Files
alkssh/docs/architecture/open-questions.md
T
glm-5.3-flash c7ab19ed8a docs(architecture): retire the dynamic-forward feature — the -D untangle
Review untangle (three layers: local door / wire protocol / fabric):
- vanilla ssh -D binds its SOCKS5 proxy client-side (the local door —
  alksocks' local-door shape) and opens plain direct-tcpip per
  connection: the server needs nothing SOCKS-shaped (tunnel row +
  route-1 bridge cover the leg; POC-3 correction 2 already said this)
- the family-native SOCKS5-in-channel server row served no consumer
  of ours: family apps compose alksocks' local door locally over the
  alkssh client's direct-tcpip DialFn — alkssh doesn't depend on
  alksocks on this path
- amendments: ADR-003 §1a (feature removed), ADR-006 point 3 (SOCKS-
  detect retired; session dispatch is parse-only; request-less
  session channels decline), OQ-02 resolution updated with the
  simplification, mapping-table.md rows annotated (research doc keeps
  POC-3 stage B as the re-add feasibility record)
2026-10-26 15:32:08 +00:00

11 KiB

status, last_updated
status last_updated
draft 2026-10-26

Open questions

Centralized tracker for alkssh. Seeded from the phase 0 POC findings (docs/research/poc-{1,2,3}-*.md), the research docs' OQ seeds, and the reverse-runner extraction. Numbers are repo-local (family and alkcall trackers have their own OQ spaces).

Theme A — wire & family topology

OQ-01: Does an alk/ssh relay/browser-leg consumer emerge?

  • Origin: mapping-table.md §topology, vision.md scope Q1
  • Status: deferred(scope)
  • Door type: two-way (the pin is one-way; consumer existence is not)
  • Priority: medium
  • Impacts: none for the phase 1 scope — ADR-001 pins the contract so relay/browser legs don't foreclose it; the phase 1 docs serve edge termination only. A future relay leg would exercise docs/architecture/client.md's accept surface in a new role.
  • Blocked on: a concrete consumer — either the browser-WASM route (alkcall ADR-009 sketch) materializing in an assembly, or a hub deployment needing SSH-in-relay. No such use case exists yet.
  • Resolution: Not yet decidable — no consumer use case exists. ADR-001 decides everything decidable now: the ALPN pin's raw-stream contract, and its transport-blindness.
  • Cross-references: ADR-001, OQ-13

Theme B — session-channel dispatch & mapping details

OQ-02: What is the session-channel dispatch shape (SOCKS-detect vs parse, and who bounds the window)? — resolved (then simplified)

  • Origin: poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md §Stage B.3, mapping-table.md §notes
  • Status: resolved — resolved twice over. First by ADR-006 point 3 (dispatch composition: request-driven parse wins, request-less channels get the detect). Then simplified by the ADR-003 §1a amendment: the dynamic-forward feature retired (no consumer is ever the family-native SOCKS-in-channel client; vanilla -D is client-side SOCKS + plain direct-tcpip; the family -D door is alksocks composed locally at the assembly), so the detect lost its owner. Final shape: session dispatch is parse-only; request-less session channels decline. POC-3 stage B survives as the feasibility record for re-adding a remote SOCKS door via explicit ADR.
  • Cross-references: ADR-006, ADR-003 §1a

OQ-03: Username disposition — resolved

  • Origin: poc-1-auth-bridge.md §2, auth-bridge.md §The mapping
  • Status: resolved
  • Resolution: usernames are never the identity model and carry no routing semantics — the fingerprint is the sole resolution path (POC-1: ssh anything@host works with the same identity). Whether a username string appears in logs is deployment policy, outside the crate. Rides as the recorded contract in the auth.md spec / ADR-004.

OQ-04: OpenSSH certificate auth — is there ever a CA-trust use case?

  • Origin: mapping-table.md (auth rows), poc-1-auth-bridge.md OQ seed 4
  • Status: deferred(scope)
  • Door type: two-way
  • Priority: low
  • Impacts: none — auth_openssh_certificate is declined (the ADR-004 disposition), and POC-1 established the decline exists. A revisit only matters if alkforge ever wants CA-issued certificates.
  • Blocked on: a concrete OpenSSH-CA use case arriving in an embedding assembly.
  • Resolution: Not yet decidable — decline initial; no CA-trust story in the family identity model today.

Theme C — auth, identity & key custody

OQ-05: What is the client-side host-key pin store? — resolved (policy-seam shape)

  • Origin: auth-bridge.md §Host keys, reverse-runner.md §5

  • Status: resolved — the seam is decided; where learned pins persist is assembly detail (the crate takes a policy, not a pin store).

  • Resolution: two basic client cases, one seam:

    1. Known beforehand — trust anchors exist. Family-built runners mint their host key at assembly time, so the expected fingerprint is known before first contact: assembly-supplied pins, hard decline on mismatch (no soft failure).
    2. Unknown beforehand — vanilla sshd on container fleets the assembly didn't provision; no anchor exists until first contact. The crate surfaces the presented host key (host, port, fingerprint) to an assembly-provided HostKeyPolicy that decides: prompt-and-record, provider-metadata match, or learn-and-record. The OpenSSH "add to known_hosts?" moment becomes an assembly policy rather than crate behavior.

    Crate rules that make this family-shaped: the crate's default policy is fail-closed (reject unknown, hard-decline mismatch — russh's own reject-all default, kept); the crate never decides trust itself; accept-all is never a crate option (that collapse is the old-code anti-pattern, and for ephemeral fleets strict pinning is the wrong control anyway — the anchor there is hub-held key material/lifecycle, not host pins). The contract lands in the client-side ADR (written with client.md; expected to be ADR-007) and the auth.md spec.

