Decompose security review #003 findings into 17 fix tasks and 1 review task

Address 4 critical, 8 warning, and 5 suggestion findings from the
security and bug review by creating atomic, dependency-ordered tasks:

Critical fixes (C1-C4): rate limiter IP source (ADR-025), InFlightCounter
increment + drain interval, connector timeout ceiling (ADR-026), JSON format
without log file.

Validation tightening (W1, W2): upstream host validation, ACME contact email
validation.

Robustness (W3, W4, W5, W12): upstream URI error handling (502 not silent
drop), admin socket resource limits (ADR-027), TlsMode wildcard mismatch,
http_port u32→u16.

Code quality (W6, W10, W11, S1, S3, W8/W9): config type consolidation,
TokenBucket field visibility, reload_mutex #[cfg(test)], dead code removal,
root cert count logging, misleading test names.

Test coverage (S10): rate limiter ConnectInfo tests (depends on C1 fix).

Review: post-security-fix-review checkpoint covering all critical fixes
and sensitive config consolidation path.
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-12 13:42:37 +00:00
parent 80d1fd0fb3
commit 54f1725173
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---
id: fix/admin-socket-resource-limits
name: Add read timeout and line length limit to admin socket (ADR-027)
status: pending
depends_on: []
scope: narrow
risk: low
impact: component
level: implementation
review_findings: [W4, S4]
---
## Description
The admin socket's `handle_connection` reads one newline-terminated line with
`reader.read_line(&mut line)` but sets no timeout and no length limit. This
allows:
1. A client to connect and send no data, holding a connection indefinitely
2. A client to send unbounded data without a newline, causing OOM
ADR-027 specifies: 5-second read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit.
### Changes Required
**`src/admin/socket.rs`** — `handle_connection` function (lines 166-210):
- Wrap the `BufReader` with `tokio::io::take` to limit read size to 4096 bytes:
```rust
let (reader, mut writer) = stream.into_split();
let mut reader = BufReader::new(tokio::io::take(reader, 4096));
let mut line = String::new();
```
- Wrap the `read_line` call in a `tokio::time::timeout`:
```rust
use std::time::Duration;
let read_result = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(5),
reader.read_line(&mut line),
).await;
```
- Handle timeout and line-too-long cases:
```rust
match read_result {
Ok(Ok(0)) | Ok(Err(_)) => {
// existing "invalid input" handling
}
Err(_) => {
// timeout
tracing::debug!("admin socket connection timed out");
let _ = writer.write_all(
format!("{}\n", serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
status: "error",
message: "read timeout".to_string(),
}).unwrap()).as_bytes()
).await;
return;
}
Ok(Ok(n)) => {
// Check if line was truncated (no newline found within limit)
if !line.ends_with('\n') && n > 0 {
tracing::warn!("admin socket command exceeded 4096 byte limit");
let _ = writer.write_all(
format!("{}\n", serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
status: "error",
message: "command too long".to_string(),
}).unwrap()).as_bytes()
).await;
return;
}
// ... existing command handling
}
}
```
- Update existing tests and add new tests for timeout and line length limit.
## Acceptance Criteria
- [ ] Read timeout of 5 seconds applied to admin socket connections
- [ ] Line length limit of 4096 bytes applied (via `tokio::io::take`)
- [ ] Timeout logged at `debug` level per ADR-027
- [ ] Line-too-long logged at `warn` level per ADR-027
- [ ] Both conditions return appropriate error JSON to the client
- [ ] Legitimate commands (`reload`, `status`) still work
- [ ] New tests for timeout and line length limit behavior
- [ ] `cargo test` passes
- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
## References
- docs/architecture/decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md — ADR-027
- docs/architecture/operations.md — admin socket resource limits
- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W4, S4 findings
- src/admin/socket.rs — `handle_connection`
## Notes
> To be filled on completion
## Summary
> To be filled on completion