Resolve the cert-type negotiation gap (review 001 §U-3, OQ-TLS-10) by
deviation from alknet: the gap was a defect in the prior art (alknet's
code never delivered its spec's raw-key-over-TCP promise — ADR-082
"works for both QUIC and TCP+TLS"), not behavior to preserve.
- FingerprintPinVerifier::requires_raw_public_keys() derives from the
pin format: ed25519: -> true (offer [RawPublicKey]), SHA256: ->
false (X.509 offer). Crate pin client now completes against the
crate raw-key server; SHA256: pins negotiate unchanged.
- RawKeyClientCertResolver presents the SPKI under the X.509 offer
(only_raw_public_keys() == false): a raw-only client offer can only
negotiate against a requires_raw server verifier, and
AcceptAnyCertVerifier correctly stays on the default (accepts both
cert types). The server extracts the ed25519: fingerprint from the
SPKI bytes either way.
- Fail-closed preserved and strengthened: an ed25519: pin against an
X.509 server now aborts at negotiation (suite 2b), never a
downgrade; no API change (no public signature affected; the fix is
invisible to consumers apart from working handshakes).
- tests/handshake_behavior.rs: suite 3 now runs crate-native (no
custom iroh-shaped verifier), new negotiation fail-closed suite,
suite 3b inverted to end-to-end success; invariant_pins.rs
resolver-offer assertions flipped; unused imports dropped.
- Docs: ADR-007 written; OQ-TLS-10 -> resolved-by-deviation;
client.md/server.md/overview/README/task postscript synced
(incl. the strict-foreign-server limit in ADR-007 §Limits).
Verification: cargo test 81 / --features tcp 94 / --all-features
105 green; clippy -D warnings clean (default + all-features); fmt
clean; cargo doc warning-free.
glm-5.3-flash
49d4432247