# AGENTS.md

Operating instructions for opencode agents working in this repo. opencode
auto-loads this file as instructions, overriding the built-in defaults for
this project. Custom agents in `.opencode/agents/` inherit these rules
unless their own prompts say otherwise.

## Git Workflow

**Commit and push when reasonable.** When a change is complete and
verified (build + lint + tests pass), commit and push to `origin/main`
without asking. This overrides the built-in default of "only commit when
explicitly asked."

The workflow:

1. Make the change
2. Verify: `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
   `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo doc --no-deps` if docs changed
3. Inspect `git status` and `git diff` before staging — stage only the
   intended files, never secrets
4. Write a concise commit message matching the repo style (see `git log
   --oneline -10`). For multi-point changes, use a summary line plus a
   body with bullet points and a verification block.
5. `git push origin main`
6. Report the commit hash and the verification summary

Exceptions — **do not** commit or push without asking:

- The change is exploratory / speculative (you're not sure the user wants
  it kept)
- The user is actively reviewing the diff and may ask for changes
- The change touches a public API surface that consumers implement or
  compile against (one-way doors — see "Public API shapes are one-way
  doors" below; once consumers exist, those signatures are stable
  contracts)
- You'd be force-pushing, amending a published commit, creating an empty
  commit, or skipping hooks

Never commit secrets, keys, or credentials. If a commit fails or hooks
reject it, fix the issue and create a new commit — do not amend the
failed one.

Git identity is preconfigured (`glm-5.3-flash <glm-5.3-flash@alk.dev>`). Do
not change `git config`, skip hooks, or use `git commit -i`.

## Project Conventions (Rust / TLS crate)

This is the TLS crate — shared TLS setup types for the alk* stack:
server and client `rustls` configs, cert resolvers, verifiers, and
ACME state-machine wiring, transport-agnostic and shareable across
transports (noq, `tokio-rustls` TCP+TLS, and anything else that
consumes a `rustls` config). It is the extraction of the TLS handling
from alknet (alknet ADR-082/087/088 and the `crates/tls` spec are the
prior art). The conventions below apply to all work in `src/` and
`tests/`. They mirror `.opencode/agents/implementation-specialist.md`
§Project Conventions and are repeated here so they apply to every
session, not just spawned implementation agents.

1. **No comments in code** unless the user explicitly asks. This is a
   project-wide convention. Doc comments (`///`, `//!`) are fine and
   expected on public API. Inline `//` comments only when the user asks
   or when a non-obvious security/correctness constraint would otherwise
   be missed (e.g., "the root store must never be empty — a container
   with no system CA bundle still needs to verify public X.509 remotes;
   see alknet ADR-088 §5").

2. **Error handling** — `thiserror` for the library error type
   (`TlsError`, `#[non_exhaustive]`, one variant per failure category —
   the alknet ADR-088 shape). No panics in library code. No `unwrap()`
   or `expect()` outside tests. If you reach for `unwrap`, the error
   path wasn't specified — stop and decide what should actually happen.
   For poisoned `RwLock`/`Mutex`, use `unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())`
   so a panic in one operation does not cascade to other operations.

3. **`tokio` is the async runtime** — all I/O is async. The ACME state
   machine is a spawned task; cert loading is sync file I/O behind an
   `async fn` signature for API uniformity. Use the wasm-clean tokio
   subset (`rt`, `sync`, `macros`) — **do NOT use `features = ["full"]`**
   in `[dependencies]` (dev-dependencies may use `full`).

4. **The default crate should stay lean** — TLS setup and config types
   only. Transport-specific wrapping is feature-gated: `noq` (the
   `for_noq()` accessors), `tcp` (`tokio-rustls`), `acme` (the ACME
   state machine, a heavy dep). The `rustls` dep is always present —
   it is the core library. Unlike the sibling protocol crates
   (alktunnels, alktty), wasm is not a load-bearing target here: the
   crypto stacks (`aws-lc-rs`) and file I/O are platform code. If a
   design decision ever makes the default crate heavier than "rustls +
   cert material + tokio spawn," that is an ADR-worthy decision, not an
   accident.

5. **Behavior-preservation invariants are load-bearing** — the extraction
   from alknet must preserve these TLS behaviors exactly. An
   implementation that omits any of these compiles and passes
   type-checks but silently changes TLS behavior (alknet ADR-082 §
   Behavior-preservation invariants):
   - **`max_early_data_size = u32::MAX`** on all server config paths —
     enables 0-RTT / early data. Omitting it silently breaks 0-RTT
     clients.
   - **`rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider()`** as the crypto
     provider on all paths (alknet ADR-084). Do not switch to `ring` or
     the process-default provider without an ADR.
   - **`AcceptAnyCertVerifier`'s `supported_verify_schemes()`** returns
     ED25519 + ECDSA P-256/P-384 + RSA PSS/PKCS1 (SHA256/384/512),
     verbatim.
   - **`acme-tls/1` ALPN append** for the ACME path only, done by the
     TLS crate, not the caller (alknet ADR-027 §7).
   - **Non-empty root store** — the client CA path merges
     `webpki-roots` when the platform store is empty (alknet ADR-088
     §5); a containerized deployment with no system CA bundle must
     still verify public X.509 remotes.

