Mark review/post-security-fix-review as completed — all 10 criteria PASS

Add host part validation to is_valid_upstream: IPv4/IPv6 addresses must parse
as valid IpAddr, bracket-enclosed hosts must parse as IPv6, DNS names must
pass is_valid_hostname. Previously, values like '!!!bad!!!:3000' would pass.

AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# AGENTS.md
+
+Guidance for LLM agents (and humans) working on this project.
+
+## Project Overview
+
+A memory-safe reverse proxy built with Rust/axum that replaces vulnerable nginx
+installations. Terminates TLS, routes requests by Host header to upstream
+services, enforces rate limits, and injects proxy headers. See `README.md` and
+`docs/architecture/` for full details.
+
+## Build & Run
+
+```bash
+cargo build                          # debug build
+cargo build --release                # release build
+cargo test                           # run all tests (unit + integration)
+cargo test -- --nocapture            # run tests with stdout visible
+cargo clippy                         # lint
+reverse-proxy --config config.toml   # run (defaults to /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml)
+reverse-proxy --validate --config config.toml  # validate config only
+```
+
+For a static binary with no libc dependency:
+
+```bash
+cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
+```
+
+## Project Structure
+
+```
+src/
+├── main.rs              # Entry point, server startup, listener binding
+├── cli.rs               # CLI parsing (clap), config loading, validation
+├── lib.rs               # Library root, module declarations
+├── config/
+│   ├── static_config.rs # StaticConfig — immutable, requires restart
+│   ├── dynamic_config.rs# DynamicConfig — hot-reloadable via ArcSwap
+│   ├── validation.rs    # Config validation rules (called at startup and reload)
+│   └── test_fixtures.rs # Test config generation helpers
+├── proxy/
+│   ├── handler.rs       # Core reverse proxy handler (forward requests to upstream)
+│   ├── headers.rs       # Proxy header injection (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, etc.)
+│   ├── body_limit.rs    # Request body size limiting middleware
+│   ├── error.rs         # Error response types (502, 504, 429, etc.)
+│   └── mod.rs           # Router construction, client creation
+├── tls/
+│   ├── acceptor.rs      # TLS acceptor setup (manual + ACME)
+│   ├── acme.rs          # ACME certificate provisioning via rustls-acme
+│   ├── config.rs        # TLS ServerConfig construction, cipher suites
+│   └── redirect.rs     # HTTP → HTTPS 301 redirect listener
+├── rate_limit/
+│   ├── mod.rs           # Rate limiting middleware, eviction task
+│   └── bucket.rs        # Token bucket implementation (IPv4 /32, IPv6 /64)
+├── admin/
+│   ├── socket.rs        # Unix domain socket admin API (reload, status)
+│   └── mod.rs
+├── health.rs            # Health check endpoint on localhost:9900
+├── logging/
+│   ├── mod.rs           # Logging init (file + stdout, ANSI disabled)
+│   └── format.rs       # Structured log format (REQUEST, RATE_LIMIT, etc.)
+├── server.rs            # HTTPS listener serving with ALPN detection
+├── shutdown.rs          # Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM, SIGINT) + SIGHUP reload
+└── utils.rs             # Shared utilities
+```
+
+## Key Architecture Concepts
+
+- **StaticConfig vs DynamicConfig**: Static config (bind addresses, TLS,
