docs: repo init — gitignore, AGENTS.md, Phase 0 draft

- .gitignore (target/, node_modules/, .worktrees/, Cargo.lock)
- AGENTS.md: project conventions adapted from alktunnels for the
  SOCKS5 wrapper crate (no-forced-binding posture, fast-socks5
  genericity, producer/consumer vocabulary, upstream-asks rule,
  verification commands with the wasm caveat for OQ-SK-04)
- docs/research/phase-0.md: Phase 0 draft — vision, prior art
  (fast-socks5 surface, alktunnels -D conclusion, alknet ADR-090
  client, noq trait-shape divergence), open questions OQ-SK-01..07,
  POC candidates, convergence checklist
- sdd_process.md: package name fixed (alkcall -> alksocks)
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# AGENTS.md
Operating instructions for opencode agents working in this repo. opencode
auto-loads this file as instructions, overriding the built-in defaults for
this project. Custom agents in `.opencode/agents/` inherit these rules
unless their own prompts say otherwise.
## Git Workflow
**Commit and push when reasonable.** When a change is complete and
verified (build + lint + tests pass), commit and push to `origin/main`
without asking. This overrides the built-in default of "only commit when
explicitly asked."
The workflow:
1. Make the change
2. Verify: `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
`cargo fmt --check`, `cargo doc --no-deps` if docs changed
3. Inspect `git status` and `git diff` before staging — stage only the
intended files, never secrets
4. Write a concise commit message matching the repo style (see `git log
--oneline -10`). For multi-point changes, use a summary line plus a
body with bullet points and a verification block.
5. `git push origin main`
6. Report the commit hash and the verification summary
Exceptions — **do not** commit or push without asking:
- The change is exploratory / speculative (you're not sure the user wants
it kept)
- The user is actively reviewing the diff and may ask for changes
- The change touches the wire format or a trait shape that backends or
consumers implement (one-way doors — see "Wire formats are stable" and
"Backend trait shapes are one-way doors" below; once consumers exist,
those signatures are wire-stable contracts)
- You'd be force-pushing, amending a published commit, creating an empty
commit, or skipping hooks
Never commit secrets, keys, or credentials. If a commit fails or hooks
reject it, fix the issue and create a new commit — do not amend the
failed one.
Git identity is preconfigured (`glm-5.3-flash <glm-5.3-flash@alk.dev>`). Do
not change `git config`, skip hooks, or use `git commit -i`.
## Project Conventions (Rust / SOCKS5 protocol crate)
This is the SOCKS5 protocol crate — a wrapper around `fast-socks5` that
offers the SSH `-D` (dynamic / SOCKS5 proxy) capability alongside
alktunnels' `-R` and `-L`, composed with alkcall channels ("ALPN as a
service"). It sits in the alk* family: alkcall (call + channels — the
substrate), alktty (terminal sessions), alktunnels (arbitrary `-L`/`-R`/
tunnels). The distinguishing posture of this crate: **the SOCKS5 server
never binds a port unless explicitly configured to** — the protocol is
served inside alkcall channels data channels (a produced, ACL-scoped
resource), not on a kernel socket. A local bind is one optional
assembly-layer shape, not the protocol's home. The conventions below
apply to all work in `src/` and `tests/`. They mirror
`.opencode/agents/implementation-specialist.md` §Project Conventions and
are repeated here so they apply to every session, not just spawned
implementation agents.
1. **No comments in code** unless the user explicitly asks. This is a
project-wide convention. Doc comments (`///`, `//!`) are fine and
expected on public API. Inline `//` comments only when the user asks
or when a non-obvious safety/correctness constraint would otherwise
be missed (e.g., "a two-pump tunnel must shut down the opposite sink
on pump completion — `try_join!` alone deadlocks; see alkcall
ADR-050's `pump_bidi` / alknet ADR-078").
2. **Error handling** — `thiserror` for library error types; map SOCKS5
reply codes (`fast_socks5::ReplyError`) faithfully per RFC 1928. No
panics in library code. No `unwrap()` or `expect()` outside tests. If
you reach for `unwrap`, the error path wasn't specified — stop and
decide what should actually happen. For poisoned `RwLock`/`Mutex`,
use `unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())` so a panic in one operation
does not cascade to other operations.
3. **`tokio` is the async runtime** — all I/O is async. `fast-socks5` is
tokio-native; the wrapper's protocol layer, pumps, and client session
types are all async. Use `tokio::sync` primitives (`oneshot`, `mpsc`)
for lifecycle correlation. Any non-wasm backend module (local TCP
listener for a "real" `socks5://` endpoint) lives behind a feature
flag like alktty/alktunnels' `local`.
4. **WASM target is load-bearing (by default)** — the default crate
(protocol-only) should compile to `wasm32-unknown-unknown`, following
the alktty/alktunnels precedent. Use the wasm-clean tokio subset
(`rt`, `sync`, `io-util`, `macros`, `time`) — **do NOT use `features
= ["full"]`** — and keep socket/platform I/O feature-gated. Note:
`fast-socks5` itself uses `tokio::net` and `socket2` unconditionally;
whether it compiles wasm-clean, needs a fork, or the wrapper
reimplements the SOCKS5 state machine over `tokio::io` generics is an
open question (see `docs/research/phase-0.md` OQ-SK-04) — do not
assume either way until it is resolved.
5. **Wire format is stable** — the SOCKS5 protocol itself is RFC 1928
(fixed); this crate's wire surface is the ALPN + the channel open-op
params that carry it. Those params are a one-way door once consumers
exist. Follow the alktunnels precedent: params are a self-contained
JSON object identifying the produced resource (alkcall ADR-039 —
`params` is ALPN-specific, interpreted by the open handler). Any
params-format ADR must be written before the first consumer exists;
after that, changes are additive-only.
6. **Producer/consumer, not server/client** — both sides of a channels
connection can initiate. A producer exposes the SOCKS5 service
(registers openable channels via `ChannelCore::register_openable`); a
consumer opens SOCKS5 channels and speaks RFC 1928 inside them. Both
sides can be both simultaneously — connection direction (who opened
it) is independent of service direction (who dials targets, who
serves). Avoid "server" and "client" framing in docs and API names;
use "producer" and "consumer," or "accept side" / "connect side" for
the connection-establishment half specifically. (SOCKS5's own
client/server roles are RFC vocabulary and keep their RFC names
inside the protocol layer.) See alkcall ADR-022, ADR-037.
