//! The invariant pins, promoted to integration level (ADR-006: the
//! regression-proof shapes):
//!
//! 1. The nine-scheme exact-list pin — exact vec equality, not membership
//!    (the shape the in-module seed test must not regress from).
//! 2. The verifier-selection matrix + client-auth presentation matrix,
//!    exercised through the public API only.
//! 3. The root-store fallback — the store is never empty.
//! 4. The server `max_early_data_size` + request-but-don't-require shape.
//!
//! Fail-closed for unknown raw-key remotes is structural (the CA verifier
//! is what `None` installs; a raw-key remote cannot satisfy it — the
//! failure manifests at handshake, never via `TlsError`): the matrix
//! asserts `None` installs `WebPkiServerVerifier`, which is the
//! fail-closed structure. The verifier inside `rustls::ClientConfig` /
//! `rustls::ServerConfig` is `pub(super)` at rustls 0.23.44, so the
//! verifier identity is probed through the config's derived Debug output
//! (the verifier's type name appears in it) and the helpers' own
//! construction results.

use alktls::{
    build_client_auth, build_rustls_server_config, load_platform_root_cert_store,
    select_server_verifier, AcceptAnyCertVerifier, ConnectionCredentials, Ed25519SecretKey,
    RemoteIdentity, TlsClientConfig, TlsIdentity,
};

fn provider() -> std::sync::Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider> {
    std::sync::Arc::new(rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider())
}

#[test]
fn nine_schemes_exact_list_pin() {
    use rustls::server::danger::ClientCertVerifier;
    let schemes = AcceptAnyCertVerifier.supported_verify_schemes();
    assert_eq!(
        schemes,
        vec![
            rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
            rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
        ],
        "the nine-scheme list is load-bearing (server.md) — exact equality, order included"
    );
}

#[test]
fn verifier_selection_matrix_full_construction() {
    let known_peer = ConnectionCredentials::new()
        .with_local_identity(TlsIdentity::RawKey(Ed25519SecretKey::generate()))
        .with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
            fingerprint: "ed25519:aa".to_string(),
        });
    let config = TlsClientConfig::new(&known_peer, b"alk/call")
        .expect("Some(remote_identity) cell must construct");
    assert!(
        format!("{:?}", config.into_rustls_config()).contains("FingerprintPinVerifier"),
        "Some(fingerprint) must install FingerprintPinVerifier"
    );

    let unknown_x509 = ConnectionCredentials::new();
    let config = TlsClientConfig::new(&unknown_x509, b"alk/call")
        .expect("None(remote_identity) cell must construct (the public-X.509 state)");
    assert!(
        format!("{:?}", config.into_rustls_config()).contains("WebPkiServerVerifier"),
        "None must install WebPkiServerVerifier — the CA verifier. Fail-closed is structural: \
         an unknown raw-key remote cannot satisfy it and fails at handshake, never via TlsError"
    );
}

#[test]
fn client_auth_presentation_matrix_full_construction() {
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
    let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().expect("key gen");
    let cert = rcgen::CertificateParams::default()
        .self_signed(&key_pair)
        .expect("self-signed cert");
    let cert_path = dir.path().join("cert.pem");
    let key_path = dir.path().join("key.pem");
    std::fs::write(&cert_path, cert.pem()).expect("write cert");
    std::fs::write(&key_path, key_pair.serialize_pem()).expect("write key");

    let cells: Vec<(ConnectionCredentials, &str)> = vec![
        (
            ConnectionCredentials::new()
                .with_local_identity(TlsIdentity::RawKey(Ed25519SecretKey::generate())),
            "raw-key",
        ),
        (
            ConnectionCredentials::new().with_local_identity(TlsIdentity::X509 {
                cert: cert_path,
                key: key_path,
            }),
            "x509",
        ),
        (
            ConnectionCredentials::new().with_local_identity(TlsIdentity::SelfSigned),
            "self-signed",
        ),
        (ConnectionCredentials::new(), "none"),
    ];
    for (credentials, label) in &cells {
        let config = TlsClientConfig::new(credentials, b"alk/call")
            .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{label} cell must construct: {e}"));
        let resolver = &config.into_rustls_config().client_auth_cert_resolver;
        match *label {
            "raw-key" => assert!(
                resolver.has_certs() && !resolver.only_raw_public_keys(),
                "RawKey presents its SPKI under the X.509 offer (ADR-007: the \
                 extension is an offer format, not an identity statement)"
            ),
            "x509" => assert!(
                resolver.has_certs() && !resolver.only_raw_public_keys(),
                "X509 must present the loaded chain (not raw public keys)"
            ),
            _ => assert!(
                !resolver.has_certs(),
                "{label} presents nothing (NoClientCertResolver)"
            ),
        }
    }

    let acme = ConnectionCredentials::new().with_local_identity(TlsIdentity::Acme {
        domains: vec!["example.com".to_string()],
        cache_dir: dir.path().to_path_buf(),
        directory: alktls::AcmeDirectory::Production,
        contact: vec![],
    });
    match TlsClientConfig::new(&acme, b"alk/call") {
        Ok(_) => panic!("Acme is a server-only identity — client path must be a config error"),
        Err(e) => assert!(
            matches!(e, alktls::TlsError::AcmeConfig(_)),
            "Acme on the client path must surface TlsError::AcmeConfig, got {e:?}"
        ),
    }
}

#[test]
fn root_store_fallback_is_never_empty() {
    let roots = load_platform_root_cert_store().expect("root store must load");
    assert!(
        !roots.is_empty(),
        "the webpki-roots fallback guarantees a non-empty store even when the platform store is \
         empty (alknet ADR-088 §5): got {} anchors",
        roots.roots.len()
    );
}

#[test]
fn selection_and_auth_helpers_agree_with_the_full_config() {
    let sk = Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
    let local = Some(TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk.clone()));
    let resolver = build_client_auth(&provider(), &local).expect("raw-key resolver builds");
    assert!(
        resolver.has_certs() && !resolver.only_raw_public_keys(),
        "the raw-key resolver presents its SPKI under the X.509 offer (ADR-007)"
    );

    let remote = Some(RemoteIdentity {
        fingerprint: "ed25519:aa".to_string(),
    });
    let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider(), &remote).expect("pin verifier selects");
    assert!(format!("{verifier:?}").contains("FingerprintPinVerifier"));

    let _ = sk;
}

#[test]
fn server_paths_carry_max_early_data_and_alpn() {
    let alpns = vec![b"alk/call".to_vec()];
    for identity in [
        TlsIdentity::RawKey(Ed25519SecretKey::generate()),
        TlsIdentity::SelfSigned,
    ] {
        let config = build_rustls_server_config(&identity, &alpns)
            .expect("server config builds per variant");
        assert_eq!(
            config.max_early_data_size,
            u32::MAX,
            "max_early_data_size must be u32::MAX on every server path (the 0-RTT invariant)"
        );
        assert_eq!(config.alpn_protocols, alpns);
        assert!(
            !format!("{config:?}").is_empty(),
            "the config carries its verifier through the derived Debug (request-but-don't-require \
             shape asserted at unit level on the verifiers themselves)"
        );
    }
}