+  ports) requires a restart. Dynamic config (sites, rate limits, body limits)
+  can be reloaded at runtime via SIGHUP or admin socket, using `ArcSwap` for
+  lock-free reads.
+- **Multi-listener**: `[[listeners]]` in TOML — each listener has its own bind
+  address, TLS config, and site routing. Sites are collected into a global
+  routing table at runtime.
+- **Edge proxy model**: The proxy is the edge — X-Forwarded-For is replaced
+  (not appended), X-Real-IP is set from the connection's remote address.
+- **No `/health` on public listener**: Health checking is localhost:9900 only.
+  The main listener does not intercept any paths.
+- **HTTP/2 client-facing only**: ALPN detects h2 vs http/1.1. Upstream
+  connections are always HTTP/1.1.
+- **IPv6 rate limiting**: IPv6 addresses are normalized to /64 prefixes so
+  addresses within the same /64 share a token bucket.
+
+## Config Format
+
+TOML. See `docs/architecture/config.md` for full schema. Key validation rules:
+
+- `bind_addr` must be explicit (no `0.0.0.0`) unless `allow_wildcard_bind` is
+  enabled via config or `--allow-wildcard-bind` CLI flag (OR logic)
+- Site `host` values must be unique across all listeners
+- `upstream` must be in `host:port` format (e.g., `gitea:3000`, `127.0.0.1:3000`)
+- ACME mode requires `acme_domains` (non-empty) and `acme_contact` (valid
+  `mailto:` URI)
+- Manual mode requires `cert_path` and `key_path` pointing to readable files
+- `rate_limit.requests_per_second` and `rate_limit.burst` must be > 0
+- `body.limit_bytes` must be > 0
+- `http_port` must be 0 (disabled) or 1–65535; `https_port` must be 1–65535
+- `health_check_port` must not conflict with any listener's http_port or
+  https_port on the same bind address
+
+## Testing
+
+Tests use `rcgen` for self-signed certificate generation and `reqwest` for
+HTTP client requests. Integration tests are in `tests/integration_test.rs`
+with helpers in `tests/helpers/`.
+
+```bash
+cargo test                    # all tests
+cargo test --test integration # integration tests only
+cargo test --lib               # unit tests only
+```
+
+## Code Style
+
+- No comments unless explicitly requested
+- Error handling uses `anyhow` for application code and `thiserror` for
+  library error types
+- Structured logging with `tracing` — always `with_ansi(false)`
+- Config types implement `serde::Deserialize` for TOML parsing
+- All network operations use `tokio` async runtime
+
+## Deployment Files
+
+`deploy/` contains production-ready deployment configs:
+
+- `Dockerfile` — multi-stage build (rust:alpine → alpine)
+- `docker-compose.yml` — complete setup with Gitea example
+- `reverse-proxy.service` — systemd unit file with security hardening
+- `fail2ban/` — filter and jail config for rate limit log parsing
+
+See `deploy/README.md` for step-by-step setup instructions.
+
+## Common Modifications
+
+### Adding a new site
+
+Add a `[[listeners.sites]]` entry to config and reload:
+
+```bash
+echo "reload" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock
+```
+
+### Changing rate limits
+
+Update `[rate_limit]` in config and reload (no restart needed).
+
+### Changing bind address or TLS config
+
+These are in StaticConfig — require a full process restart.
+
+### Adding per-site timeouts
+
+Set `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` and `upstream_request_timeout_secs` on a
+site definition. Defaults are 5s connect, 60s request.

LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+Dual Licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+
+You may use this software under either of the following licenses:
+
+=== MIT License ===
+
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 alkdev
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
+
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+   limitations under the License.

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+# reverse-proxy
+
+A memory-safe reverse proxy built with Rust and axum, designed to replace
+vulnerable nginx installations for TLS-terminated host-based routing.
+
+## Why
+
+nginx's C codebase has a long history of memory corruption vulnerabilities, and
+the discovery rate is accelerating. CVE-2026-42945 ("NGINX Rift") is an
+unauthenticated RCE via the `rewrite` module with a public PoC and active
+exploitation — and 6 of 7 recent nginx CVEs are memory corruption bugs that
+Rust eliminates by construction.
+
+This proxy targets a specific use case: TLS termination, host-based routing,
+and request forwarding to upstream services. It is not a general-purpose web
+server or load balancer.
+
+## Features
+
+- **TLS termination** — ACME (Let's Encrypt) with automatic provisioning and
+  renewal, or manual certificates
+- **HTTP/2** — ALPN-based protocol detection on the client-facing side; upstream
+  connections use HTTP/1.1
+- **Multi-site routing** — host-based routing to multiple upstream services from
+  a single process
+- **Multiple listeners** — dedicated-IP (one IP per domain) or shared-IP
+  (SAN certificate) deployment models
+- **Rate limiting** — per-IP token bucket with fail2ban-compatible structured
+  logging (IPv6 rate limited per /64 prefix)
+- **Proxy headers** — X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For (edge proxy model), X-Forwarded-Proto
+- **Hot config reload** — SIGHUP or admin Unix domain socket with success/failure
+  feedback
+- **Health check** — localhost-only endpoint on a separate port (default: 9900)
+- **HTTP → HTTPS redirect** — per-listener redirect on port 80
+- **Graceful shutdown** — SIGTERM with in-flight request drain
+- **systemd integration** — `Type=notify` with `sd_notify`
+- **Container-ready** — Docker deployment with health check and fail2ban volume
+  mount
+- **Restricted cipher suites** — ECDHE-AES-GCM for TLS 1.2, all TLS 1.3 suites
+  (matching nginx scope)
+
+## Quick Start
+
+### Build
+
+```bash
+cargo build --release
+```
+
+Produces a static binary at `target/release/reverse-proxy`. For a fully static
+binary (no libc dependency), build with the `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` target.
+
+### Minimal Config
+
+Create `/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml`:
+
+```toml
+health_check_port = 9900
+
+[logging]
+level = "info"
+format = "text"
+
+[rate_limit]
+requests_per_second = 10
+burst = 20
+
+[body]
+limit_bytes = 104857600
+
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "0.0.0.0"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
+acme_directory = "staging"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
+```
+
+> **Note:** `bind_addr = "0.0.0.0"` requires the `--allow-wildcard-bind` flag or
+> `allow_wildcard_bind = true` in config. This is intentional — see
+> [Explicit bind address](#explicit-bind-address).
+
+### Run
+
+```bash
+reverse-proxy --config /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml
+```
+
+Or with Docker (see [Deployment](#deployment)).
+
+### Validate Config
+
+```bash
+reverse-proxy --config /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml --validate
+```
+
+## Configuration
+
+Configuration uses TOML and is split into **static** (requires restart) and
+**dynamic** (hot-reloadable) sections.
+
+### Static Config (requires restart)
+
+| Field | Default | Description |
+|-------|---------|-------------|
+| `listeners` | (required) | TLS listener definitions |
+| `allow_wildcard_bind` | `false` | Allow `0.0.0.0` bind addresses |
+| `health_check_port` | `9900` | Local health check port (`0` to disable) |
+| `admin_socket_path` | `/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock` | Admin Unix socket (empty string to disable) |
+| `shutdown_timeout_secs` | `30` | Graceful shutdown timeout |
+| `logging.level` | `"info"` | Log level |
+| `logging.format` | `"text"` | Log format (`"text"` or `"json"`) |
+| `logging.log_file_path` | (not set) | Path to log file for fail2ban |
+
+### Dynamic Config (hot-reloadable via SIGHUP or admin socket)
+
+| Field | Default | Description |
+|-------|---------|-------------|
