OQ-06 resolved: honker-core quality read fires the fork trigger (ADR-011)
Quality read of honker-core's watcher/transactional core cross-checked against the published crates.io artifact: the core itself is clean (Writer/Readers, polling-watcher failure handling, WatcherDeathGuard all verified), but published 0.5.0 predates upstream's unreleased fix train carrying the issue-#133 savepoint hardening (silent job loss in the dead-letter paths) and five .ok() error swallows — and ADR-010's queue depth requires engine-owned queue SQL in any posture. Resolution: fork honker-core at the reference revision, inherit the clean machinery and test suites, re-derive queue ops on contract v1, rename tables to __alkstore_*. - docs/research/quality-read-honker-core.md — full evidence - docs/architecture/decisions/011-sqlite-substrate-fork.md — decision - OQ-06 resolved in open-questions.md; ADR-003/005/008, engine-sqlite, queues, README annotated for consistency
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
79a135c934
commit
befbe2e714
10 files changed
+586
-74
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
status: draft
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-10-05
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Quality read: honker-core — OQ-06 (the SQLite dependency gate)
|
||||
|
||||
OQ-06's mandate ([ADR-005](../architecture/decisions/005-dependency-ownership.md)):
|
||||
a Phase 1 quality read of honker-core 0.5's watcher/transactional core
|
||||
(Writer / Readers / SharedUpdateWatcher / attach_*), looking for defects
|
||||
the POCs wouldn't surface, unsafe assumptions in the watcher
|
||||
failure-handling, and schema-migration brittleness — and a weighing of
|
||||
the two concrete fork candidates ADR-010 handed it (the expired-
|
||||
processing-row zombie fix, dead-row `get_job` visibility) as
|
||||
complement-over-machinery vs fork.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: the fork trigger fires** — [ADR-011](../architecture/decisions/011-sqlite-substrate-fork.md).
|
||||
The core the read was originally for is clean, but the read surfaced
|
||||
that the *published artifact* is materially behind the reference
|
||||
revision and carries confirmed silent-job-loss defects in exactly the
|
||||
queue operations the ride posture points at, while contract v1's queue
|
||||
depth ([ADR-010](../architecture/decisions/010-queue-semantics-depth.md))
|
||||
requires re-deriving that surface in any posture. The fork is normal
|
||||
work per ADR-005. This document is the evidence; the ADR is the
|
||||
decision.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Read scope and the published-artifact fact
|
||||
|
||||
Read in full: honker-core at the reference checkout
|
||||
(`/workspace/honker` @ `f4e53c6`, 2026-10-02) — all five source files
|
||||
(8,833 lines): `lib.rs` (PRAGMA/WAL handling, `Writer`, `Readers`,
|
||||
`UpdateWatcher` + `run_poll_loop`, `SharedUpdateWatcher` +
|
||||
`WatcherDeathGuard`, bootstrap + migrations), `honker_ops.rs`
|
||||
(savepoint machinery, every queue / lock / stream / scheduler /
|
||||
notifications function), `kernel_watcher.rs`, `shm_watcher.rs`,
|
||||
`cron.rs` (skimmed — contract-rejected per ADR-009).
|
||||
|
||||
Cross-checked against **crates.io**: honker-core's newest published
|
||||
version is **0.5.0** — published 2026-08-23 (commit `78dec24` = tag
|
||||
`v0.5.0`; same commit as `rust-v0.5.0`), single maintainer, 8 versions
|
||||
total, no yanks. The reference checkout HEAD is ~6 weeks ahead and
|
||||
contains a body of correctness work **no published release carries**
|
||||
(the `v0.6.0` tag is a package-versioning tag; the honker-core crate at
|
||||
even `v0.6.0` is still 0.5.0 and still lacks the fixes).
