- OQ-10 resolved: alkssh derives SSH exit-signal from the alktty exit chunk's negative code (−N = signal N, pipe path) server-side; −1 (alktty's could-not-determine sentinel) → exit-status(255), never a signal claim; core_dumped never asserted in v1; no alktty wire change - new verified backend finding recorded: portable-pty 0.9 reduces PTY-mode signal termination to a plain exit code 1 (signal number unrecoverable through its trait surface) — faithful exit-signal on the PTY row is an alktty/portable-pty upstream ask, not an alkssh one - research docs (poc-3 §D.2, pocs.md, mapping-table rows) restated accurately instead of carrying inline correction scaffolding Verification: cargo doc --no-deps earlier this session (docs-only change)
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status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-10-27 |
Open questions
Centralized tracker for alkssh. Seeded from the phase 0 POC findings
(docs/research/poc-{1,2,3}-*.md), the research docs' OQ seeds, and
the reverse-runner extraction. Numbers are repo-local (family and
alkcall trackers have their own OQ spaces).
Theme A — wire & family topology
OQ-01: Does an alk/ssh relay/browser-leg consumer emerge?
- Origin: mapping-table.md §topology,
vision.mdscope Q1 - Status: deferred(scope)
- Door type: two-way (the pin is one-way; consumer existence is not)
- Priority: medium
- Impacts: none for the phase 1 scope — ADR-001 pins the contract so relay/browser legs don't foreclose it; the phase 1 docs serve edge termination only. A future relay leg would exercise
docs/architecture/client.md's accept surface in a new role. - Blocked on: a concrete consumer — either the browser-WASM route (alkcall ADR-009 sketch) materializing in an assembly, or a hub deployment needing SSH-in-relay. No such use case exists yet.
- Resolution: Not yet decidable — no consumer use case exists. ADR-001 decides everything decidable now: the ALPN pin's raw-stream contract, and its transport-blindness.
- Cross-references: ADR-001, OQ-13
Theme B — session-channel dispatch & mapping details
OQ-02: What is the session-channel dispatch shape (SOCKS-detect vs parse, and who bounds the window)? — resolved
- Origin: poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md §Stage B.3,
mapping-table.md§notes - Status: resolved. Decided by ADR-006 point 3, then simplified by the ADR-003 §1a amendment: the
dynamic-forwardfeature retired (no consumer is ever the family-native SOCKS-in-channel client; vanilla-Dis client-side SOCKS + plaindirect-tcpip; the family-Ddoor is alksocks composed locally at the assembly), so the detect lost its owner. Session dispatch is parse-only; request-less session channels decline. POC-3 stage B survives as the feasibility record for re-adding a remote SOCKS door via explicit ADR. - Cross-references: ADR-006, ADR-003 §1a
OQ-03: Username disposition — resolved
- Origin: poc-1-auth-bridge.md §2,
auth-bridge.md§The mapping - Status: resolved
- Resolution: usernames are never the identity model and carry no routing semantics — the fingerprint is the sole resolution path (POC-1:
ssh anything@hostworks with the same identity). Whether a username string appears in logs is deployment policy, outside the crate. Rides as the recorded contract in theauth.mdspec / ADR-004.
OQ-04: OpenSSH certificate auth — is there ever a CA-trust use case?
- Origin:
mapping-table.md(auth rows), poc-1-auth-bridge.md OQ seed 4 - Status: deferred(scope)
- Door type: two-way
- Priority: low
- Impacts: none —
auth_openssh_certificateis declined (the ADR-004 disposition), and POC-1 established the decline exists. A revisit only matters if alkforge ever wants CA-issued certificates. - Blocked on: a concrete OpenSSH-CA use case arriving in an embedding assembly.
- Resolution: Not yet decidable — decline initial; no CA-trust story in the family identity model today.
Theme C — auth, identity & key custody
OQ-05: What is the client-side host-key pin store? — resolved (policy-seam shape)
-
Origin: auth-bridge.md §Host keys,
reverse-runner.md§5 -
Status: resolved — the seam is decided; where learned pins persist is assembly detail (the crate takes a policy, not a pin store).
-
Resolution: two basic client cases, one seam:
- Known beforehand — trust anchors exist. Family-built runners mint their host key at assembly time, so the expected fingerprint is known before first contact: assembly-supplied pins, hard decline on mismatch (no soft failure).