+| `sites[].host` | (required) | Hostname to match |
+| `sites[].upstream` | (required) | Upstream `host:port` address |
+| `sites[].upstream_scheme` | `"http"` | Upstream protocol (`"http"` or `"https"`) |
+| `sites[].upstream_connect_timeout_secs` | `5` | TCP connect timeout |
+| `sites[].upstream_request_timeout_secs` | `60` | Full request timeout |
+| `rate_limit.requests_per_second` | (required) | Per-IP request rate |
+| `rate_limit.burst` | (required) | Burst capacity |
+| `body.limit_bytes` | (required) | Max request body size |
+
+### TLS Modes
+
+**ACME** (automatic Let's Encrypt certificates):
+
+```toml
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["git.example.com", "example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
+acme_directory = "production"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "git.example.com"
+upstream = "gitea:3000"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "example.com"
+upstream = "app:8080"
+```
+
+**Manual** (bring your own certificates):
+
+```toml
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.11"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "manual"
+cert_path = "/etc/ssl/example.com/fullchain.pem"
+key_path = "/etc/ssl/example.com/privkey.pem"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
+```
+
+### Explicit Bind Address
+
+By default, `bind_addr` must be an explicit IP address. `0.0.0.0` is rejected
+to prevent accidental exposure. For container deployments where the proxy binds
+inside the container and Docker handles port publishing, enable wildcard binding
+with either:
+
+- Config: `allow_wildcard_bind = true`
+- CLI: `--allow-wildcard-bind`
+
+Either source enables it (OR logic, not AND).
+
+## Deployment
+
+### Docker
+
+```yaml
+services:
+  reverse-proxy:
+    build: .
+    container_name: reverse-proxy
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    ports:
+      - "203.0.113.10:80:80"
+      - "203.0.113.10:443:443"
+    volumes:
+      - /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml:/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml:ro
+      - /var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache:/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache
+      - /var/log/reverse-proxy:/var/log/reverse-proxy
+      - /run/reverse-proxy:/run/reverse-proxy
+    networks:
+      - proxy-net
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "--spider", "http://127.0.0.1:9900/health"]
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+```
+
+Container config must set `allow_wildcard_bind = true` and bind to `0.0.0.0`.
+
+See [`deploy/docker-compose.yml`](deploy/docker-compose.yml) for a complete
+example including Gitea and PostgreSQL.
+
+### systemd
+
+Install the binary and service file:
+
+```bash
+cp target/release/reverse-proxy /usr/local/bin/
+cp deploy/reverse-proxy.service /etc/systemd/system/
+```
+
+Create config at `/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml`, then:
+
+```bash
+systemctl enable --now reverse-proxy
+```
+
+See [`deploy/reverse-proxy.service`](deploy/reverse-proxy.service) for the
+unit file with security hardening options.
+
+### fail2ban
+
+Install the filter and jail config:
+
+```bash
+cp deploy/fail2ban/filter.d/reverse-proxy.conf /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/
+cp deploy/fail2ban/jail.d/reverse-proxy.conf /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/
+systemctl restart fail2ban
+```
+
+The filter matches `RATE_LIMIT` log lines from the proxy's structured log
+output. The jail bans IPs after 10 rate-limited requests within 60 seconds
+(adjust `maxretry` and `findtime` to taste).
+
+Rate-limited requests produce log lines like:
+
+```
+RATE_LIMIT client_ip=203.0.113.50 host=git.example.com path=/login status=429
+```
+
+For Docker deployments, mount the log directory so fail2ban on the host can
+read it:
+
+```yaml
+volumes:
+  - /var/log/reverse-proxy:/var/log/reverse-proxy
+```
+
+Enable file logging in config:
+
+```toml
+[logging]
+log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log"
+```
+
+## Admin Socket
+
+The admin Unix domain socket supports two commands:
+
+```bash
+# Reload config
+echo "reload" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock
+
+# Check status
+echo "status" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock
+```
+
+Responses are newline-terminated JSON:
+
+```json
+{"status":"ok"}
+{"status":"ok","uptime_secs":1234,"sites":2}
+{"status":"error","message":"config validation failed: ..."}
+```
+
+Config can also be reloaded with `kill -SIGHUP $(pidof reverse-proxy)`, but
+SIGHUP provides no feedback on success or failure.
+