|
||||
|
||||
What 0.5.0 lacks (the upstream "Unreleased" fix train, all honker-core,
|
||||
verified by diffing the tag against HEAD):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Issue #133's savepoint hardening** (`in_savepoint`/`UnwindUndo`,
|
||||
`honker_ops.rs:118-254` at f4e53c6) — absent from 0.5.0 entirely
|
||||
(grep: 0 occurrences). Five dead-letter/sweep paths in 0.5.0 are
|
||||
bare `DELETE … RETURNING` + decode + INSERT sequences with no
|
||||
savepoint (commits `3ab43aa`, `753f6d0`).
|
||||
2. **Five `.ok()` error-swallows** in 0.5.0's `retry`, `fail`,
|
||||
`get_job`, `lock_acquire`, `result_get` — every SQLite error
|
||||
(I/O, corruption, disk full) maps to "no row"/"not our claim"/
|
||||
"lock held", not just `QueryReturnedNoRows` (commit `4881f27`).
|
||||
3. **`claimed_at`** (schema column + migration) — absent from 0.5.0's
|
||||
`BOOTSTRAP_HONKER_SQL`; added at HEAD only (`6780cae`/PR #140).
|
||||
|
||||
Present in 0.5.0 already (i.e. the watch-side hardening predates the
|
||||
release): issue #80's `-shm`-descriptor registry and the kqueue
|
||||
lock-bearing-path guards (verified in the tag's `shm_watcher.rs` /
|
||||
`kernel_watcher.rs`), and the full `WatcherDeathGuard` machinery.
|
||||
|
||||
**Consequence of the artifact fact:** riding published 0.5.0 means
|
||||
shipping the confirmed job-loss windows of §3 below inside the exact
|
||||
functions ADR-010's ride posture points at; the fixes exist upstream,
|
||||
are documented in honker's own CHANGELOG as real defects, and are
|
||||
stranded unreleased with no announced date.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Watcher / transactional core — the read's original mandate
|
||||
|
||||
Verdict: **clean.** Per component (line cites at f4e53c6 unless
|
||||
prefixed `v0.5.0:`, which cite the published tag):
|
||||
|
||||
- **`Writer`** (`lib.rs:549-617`; identical in `v0.5.0:lib.rs`):
|
||||
single-connection write slot over `Mutex<Option<Connection>>` +
|
||||
condvar + `closed` AtomicBool. Correct — the `acquire` wait loop
|
||||
re-checks `closed` after each wakeup (close wakes blocked acquirers
|
||||
with `None`), `release` after `close` drops the connection instead of
|
||||
pooling it, `close` is idempotent. The explicit-`close` design
|
||||
(binding-GC pressure relief) is sound for our shape too.
|
||||
- **`Readers`** (`lib.rs:629-716`): the subtle race handling is right —
|
||||
capacity slot is re-checked *after* `open_conn` returns (a close-race
|
||||
drops the brand-new connection and releases the slot it reserved), and
|
||||
the failed-open path decrements `outstanding` so transient open
|
||||
failures cannot permanently shrink the pool. The closed sentinel
|
||||
(`SQLITE_MISUSE` + "Database is closed") is a hack, but a documented
|
||||
and harmless one.
|
||||
- **Polling watcher** (`run_poll_loop`, `lib.rs:832-937`): the
|
||||
three-layer defense is genuinely good and is the quality POC #1
|
||||
measured. (a) `PRAGMA data_version` fast path (~3.5 µs/poll). (b)
|
||||
**Transient-vs-fatal error classification**: `SQLITE_BUSY`/`LOCKED`
|
||||
are retried in place — critically *not* treated as connection death,
|
||||
because a reconnect would silently re-baseline `last_version` and skip
|
||||
pending wakes; fatal errors drop the connection, fire one conservative
|
||||
`on_change()`, and reconnect (re-baselining again — the conservative
|
||||
wake covers the gap). (c) The dead-man's switch: `stat` identity
|
||||
`(dev, ino)` ~every 100 ms; a replaced file (atomic rename, litestream
|
||||
restore, remount) panics the watcher thread with a precise message
|
||||
rather than watching stale data. All present in 0.5.0.
|
||||
- **`SharedUpdateWatcher`** (`lib.rs:1063-1176`; death guard at
|
||||
`:1053-1061`, in 0.5.0): one poll thread, N subscribers, capacity-1
|
||||
channels (bursts coalesce), disconnected-subscriber pruning on
|
||||
`TrySendError::Disconnected`, and **`WatcherDeathGuard`** — thread
|
||||
exit or panic → closure drops → guard's `Drop` clears every sender →
|
||||
each subscriber's next `recv()` returns `Err`. The failure-handling
|
||||
property ADR-006 pins ("watcher death closes receivers, never a
|
||||
silent hang") is mechanically verified in source, present in 0.5.0.
|
||||
- **Experimental backends** (`kernel_watcher.rs`, `shm_watcher.rs`):
|
||||
separate opt-in Cargo features with explicitly documented weaker
|
||||
contracts (missed wakes possible; init failure = stderr + a backend
|
||||
that produces no wakes). Their issue-#80 handling — never close a
|
||||
descriptor on a lock-bearing inode (`-shm`/main db under kqueue),
|
||||
with the reasoning stated at `kernel_watcher.rs:393-423` — is
|
||||
exemplary systems work. **We never enable these features**; in the
|
||||
fork they are dropped (§6).
|
||||
- **`attach_*`** (`honker_ops.rs:259+`): standard rusqlite
|
||||
scalar-function registration; documented as *not* idempotent
|
||||
("call exactly once per connection") — the engine's open path must
|
||||
respect that (it already does, per ADR-003's wiring).
|
||||
|
||||
Minor findings — none trigger anything, recorded as fork-port notes:
|
||||
|
||||
- **W-1 (reconnect backoff):** the reconnect loop retries one open
|
||||
attempt + one `eprintln` per poll tick (1 ms). A db file that
|
||||
disappears mid-flight produces ~1000 log lines/sec until closure.
|
||||
In our engine the watcher closes with subscribers on db loss anyway,
|
||||
but the fork's port should add bounded backoff.
|
||||
- **W-2 (thread-build panic):** `spawn_with_config` ends in
|
||||
`.expect("spawn update-poll thread")` — a panic in library code
|
||||
(thread-budget exhaustion). Our crate rules ban panics outside tests;
|
||||
the fork's port makes watcher spawn fallible. Trivial.
|
||||
- **W-3 (`data_version` u32 wrap):** at sustained max commit rates the
|
||||
counter can wrap and alias the last seen value — one missed wake per
|
||||
2³² commits. Hint-signal semantics absorb it (consumers re-read;
|
||||
subsequent commits re-wake). Not actionable.
|
||||
- **W-4 (watcher connection opens RW):** `run_poll_loop` opens with
|
||||
`READ_WRITE`; a `data_version` read is readable RO. Harmless (the
|
||||
watcher legitimately needs write access on non-WAL journals' busy
|
||||
paths? unproven) — noted so the fork's port makes a deliberate
|
||||
choice rather than inheriting one.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The published-0.5.0 defect register (what the fork fires on)
|
||||
|
||||
Cites prefixed `v0.5.0:` are into the published tag's sources (read
|
||||
directly from the tag); HEAD cites are into the reference checkout.
|
||||
"Would-be engine impact" assumes the ADR-003/ADR-010 ride posture
|
||||
(consuming these functions through the tx seam).
|
||||
|
||||
- **D-1 — `fail()` destroys a job and reports "not our claim."**
|
||||
(`v0.5.0:honker-core/src/honker_ops.rs:911-948`) `fail` runs
|
||||
`DELETE … RETURNING` and then swallows the read with `.ok()` (:934):
|
||||
a decode/mapper failure is converted to `Ok(0)` *after the DELETE has
|
||||
executed inside that statement* — the row is gone from `_honker_live`,
|
||||
the `_honker_dead` INSERT never runs, the caller is told the claim
|
||||
wasn't theirs. Silent job loss on any decode failure or I/O error
|
||||
mid-statement. Upstream: `4881f27` (error propagation) + `3ab43aa`
|
||||
(savepoint) — fixed at HEAD, unreleased. The upstream CHANGELOG
|
||||
states it outright: "a failed `fail()` leaves the job claimable
|
||||
instead of destroyed."