7. **Substrate-agnostic by construction** — the protocol layer must not
know whether the far side of a SOCKS5 connection is a kernel TCP
socket, a channels `BiStream`, a unix socket, or an in-process pipe.
`fast-socks5`'s explicit server API is generic over
`T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin` (`Socks5ServerProtocol<T, ...>`,
`transfer(inbound, outbound)`); the wrapper must preserve that
genericity — the channels adapter feeds the SOCKS5 state machine a
`BiStream` (which is `AsyncRead + AsyncWrite`), the local backend
feeds it a `TcpStream`. Substrate-specific types are confined to
feature-gated backend modules, injected at the assembly layer — the
same inversion-point pattern as alktty's `TtyBackend` and
alktunnels' pump halves.
8. **Two-pump shutdown-on-completion is a contract** — the SOCKS5
CONNECT data plane is the canonical two-pump shape (one pump per
direction). Each pump MUST shut down the opposite sink when it
completes; `tokio::try_join!` alone deadlocks. The helper is pinned
upstream as alkcall `channels::pump_bidi` (ADR-050, review 007 R-03)
— use it; do not hand-roll the two-pump shape. The channels layer
drops all per-channel senders on transport EOF — rely on that for
teardown, and emit EOF sentinels (zero-length chunks) on clean sink
shutdown. Await `pump_bidi` inline inside the `OpenHandler`'s task —
the returned `JoinHandle` must track the data-plane lifetime (R-02;
early return = teardown-at-birth).
9. **No forced local binding** — the defining requirement of this crate.
The SOCKS5 server must run without binding any port: the RFC 1928
conversation is carried inside a channels data channel, and target
dials happen on the producing side (or hop further through
alktunnels/alksocks). A local bind (a genuine `socks5://host:port`
endpoint) is an optional assembly-layer/feature-gated capability.
UDP ASSOCIATE is the hard case: RFC 1928 replies with a UDP relay
address and the client sends datagrams to it, which seems to demand a
bind — how the relay address is virtualized (or the associate shape
adapted) is a Phase 0 question (OQ-SK-03). Binding decisions belong
to the caller (assembly layer), never the protocol crate.
10. **Backpressure and limits are inherited, not redefined** — bounded
per-channel buffers, the 256-channel per-connection cap, monotonic
channel IDs, and the zero-length-sentinel EOF convention are
alkcall channels invariants (see alkcall ADR-040/041/034). The
crate consumes them via `ChannelCore`/`ChannelClient`; do not build
a second demux/mux or re-derive limits. SOCKS5 CONNECT is a single
stream per open (no sub-demux inside the channel) — one channel per
SOCKS5 session, no protocol-level flow key.
11. **Vendored core types come from alkcall** — `Connection`,
`ProtocolHandler`, `BiStream`, `BidiStreamSource`, `AuthContext`,
`Identity`, `IdentityProvider`, `AccessControl`,
`OwnershipProvider`, `HandlerError`, `StreamError` come from
`alkcall::core`. Do not vendor copies into this crate. alkcall is
v0.7.x — breaking changes are expected at this major-zero stage;
this is an early consumer, so we find and fix issues upstream
rather than working around them. Pin `alkcall = "0.7.1"` and bump
deliberately. The establishment surface (alkcall ADR-049 +
amendment 2) is load-bearing for this crate: SOCKS5 session opens
use `register_openable_with_establisher` so a refused/auth-failed
session is a typed `channel:open_failed` call error, never a
phantom channel; the establisher returns the negotiated handle via
`Establishment::new(plan)` (typed-opaque `ChannelPlan` — payloads
must be `Send + Sync`). The 0.7.0 identity surface (ledger
CF-005/CF-006) is load-bearing for auth mapping: the per-call
opener identity arrives on the open-op hooks — map it to SOCKS5
credentials/ACL there, not via any in-band SOCKS auth unless
clients need RFC-facing username/password.
12. **Access control** — the producer's openable channels get
authorization for free via `ChannelCore::register_openable`, which
wires `AccessControl` into the operation spec (the registry runs
the ACL before the open handler). Scope-gate SOCKS5 opens (e.g.
`SOCKS5_OPEN_SCOPE`, shape following alktty's `TTY_OPEN_SCOPE`) and
optionally consult `OwnershipProvider` for resource ownership.
SOCKS5 is arbitrary-egress by nature — treat the open gate and the
target policy as the security boundary; per-target allowlists (if
any) are a producer-side policy question for Phase 1 (OQ-SK-05).
See alknet ADR-024 (registry layering, alkcall ADR-019), alknet
ADR-050 (ownership, alkcall ADR-011), and alktunnels' resolved
posture (target selection lives in the SOCKS5 protocol at the
producing side; whatever ACL governs the socks5 resource governs
everything reachable through it).
13. **Feature flags** — substrate backends are feature-gated if the
need arises. The base crate should compile lean (no socket/platform
deps unless the feature is on). Verify both `cargo test` (default)
and `cargo test --all-features` pass if features are added.
14. **Naming** — Rust standard: `snake_case` for functions/variables/
modules, `PascalCase` for types/traits, `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` for
constants.
15. **Module structure** — one module per file under `src/`, re-exported
from `src/lib.rs`. Public API surface is `lib.rs` re-exports. The
expected shape (pending Phase 1 pinning): the SOCKS5 protocol
wrapper (server state machine + client session), the channels
adapter (producer half — open handler for this crate's ALPN), the
consumer half (a typed client that opens SOCKS5 channels and
speaks RFC 1928 through them), and feature-gated backend modules
(the optional local-bind listener). Backend modules are
feature-gated and never imported from the protocol/adapter/client
modules.
16. **ALPN naming** — this crate owns a `alk/`-prefixed ALPN (provisional
`alk/socks5`; final naming per alkcall ADR-004/ADR-006 convention).
One ALPN per protocol. The ALPN string is wire-stable once
published — decide via ADR before the first consumer.