+## Health Check
+
+```bash
+curl http://127.0.0.1:9900/health
+```
+
+Returns `200 OK` with an empty body. Bound to localhost only — not exposed on
+public ports.
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+                    ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
+                    │  reverse-proxy (Rust/axum)         │
+config.toml ──────► │  StaticConfig + DynamicConfig      │
+                    │  (ArcSwap for hot-reload)           │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  ┌─ Listener 1 ─────────────────┐   │
+ bind_addr:80  ───► │  │  HTTP → 301 redirect           │   │
+                    │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
+                    │                                      │
+ bind_addr:443 ───► │  │  TLS listener (tokio-rustls)    │   │
+                    │  │  ├─ ACME or Manual TLS config    │   │
+                    │  │  └─ axum router (per-listener)   │   │
+                    │  │     ├─ Host → global site lookup  │   │
+                    │  │     ├─ Rate limiting, headers     │   │
+                    │  │     └─ Proxy to upstream           │   │
+                    │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
+                    │                                      │
+                    │  /health → 200 OK (port 9900)        │
+                    │  Admin socket (Unix domain)           │
+                    └────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+For full architecture documentation, see [`docs/architecture/`](docs/architecture/).
+
+## Project Structure
+
+```
+src/
+├── main.rs              # Entry point, server startup
+├── cli.rs               # CLI argument parsing
+├── lib.rs               # Library root
+├── config/
+│   ├── static_config.rs # Immutable startup configuration
+│   ├── dynamic_config.rs# Hot-reloadable runtime configuration
+│   └── validation.rs    # Config validation rules
+├── proxy/
+│   ├── handler.rs       # Core reverse proxy handler
+│   ├── headers.rs       # Proxy header injection
+│   ├── body_limit.rs    # Request body size limiting
+│   └── error.rs         # Error response types
+├── tls/
+│   ├── acceptor.rs      # TLS acceptor setup
+│   ├── acme.rs          # ACME certificate provisioning
+│   ├── config.rs        # TLS configuration
+│   └── redirect.rs      # HTTP → HTTPS redirect
+├── rate_limit/
+│   ├── mod.rs           # Rate limiting middleware
+│   └── bucket.rs        # Token bucket implementation
+├── admin/
+│   ├── socket.rs        # Unix domain socket admin API
+│   └── mod.rs
+├── health.rs            # Health check endpoint
+├── logging/
+│   ├── mod.rs           # Logging initialization
+│   └── format.rs        # Structured log formatting
+├── server.rs            # HTTPS listener serving
+├── shutdown.rs          # Graceful shutdown handling
+└── utils.rs             # Shared utilities
+
+deploy/
+├── Dockerfile
+├── docker-compose.yml
+├── reverse-proxy.service
+└── fail2ban/
+    ├── filter.d/reverse-proxy.conf
+    └── jail.d/reverse-proxy.conf
+
+docs/
+├── architecture/        # Full architecture documentation
+│   ├── overview.md
+│   ├── proxy.md
+│   ├── tls.md
+│   ├── config.md
+│   ├── operations.md
+│   └── decisions/       # Architecture Decision Records (ADRs)
+└── research/
+    └── threat-landscape.md
+```
+
+## Why Rust
+
+6 of 7 recent nginx CVEs are memory corruption bugs (buffer overflows,
+use-after-free, out-of-bounds reads) — the exact class of bugs Rust eliminates
+by construction. Combined with rustls (pure Rust TLS, no OpenSSL dependency),
+this proxy provides a fundamentally safer baseline than nginx.
+
+Rust does not eliminate logic bugs. Rate limiting, header injection prevention,
+and access control still require careful implementation. But it eliminates the
+entire category of vulnerabilities that make nginx's C codebase a persistent
+attack surface.
+
+See [`docs/research/threat-landscape.md`](docs/research/threat-landscape.md)
+for the full vulnerability analysis that motivated this project.
+
+## License
+
+Licensed under either of
+
+- Apache License, Version 2.0
+  ([http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0](http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0))
+- MIT License
+  ([http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT](http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT))
+
+at your option.
+
+Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted
+for inclusion in this project by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall
+be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

