Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
glm-5.3-flash 23893d6236 re-baseline the four pending remediation tasks against the ADR-007/008 tree
The tasks were decomposed (d7db6b1) before 49d4432/ac440f3 landed;
both commits touched exactly the areas the tasks reference. Fixes
grounded in verified sources (vendored rustls-acme 0.12.1, rustls-pemfile
2.2.0, rustls-native-certs 0.8.4) and a fresh cargo llvm-cov run:

- acme-event-loop-test: the termination assertion was impossible —
  rustls-acme's Stream for AcmeState never yields None
  (state.rs:407-412, poll_next_infinite + 2^16s backoff); the review's
  U-1 exit-condition premise is withdrawn and corrected in place.
  Replaced with timeout-bounded event collection, a reachable-arm
  inventory (Order warn, AccountCacheStore, Load/Parse error arms,
  DeployedCachedCert/CertCacheStore via deterministic DirCache file
  pre-seeding), and an explicit mark for the full-fake-CA arms.
  server.rs:135 flagged as unreachable dead code (delete or accept).
- coverage-cheap-closes: re-baselined per-line ground truth — original
  groups 1 and 5 are already closed by the handshake suites; group 2's
  TLS 1.3 half is covered, leaving the TLS 1.2 else-arm (client.rs:316);
  new group added for VerifyPresentedCertVerifier::verify_tls12_signature
  (server.rs:349-366, opened by ADR-008; required for the >=98% bar);
  AcceptAnyCertVerifier refs moved to server.rs:468-475 with the stale
  OQ-TLS-09 coordination caveat retired.
- docs-pin-c1-c4-n3-n4: N-4 re-scoped (the mechanism analysis already
  lives in ADR-007 + the resolver doc block; what remains is a short
  server-verifier note covering both verifiers); C-4 updated for
  ADR-007's negotiation-earlier failure point; added the
  FingerprintPinVerifier pop cross-ref update (post-ADR-008 the default
  verifier does verify possession).
- config-validation-and-trivia: added the feature-gate mechanics note
  for the C-3 test (a non-gated test passes vacuously under default
  features); refreshed drifted line refs with a re-grep advisory.
- review 001: Status block records OQ-TLS-09/-10 resolutions; U-1
  carries the termination correction; U-2 carries the supersession
  note. ADR-008 gains the suite-number-to-test-name mapping.

Verification: taskgraph validate 14 tasks; cargo doc --no-deps
warning-free; all edits docs-only (no code paths touched).
2026-09-12 02:42:20 +00:00
glm-5.3-flash ac440f3a9a ADR-008: server-path possession verification — the verifying verifier is the default (OQ-TLS-09 resolved)
Close review 001 §S-1: the default client-cert verifier never checked
the client's CertificateVerify, so anyone holding a peer's *public*
cert/SPKI bytes (public by design — peers publish them to be dialable)
could complete a handshake as that peer, and the auth layer could not
detect it. The consumer designs are known (X.509 and raw-key TCP/QUIC
endpoints with identity-bearing clients), so implementing now — the
zero-consumer moment — avoids the guaranteed breaking republish of
flipping the default later.

- VerifyPresentedCertVerifier (new): request, don't require, verify
  possession — permissive verify_client_cert (self-signed chains and
  bare SPKIs stay valid presentation) + CertificateVerify routing by
  presented cert kind (Ed25519 SPKI -> verify_tls13_signature_with_
  raw_key both TLS versions; X.509 -> standard route), the same
  routing FingerprintPinVerifier implements. Nine-scheme list
  verbatim (shared fn, exact-list pin covers both).
- Default on every TlsServerConfig path — X509 / RawKey / SelfSigned
  / ACME (the verifier install is crate-side rustls in new_acme, not
  rustls-acme's).
- AcceptAnyCertVerifier stays public as the explicit no-pop escape
  hatch, no longer installed by any crate path.
- tests/impersonation_posture.rs: four pins — default rejects the
  attacker (X.509: UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithmForPublicKeyContext;
  raw-key: BadSignature), escape hatch still accepts + extracts the
  victim's fingerprint (both cert types).
- tests/handshake_behavior.rs: suites 4/4b — possession-checked legit
  clients (raw-key pin vs raw-key server; X.509 client vs X.509
  server) complete and the server extracts the fingerprint; suite 3b
  doc updated.
- Docs: ADR-008 written; OQ-TLS-09 -> resolved (option (b));
  ADR-007 §Limits deferral retired to not-planned; server.md/client.md
  invariants/README/overview synced.

Verification: cargo test 81 / --features tcp 95 / --all-features 104
green; clippy -D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt clean;
cargo doc warning-free.
2026-09-11 11:12:48 +00:00