17. **Upstream is ours — make asks early.** We own `fast-socks5`
(`/workspace/fast-socks5`, v1.0.0, MIT) and alkcall. If the wrapper
needs a change upstream (a typestate hook, a generic split, a new
event), file it and land it there rather than working around it
locally — the alktunnels precedent (the E-01/E-02 sweep, filed from
its Phase 0 and landed in alkcall 0.5.0 within a day). Keep
`/workspace/fast-socks5` as the reference checkout; if upstream
diverges from what we publish, note the fork point in the research
docs.
## Verification Commands
Run these before committing. All must pass.
```bash
cargo test # full suite
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo fmt --check
cargo doc --no-deps # if docs changed
cargo test --all-features # if features are added
cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown # default crate stays wasm-clean
cargo clippy --target wasm32-unknown-unknown -- -D warnings
cargo publish --dry-run --allow-dirty # before a release
```
The wasm check is the structural guard for the "default crate is
wasm-clean" invariant (same as alktty/alktunnels) — run it whenever a
non-backend module changes. Until OQ-SK-04 (fast-socks5 wasm posture) is
resolved, the wasm check may fail on the dependency graph; that failure
is expected and is exactly what the OQ tracks.
## Architecture Context
- `docs/research/phase-0.md` — the Phase 0 (Exploration) document and
the current state of this repo: vision, prior art, open questions
(OQ-SK-01..NN), and POC candidates. Read it before non-trivial work.
The SDD process lives in `docs/sdd_process.md` (Phase 0 in progress;
`docs/architecture/` does not exist yet).
- The prior art for this crate:
- **alktunnels** — `/workspace/@alkdev/alktunnels` (v0.1, the closest
sibling): the producer/consumer tunnel crate on alkcall channels.
Its Phase 0 findings (`docs/research/phase-0-findings.md`) settled
the hub-owns-the-connection model, the two-pump shape, the
establishment story (alkcall ADR-049), and the `-D`-composes-at-the-
assembly-layer conclusion — this crate is that conclusion's
realization. Its Phase 1 ADRs (params shape, ALPN strategy,
access-control posture) are the template for this crate's Phase 1.
- **alktty** — `/workspace/@alkdev/alktty` (v0.4): the first
producer/consumer protocol crate on alkcall channels; the backend
inversion point, wasm-clean default crate, and feature-gated local
backend precedents.
- **alkcall** — `/workspace/@alkdev/alkcall` (v0.7.1, crates.io). The
substrate: call protocol + channels multiplexing. This crate
consumes `alkcall::core` types and the channels
`ChannelCore`/`ChannelClient`/`register_openable_with_establisher`
surface, same as alktty/alktunnels.
- **fast-socks5** — `/workspace/fast-socks5` (v1.0.0, MIT, we own
upstream). The SOCKS5 implementation to wrap: explicit typestate
server API (`Socks5ServerProtocol<T, states::*>`), generic over
`T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin`; `run_tcp_proxy` /
`run_udp_proxy_custom` / `transfer` are the interception points;
client side has `Socks5Stream` (generic over the backing socket)
and `Socks5Datagram` (UDP associate).
- **alknet's SOCKS5 client** —
`/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/crates/alknet-client/src/socks5.rs`
(ADR-090): the client-side example need — `Socks5UdpSocket`
implements `quinn::AsyncUdpSocket` so QUIC rides SOCKS5 UDP
ASSOCIATE. Validated by the quinn-proxy POC
(`/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/docs/research/quinn-quic-proxy/
findings.md`). The open question for this crate's client story: the
same trait impl against **noq** (iroh's quinn fork,
`/workspace/noq` — `noq::AsyncUdpSocket`, `Endpoint::
new_with_abstract_socket` exist but with a different surface shape;
see OQ-SK-06).
- Key upstream ADRs that inform this crate's design (alknet numbers;
alkcall's ports live in `/workspace/@alkdev/alkcall/docs/architecture/
decisions/`):
- alknet ADR-093 / alkcall ADR-035 — channels pure channel
multiplexing (8-byte header, no `stream_type`); the SOCKS5 session
rides inside the channel's `BiStream`
- alknet ADR-078 / alkcall ADR-050 — two-pump shutdown-on-completion;
the helper is pinned upstream as `alkcall::channels::pump_bidi` —
use it, do not hand-roll
- alkcall ADR-049 (amendment 2) — the establishment phase; the
establisher returns the negotiated handle via `Establishment::new`
(typed-opaque `ChannelPlan`, `Send + Sync` payload constraint)
- alknet ADR-074 / alkcall ADR-038 — `ChannelConnection` as a
`BidiStreamSource`; every handler receives a `Connection`
- alknet ADR-075 / alkcall ADR-039 — `ChannelsAdapter` /
`ChannelManager` (substrate-agnostic demux; `params` is
ALPN-specific — for this crate, the SOCKS5 service identity/policy)
- alknet ADR-071 / alkcall ADR-034 — channels wire format (one-way
door); alkcall ADR-036 — channel 0 is pre-negotiated `alk/call`;
alkcall ADR-037 — channel lifecycle operations (`channel/open` on
channel 0)
- alkcall ADR-042 — hub relay; alktunnels' hub-proxy refinement —
the hub terminates and re-produces per-hop ACL (a SOCKS5 resource
is the same shape, "further downstream" — alktunnels
phase-0-findings §Prior art)
- alkcall ledger CF-005/CF-006 (0.7.0) — the connect-side serving
identity seam: caller identity precedence (token >
`ServingConfig.identity` > transport), per-call opener identity on
the open-op hooks
- The suite decomposition context: alknet was the massive POC ("vpn-like
without being a vpn" + transport agnosticism) being rewritten; this
crate extracts and improves its SOCKS5 story (client side: ADR-090's
proxy support; server side: the `-D` capability alktunnels deferred
to composition). `alknet-client/src/socks5.rs` and the quinn-proxy
POC findings are the direct ancestors of this crate's client work.
- If a TODO references a design direction that a later ADR has decided
against, the TODO is stale — remove it and align with the ADR. Do not
implement the rejected design.