deploy/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+# Deployment
+
+Step-by-step setup guides for running reverse-proxy.
+
+## Docker Deployment (Recommended)
+
+This is the easiest way to get started and provides container-level isolation
+as a defense-in-depth measure.
+
+### 1. Build the image
+
+```bash
+cd /path/to/reverse-proxy
+docker build -t reverse-proxy .
+```
+
+### 2. Create directories on the host
+
+```bash
+sudo mkdir -p /etc/reverse-proxy
+sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache
+sudo mkdir -p /var/log/reverse-proxy
+sudo mkdir -p /run/reverse-proxy
+```
+
+### 3. Create the config file
+
+Create `/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml`. For a basic single-domain setup with
+Let's Encrypt:
+
+```toml
+allow_wildcard_bind = true
+health_check_port = 9900
+
+[logging]
+level = "info"
+format = "text"
+log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log"
+
+[rate_limit]
+requests_per_second = 10
+burst = 20
+
+[body]
+limit_bytes = 104857600
+
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "0.0.0.0"
+http_port = 80
+https_port = 443
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["yourdomain.example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
+acme_directory = "production"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@yourdomain.example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "yourdomain.example.com"
+upstream = "your-backend:8080"
+```
+
+**Important:** Replace `yourdomain.example.com` with your actual domain and
+`your-backend:8080` with your upstream service address. For initial testing,
+use `acme_directory = "staging"` to avoid Let's Encrypt rate limits.
+
+### 4. Set up Docker Compose
+
+Copy and customize `docker-compose.yml`:
+
+```bash
+cp deploy/docker-compose.yml /opt/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.yml
+```
+
+Edit the compose file to:
+- Replace `203.0.113.10` with your server's public IP
+- Update upstream service definitions to match your infrastructure
+- Adjust the `DB_PASSWORD` environment variable (use Docker secrets or `.env`
+  file, never commit real passwords)
+
+### 5. Start the proxy
+
+```bash
+cd /opt/reverse-proxy
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+### 6. Verify
+
+```bash
+# Check container health
+docker compose ps
+
+# Test health endpoint (from the host)
+curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9900/health
+
+# Check logs
+docker compose logs reverse-proxy
+
+# Test TLS
+curl -v https://yourdomain.example.com/
+```
+
+### 7. Set up fail2ban
+
+If you want automated IP banning for rate limit violations:
+
+```bash
+sudo cp deploy/fail2ban/filter.d/reverse-proxy.conf /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/
+sudo cp deploy/fail2ban/jail.d/reverse-proxy.conf /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/
+sudo systemctl restart fail2ban
+```
+
+Verify fail2ban is watching the logs:
+
+```bash
+sudo fail2ban-client status reverse-proxy
+```
+
+## Bare Metal / systemd Deployment
+
+For running directly on a host without Docker.
+
+### 1. Build
+
+```bash
+cargo build --release
+# For a fully static binary (no libc dependency):
+# cargo build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
+```
+
+### 2. Install
+
+```bash
+sudo cp target/release/reverse-proxy /usr/local/bin/
+sudo cp deploy/reverse-proxy.service /etc/systemd/system/
+```
+
+### 3. Create config and directories
+
+```bash
+sudo mkdir -p /etc/reverse-proxy
+sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache
+sudo mkdir -p /var/log/reverse-proxy
+sudo mkdir -p /run/reverse-proxy
+```
+
+Create `/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml` (see example configs in the main
+README). With a bare metal deployment, use the server's actual IP as
+`bind_addr` instead of `0.0.0.0`:
+
+```toml
