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glm-5.3-flash 9587670138 docs: Phase 1 architecture — specs, ADRs 001-012, open-questions tracker

- docs/architecture/: README index, overview, wire, producer,
  consumer, vendor, bast specs + open-questions.md (the OQ-SK-01..09
  ledger promoted; new questions as OQ-SK2-06..)
- ADRs 001-012: ALPN/op/params, protocol base, the handle swap,
  the dial-callback shape, auth split by the door, access control
  (open gate + BIND command gate), BIND in base, provider defaults,
  feature gates, channel capacity, the inline vendor, target policy
- deferred OQs (SK2-06, SK2-07) with tracker tasks in
  tasks/architecture/ per the sdd_process deferred-OQ protocol
- review pass applied: frame-length joint bound (65766 corner),
  accept_no_auth vs skip_auth corrected against fast-socks5 source,
  composed-feature wasm posture, cross-reference fixes

Verified: cross-references (all ADR/OQ refs resolve), doc sizes
under split threshold, Phase 0 fidelity spot-checks

2026-09-20 18:41:56 +00:00

3.9 KiB

Raw Blame History

ADR-006: Access-Control Posture — the Open Gate Plus the Command Gate

Status

Accepted (2026-09-20, Phase 1; scope gates POC-validated in shape — POC #1 (socks5:open), POC #5 (socks5:bind at command dispatch))

Context

SOCKS5 is arbitrary-egress by nature — the open gate plus the target policy are the security boundary (AGENTS.md convention 12). alktunnels resolved the sibling posture (its ADR-006): whatever ACL governs the resource governs everything reachable through it, plus whatever policy the SOCKS5 implementation itself applies downstream. For SOCKS5, BIND adds an inbound capability — the accept-side twin of arbitrary egress — so the open gate must distinguish it (OQ-SK-08's security note): an identity with proxy egress must not implicitly get ingress listeners. POC #5 validated exactly this distinction at command dispatch from the per-call opener identity.

Decision

The open gate is the boundary. The open op's AccessControl.required_scopes is ["socks5:open"] (SOCKS5_OPEN_SCOPE) — scope-gated via ChannelCore::register_openable (the registry runs the ACL before the open handler). Scope-string convention: <alpn-family>:<capability> (socks5:open, socks5:bind) — following alktty's TTY_OPEN_SCOPE / alktunnels' tunnel:open/tunnel:direct shape. Stable once published.
The command gate: BIND requires socks5:bind at command dispatch. The open op carries the session-level gate; the command-class distinction happens in-stream, at command read, from the per-call opener identity (CF-005/CF-006): CONNECT and UDP ASSOCIATE require only socks5:open; TCP BIND requires socks5:bind. An identity without it gets the RFC-faithful ConnectionNotAllowed (0x02) refusal while CONNECT still serves the same identity (POC #5 test 4).
Target policy is the dialer's concern. No target allowlists in the base crate — the dial callback refuses (per-target refusal is an RFC reply code; ADR-004's seams). The dialer-refuses shape avoids a second policy layer (alktunnels OQ-TN-08's resolution pattern, evidence-backed). Whatever ACL governs the socks5 resource governs everything reachable through it, plus whatever the dial callback enforces.
Per-target ACL for the composed egress comes free: each destination rides its own alktunnels direct-op channel governed by the tunnel:direct grant's ACL (POC #2 validated); the dial callback governs per-destination checks.
Ownership: optionally consult OwnershipProvider for resource ownership (alknet ADR-050's seam) — a registration-time choice, not a protocol concern.
Hub relaying: the hub's terminate-and-re-produce applies per hop (alkcall ADR-051's ChannelRelay/HubLegTemplate); the hub's ACL governs the final dial — the hub is the network boundary. No socks5-specific relay work.

Consequences

Two grants, clean separation: socks5:open (egress) and socks5:bind (ingress listeners) — never implied by each other (the alktunnels ADR-006 Amendment 1 posture: a capability on its own scope).
BIND's security boundary is enforced even though BIND rides the same op (ADR-001): the command gate is the mechanism, and it is POC-validated (POC #5).
The allowlist-hook variant (a declarative per-target policy at registration) is not shipped in v1 — the dial callback is the policy point; see OQ-SK-05's residue (OQ-SK2-07 in the tracker) for the virtual-subnet translation-layer proposal, which is the same dial-callback shape.

References

OQ-SK-05 (target policy), OQ-SK-08 (the BIND security note)
POC #1 (the socks5:open gate; the identity seam), POC #5 (the socks5:bind command gate), POC #2 (composed per-target ACL)
alktunnels ADR-006 + Amendment 1 (the sibling posture), alknet ADR-024 (registry layering), alknet ADR-050 (ownership), alkcall ADR-042 / ADR-051 (hub relay)

3.9 KiB Raw Blame History