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---
status: draft
last_updated: 2026-09-12
---
# alksocks — Phase 0 (Exploration)
This document captures Phase 0 (Exploration) for the `alksocks` crate:
vision, guiding principles, prior art, open questions (OQ-SK-01..NN), and
POC candidates. Phase 0's objective per `docs/sdd_process.md`: *capture
vision and guiding principles; research options; validate approaches;
converge on a recommended approach.* It is the input to Phase 1
(Architecture), where the Architect will produce `docs/architecture/`
specs, ADRs, and the open-questions tracker.
Drafted 2026-09-12, emerging from the initial setup discussion. The crate
is the sibling of alktty (`alk/tty`) and alktunnels (`alk/tunnel`) on the
alkcall substrate; where alktunnels realizes the `-L`/`-R` forwarding
flavors, alksocks realizes the `-D` flavor (dynamic / SOCKS5 proxy) —
the one alktunnels explicitly deferred to composition.
## Vision and guiding principles
**One sentence:** a SOCKS5 (RFC 1928) producer/consumer protocol crate on
alkcall channels — an arbitrary-egress proxy service that never binds a
port unless explicitly configured to, wrapping `fast-socks5` so the RFC
conversation rides inside a channels data channel like any other produced
resource.
Guiding principles, inherited from the alk* family:
1. **"ALPN as a service," not "a server."** The SOCKS5 service is a
produced, ACL-scoped resource on a channels connection — the same
shape as an alktty terminal or an alktunnels TCP tunnel. A genuine
`socks5://host:port` kernel-socket listener is one optional
assembly-layer shape (a feature-gated local backend), never the
protocol's home. This inverts the usual SOCKS5 deployment posture and
is the crate's defining requirement.
2. **The `-D` conclusion, realized.** alktunnels' Phase 0 settled that
`-D` composes at the assembly layer: "`-D` is just tunnel a socks5
connection"; target selection lives in the SOCKS5 protocol at the
producing side, governed by the same op-level ACL as the resource.
This crate is that conclusion's realization as a first-class protocol
crate, not an assembly-layer afterthought.
3. **Wrap `fast-socks5`, preserve its genericity.** `fast-socks5`'s
explicit typestate server API (`Socks5ServerProtocol<T, states::*>`)
is generic over `T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin`, and its
interception points (`run_tcp_proxy`, `run_udp_proxy_custom`,
`transfer`) accept any such `T`. The channels adapter feeds the state
machine a `BiStream`; the local backend feeds it a `TcpStream`. The
wrapper must not leak either substrate into the protocol layer
(alktty `TtyBackend` / alktunnels pump-halves inversion-point
precedent).
4. **Producer/consumer vocabulary.** Both sides of a channels connection
can initiate; a producer registers openable SOCKS5 channels
(`ChannelCore::register_openable`), a consumer opens them and speaks
RFC 1928 inside. RFC 1928's own client/server roles keep their RFC
names *inside* the protocol layer, but crate-level docs and API use
producer/consumer. Avoid "SOCKS5 server" as a crate-level noun.
5. **Extract-and-improve from alknet.** alknet's SOCKS5 story is the
direct ancestor: the client side (`alknet-client/src/socks5.rs`,
ADR-090 — `Socks5UdpSocket` implements `quinn::AsyncUdpSocket` so
QUIC rides UDP ASSOCIATE, validated by the quinn-proxy POC) and the
server side (the `-D` capability alktunnels deferred). This crate
rehomes both halves behind one protocol crate and improves them.
## What is already settled
The foundation is POC-validated and ADR-pinned upstream; this crate does
not start from zero. It inherits:
- **The channels data path** — demux→Connection→handler→mux, validated
by the alknet-channels POC and production alktty/alktunnels. The SOCKS5
payload is raw bytes inside a channels data channel's `BiStream`;
channels strips its 8-byte header transparently (alknet ADR-093 /
alkcall ADR-035). SOCKS5 CONNECT is one `BiStream` per session — the
RFC conversation *is* the stream; no sub-demux, no framing, no flow
key (one channel per SOCKS5 session).
- **The two-pump data plane** — the CONNECT proxy loop is the canonical
two-pump shape; `alkcall::channels::pump_bidi` (ADR-050) is pinned
upstream and alktunnels-validated. Use it; do not hand-roll.
- **The establishment story** — session opens use
`register_openable_with_establisher` (alkcall ADR-049 + amendment 2):
the establisher runs as an awaited, bounded establishment phase; a
refused session is a typed `channel:open_failed` call error
(`reason ∈ dial_failed / unknown_resource / resource_shortage /
handler_error / timeout`), never a phantom channel. The negotiate/
auth half of the RFC conversation still runs in-stream over the
`BiStream` — establishment covers only the producer's accept policy,
not the RFC handshake.
- **The producer/consumer model** — producer registers openable channels
(authorization for free via `AccessControl`); consumer opens them via
`ChannelClient` (alkcall ADR-037, ADR-043). Connection direction is
independent of service direction.
- **The relay/hub story** — a SOCKS5 resource traverses alkcall hub
relays like any produced resource; the hub's terminate-and-re-produce
proxy (alktunnels' refinement of alkcall ADR-042) applies per hop, and
a SOCKS5 resource is exactly the "further downstream" shape alktunnels
described. No socks5-specific relay work.
- **The identity seam** — alkcall 0.7.0's CF-005/CF-006: the per-call
opener identity arrives on the open-op hooks. Auth mapping (identity →
SOCKS5 credentials/ACL, if any) happens there, not via in-band SOCKS
auth, unless RFC-facing username/password is needed for vanilla SOCKS5
clients (OQ-SK-02).
- **The backend inversion point pattern** — substrate-specific types
confined to feature-gated backend modules, injected at the assembly
layer (alktty `TtyBackend` / alktunnels no-trait precedent).
- **The wasm-clean default crate** — protocol-only code should compile
to `wasm32-unknown-unknown` (alktty/alktunnels precedent). Caveat:
`fast-socks5` itself is not yet known to be wasm-clean (OQ-SK-04).
