- Rewrote em dash prose across the whole tree outside docs/reviews/
(the historical reviews stay verbatim, matching the alktunnels and
alktty precedent): src doc comments and inline comments (587),
docs/architecture (319), docs/research + sdd_process (484), tests
(361), tasks (899), fuzz (28), README/CHANGELOG/Cargo.toml (77),
AGENTS.md (85), and the .opencode/agents prompts (109)
- Fenced content follows the precedent: comments, ASCII-diagram label
separators, and template placeholders rewritten; wire data, JSON/BAST
documents, byte diagrams, and transcripts survive verbatim; assert,
expect, panic, error-display, and format message literals rewritten
as prose; no code, fixture, or test data change
- src/rfc1928/LICENSE: the two dashes in alksocks' own provenance
header rewritten; the MIT legal text untouched
- AGENTS.md adds Project Convention 18: no em dashes in prose; varied
restructure, no spaced-hyphen substitutes, fenced prose rule, en
dash numeric ranges exempt, docs/reviews/ exempt from the greps
- tasks/*.md frontmatter: the name values rewritten by the sweep are
now quoted (a raw colon inside an unquoted YAML scalar parsed as
null); taskgraph validate reports 37 tasks, no issues
Verification: cargo test; cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings;
cargo fmt --check; cargo doc --no-deps; fuzz corpus replay
(cargo test --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml); wasm check and
clippy for wasm32-unknown-unknown with -D warnings; em dash grep over
the repo returns matches only in docs/reviews/ and the bast.md BAST
JSON data fence
The consumer's TCP front door (feature `local`, ADR-005/ADR-014): the
ssh `-D` local exposure vanilla clients point at.
- `src/door.rs`: `FrontDoor::builder().credentials(...).bind(...)`
→ `serve`/`serve_on`. The NoAuth door is the literal raw pipe
(accept → channel BiStream via copy_bidirectional, zero protocol
translation). The cred-bearing door terminates RFC 1929 locally
(the forked accept_password_auth shape) and re-originates in-band
via the token-carrying consumer sessions — the vanilla replies are
re-encoded at the door (the RFC codec boundary, ADR-003), the
password never crosses the channel as a SOCKS password. The BIND
door rides BindSession with reply#1 fidelity (the advertised
address passes through unchanged). UDP ASSOCIATE at the TCP door
refuses RFC-faithfully (0x07 — the UDP door's task). The ADR-014
accept-path defense: the idle-first-byte window (peek-based,
door-side close) + the max-sessions cap (semaphore) as constructor
config; per-accept failure isolation (the loop continues).
- The identity mechanism (decided + recorded in the task Notes): the
per-credential identity rides the open-op `auth_token` payload
(CF-005 precedence (1)) — the token is the mapped identity's id;
the producer resolves it through ServingConfig.identity_provider.
No per-credential ChannelClient.
- `src/consumer.rs`: `TokenClient` (the token-carrying open surface
over the taken CallConnection + shared manager) and the
`*_with_token` twins of the three session constructors through the
open_with_token_and_negotiate prologue (teardown-at-birth
preserved); `Socks5ChannelSession::reply_addr` (the CONNECT
reply's BND.ADDR for the door's re-encoding). Existing surfaces
untouched.
- `tests/door-tcp.rs`: 10 integration tests — the NoAuth raw-pipe
round-trip (the POC #1 curl shape), good/bad credentials (the
establisher witness sees the mapped identity, never the password;
a rejection opens no channel), the never-pipes-raw-post-auth pin,
the BIND door's vanilla conversation, the idle timeout, the
session cap, failure isolation, and the native-session/BIND-token
regression guards. Harness: wire_consumer_side_with_provider (the
producer's identity provider configurable).
Verification: cargo test (375) + --all-features (423) green; clippy
-D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt --check clean; wasm
check + wasm clippy green; default graph stays net-free.