+# Single-domain bare metal example
+health_check_port = 9900
+
+[logging]
+level = "info"
+format = "text"
+log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log"
+
+[rate_limit]
+requests_per_second = 10
+burst = 20
+
+[body]
+limit_bytes = 104857600
+
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
+http_port = 80
+https_port = 443
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["yourdomain.example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
+acme_directory = "production"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@yourdomain.example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "yourdomain.example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:3000"
+```
+
+### 4. Start
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl enable --now reverse-proxy
+```
+
+### 5. Verify
+
+```bash
+# Check service status
+systemctl status reverse-proxy
+
+# Test health endpoint
+curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9900/health
+
+# Check logs
+journalctl -u reverse-proxy -f
+```
+
+### 6. Reload config
+
+```bash
+# Via SIGHUP (no feedback)
+sudo kill -SIGHUP $(pidof reverse-proxy)
+
+# Via admin socket (returns success/failure JSON)
+echo "reload" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock
+
+# Check status
+echo "status" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock
+```
+
+## Multi-Domain Setup
+
+### Shared IP with SAN certificate
+
+One IP, one listener, multiple domains on a single Let's Encrypt SAN certificate:
+
+```toml
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["git.example.com", "www.example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
+acme_directory = "production"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "git.example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:3000"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "www.example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
+```
+
+### Dedicated IP per domain
+
+Multiple listeners, each with its own IP and certificate:
+
+```toml
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "acme"
+acme_domains = ["git.example.com"]
+acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache-git"
+acme_directory = "production"
+acme_contact = "mailto:admin@example.com"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "git.example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:3000"
+
+[[listeners]]
+bind_addr = "203.0.113.11"
+
+[listeners.tls]
+mode = "manual"
+cert_path = "/etc/ssl/www.example.com/fullchain.pem"
+key_path = "/etc/ssl/www.example.com/privkey.pem"
+
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "www.example.com"
+upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
+```
+
+## HTTPS Upstream
+
+If your upstream service uses TLS, set `upstream_scheme = "https"`:
+
+```toml
+[[listeners.sites]]
+host = "secure.example.com"
+upstream = "10.0.0.5:8443"
+upstream_scheme = "https"
+```
+
+The proxy validates upstream TLS certificates using the system's native
+certificate store.
+
+## Security Notes
+
+- The proxy binds to explicit IP addresses by default. `0.0.0.0` is rejected
+  unless `--allow-wildcard-bind` or `allow_wildcard_bind = true` is set.
+  This prevents accidental exposure on unintended interfaces.
+- The health check endpoint binds to `127.0.0.1` only and is never exposed on
+  public ports.
+- The admin socket should be protected by file permissions. It defaults to
+  `/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock`.
+- Rate limiting is global per-IP (IPv4: /32, IPv6: /64) in the current
+  version. Per-site rate limits may be added later.
+- All log output disables ANSI escape codes for fail2ban and container
+  compatibility.
+- The `Server` header is stripped from upstream responses and not added by the
+  proxy, reducing server fingerprinting.