## Prior art
### alktunnels Phase 0 — the closest sibling
`/workspace/@alkdev/alktunnels/docs/research/phase-0-findings.md`. The
load-bearing conclusions this crate inherits:
- **Hub-owns-the-connection model** — role follows the resource;
whoever can reach the target is the producer, whoever wants the bytes
is the consumer. The "exposed port" is a virtual, ACL-scoped resource,
not a bind. For alksocks: the producer is the side that dials targets
(the egress side); the consumer is the side that wants proxied
egress. "A SOCKS5 service is the same shape [as a produced tunnel
resource], further downstream" is alktunnels' own wording — this
crate exists to make it literal.
- **`-D` composes at the assembly layer** — the original half-answer,
now with the mechanism named: a SOCKS5 server at some assembly layer
is just a consumer opening channels with per-connection dynamic
targets. The refinement this crate adds: the SOCKS5 *service* is
itself a produced resource (producer half), so a vanilla SOCKS5 client
(curl, a browser, ssh -D's own client half) can attach through the
optional local backend, and channels-native consumers get the same
service in-band. Both halves wrap the same protocol layer.
- **Target policy = resource policy.** alktunnels OQ-TN-08 dissolved
dynamic-target policy: whatever ACL governs the socks5 resource
governs everything reachable through it, plus whatever policy the
SOCKS5 implementation itself applies downstream. No target allowlists
in the base crate unless Phase 1 wants them (OQ-SK-05).
- **The codec conclusion does NOT transfer.** alktunnels needed
length-framing only for datagram substrates; a SOCKS5 CONNECT session
is a byte stream end to end (RFC 1928 defines its own framing on the
wire) — the channel payload is pure pass-through, 0 B overhead over
the channels 8-byte header. UDP ASSOCIATE's datagram stage is the
exception (OQ-SK-03).
### fast-socks5 — the implementation to wrap
`/workspace/fast-socks5` (v1.0.0, MIT, we own upstream). Read the source
before designing against it. Key surface points, verified:
- **Explicit typestate server API** (`src/server.rs`):
`Socks5ServerProtocol<T, states::Opened|Authenticated|CommandRead>`,
generic over `T: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin`. Flow:
`start(inner)``negotiate_auth(&methods)`
`finish_auth()` / `accept_no_auth` / `accept_password_auth`
`read_command()` → (`reply_success`, `reply_error`). The legacy
`Socks5Server`/`Socks5Socket`/`Incoming` API (binds a `TcpListener`)
is deprecated — the wrapper uses the explicit API only.
- **Auth surface** — the `AuthMethod<T>` trait (metadata: `method_id`,
`new`) + `AuthMethodSuccessState<T>` (carry the socket back out);
`StandardAuthentication` enum for NoAuth + Password with static
dispatch; custom methods implement the trait. Username/password check
is a closure (`accept_password_auth`). The auth *decision* is where
the alkcall identity seam plugs in (OQ-SK-02).
- **Command handling is swappable** — the interception points:
- `run_tcp_proxy(proto, addr, timeout, nodelay)` — dials, replies,
then `transfer(inbound, outbound)` (a `copy_bidirectional` wrapper,
itself generic). This is where a channels-native dial replaces the
`tokio::net` dial: the wrapper's producer half intercepts here,
dials via alktunnels/alkcall primitives (or its own dial policy),
and returns the `T` back.
- `run_udp_proxy_custom(proto, addr, peer_bind_ip, reply_ip, transfer)`
— the customizable UDP ASSOCIATE handler: the wrapper supplies a
custom `transfer` closure that owns the relay half (OQ-SK-03).
- `transfer(inbound, outbound)` — plain two-pump copy; a channels
`BiStream` is a legal `T` on either side.
- **UDP support** — `new_udp_header(target)` / `parse_udp_request(buf)`
are public and pure (no socket I/O) — the SOCKS5 UDP datagram header
codec is reusable without the `Socket2`-based relay machinery. The
default `run_udp_proxy` binds two kernel sockets (`Socket2`, random
ports) — the *binds are in the default handler, not in the protocol*,
which is exactly the seam the no-bind requirement needs.
- **Client side** — `Socks5Stream<S>` (generic over the backing socket;
`use_stream` upgrades any `AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin` already
connected) and `Socks5Datagram<S>` (UDP associate; also accepts a
caller-supplied socket via `use_socket`). `Socks5Stream` impls
`AsyncRead + AsyncWrite` itself, so a consumer session over a
channels `BiStream` is the intended use, not a hack. Note:
`Socks5Stream::connect` convenience constructors dial
`tokio::net::TcpStream` and are non-wasm; `use_stream` is the
substrate-free path.
- **Error surface** — `ReplyError` (the RFC reply codes, `as_u8`/
`from_u8`) and `SocksError`; `SocksServerError` on the explicit API.
Map these faithfully; never collapse a refusal into a generic error.
- **`router.rs` example** — the "conditional interception" template: a
server that inspects the command/target, then decides whether to
proxy, refuse, or handle in-process. Structurally the shape of the
channels open handler (inspect params → dial or refuse) and of the
alknet ADR-090 client (hand the established stream to quinn).
### alknet's SOCKS5 client + the quinn-proxy POC — the client-side ancestor
`/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/crates/alknet-client/src/socks5.rs` (ADR-090)
implements `Socks5UdpSocket: quinn::AsyncUdpSocket` — a SOCKS5 UDP
ASSOCIATE tunnel wrapped as the socket QUIC polls. The quinn-proxy POC
(`/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/docs/research/quinn-quic-proxy/findings.md`)
validated the approach end-to-end (5/5 clean runs) against quinn 0.11:
one public trait (`AsyncUdpSocket`), one public constructor
(`Endpoint::new_with_abstract_socket`), no fork. Known limitations
there, likely inherited: ECN is lost through the SOCKS5 header; the
proxy must support UDP ASSOCIATE; `may_fragment() == true` disables
path MTU discovery.
This crate's client half rehomes that work (cleaned up, `ClientDialError`
→ thiserror types, and the datagram codec sourced from fast-socks5
rather than hand-rolled inline). The open question is noq (OQ-SK-06).
