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glm-5.3-flash 23893d6236 re-baseline the four pending remediation tasks against the ADR-007/008 tree 
The tasks were decomposed (d7db6b1) before 49d4432/ac440f3 landed;
both commits touched exactly the areas the tasks reference. Fixes
grounded in verified sources (vendored rustls-acme 0.12.1, rustls-pemfile
2.2.0, rustls-native-certs 0.8.4) and a fresh cargo llvm-cov run:

- acme-event-loop-test: the termination assertion was impossible —
  rustls-acme's Stream for AcmeState never yields None
  (state.rs:407-412, poll_next_infinite + 2^16s backoff); the review's
  U-1 exit-condition premise is withdrawn and corrected in place.
  Replaced with timeout-bounded event collection, a reachable-arm
  inventory (Order warn, AccountCacheStore, Load/Parse error arms,
  DeployedCachedCert/CertCacheStore via deterministic DirCache file
  pre-seeding), and an explicit mark for the full-fake-CA arms.
  server.rs:135 flagged as unreachable dead code (delete or accept).
- coverage-cheap-closes: re-baselined per-line ground truth — original
  groups 1 and 5 are already closed by the handshake suites; group 2's
  TLS 1.3 half is covered, leaving the TLS 1.2 else-arm (client.rs:316);
  new group added for VerifyPresentedCertVerifier::verify_tls12_signature
  (server.rs:349-366, opened by ADR-008; required for the >=98% bar);
  AcceptAnyCertVerifier refs moved to server.rs:468-475 with the stale
  OQ-TLS-09 coordination caveat retired.
- docs-pin-c1-c4-n3-n4: N-4 re-scoped (the mechanism analysis already
  lives in ADR-007 + the resolver doc block; what remains is a short
  server-verifier note covering both verifiers); C-4 updated for
  ADR-007's negotiation-earlier failure point; added the
  FingerprintPinVerifier pop cross-ref update (post-ADR-008 the default
  verifier does verify possession).
- config-validation-and-trivia: added the feature-gate mechanics note
  for the C-3 test (a non-gated test passes vacuously under default
  features); refreshed drifted line refs with a re-grep advisory.
- review 001: Status block records OQ-TLS-09/-10 resolutions; U-1
  carries the termination correction; U-2 carries the supersession
  note. ADR-008 gains the suite-number-to-test-name mapping.

Verification: taskgraph validate 14 tasks; cargo doc --no-deps
warning-free; all edits docs-only (no code paths touched).
 2026-09-12 02:42:20 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash ac440f3a9a ADR-008: server-path possession verification — the verifying verifier is the default (OQ-TLS-09 resolved) 
Close review 001 §S-1: the default client-cert verifier never checked
the client's CertificateVerify, so anyone holding a peer's *public*
cert/SPKI bytes (public by design — peers publish them to be dialable)
could complete a handshake as that peer, and the auth layer could not
detect it. The consumer designs are known (X.509 and raw-key TCP/QUIC
endpoints with identity-bearing clients), so implementing now — the
zero-consumer moment — avoids the guaranteed breaking republish of
flipping the default later.

- VerifyPresentedCertVerifier (new): request, don't require, verify
  possession — permissive verify_client_cert (self-signed chains and
  bare SPKIs stay valid presentation) + CertificateVerify routing by
  presented cert kind (Ed25519 SPKI -> verify_tls13_signature_with_
  raw_key both TLS versions; X.509 -> standard route), the same
  routing FingerprintPinVerifier implements. Nine-scheme list
  verbatim (shared fn, exact-list pin covers both).
- Default on every TlsServerConfig path — X509 / RawKey / SelfSigned
  / ACME (the verifier install is crate-side rustls in new_acme, not
  rustls-acme's).
- AcceptAnyCertVerifier stays public as the explicit no-pop escape
  hatch, no longer installed by any crate path.
- tests/impersonation_posture.rs: four pins — default rejects the
  attacker (X.509: UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKeyContext;
  raw-key: BadSignature), escape hatch still accepts + extracts the
  victim's fingerprint (both cert types).
- tests/handshake_behavior.rs: suites 4/4b — possession-checked legit
  clients (raw-key pin vs raw-key server; X.509 client vs X.509
  server) complete and the server extracts the fingerprint; suite 3b
  doc updated.
- Docs: ADR-008 written; OQ-TLS-09 -> resolved (option (b));
  ADR-007 §Limits deferral retired to not-planned; server.md/client.md
  invariants/README/overview synced.