  • Cross-references: OQ-07, reverse-runner.md, poc-2-vault-keys.md §5 (host keys ride the vault model)

OQ-06: One vault, many roles? — resolved

  • Origin: poc-2-vault-keys.md OQ seed 3
  • Status: resolved
  • Resolution: not an alkssh constraint. The crate takes vault handles the assembly injects; whether the assembly runs separate vault instances per role (client keys vs host keys) is assembly policy. ADR-005 records the boundary: vault handle in, key material out, version semantics owned by the vault.

OQ-07: Is the alkvault decrypt plain-String zeroization gap closed at the vault or at the adapter?

  • Origin: poc-2-vault-keys.md §2 + OQ seed 1
  • Status: open
  • Priority: medium
  • Impacts: an in-family cross-crate ask (alkvault API change vs alkssh-side convention). Blocks nothing functionally — POC-2 proves the adapter-side Zeroizing wrap correct — but decides where the security convention lives for the whole family (alkhttp secrets ride the same &str-out surface).
  • Resolution: pending. Candidates: alkvault returns Zeroizing<String> (family-wide fix, touches a published crate), or the adapter-side wrap is the recorded family convention (ADR-005). Bring to alkvault; if upstream accepts, ADR-005 cites the follow-up; if not, ADR-005 records the adapter obligation as the convention.
  • Cross-references: OQ-05, ADR-005

Theme D — session-request mapping details

OQ-08: Shell command convention for shell_request

  • Origin: mapping-table.md (shell row), poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md OQ seed 3
  • Status: open
  • Priority: medium
  • Impacts: blocks the mapping.md session-row detail (what alktty drives when a vanilla ssh host lands). The POC's stand-in (bash/sh -c) was explicit assembly policy, not wire-derived.
  • Resolution: pending. Direction known (assembly policy, nothing wire-supplied); the decision is the concrete convention surface: a config field on the assembly vs a crate-level default that the assembly may override. Decide when writing mapping.md.

OQ-09: env_request policy — is an allowlist ever wanted?

  • Origin: mapping-table.md (env_request row)
  • Status: deferred(scope)
  • Door type: two-way
  • Priority: low
  • Impacts: none — decline-by-default is the fixed posture (wire env is not family config). An allowlist (LANG, …) only matters if a consuming assembly has a concrete need.
  • Blocked on: a concrete consumer use case requiring wire-supplied environment variables.
  • Resolution: Not yet decidable — no use case; decline stands.

OQ-10: The alktty exit chunk carries no signal identity — widen the chunk or map by assembly policy?

  • Origin: poc-3-mapping-bakeoff.md §D.2, mapping-table.md (exit_signal row)
  • Status: open
  • Priority: medium
  • Impacts: blocks the exit-signal fidelity detail in mapping.md; an in-family upstream ask (alktty wire change, third-party-upstream posture applies family-internally too).
  • Resolution: pending. Candidates (per POC-3): alktty widens the exit chunk with the signal name (filed as an ask — alkssh never silently works around), or alkssh maps negative exit codes via assembly policy (fidelity compromise: name inferred/coarse). Also in scope for the same OQ: pipe-mode signals are pid-only vs PTY process-group scope (backend-semantics fidelity note for the session rows). Decide the fallback during mapping.md; the upstream ask stays open until alktty answers.
  • Cross-references: OQ-08

OQ-11: direct-streamlocal platform surface — compile-time or runtime decline shape?

  • Origin: mapping-table.md (streamlocal row)
  • Status: open
  • Priority: low
  • Impacts: blocks the tunnel feature's platform matrix detail (unix-only compile-out vs universal-compile runtime decline), a small contract test question.
  • Resolution: pending — decide during mapping.md; default direction is runtime decline (matches fail-closed and windows-on-ssh portability) unless the unix-only compile split proves simpler.

OQ-12: Client reconnect: does the crate own forward/session restoration? — resolved

  • Origin: reverse-runner.md §4
  • Status: resolved
  • Resolution: the crate owns lifecycle primitives only — bound-port handles (forward listeners return the actually-bound port, per russh's tcpip_forward -> u32), explicit cancellable forward/session handles, and clean disconnects. Reconnect-and-restore policy (rebinding persisted tunnel ports per alkminer's flow) is assembly-owned. Recorded as a constraint in client.md; no reconnect policy is baked into the crate.

Theme E — deferred features

OQ-13: The sftp client+server halves when alkfs lands

  • Origin: mapping-table.md (sftp rows), reverse-runner.md, POC-2 scope notes
  • Status: deferred(scope)
  • Door type: two-way
  • Priority: low (until alkforge phase 0 resumes)
  • Impacts: the sftp feature ships declining from the first build (honest advertisement, decline contract tested on both sides); the alkforge CI deploy path (binary/artifact push, alkminer-precedent evidence) and the alkfs server seam are the eventual consumers.
  • Blocked on: alkfs — family ADR-002, paused so alkforge can land; alkssh's sftp implementation follows alkfs' maturity.
  • Resolution: Not yet decidable — the target protocol is pending. The placeholder contract (decline, tested) is in scope for the first architecture pass.
  • Cross-references: OQ-01

Deferred / Blocked (at a glance)

OQ Blocked on Priority
OQ-01 concrete relay/browser-leg consumer medium
OQ-02 (deferred(unclear)) investigation during mapping.md high
OQ-04 concrete OpenSSH-CA use case low
OQ-09 concrete wire-env use case low
OQ-13 alkfs landing (family ADR-002) low (for now)