### noq — the quinn fork the client story must also fit
`/workspace/noq` (v1.2.0; iroh's fork of quinn — iroh depends on
`noq = "1.2.0"`). Surface verified:
- `noq::AsyncUdpSocket` exists (`noq/src/runtime/mod.rs:44`) but with a
**different shape** than quinn 0.11: `create_io_poller` +
`try_send` are replaced by `create_sender() -> Pin<Box<dyn UdpSender>>`
with `poll_send(transmit, cx)` — a sender-object split (any number of
`UdpSender`s per socket, each holding its own waker).
- `RecvMeta` gained fields (`interface_index`, `timestamp`) but stays
default-constructible; `Transmit` is unchanged in the fields the
SOCKS5 wrapper touches (`destination`, `contents`, `ecn`, `src_ip`,
`segment_size`).
- `Endpoint::new_with_abstract_socket` exists (`noq/src/endpoint.rs:162`)
with the same doc-comment intent, but takes
`Box<dyn AsyncUdpSocket>` rather than `Arc<dyn AsyncUdpSocket>` — the
poller-removal reshuffle also changed the ownership shape.
- The alknet `Socks5UdpSocket` does **not** drop in unchanged: the impl
must be rewritten against `create_sender`/`poll_send`, and the
`Arc``Box` change ripples into construction. Whether one crate can
serve both quinn and noq behind feature flags (shared core, two thin
trait-impl shells) or whether the shapes have diverged enough to
justify two impls is the research question (OQ-SK-06). iroh's own
adoption makes noq support the practically-important target.
### Anti-prior-art (what NOT to carry over)
- **The alknet client's hand-rolled SOCKS5 codec** —
`socks5.rs` inlines the greeting/auth/CONNECT/ASSOCIATE byte logic
twice (handshake for UDP, again for CONNECT). fast-socks5's client
types and `new_udp_header`/`parse_udp_request` supersede it; the
wrapper should not vendor a second codec.
- **`Socks5Server` (the legacy bind-based API)** — deprecated upstream;
never the default path here.
- **In-band SOCKS auth as the primary auth story** — alkcall's identity
seam (CF-005/CF-006) authorizes at the open-op layer. In-band RFC
username/password remains available only for vanilla-client
compatibility (OQ-SK-02).
## Open Questions
These are the design questions Phase 0 must resolve (or explicitly
defer) before the architecture spec. Numbered OQ-SK-01.. so they can be
referenced, tracked, and promoted into `docs/architecture/
open-questions.md` in Phase 1. Half-answers and hunches are marked as
such — the point of this document is to hold them without forcing
premature decisions.
### OQ-SK-01: Producer dial policy — what dials the target?
When the producer's SOCKS5 state machine reads a CONNECT command, the
target dial must happen *somewhere*. Options:
- **Option A: dial via alktunnels** — the producer composes with a
local alktunnels consumer: the SOCKS5 handler opens an `alk/tunnel`
channel naming the target, and the two-pump data plane is
tunnel-channel ↔ SOCKS5-`BiStream`. Maximum composition ("further
downstream" made literal), but adds a runtime dependency and a hop.
- **Option B: dial directly** — the producer dials the target itself
(`TcpStream` behind the `local` feature, or an injected dial
callback). No alktunnels dependency; the dial policy (allowlists,
routing through another alksocks hop) is the caller's callback.
- **Option C: injected dialer trait** — a `Dialer`-shaped trait
(`async fn dial(target) -> impl AsyncRead + AsyncWrite`) with
alktunnels and local-TCP implementations behind features. Middle
ground; the trait is a backend-inversion-point decision (compare
alktunnels OQ-TN-05's resolution: *no trait*, a function producing
boxed halves sufficed).
Considerations: substrate-agnostic-by-construction (AGENTS.md
convention 7) favors injection over hardwiring; the "hub terminates and
re-produces" story means a hub-hop SOCKS5 resource's dialer is just
"open a channel further downstream," which is Option A's shape — so
whatever is decided must not *prevent* A when composing. Hunch: a dial
callback/trait at the protocol layer, with alktunnels and local-TCP
providers feature-gated — but alktunnels' no-trait precedent warns
against a trait unless two real implementations converge; decide with
the Phase 1 spec.
### OQ-SK-02: Auth mapping — identity seam vs in-band SOCKS auth
The producer's open-op hooks receive the per-call opener identity
(alkcall CF-005/CF-006). The SOCKS5 RFC conversation also carries its
own optional username/password auth (RFC 1929). Questions:
- Is the identity seam the *only* auth story (the open op is
authorized; the in-band handshake is skipped via
`skip_auth_this_is_not_rfc_compliant` or a no-op NoAuth), with
RFC-facing username/password available only for the optional local
backend (where vanilla SOCKS5 clients connect)?
- If both exist, how do they compose — does in-band auth *replace* the
channel identity for target-policy purposes, or is it a second gate?
- Does the wrapper need a fast-socks5 `AuthMethod` implementation that
consults the alkcall `AuthContext`/`Identity` (filed upstream if the
hook shape doesn't fit — AGENTS.md convention 17)?
Hunch: identity-at-the-open-op is the primary gate for
channels-native consumers; in-band username/password exists for the
local-backend path only. Needs a decision (and possibly an upstream
ask) in Phase 1.
### OQ-SK-03: UDP ASSOCIATE without binding — the hard case
RFC 1928 §7: the client sends UDP ASSOCIATE over the TCP control
connection; the server replies with a UDP relay address (`BND.ADDR`/
`BND.PORT`); the client then sends UDP datagrams (SOCKS5 UDP header +
payload) *to that address*. On channels there is no UDP relay socket —
the datagram stage must ride a channel. Sub-questions:
- **Where does the datagram stage live?** Options:
- **Same channel, extended protocol** — after ASSOCIATE, the channel's
`BiStream` carries length-prefixed datagrams (the alktunnels UDP
codec shape, `[len: u16 BE]` per datagram; 65507 < 65535 so u16
suffices). The reply to the client rewrites `BND.ADDR`/`BND.PORT`
to a sentinel that means "same channel" — but vanilla SOCKS5
clients will literally `sendto()` that address, so this shape only
works for *wrapper-aware* client halves (the crate's own consumer
session, or an assembly layer bridging a real UDP socket).