- Unknown beforehand — vanilla
sshdon container fleets the assembly didn't provision; no anchor exists until first contact. The crate surfaces the presented host key (host, port, fingerprint) to an assembly-providedHostKeyPolicythat decides: prompt-and-record, provider-metadata match, learn-and-record, or accept-and-continue (the ephemeral-fleet shape — see below). The OpenSSH "add to known_hosts?" moment becomes an assembly policy rather than crate behavior.
Crate rules that make this family-shaped: the crate's default policy is fail-closed (reject unknown, hard-decline mismatch — russh's own reject-all default, kept); the crate never decides trust itself and never hard-codes a trust model — accept-all is not a built-in crate option, but a permissive case-2 policy is the assembly's to choose where its fleet model calls for it (alkminer's accept-all for rental fleets is that shape, made deliberately: fresh container per rent → fresh host key, so no pin can exist beforehand and the security anchor is hub-held per-instance dial keys plus what rides the tunnels, not host pins). The contract lands in the
auth.mdspec (host-key policy section) andclient.md's dial surface. -
Cross-references: OQ-07,
reverse-runner.md, poc-2-vault-keys.md §5 (host keys ride the vault model)
OQ-06: One vault, many roles? — resolved
- Origin: poc-2-vault-keys.md OQ seed 3
- Status: resolved
- Resolution: not an alkssh constraint. The crate takes vault handles the assembly injects; whether the assembly runs separate vault instances per role (client keys vs host keys) is assembly policy. ADR-005 records the boundary: vault handle in, key material out, version semantics owned by the vault.
OQ-07: Is the alkvault decrypt plain-String zeroization gap closed at the vault or at the adapter? — resolved (at this level)
decrypt plain-String zeroization gap closed at the vault or at the adapter?- Origin: poc-2-vault-keys.md §2 + OQ seed 1
- Status: resolved — the alkssh-level answer is the adapter-side wrap; the vault-side improvement belongs upstream, not here.
- Resolution: ADR-005 decision 3 is the contract on this path: the adapter owns a
Zeroizing<String>wrap at the seam (POC-2-proven; bounds the plaintext from adapter-takeover onward; ssh-key zeroizes the decoded key bytes on drop). The remaining unfenced pre-wrap window is alkvault's API shape to close — the ask is filed in alkvault's own tracker (downstream/family-space concern; alkforge and every secrets-bearing crate benefits, not just alkssh). alkssh does not carry it, does not gate on it, and ADR-005 records only the adapter obligation. This tracker entry stays closed; when alkvault ships aZeroizing-out API, ADR-005's reference here updates as a one-line doc touch, nothing else. - Cross-references: ADR-005 §3, OQ-05
Theme D — session-request mapping details
OQ-08: Shell command convention for shell_request
- Origin:
mapping-table.md(shell row), poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md OQ seed 3 - Status: open
- Priority: medium
- Impacts: blocks the
mapping.mdsession-row detail (what alkttydriveswhen a vanillassh hostlands). The POC's stand-in (bash/sh -c) was explicit assembly policy, not wire-derived. - Resolution: pending. Direction known (assembly policy, nothing wire-supplied); the decision is the concrete convention surface: a config field on the assembly vs a crate-level default that the assembly may override. Decide when writing
mapping.md.
OQ-09: env_request policy — is an allowlist ever wanted?
- Origin:
mapping-table.md(env_request row) - Status: deferred(scope)
- Door type: two-way
- Priority: low
- Impacts: none — decline-by-default is the fixed posture (wire env is not family config). An allowlist (
LANG, …) only matters if a consuming assembly has a concrete need. - Blocked on: a concrete consumer use case requiring wire-supplied environment variables.
- Resolution: Not yet decidable — no use case; decline stands.
OQ-10: SSH exit-signal fidelity over the alktty exit-code convention — resolved
exit-signal fidelity over the alktty exit-code convention-
Origin:
mapping-table.md(exit_signal row), poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md §D.2 -
Status: resolved — the alkssh mapping contract is decided (below, and in
mapping.md's exit rows). The PTY-path fidelity limit recorded in point 4 is an alktty-backend/portable-pty matter and belongs in their trackers; alkssh adapts automatically with no contract change if the convention ever holds on that path. -
Resolution: alkssh adds nothing to the alktty wire — the exit chunk is alktty's contract (
{"type":"exit","code":N}on ctrl-out, exit-chunk-is-last — alktty ADR-004, ported from alknet ADR-055) — and derives all SSH fidelity from the code the chunk already carries:- The negative code is the signal encoding on the pipe path. alktty's pipe backend maps Unix
ExitStatussignal termination to−N(pipe.rs::exit_code_from,ExitStatusExt::signal() → -sig; the alknet ADR-055 convention). POC-3 stage D observed it live on the wire: signal TERM →−15→ SSHexit-signal("TERM")via the clonedSession::handle(). - Name derivation is alkssh server-side work, not a wire change:
−N→ the SSHexit-signalname from a Unix signal-number→name table (signal semantics belong to the serving platform, where the backend reaps).core_dumpedis alwaysfalsein v1 — alktty discardsExitStatus::core_dumped(), so nothing better is knowable from the chunk; no error message rides. −1is never a signal claim. Per alktty ADR-004 §4,−1is the backend could-not-determine sentinel — it collides with a real SIGHUP termination (signal 1). Alkssh renders−1asexit-status(255)(OpenSSH's conventional failure value): fabricatingexit-signal("HUP")for a wait failure would invent a signal that never happened. The SIGHUP information loss inside the sentinel is alktty's documented edge — alktty's additiveexit_errorcontrol type is its own extension seam if it ever becomes load-bearing.- PTY path — the real fidelity limit, backend-side. portable-pty 0.9 converts a signal-terminated child's wait status with
code = status.code().unwrap_or(1)→ 1, keeping the signal only in a separate humanized (strsignal) string field that alktty's PTY waiter discards (pty.rsreadsexit_code()only; the number is unrecoverable through portable-pty 0.9's trait surface). So a signal-killed PTY session arrives as a plain exit 1 → alkssh mapsexit-status(1); faithfulexit-signalfor thesession/PTY row needs the PTY backend to conform to alktty's own negative-code convention — an alktty/portable-pty ask with tty/pty-grounded justification, not an alkssh convenience ask. - Non-Unix: no signal termination;
−1is the only negative that can appear → rule 3. - Pipe-mode pid-only vs PTY process-group signal scope is backend semantics, not a mapping change — recorded as a fidelity note on
mapping.md'ssignalrow.
- The negative code is the signal encoding on the pipe path. alktty's pipe backend maps Unix
-
Cross-references: OQ-08, mapping.md (
exit_signal,exit_status,signalrows), alktty ADR-004 / alknet ADR-055
OQ-11: direct-streamlocal platform surface — compile-time or runtime decline shape?
- Origin:
mapping-table.md(streamlocal row) - Status: open
- Priority: low
- Impacts: blocks the
tunnelfeature's platform matrix detail (unix-only compile-out vs universal-compile runtime decline), a small contract test question. - Resolution: pending — decide during
mapping.md; default direction is runtime decline (matches fail-closed and windows-on-ssh portability) unless the unix-only compile split proves simpler.
OQ-12: Client reconnect: does the crate own forward/session restoration? — resolved
- Origin:
reverse-runner.md§4 - Status: resolved
- Resolution: the crate owns lifecycle primitives only — bound-port handles (forward listeners return the actually-bound port, per russh's
tcpip_forward -> u32), explicit cancellable forward/session handles, and clean disconnects. Reconnect-and-restore policy (rebinding persisted tunnel ports per alkminer's flow) is assembly-owned. Recorded as a constraint inclient.md; no reconnect policy is baked into the crate.
Theme E — deferred features
OQ-13: The sftp client+server halves when alkfs lands
- Origin:
mapping-table.md(sftp rows),reverse-runner.md, POC-2 scope notes - Status: deferred(scope)
- Door type: two-way
- Priority: low (until alkforge phase 0 resumes)
- Impacts: the
sftpfeature ships declining from the first build (honest advertisement, decline contract tested on both sides); the alkforge CI deploy path (binary/artifact push, alkminer-precedent evidence) and the alkfs server seam are the eventual consumers. - Blocked on: alkfs — family ADR-002, paused so alkforge can land; alkssh's sftp implementation follows alkfs' maturity.
- Resolution: Not yet decidable — the target protocol is pending. The placeholder contract (decline, tested) is in scope for the first architecture pass.
- Cross-references: OQ-01
Deferred / Blocked (at a glance)
| OQ | Blocked on | Priority |
|---|---|---|
| OQ-01 | concrete relay/browser-leg consumer | medium |
| OQ-04 | concrete OpenSSH-CA use case | low |
| OQ-09 | concrete wire-env use case | low |
| OQ-13 | alkfs landing (family ADR-002) | low (for now) |