Decompose security review #003 findings into 17 fix tasks and 1 review task

Address 4 critical, 8 warning, and 5 suggestion findings from the
security and bug review by creating atomic, dependency-ordered tasks:

Critical fixes (C1-C4): rate limiter IP source (ADR-025), InFlightCounter
increment + drain interval, connector timeout ceiling (ADR-026), JSON format
without log file.

Validation tightening (W1, W2): upstream host validation, ACME contact email
validation.

Robustness (W3, W4, W5, W12): upstream URI error handling (502 not silent
drop), admin socket resource limits (ADR-027), TlsMode wildcard mismatch,
http_port u32→u16.

Code quality (W6, W10, W11, S1, S3, W8/W9): config type consolidation,
TokenBucket field visibility, reload_mutex #[cfg(test)], dead code removal,
root cert count logging, misleading test names.

Test coverage (S10): rate limiter ConnectInfo tests (depends on C1 fix).

Review: post-security-fix-review checkpoint covering all critical fixes
and sensitive config consolidation path.

tasks/review/post-security-fix-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+id: review/post-security-fix-review
+name: Review security fix implementations before production consideration
+status: pending
+depends_on:
+  - fix/rate-limiter-ip-source
+  - fix/inflight-counter-increment
+  - fix/connector-timeout-ceiling
+  - fix/json-format-without-logfile
+  - fix/upstream-host-validation
+  - fix/acme-contact-validation
+  - fix/upstream-uri-error-handling
+  - fix/admin-socket-resource-limits
+  - fix/consolidate-config-types
+  - fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests
+scope: moderate
+risk: low
+impact: project
+level: review
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Review all security and bug fix implementations from Review #003 before
+considering them production-ready. Verify that the fixes correctly implement
+the architecture decisions (ADR-025, ADR-026, ADR-027) and the updated spec
+documents.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] C1 fix: Rate limiter uses ConnectInfo only, rejects without it (ADR-025)
+- [ ] C2 fix: InFlightCounter increments before task spawn, drain polls 100ms
+- [ ] C3 fix: Connector ceiling is 30s, per-site timeouts work >5s (ADR-026)
+- [ ] C4 fix: JSON format applied in stdout-only path
+- [ ] W1 fix: Upstream host part validated (DNS name or IP, IPv6 brackets)
+- [ ] W2 fix: ACME contact email validated (non-empty, contains @)
+- [ ] W3 fix: URI parse failure returns 502, never drops query string silently
+- [ ] W4 fix: Admin socket has 5s timeout and 4096 byte line limit (ADR-027)
+- [ ] W6 fix: RawConfig eliminated, FullConfig used in both paths
+- [ ] S10 fix: Rate limit tests use ConnectInfo, verify XFF is ignored
+- [ ] All `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] All `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+- [ ] No regressions in integration tests
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — all findings
+- docs/architecture/decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md — ADR-025
+- docs/architecture/decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md — ADR-026
+- docs/architecture/decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md — ADR-027
+
+## Notes
+
+> This review covers the critical security fixes and the sensitive config
+> consolidation. It should be the last task before the generation 4+ code
+> quality items are considered final.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion