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glm-5.3-flash e196ed43e3 docs: remove em dashes from repo prose and forbid them going forward

- Rewrote em dash prose across the whole tree outside docs/reviews/
  (the historical reviews stay verbatim, matching the alktunnels and
  alktty precedent): src doc comments and inline comments (587),
  docs/architecture (319), docs/research + sdd_process (484), tests
  (361), tasks (899), fuzz (28), README/CHANGELOG/Cargo.toml (77),
  AGENTS.md (85), and the .opencode/agents prompts (109)
- Fenced content follows the precedent: comments, ASCII-diagram label
  separators, and template placeholders rewritten; wire data, JSON/BAST
  documents, byte diagrams, and transcripts survive verbatim; assert,
  expect, panic, error-display, and format message literals rewritten
  as prose; no code, fixture, or test data change
- src/rfc1928/LICENSE: the two dashes in alksocks' own provenance
  header rewritten; the MIT legal text untouched
- AGENTS.md adds Project Convention 18: no em dashes in prose; varied
  restructure, no spaced-hyphen substitutes, fenced prose rule, en
  dash numeric ranges exempt, docs/reviews/ exempt from the greps
- tasks/*.md frontmatter: the name values rewritten by the sweep are
  now quoted (a raw colon inside an unquoted YAML scalar parsed as
  null); taskgraph validate reports 37 tasks, no issues

Verification: cargo test; cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings;
cargo fmt --check; cargo doc --no-deps; fuzz corpus replay
(cargo test --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml); wasm check and
clippy for wasm32-unknown-unknown with -D warnings; em dash grep over
the repo returns matches only in docs/reviews/ and the bast.md BAST
JSON data fence

2026-11-03 19:31:53 +00:00

4.4 KiB

Raw Blame History

ADR-006: Access-Control Posture: the Open Gate Plus the Command Gate

Status

Accepted (2026-09-20, Phase 1; scope gates POC-validated in shape: POC #1 (socks5:open), POC #5 (socks5:bind at command dispatch); consequence asymmetry pinned by the integration suite, 2026-09-24)

Context

SOCKS5 is arbitrary-egress by nature; the open gate plus the target policy are the security boundary (AGENTS.md convention 12). alktunnels resolved the sibling posture (its ADR-006): whatever ACL governs the resource governs everything reachable through it, plus whatever policy the SOCKS5 implementation itself applies downstream. For SOCKS5, BIND adds an inbound capability, the accept-side twin of arbitrary egress, so the open gate must distinguish it (OQ-SK-08's security note): an identity with proxy egress must not implicitly get ingress listeners. POC #5 validated exactly this distinction at command dispatch from the per-call opener identity.

Decision

The open gate is the boundary. The open op's AccessControl.required_scopes is ["socks5:open"] (SOCKS5_OPEN_SCOPE), scope-gated via ChannelCore::register_openable (the registry runs the ACL before the open handler). Scope-string convention: <alpn-family>:<capability> (socks5:open, socks5:bind), following alktty's TTY_OPEN_SCOPE / alktunnels' tunnel:open/tunnel:direct shape. Stable once published.
The command gate: BIND requires socks5:bind at command dispatch. The open op carries the session-level gate; the command-class distinction happens in-stream, at command read, from the per-call opener identity (CF-005/CF-006): CONNECT and UDP ASSOCIATE require only socks5:open; TCP BIND requires socks5:bind. An identity without it gets the RFC-faithful ConnectionNotAllowed (0x02) refusal while CONNECT still serves the same identity (POC #5 test 4).
Target policy is the dialer's concern. No target allowlists in the base crate; the dial callback refuses (per-target refusal is an RFC reply code; ADR-004's seams). The dialer-refuses shape avoids a second policy layer (alktunnels OQ-TN-08's resolution pattern, evidence-backed). Whatever ACL governs the socks5 resource governs everything reachable through it, plus whatever the dial callback enforces.
Per-target ACL for the composed egress comes free: each destination rides its own alktunnels direct-op channel governed by the tunnel:direct grant's ACL (POC #2 validated); the dial callback governs per-destination checks.
Ownership: optionally consult OwnershipProvider for resource ownership (alknet ADR-050's seam), a registration-time choice, not a protocol concern.
Hub relaying: the hub's terminate-and-re-produce applies per hop (alkcall ADR-051's ChannelRelay/HubLegTemplate); the hub's ACL governs the final dial; the hub is the network boundary. No socks5-specific relay work.

Consequences

Two grants, clean separation: socks5:open (egress) and socks5:bind (ingress listeners), never implied by each other (the alktunnels ADR-006 Amendment 1 posture: a capability on its own scope). The implication asymmetry is pinned by the integration suite (tests/core-integration.rs, the identity/scope matrix): socks5:open alone serves CONNECT + ASSOCIATE and is refused BIND (0x02) at the command gate; socks5:bind alone grants nothing on the op: the open gate's required_scopes = ["socks5:open"] fails closed for every command (the establisher never runs, no phantom channel); both scopes, granted explicitly, serve everything. A BIND-capable deployment grants both.
BIND's security boundary is enforced even though BIND rides the same op (ADR-001): the command gate is the mechanism, and it is POC-validated (POC #5).
The allowlist-hook variant (a declarative per-target policy at registration) is not shipped in v1: the dial callback is the policy point; see OQ-SK-05's residue (OQ-SK2-07 in the tracker) for the virtual-subnet translation-layer proposal, which is the same dial-callback shape.

References

OQ-SK-05 (target policy), OQ-SK-08 (the BIND security note)
POC #1 (the socks5:open gate; the identity seam), POC #5 (the socks5:bind command gate), POC #2 (composed per-target ACL)
alktunnels ADR-006 + Amendment 1 (the sibling posture), alknet ADR-024 (registry layering), alknet ADR-050 (ownership), alkcall ADR-042 / ADR-051 (hub relay)

4.4 KiB Raw Blame History