|
||||
- **D-2 — dead-letter moves are not atomic.**
|
||||
(`v0.5.0:honker_ops.rs:607-650` `dead_letter_exhausted_claimable`,
|
||||
`:1079-1119` `sweep_expired`, and retry's dead-letter branch
|
||||
`:890-907`) DELETE-then-INSERT with no savepoint; a mid-loop INSERT
|
||||
failure leaves rows deleted from `_honker_live` whose `_honker_dead`
|
||||
INSERT never came — stranded between tables. (The pre-claim path in
|
||||
`claim_batch` :663 uses it too.) Upstream fixed all four sites with
|
||||
the `in_savepoint` train.
|
||||
- **D-3 — `retry` swallow.** (`v0.5.0:honker_ops.rs:866`) The claim
|
||||
read ends `.ok()`: a SQLite error maps to `Ok(0)` ("not our claim")
|
||||
while the row sits `processing` with a dead worker — silently
|
||||
extending the dual-execution window until a reclaimer arrives.
|
||||
- **D-4 — `lock_acquire` swallow.** (`v0.5.0:honker_ops.rs:1146`) The
|
||||
owner read-back ends `.ok()`: a broken database reports the lock as
|
||||
*not acquired* — if leadership acquisition rides it, the leader
|
||||
silently never starts (a stall, not an error). The scheduler's
|
||||
`run_schedules` would have inherited this via the leadership-lock
|
||||
path.
|
||||
- **D-5 — `get_job` swallow.** (`v0.5.0:honker_ops.rs:1016`) Error
|
||||
reported as job-miss. Diagnosis-by-API under a broken stored value
|
||||
lies.
|
||||
- **D-6 — no zombie reachability** (both 0.5.0 and HEAD): an expired
|
||||
*processing* row whose worker died is unreachable by the claim
|
||||
predicate (HEAD :878), by pre-claim dead-lettering (HEAD :792), and by
|
||||
`sweep_expired` (pending-only, HEAD :1346) — the ADR-010 §5
|
||||
no-stranded-rows property fails upstream of anything we control.
|
||||
(This is fork candidate #1.)
|
||||
- **D-7 — schema gaps vs contract v1** (0.5.0; mostly HEAD too): no
|
||||
`claimed_at` in 0.5.0's schema; no per-job stamps anywhere
|
||||
(visibility/backoff/retention columns of ADR-010 §3a); `get_job`
|
||||
reads live-rows only (HEAD :1237-1240 — fork candidate #2) and
|
||||
exposes neither stamps nor `claimed_at` in its JSON (HEAD's #136
|
||||
tracks claimed_at exposure as open).
|
||||
|
||||
The POCs measured happy paths, commit/rollback atomicity, concurrency,
|
||||
and latency; D-1..D-5 are failure-interrupted windows and
|
||||
corrupted-value paths — exactly the class POC measurement does not
|
||||
surface.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Schema / migration brittleness — verdict: minor
|
||||
|
||||
- **Bootstrap** (`lib.rs:441-510`): `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` +
|
||||
`ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN` migrations guarded by
|
||||
`pragma_table_info`. The concurrent-bootstrap "duplicate column"
|
||||
race is handled honestly (SQLite serializes writes file-wide; the
|
||||
loser swallows that specific error) — but the swallow keys on a
|
||||
lowercase **error-string match** (`.contains("duplicate column")`),
|
||||
brittle to SQLite message rewording. A rewording turns a benign race
|
||||
into a loud bootstrap error (recoverable by retry) — not a
|
||||
correctness hole.
|
||||
- No `schema_version` table; migrations are append-column-only,
|
||||
per-table, in-code. Adequate at this scale (three columns added
|
||||
over the project's life).
