Cross-check max_connections against RLIMIT_NOFILE at startup/reload (review #010 C2)
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
1bbb9c237c
commit
da4c3a8a12
10 files changed
+248
-13
No files matched your search
@@ -469,6 +469,16 @@ On startup, the config is validated:
|
||||
23. `tls_handshake_timeout_secs` must be > 0. A zero value would immediately
|
||||
kill every TLS handshake, preventing any client connection from
|
||||
completing (review #010 C3).
|
||||
24. `max_connections` + 64 reserved FDs must fit under the process's soft
|
||||
`RLIMIT_NOFILE` (checked at startup and on reload, Unix only; skipped
|
||||
when the limit is `RLIM_INFINITY`). This is an environment-dependent
|
||||
check, separate from the pure TOML rules above. With the connection
|
||||
semaphore shared across listeners (review #010 C4), connection FDs are
|
||||
capped at exactly `max_connections` process-wide; the reserved headroom
|
||||
covers listener sockets, the log file, ACME renewal sockets, epoll/timer
|
||||
FDs, and stdin/stdout/stderr. A soft limit at or below the Docker default
|
||||
(1024) also triggers a prominent startup warning even when the budget
|
||||
fits (review #010 C2).
|
||||
|
||||
On SIGHUP reload, the same validation applies. If the new config fails
|
||||
validation, the reload is rejected and the old config remains active. An error
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user