diff --git a/src/error.rs b/src/error.rs
index 2d42eb2..103dbc0 100644
--- a/src/error.rs
+++ b/src/error.rs
@@ -94,9 +94,12 @@ pub enum KeySourceError {
     /// private-key PEM (decision 1's inner format). Distinct from
     /// [`Decryption`](KeySourceError::Decryption) on purpose — the
     /// custody boundary held, what was guarded is not a key. The
-    /// parse error's message is honest content; the typed parse
-    /// error is deliberately not preserved so the RC-pinned
-    /// `ssh-key` error type never enters the crate's public API.
+    /// underlying parse error's message is deliberately *not*
+    /// carried — the machinery's text can echo plaintext-shaped
+    /// material (the `w5-fuzz-harness` finding: the `ssh-key` PPK
+    /// path interpolates the raw header), so the payload is
+    /// crate-owned fixed text; the RC-pinned `ssh-key` error type
+    /// never enters the crate's public API either way.
     ///
     /// Fail-closed consequence: no dial; on the host-key path, no
     /// server construction.
diff --git a/src/key_source.rs b/src/key_source.rs
index ecede45..2d13b3d 100644
--- a/src/key_source.rs
+++ b/src/key_source.rs
@@ -186,7 +186,44 @@ fn decrypt_and_decode(
     blob: &EncryptedData,
 ) -> Result<PrivateKey, KeySourceError> {
     let plaintext = Zeroizing::new(vault.decrypt(blob).map_err(map_vault_error)?);
-    decode_secret_key(&plaintext, None).map_err(|e| KeySourceError::Decode(e.to_string()))
+    decode_key_arm(&plaintext)
+}
+
+/// The at-use chain's decode arm — the one-time
+/// [`decode_secret_key`] conversion of [`decrypt_and_decode`]
+/// (ADR-005 decision 2's single conversion; this function is byte-for-
+/// byte that arm, extracted so the arm is the *only* shape the fuzz
+/// target drives). `#[doc(hidden)]` fuzz-visible surface
+/// (`w5-fuzz-harness`; the recorded exposure decision — the ingress is
+/// production-private, so the exposure is the production arm itself,
+/// not a fork). Not documented API: the vault-facing surface is
+/// exactly [`VaultKeySource`] / [`VaultHostKeySource`].
+///
+/// The `Zeroizing` posture rides the signature: the plaintext arrives
+/// already wrapped at the adapter seam (decision 3), the decode reads
+/// it once, and nothing is retained — `Ok` carries the decoded
+/// [`PrivateKey`], `Err` carries only the typed [`KeySourceError`]
+/// class (never the plaintext).
+///
+/// The typed `Decode` payload is crate-owned fixed text, deliberately
+/// *not* the underlying machinery's message (the `w5-fuzz-harness`
+/// finding, 2026-10-30): russh's/`ssh-key`'s PPK parse path
+/// (`PpkParseError::Header`) interpolates raw header bytes — the
+/// plaintext's own material — into its Display, so a machinery message
+/// riding the typed payload would echo decrypted-record material
+/// exactly the no-persist posture (decision 7) forbids. The upstream
+/// echo ask is recorded with the task; if the machinery gains an
+/// echo-free message taxonomy, the mapping can carry its granularity.
+#[doc(hidden)]
+pub fn decode_key_arm(plaintext: &Zeroizing<String>) -> Result<PrivateKey, KeySourceError> {
+    decode_secret_key(plaintext, None).map_err(|_| {
+        KeySourceError::Decode(
+            "the plaintext is not OpenSSH private-key PEM material — the decode machinery \
+             refused it (the machinery's message is not carried: it can echo plaintext \
+             material; the upstream echo ask is recorded)"
+                .to_owned(),
+        )
+    })
 }
 
 /// The vault's error taxonomy reshaped into ADR-005 decision 4's