|
||||
- **The co-migration exposure:** realizing contract v1's `claimed_at`
|
||||
(get_job, ADR-010 §1) and opt stamps (§3a) over honker's tables means
|
||||
the engine runs its own migrations over `_honker_*` — two codebases
|
||||
(ours and honker-core's) migrating one table family, with only an
|
||||
exact version pin holding the seam stable. Either posture must
|
||||
resolve this; the fork resolves it by unifying ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. The fork calculus — the two candidates, plus the §3a stamps
|
||||
|
||||
Framing per OQ-06: complement-over-machinery vs fork, on the concrete
|
||||
candidates.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Zombie fix (D-6):** complement is genuinely small — one engine-side
|
||||
SQL function over honker's own tables (move expired-processing rows
|
||||
to dead; the pending half exists, the processing half doesn't).
|
||||
Achievable over the machinery.
|
||||
- **Dead-visible `get_job` (D-7):** complement is small *nominally* —
|
||||
but contract `get_job` also carries `claimed_at` (absent from 0.5.0's
|
||||
schema → engine `ALTER TABLE` over honker's table, or a sidecar) and
|
||||
the stamps. Achievable, but it crosses schema ownership.
|
||||
- **Stamps (ADR-010 §3a):** per-row visibility deadlines honored in a
|
||||
**single claim statement** (the pinned deadline semantics) require
|
||||
rows carrying their stamps and a claim statement that reads them —
|
||||
i.e. engine-owned enqueue + claim SQL in *any* posture. The
|
||||
over-machinery alternative (claim with the uniform queue timeout, then
|
||||
re-stamp per row post-claim) is a two-statement bridge that bends the
|
||||
pinned "deadline = the job's stamp" semantics for one bounded window —
|
||||
the kind of contract-honesty fudge ADR-010 explicitly worked to
|
||||
avoid.
|
||||
|
||||
**The pivot:** once §3a and the contract `get_job` land, the engine
|
||||
owns enqueue / claim / retry / fail / sweep / get_job — the majority of
|
||||
the queue-op surface — in **both** postures. The ride then covers
|
||||
ack/heartbeat/cancel/locks/streams/notify/scheduler plus plumbing
|
||||
(watcher, Writer/Readers, pragmas, bootstrap). The fork question
|
||||
reduces to: *own the remaining half, or keep depending on it?*
|
||||
|
||||
The artifact fact (§1) decides it: the half you'd keep riding carries
|
||||
confirmed silent-job-loss windows in its published form (D-1..D-5),
|
||||
its fixes are stranded unreleased on a bindings' cadence, its crate
|
||||
description says "not intended for direct use" (its intended consumers
|
||||
are three language bindings, not direct library consumption — no
|
||||
upstream support contract for our posture), and the co-migration
|
||||
exposure keeps the schema dual-owned in the complement posture. The
|
||||
fork also inherits ~4,000 lines of upstream tests (savepoint, watcher,
|
||||
multiprocess pressure suites) — a large share of the fork cost is
|
||||
pre-paid.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rejected postures, recorded for revisit:**
|
||||
|
||||
- *Wait for upstream 0.5.1+:* unbounded timing; the read's facts stand
|
||||
for the state actually measured.
|
||||
- *Git-dependency pinned to upstream main:* pins an unreleased branch
|
||||
as a production substrate, still lacks every contract delta and the
|
||||
zombie fix (both present at f4e53c6 — verified), still dual-owned
|
||||
schema; adds workspace/monorepo resolution gymnastics. Rejected.
|
||||
- *Complement v2 (engine-owned queue SQL over honker's tables, keep
|
||||
honker for the rest):* the strongest alternative — recorded with its
|
||||
genuine merits (zero vendored code; the defect functions are simply
|
||||
never called) — and rejected on the dual-owner schema, dead-weight
|
||||
dependency, release-cadence hostage, and direct-use-unnovation
|
||||
factors above.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Fork scope (feeds ADR-011)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Fork at the f4e53c6 state** (the full fix train included), not the
|
||||
published tag — provenance: honker-core, MIT OR Apache-2.0, upstream
|
||||
commit `f4e53c6` (package `node-v0.5.1-10-gf4e53c6`), recorded per
|
||||
AGENTS.md §3.