- **Second channel for the datagram stage** — the producer
establishes the association on channel 1, then the client opens a
second channel that becomes the relay. Keeps CONNECT-shaped
`BiStream` semantics clean but adds an open-op round trip and
needs correlation (params carry the association id?).
- **Local-backend bridge only** — UDP ASSOCIATE is offered only
through the optional local backend (which binds a real UDP relay
socket as the assembly layer's explicit choice), never
channels-natively. Simplest; weakens the "ALPN as a service"
story for UDP.
- **What does `BND.ADDR`/`BND.PORT` reply contain on the channels
path?** RFC says the relay address; a channels path has none.
fast-socks5's `run_udp_proxy_custom` lets the wrapper supply the
reply and the relay half — the seam exists upstream; the semantics
are ours to define.
- **Per-datagram addressing** — the SOCKS5 UDP header carries the
destination per datagram (ATYP + addr + port), so one association
multiplexes many endpoints: per-endpoint flow table producer-side
(the alknet `Socks5UdpSocket` model, and the udpgw prior art
alktunnels documented). Boundary preservation is mandatory (empty
datagram ≠ EOF — alktunnels F-2's lesson transfers directly).
- **Do vanilla (wrapper-unaware) clients need channels-native UDP at
all?** If the only UDP ASSOCIATE consumers are wrapper-aware, the
sentinel-reply shape is fine and no virtualized relay address is
ever invented.
Hunch: wrapper-aware client halves ride the same-channel
length-prefixed-datagram shape; vanilla clients get UDP ASSOCIATE only
via the optional local backend. But this is the crate's largest
unknown — a POC candidate (OQ-SK-07 #2), decided by an ADR before the
first consumer (the datagram framing is wire-stable once published).
### OQ-SK-04: fast-socks5 wasm posture (blocks the wasm-clean invariant)
`fast-socks5` uses `tokio::net` (`TcpListener`, `TcpStream`,
`UdpSocket`) and `socket2` unconditionally (`Cargo.toml`: tokio features
`io-util, net, time, macros`; deps `socket2 = "0.5.8"`); `wasm32-
unknown-unknown` has no `tokio::net`. The wrapper's own protocol layer
can stay wasm-clean (the typestate API is generic over `T`), but
depending on the crate at all may break `cargo check --target
wasm32-unknown-unknown` at the dependency-graph level. Options:
- **Option A: upstream feature-gating ask** — add a feature to
fast-socks5 that gates `tokio::net`/`socket2` behind a default-on
`net` feature (like alktty's `local`), leaving the codecs, typestate
machinery, and client `use_stream` path wasm-clean. We own upstream
(AGENTS.md convention 17); the alk* precedent is to make asks early.
- **Option B: protocol reimplementation** — the wrapper reimplements
the SOCKS5 state machine over `tokio::io` generics (RFC 1928 is
small); fast-socks5 remains the native-path implementation. Duplicates
protocol logic; against the "wrap, don't fork" vision unless A fails.
- **Option C: wasm drops off the invariant for this crate** — accept a
native-only default. Against the alktty/alktunnels precedent;
document as an ADR-worthy exception if forced.
Action: verify the breakage empirically (a minimal crate depending on
fast-socks5, `cargo check --target wasm32-unknown-unknown`), then take
Option A upstream if confirmed. This OQ gates the wasm verification
command in AGENTS.md (the expected-failure note is already written
there).
### OQ-SK-05: Target policy and egress scoping
SOCKS5 is arbitrary-egress by nature — the open gate plus the target
policy are the security boundary (AGENTS.md convention 12). alktunnels
resolved that whatever ACL governs the socks5 resource governs
everything reachable through it; OQ-SK-01's dial policy is the
mechanism. Residual questions for Phase 1:
- Does the base crate ship a per-target allowlist hook (producer-side
policy injected at registration), or is target policy entirely the
dialer's concern (the dial callback refuses)? The dialer-refuses
shape avoids a second policy layer (alktunnels' resolution pattern);
the allowlist-hook shape makes a common policy declarative.
- Is there a `SOCKS5_OPEN_SCOPE` (scope-gate on the open op, alktty
`TTY_OPEN_SCOPE` shape) — presumably yes, but the exact scope-string
convention should follow alkcall's registry conventions.
- Domain-form targets (RFC 1928 ATYP 0x03): resolve producer-side
(fast-socks5's `dns_resolve` config), refuse, or pass through to the
dialer unresolved? (DNS-on-the-producer is the SSH `-D` semantic;
wasm producers may not have a resolver at all — another OQ-SK-04
interaction.)
### OQ-SK-06: noq client support (and the quinn/noq shape split)
The client half's UDP story is "implement the QUIC runtime's abstract
socket trait over a SOCKS5 UDP association." quinn 0.11 is proven
(quinn-proxy POC, ADR-090). noq (iroh's fork, v1.2.0) has the same
extension point (`AsyncUdpSocket`, `Endpoint::new_with_abstract_socket`)
but the trait shape changed: `create_sender() -> Pin<Box<dyn UdpSender>>`
replaces `create_io_poller` + `try_send`, and the constructor takes
`Box<dyn AsyncUdpSocket>` instead of `Arc<dyn AsyncUdpSocket>`.
Questions:
- Does this crate ship `Socks5UdpSocket` against noq (behind a feature
like `noq`), quinn (behind `quinn`), or both? Both implies a shared
substrate-free core (associate handshake, datagram codec, flow table)
with two thin trait shells — feasible only if the shared core is
genuinely trait-agnostic. iroh's adoption makes noq the
practically-important target; alknet's precedent is quinn.
- noq is not on crates.io at this version (iroh consumes it from the
n0 workspace/git) — how does this crate depend on it (git dep? wait
for publication? feature-gate so it is optional)? This may block
`cargo publish --dry-run` for the client features; a publish-lean
default (quinn optional, noq git-optional) may be needed.
- Do the ECN/MTU limitations carry over (they should — the SOCKS5 UDP
header has no ECN field), and does noq's `may_fragment` default
(`true`) behave the same as quinn's?
This is a research question first (read noq's endpoint/driver loops;
write the trait-shape comparison), then possibly a POC (OQ-SK-07 #3).