6. **Fail closed** — verifier selection (fingerprint pin / CA / fail
   closed) must never silently downgrade. An unknown raw-key remote
   fails at handshake, not to CA verification. Identity precedence and
   verifier selection follow the alknet ADR-034/ADR-091 shape: known
   peer + fingerprint → pin; unknown + X.509 → CA; unknown + raw key →
   fail closed. Client-auth cert presentation follows the local
   identity: raw key/X.509 present the cert, `None` presents nothing,
   `Acme` is a server-only identity (config error on the client path).

7. **One identity, N transports; one ACME state machine** — the central
   types are `TlsServerConfig` / `TlsClientConfig`, built once and
   shared (the inner `rustls` config is Clone — Arc-shared resolvers).
   `TlsServerConfig` is not `Clone` (it holds the ACME task's
   `JoinHandle`); share it via `Arc`. Never spawn a second ACME state
   machine for a domain already being served — duplicate orders risk
   Let's Encrypt rate limits and cert-cache divergence (alknet ADR-082
   §The cert-reuse problem). This crate is the cert provider, not the
   accept loop — transport accept loops live in the consumers
   (assembly layer / endpoint crates).

8. **TLS-crate scope boundary** — this crate owns config *construction*.
   Handshake-time outcomes (a rejected cert, the unknown-raw-key
   fail-closed) flow through the transport's connector, not through
   `TlsError` — `TlsError` is the config-construction error type (alknet
   ADR-088 §6). ACME state-machine runtime errors are stream events,
   logged in the spawned task, not `TlsError` variants. Do not grow
   `TlsError` to cover handshake outcomes.

9. **Feature gates** — transport-specific deps are opt-in (`noq`,
   `tcp`, `acme`); `default = []` — the default crate compiles lean
   (ADR-003). Verify `cargo test`
   (default) and `cargo test --all-features` both pass whenever features
   are touched.

10. **Upstream posture** — this crate extracts working code from alknet
    (`crates/alknet-tls`, `crates/alknet-core` config/fingerprint). The
    alknet spec docs (ADR-082/083/084/086/087/088/089 and the
    `crates/tls` README) are the reference; where this crate deviates,
    record the deviation as an ADR here rather than silently diverging.
    Config types (`TlsIdentity`, `Ed25519SecretKey`) are expected to
    move here from `alknet-core` — this crate owns them after the
    rewrite; do not re-import them from alknet.

11. **Naming** — Rust standard: `snake_case` for functions/variables/
    modules, `PascalCase` for types/traits, `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` for
    constants.

12. **Module structure** — one module per file under `src/`, re-exported
    from `src/lib.rs`. Public API surface is `lib.rs` re-exports. The
    alknet shape is the reference: `server.rs` (server config +
    resolvers), `client.rs` (client config + verifiers), `pem.rs`
    (cert/key loading), `signing.rs` (shared signing helpers).

## Verification Commands

Run these before committing. All must pass.

```bash
cargo test                                    # full suite
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo fmt --check
cargo doc --no-deps                           # if docs changed
cargo test --all-features                     # if features are added/touched
cargo publish --dry-run --allow-dirty         # before a release
```

## Architecture Context

- `docs/research/phase-0.md` — the Phase 0 research findings (current
  phase). Phase 1 will produce `docs/architecture/` (overview, ADRs,
  open-questions tracker) per `docs/sdd_process.md`.
- The prior art for this crate:
  - **alknet-tls** — `/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/crates/alknet-tls/` —
    the working extraction source (`server.rs`, `client.rs`, `pem.rs`,
    `signing.rs`); this crate supersedes it in the alknet rewrite.
  - **alknet docs** — `/workspace/@alkdev/alknet/docs/architecture/`:
    ADR-082 (extraction), ADR-083 (endpoint takes no TLS config),
    ADR-084 (aws-lc-rs provider), ADR-027 (identity model, `acme-tls/1`),
    ADR-086 (endpoint types / split ALPN lists), ADR-087
    (`TlsClientConfig`), ADR-088 (`TlsError` shape, root-store
    fallback), ADR-089 (client dial seam), ADR-034 (verifier
    selection), ADR-091 (`ConnectionCredentials`), and
    `docs/architecture/crates/tls/README.md` (the full crate spec —
    the most complete reference for what this crate must do).
- Key open threads carried from alknet (Phase 0 must resolve or defer
  them — see `docs/research/phase-0.md`):
  - The `TlsError` in the extracted code is the simplified 3-variant
    enum; the ADR-088 six-variant `#[non_exhaustive]` shape is the
    recorded target and was never implemented.
  - The config types (`TlsIdentity`, `Ed25519SecretKey`,
    `ConnectionCredentials`) still live in `alknet-core`; where they
    land for the rewrite is an alktls-side decision.
  - ADR-029's fingerprint question (`029-callclient-tls-client-auth...`)
    and the client-auth/remote-identity verification seams.
- If a TODO references a design direction that an ADR has since decided
  against, the TODO is stale — remove it and align with the ADR. Do not
  implement the rejected design.