|
||||
- **Keep as-ported:** the PRAGMA block + `set_journal_mode_wal` retry
|
||||
logic; `Writer`; `Readers`; the polling watcher + `SharedUpdateWatcher`
|
||||
+ `WatcherDeathGuard` + `stat_identity` dead-man's switch (W-1
|
||||
backoff, W-2 fallible spawn applied in port); the `in_savepoint` /
|
||||
`UnwindUndo` machinery as the mutation-transition discipline; the
|
||||
REAL-coercion arg helpers; the `notify()` scalar + notifications
|
||||
table (renamed, plus an at-attach pruning cap implementing ADR-010
|
||||
§6's engine-internal hygiene); stream functions; lock functions
|
||||
(with the same-owner-TTL-not-refreshed behavior documented as-is —
|
||||
contract pinning already covers it via the locks guarantee row).
|
||||
- **Re-derive on contract v1 (ADR-010):** enqueue + stamping;
|
||||
single-statement claim with per-row visibility from stamps;
|
||||
savepoint-guarded retry/fail/dead-letter/sweep; both-states
|
||||
no-stranded-rows `sweep_expired` (+ `dead_letter_retention_s`
|
||||
deletion); dead-visible `get_job` (stamps + `claimed_at` +
|
||||
`last_error`/`died_at`); scheduler tick over the new enqueue with
|
||||
`@every` next-boundary math (numeric, a few lines) — cron boundary
|
||||
machinery not ported.
|
||||
- **Drop, do not port:** `cron.rs` (ADR-009 rejects cron strings); the
|
||||
`kernel-watcher` / `shm-fast-path` features and their optional deps
|
||||
(`notify`, `memmap2`, `libc`); the rate-limit and result tables
|
||||
(cut-flags, ADR-002); the superseded queue functions.
|
||||
- **Table naming:** `_honker_*` → `__alkstore_*` across the fork's
|
||||
storage surface — ADR-010 §8 pre-authorized the fork re-owning names
|
||||
("nothing consumer-visible changes"); storage-internal per ADR-008 §4.
|
||||
- **Tests:** inherit honker-core's suites as the floor (PRAGMA/WAL,
|
||||
watcher lifecycle + failure handling, savepoint + multiprocess
|
||||
pressure) and add the contract-property tests (no-stranded-rows,
|
||||
dead-visible `get_job`, stamps immutability, wake-latency floor) —
|
||||
the core-contract verification backlog's SQLite column.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Follow-through
|
||||
|
||||
- [ADR-011](../architecture/decisions/011-sqlite-substrate-fork.md) —
|
||||
the fork decision and packaging.
|
||||
- [ADR-005](../architecture/decisions/005-dependency-ownership.md) —
|
||||
posture row for honker-core annotated (trigger fired); the calculus
|
||||
is applied, not renegotiated.
|
||||
- [ADR-003](../architecture/decisions/003-sqlite-driver.md) —
|
||||
"published honker-core" is superseded on ownership only; driver,
|
||||
seam, and watcher architecture are unchanged (the fork inherits them
|
||||
verbatim where kept).
|
||||
- [engine-sqlite.md](../architecture/engine-sqlite.md) — living spec
|
||||
updated to the forked substrate.
|
||||
- OQ-06 marked resolved in [open-questions.md](../architecture/open-questions.md)
|
||||
with a short form + reference to this document.
|
||||
- Revisit note for whoever picks this up later: upstream fixed the
|
||||
defect class once pressed (issues #80/#133 → commits at HEAD). If a
|
||||
future upstream release ships the train *and* moves toward contract
|
||||
shapes we re-derived, re-adoption is conceivable — but by then the
|
||||
fork is owned, tested, and ahead on contract deltas; re-adoption
|
||||
would have to beat it on maintenance, not on novelty.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user