Cross-references: storage.md, secret-service.md
Interface
OQ-IF-01: How does the Interface session type relate to the call protocol's EventEnvelope stream?
- Origin: interface.md
- Status: open
- Priority: high
- Resolution: (pending — needs design during Phase 1.8 implementation)
- Cross-references: interface.md, ADR-026
OQ-IF-02: Should SshInterface own ForwardingPolicy checks or should they move to Layer 3?
- Origin: interface.md
- Status: open
- Priority: medium
- Resolution: (pending — current thinking: forwarding check is Layer 3 policy, but channel open/close lifecycle is Layer 2. The Interface reports channel open requests to Layer 3; Layer 3 applies ForwardingPolicy.)
- Cross-references: interface.md, ADR-031