Verification: cargo test 81 / --features tcp 95 / --all-features 104
green; clippy -D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt clean;
cargo doc warning-free.
 2026-09-11 11:12:48 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash 49d4432247 ADR-007: RFC 7250 cert-type negotiation — the offer follows the identity (OQ-TLS-10 resolved) 
Resolve the cert-type negotiation gap (review 001 §U-3, OQ-TLS-10) by
deviation from alknet: the gap was a defect in the prior art (alknet's
code never delivered its spec's raw-key-over-TCP promise — ADR-082
"works for both QUIC and TCP+TLS"), not behavior to preserve.

- FingerprintPinVerifier::requires_raw_public_keys() derives from the
  pin format: ed25519: -> true (offer [RawPublicKey]), SHA256: ->
  false (X.509 offer). Crate pin client now completes against the
  crate raw-key server; SHA256: pins negotiate unchanged.
- RawKeyClientCertResolver presents the SPKI under the X.509 offer
  (only_raw_public_keys() == false): a raw-only client offer can only
  negotiate against a requires_raw server verifier, and
  AcceptAnyCertVerifier correctly stays on the default (accepts both
  cert types). The server extracts the ed25519: fingerprint from the
  SPKI bytes either way.
- Fail-closed preserved and strengthened: an ed25519: pin against an
  X.509 server now aborts at negotiation (suite 2b), never a
  downgrade; no API change (no public signature affected; the fix is
  invisible to consumers apart from working handshakes).
- tests/handshake_behavior.rs: suite 3 now runs crate-native (no
  custom iroh-shaped verifier), new negotiation fail-closed suite,
  suite 3b inverted to end-to-end success; invariant_pins.rs
  resolver-offer assertions flipped; unused imports dropped.
- Docs: ADR-007 written; OQ-TLS-10 -> resolved-by-deviation;
  client.md/server.md/overview/README/task postscript synced
  (incl. the strict-foreign-server limit in ADR-007 §Limits).

Verification: cargo test 81 / --features tcp 94 / --all-features
105 green; clippy -D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt
clean; cargo doc warning-free.
 2026-09-11 10:26:28 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash 4a4fae64af task 2: handshake-level suites — pin, fail-closed, RFC 7250 paths executed (U-3) 
tests/handshake_behavior.rs (tcp-gated, tokio duplex + tokio-rustls,
no new deps) turns the fail-closed / pin / raw-key language into
executed behavior:

- pin match: X.509 server + SHA256 pin -> handshake completes, app
  data round-trips, server extracts the client cert fingerprint
- pin mismatch: wrong pin -> handshake error (the pin IS the anchor)
- fail closed: remote_identity None + raw-key server -> HandshakeFailure
- raw-key server path end-to-end: completes with the iroh-shaped
  client verifier (requires_raw_public_keys == true); presented cert
  asserted to be the SPKI carrying the raw Ed25519 key
- N-4's interop trap executed: raw-key client resolver vs
  AcceptAnyCertVerifier -> IncorrectCertificateTypeExtension alert

Major finding, recorded as OQ-TLS-10 (open): a crate-built pin
client cannot reach a crate-built raw-key server over rustls TCP+TLS
— the raw-key resolver requires the client to offer [RawPublicKey]
server cert types, sent only when the client verifier overrides
requires_raw_public_keys() == true. FingerprintPinVerifier keeps the
trait default false (AcceptAnyCertVerifier too); iroh's verifier
overrides true on both sides. Gap inherited from alknet
(behavior-preserving); pinned both ways by the suite.

client.md / server.md carry the interop notes; task file updated
(premise adjustments documented in Notes, summary filled).

