- AcceptAnyCertVerifier doc: the presented CertificateVerify signature
is not verified (no proof-of-possession) — the server-extracted
fingerprint is attacker-suppliable from observed public cert/SPKI
bytes; states the two safe patterns (auth-layer challenge-response /
a verifying verifier) and points at OQ-TLS-09
- FingerprintPinVerifier doc (N-1): fixed the "stolen-but-stale
fingerprint" phrasing (the cert is presented fresh each handshake;
the signature check defeats a stolen/observed cert used by a party
without the private key) and added the server-verifier cross-reference
- OQ-TLS-09 recorded (open, high): which layer owns server-path
proof-of-possession — three options; deferral noted (needs the
auth-layer design or an API call before the first consumer)
- tests/impersonation_posture.rs (tcp-gated): the S-1 probe made
permanent, both variants — X.509 victim cert + attacker key and RFC
7250 victim SPKI + attacker key complete the handshake, application
data flows, and the server extracts the victim's fingerprint; any
future pop change must fail/update this test with the doc + OQ
- server.md / client.md synced with the same posture
- task note: the review's N-4 parenthetical ("alknet's client resolver
offers both types") is inaccurate — rustls 0.23.41/0.23.44 offer
[RawPublicKey] iff the resolver's only_raw_public_keys() is true;
task 6 should write N-4 from the rustls sources
Verified: cargo test 68 default / 77 all-features (+2) green; clippy
-D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt clean; cargo doc
--no-deps warning-free
port-identity-types (src/identity.rs):
- TlsIdentity (four variants), Ed25519SecretKey, AcmeDirectory ported
verbatim from alknet-core config.rs; OQ-TLS-02 + server-only docs
on the variants; 9 in-module tests incl. Debug-no-leak
- dep decision: rand_core 0.6 (+getrandom) with ed25519-dalek
rand_core feature, NOT rand (lockfile rand 0.10/rand_core 0.10
traits are incompatible with ed25519-dalek 2.2's CryptoRngCore);
rand stays out of the tree entirely
port-fingerprint (src/fingerprint.rs):
- fingerprint_from_cert_der, extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki,
DerParser ported verbatim; production code sha2 + manual DER
(+hex for the normalized formats)
- 16 tests: 7 ported + 9 new malformed-DER edges (the extraction
had none despite the invariant naming them)
- empty-input behavior: matches extraction's actual code (always
Some via the SHA-256 fallback); doc records the deviation from
the stale None claim
port-pem-signing (src/pem.rs, src/signing.rs):
- load_cert_chain/load_private_key remapped to TlsError::CertLoad
per ADR-002; InvalidData no-key path kept
- Ed25519SigningKey rewired to crate::identity::Ed25519SecretKey
(the one intentional change); rcgen PEM round-trip test added
lib.rs re-export block: fingerprint + pem + signing + identity lines
landed; server/client/credentials pending their port tasks
Verification: cargo test (36), cargo test --all-features (37),
clippy -D warnings (default+all-features), fmt --check, feature
checks (noq/tcp/acme) — all green
glm-5.3-flash