### OQ-SK-07: POC scope for what remains unvalidated
Candidates, in rough priority order (per the SDD process's "validate
promising approaches"):
1. **Channels-native SOCKS5 CONNECT POC** — the producer half over a
real alkcall channels connection: consumer opens a SOCKS5 channel,
speaks RFC 1928 CONNECT (via fast-socks5's client types), producer's
open handler runs the typestate machine over the `BiStream`, dials a
local echo target, two-pump proxy loop completes. Validates: the
`register_openable_with_establisher` fit, `pump_bidi` as the data
plane, params shape (trivial — probably no params), and the
`BiStream`-as-`T` genericity claim. This is the crate's core value
proposition and the cheapest to validate (alktunnels' forward POC is
the template).
2. **UDP ASSOCIATE POC** — the OQ-SK-03 chosen shape, end to end: a
wrapper-aware client associates, sends length-prefixed datagrams
down the channel, producer relays to a real UDP endpoint. Validates:
the sentinel-reply semantics, the datagram codec (fast-socks5's
`new_udp_header`/`parse_udp_request` over the length framing), the
flow table, and empty-datagram handling (alktunnels F-2 transfers).
3. **noq `AsyncUdpSocket` impl POC** — the client-side story against
noq 1.2: associate through a fast-socks5 server, wrap as
`noq::AsyncUdpSocket`, complete a QUIC handshake. Derisks OQ-SK-06
(the `create_sender`/`Box` shape changes) before the client spec is
written. (The quinn variant is already proven by the quinn-proxy
POC — re-validating it here is optional.)
4. **fast-socks5 wasm check** — minimal crate, `cargo check --target
wasm32-unknown-unknown`, confirm/inflect OQ-SK-04. Cheap; can fold
into #1's worktree.
POC placement conventions (inherited from alktunnels): a POC that needs
code from this repo runs in a worktree/branch (`.worktrees/research/
<task-id>/` per the SDD process); a self-contained POC runs as a
standalone crate in the global workspace with findings written into
`docs/research/` here. Findings always land in `docs/research/`
regardless of where the code lives.
## Survey / prior-art list
Candidate reading for the research specialist (to be expanded):
- RFC 1928 (SOCKS5) — the fixed protocol: method negotiation, CONNECT,
BIND, UDP ASSOCIATE, reply codes. RFC 1929 (username/password).
- fast-socks5 `/workspace/fast-socks5` — `src/server.rs` (typestate
API, interception points, auth traits), `src/client.rs`
(`Socks5Stream`/`Socks5Datagram`, `use_stream`), `src/lib.rs`
(`new_udp_header`/`parse_udp_request`, `ReplyError`),
`examples/router.rs` (conditional interception), `examples/
custom_auth_server.rs`.
- alktunnels — `docs/research/phase-0-findings.md` (the `-D`
composition conclusion, hub-owns-the-connection, the UDP codec
decision + F-2), `docs/architecture/` (params/ALPN/ACL ADR template),
POC summaries (POC placement and findings conventions).
- alkcall — `docs/architecture/decisions/` ADR-037/039/049/050 (channel
ops, params-is-ALPN-specific, establishment, pump_bidi), ledger
CF-005/CF-006 (identity seam), `src/channels/operations.rs`
(`ChannelCore`, `OpenHandler`, `Establishment`, `ChannelPlan`),
`src/channels/pump.rs`.
- alknet — `crates/alknet-client/src/socks5.rs` (ADR-090, the client
ancestor), `docs/research/quinn-quic-proxy/findings.md` (the POC
findings: trait + constructor surface, ECN/MTU limitations,
BotBrowser production precedent).
- noq — `/workspace/noq`: `noq/src/runtime/mod.rs` (`AsyncUdpSocket`,
`UdpSender`), `noq/src/endpoint.rs` (`new_with_abstract_socket`),
`noq-udp/src/lib.rs` (`RecvMeta`, `Transmit`), `Cargo.toml` (workspace
versioning / publication posture).
- alktty — backend inversion point (`TtyBackend`), `TTY_OPEN_SCOPE`
scope-gating shape, feature-gated `local` backend, wasm-clean
default-crate verification commands.
- tun2proxy — `/workspace/tun2proxy` `src/udpgw.rs` and its SOCKS5
files (`socks.rs`, `proxy_handler.rs`): UDP-over-stream framing and
flow-table prior art (analyzed in alktunnels phase-0-findings; the
SOCKS5-specific parts feed OQ-SK-03).
- iroh — `/workspace/iroh` `iroh/Cargo.toml` (the noq dependency
posture: `noq = "1.2.0"` from the n0 workspace) — context for
OQ-SK-06's dependency question.
## Convergence checklist (what Phase 0 must produce)
- [ ] Vision + guiding principles captured (this doc, §Vision)
- [ ] Prior-art pass complete: fast-socks5 surface verified (§Prior
art), alktunnels/alknet/noq lineage mapped, anti-prior-art list
written
- [ ] OQ-SK-01 (dial policy) — researched, half-answered (injected
dialer hunch); decide in Phase 1 against the spec
- [ ] OQ-SK-02 (auth mapping) — posture drafted (identity seam
primary, in-band auth for the local backend); decide in Phase 1
- [ ] OQ-SK-03 (UDP ASSOCIATE) — the shape space written; resolve via
research + POC #2, ADR before the first consumer
- [ ] OQ-SK-04 (fast-socks5 wasm) — verify empirically (POC #4);
likely an upstream feature-gating ask; file early per AGENTS.md
convention 17
- [ ] OQ-SK-05 (target policy) — folded into the OQ-SK-01 decision;
scope-gate convention pinned in Phase 1
- [ ] OQ-SK-06 (noq client) — research pass (trait-shape comparison,
dependency posture) + POC #3 if the research is not decisive
- [ ] Targeted POC(s) run + summaries in `docs/research/`
(OQ-SK-07; #1 first — it validates the core value proposition)
- [ ] Converge: recommended approach written up, ready to hand to the
Architect for Phase 1
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
## Overview
This document defines the SDD process for the @alkdev/alkcall package. It
This document defines the SDD process for the @alkdev/alksocks package. It
leverages:
- **OpenCode CLI** as the agent execution environment