Verification: 81 default / 91 tcp / 99 all-features tests green
(+5 new), clippy -D warnings clean both configs, fmt clean,
cargo doc warning-free, taskgraph validate 14 tasks.
 2026-09-11 08:17:28 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash e86b8ba1b5 task 1: S-1 remediation — no-pop posture doc + OQ-TLS-09 + permanent impersonation pin 
- AcceptAnyCertVerifier doc: the presented CertificateVerify signature
  is not verified (no proof-of-possession) — the server-extracted
  fingerprint is attacker-suppliable from observed public cert/SPKI
  bytes; states the two safe patterns (auth-layer challenge-response /
  a verifying verifier) and points at OQ-TLS-09
- FingerprintPinVerifier doc (N-1): fixed the "stolen-but-stale
  fingerprint" phrasing (the cert is presented fresh each handshake;
  the signature check defeats a stolen/observed cert used by a party
  without the private key) and added the server-verifier cross-reference
- OQ-TLS-09 recorded (open, high): which layer owns server-path
  proof-of-possession — three options; deferral noted (needs the
  auth-layer design or an API call before the first consumer)
- tests/impersonation_posture.rs (tcp-gated): the S-1 probe made
  permanent, both variants — X.509 victim cert + attacker key and RFC
  7250 victim SPKI + attacker key complete the handshake, application
  data flows, and the server extracts the victim's fingerprint; any
  future pop change must fail/update this test with the doc + OQ
- server.md / client.md synced with the same posture
- task note: the review's N-4 parenthetical ("alknet's client resolver
  offers both types") is inaccurate — rustls 0.23.41/0.23.44 offer
  [RawPublicKey] iff the resolver's only_raw_public_keys() is true;
  task 6 should write N-4 from the rustls sources

Verified: cargo test 68 default / 77 all-features (+2) green; clippy
-D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt clean; cargo doc
--no-deps warning-free
 2026-09-10 22:00:57 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash 8a15978c41 generation 5: review-impl — spec-conformance gate passed, API frozen 
Checklist (all six PASS):
1. API surface == ADR-004 — every accessor signature verified verbatim
2. TlsError == ADR-002 — six variants, #[non_exhaustive], typed sources,
   AcmeConfig holds exactly the two config-mismatch cases
3. Invariants: all five server invariants + client 0-RTT half +
   fail-closed structure, each with a passing behavioral test at unit
   and integration level
4. Deltas vs extraction: all ADR-pinned; two surfaced divergences
   recorded as ADR amendments — zero un-pinned divergences remain
5. Feature hygiene: default = [] lean, tokio subset (no full),
   doc comments on public API, no inline // comments, no panics
6. Docs sync: ADR-002 + ADR-003 amendment notes; overview/server/client
   Draft → Reviewed; README carries the API-freeze lifecycle note

5 findings, all low severity, all resolved forward (table in task Notes)

Verification: cargo test (81), cargo test --all-features (92),
clippy -D warnings, fmt --check, doc --no-deps,
publish --dry-run — all green. API FROZEN for the alknet rewrite.
 2026-09-10 15:05:01 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash d74a27f764 phase 1: architecture spec — overview, server/client, ADR-001..006 
- ADR-001: inherit the alknet TLS design as the baseline; deviations
  recorded as alktls ADRs
- ADR-002: TlsError ships the ADR-088 six-variant shape from day one
  (typed #[from] sources; NoqWrap; no string catch-all)
- ADR-003: the QUIC feature is noq (iroh's extracted fork), pre-
  consumer rename; default = [] per the lean-crate convention
  (corrects the extracted code's default = ["quinn"])
- ADR-004: complete accessors — for_tcp_tls() adopted, rustls_config()
  adopted; server accessors borrow (&self), client accessors consume
- ADR-005: identity + credentials + fingerprint types move into
  alktls; auth layer stays out
- ADR-006: eight-module layout; seed tests + integration invariant
  pins (exact nine-scheme list, client enable_early_data)
- specs: overview (transport picture, terminology), server.md (ACME
  lifecycle, invariants), client.md (verifier selection matrix, root-
  store fallback); open-questions.md promotes OQ-TLS-01..08 (all
  resolved at entry)
- Cargo.toml: quinn feature -> noq (per ADR-003); AGENTS.md aligned

Architecture review pass done: 0 critical, 2 major (ADR-002 AcmeConfig
doc comment contradiction; ADR-003 unrecorded default deviation) and
8 minors all addressed; cross-references verified against alknet ADRs,
rustls/noq/iroh sources.

Verified: cargo test, test --all-features, clippy -D warnings,
fmt --check, doc --no-deps
 2026-09-10 05:37:55 +00:00