deploy/fail2ban/filter.d/reverse-proxy.conf

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 [Definition]
-failregex = ^RATE_LIMIT client_ip=<HOST> host=\S+ path=\S+ status=\d+$
+failregex = RATE_LIMIT client_ip=<HOST> host=\S+ path=\S+ status=\d+
 ignoreregex =

docs/architecture/README.md

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ last_updated: 2026-06-12
 
 ## Current State
 
-**Phase 0 (Exploration) — Complete.** Phase 1 (Architecture) — In progress.
+**Phase 1 (Implementation) — Complete.** The proxy is deployed and running in a
+Docker container, replacing our vulnerable nginx 1.24.0 installation.
 
 This project replaces our vulnerable nginx 1.24.0 installation with a
 memory-safe Rust/axum reverse proxy. The primary motivation is CVE-2026-42945
@@ -16,7 +17,9 @@ memory corruption bugs in nginx's C codebase.
 
 The proxy supports multiple domains from initial release (git.alk.dev and
 alk.dev), with per-domain host-based routing and a single multi-domain SAN
-certificate via ACME.
+certificate via ACME. HTTP/2 is supported on the client-facing side (between
+the client and the proxy) with ALPN-based protocol detection. Upstream
+connections remain HTTP/1.1.
 
 ## Architecture Documents
 
@@ -24,7 +27,7 @@ certificate via ACME.
 |----------|--------|-------------|
 | [overview.md](overview.md) | Draft | Vision, scope, crate dependencies, exports |
 | [proxy.md](proxy.md) | Draft | Reverse proxy handler, request flow, header injection |
-| [tls.md](tls.md) | Draft | TLS termination, ACME, manual certs, SNI |
+| [tls.md](tls.md) | Reviewed | TLS termination, ACME, manual certs, SNI, ALPN |
 | [config.md](config.md) | Draft | TOML config format, static/dynamic split, ArcSwap reload |
 | [operations.md](operations.md) | Draft | Rate limiting, logging, health check, systemd, shutdown |
 
@@ -54,6 +57,11 @@ certificate via ACME.
 | [020](decisions/020-container-deployment.md) | Container Deployment Model | Accepted |
 | [021](decisions/021-x-forwarded-for-edge-proxy.md) | X-Forwarded-For Edge Proxy Model | Accepted |
 | [022](decisions/022-health-check-scope.md) | Health Check Scope — Local Port and Admin Socket Only | Accepted |
+| [023](decisions/023-http2-client-facing.md) | HTTP/2 Client-Facing Support | Accepted |
+| [024](decisions/024-ansi-disabled-logging.md) | ANSI-Disabled Logging for Container Deployments | Accepted |
+| [025](decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md) | Rate Limiter IP Source — ConnectInfo Only | Accepted |
+| [026](decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md) | Connector Timeout Ceiling for Per-Site Timeouts | Accepted |
+| [027](decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md) | Admin Socket Resource Limits | Accepted |
 
 ## Open Questions
 
@@ -69,10 +77,12 @@ See [open-questions.md](open-questions.md) for the full tracker.
 | ~~OQ-06~~ | ~~Should upstream timeouts be configurable per-site?~~ | ~~low~~ | **resolved** (ADR-015) |
 | ~~OQ-07~~ | ~~Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains?~~ | ~~low~~ | **resolved** (ADR-019) |
 | ~~OQ-08~~ | ~~Should `/health` use a less common path to avoid upstream collision?~~ | ~~medium~~ | **resolved** (ADR-022: no `/health` route on main listener) |
-| ~~OQ-09~~ | ~~How should `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` be enforced?~~ | ~~medium~~ | **resolved** (implementation gap — ADR-015 already decides this) |
+| ~~OQ-09~~ | ~~How should `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` be enforced?~~ | ~~medium~~ | **resolved** (ADR-026: 30s connector ceiling) |
 | ~~OQ-10~~ | ~~Should ACME contact email be a required config field?~~ | ~~high~~ | **resolved** (already specified in config.md; implementation bug C2) |
 | ~~OQ-11~~ | ~~How should `X-Forwarded-Proto` be derived per-listener?~~ | ~~medium~~ | **resolved** (hardcoded `https` is correct for TLS-terminating proxy) |
 | ~~OQ-12~~ | ~~Should request access logging be mandatory or optional?~~ | ~~high~~ | **resolved** (mandatory, always-on per operations.md) |
+| OQ-13 | Should `acme_contact` support multiple email addresses? | low | open |
+| OQ-14 | Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable? | low | open |
 
 ## Document Lifecycle
 

docs/architecture/config.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 status: draft
-last_updated: 2026-06-11
+last_updated: 2026-06-12
 ---
 
 # Configuration
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ config.toml
 
 ## Static vs Dynamic Configuration
 
-This split follows the pattern established in alknet (ADR-030) and adapted
-for our simpler use case. See ADR-019 for the rationale behind the
-`[[listeners]]` configuration format.
+This split follows the pattern established in alknet (alknet ADR-030, not
+this project) and adapted for our simpler use case. See ADR-019 for the
+rationale behind the `[[listeners]]` configuration format.
 
 ### StaticConfig
 
@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ Immutable after startup. Changes require a process restart.
 | `format` | `"text"` or `"json"` | Log output format |
 | `log_file_path` | `String` | Path to log file. When set, structured logs are written to this file in addition to stdout/stderr. Strongly recommended for fail2ban integration in container deployments (see ADR-020). Default: not set (file logging disabled) |
 
+**Note**: All log output uses `with_ansi(false)` to disable ANSI escape codes.
+This is critical for fail2ban regex matching and Docker log output (see ADR-024).
+Both text and JSON formats produce plain-text output without color codes.
+
 **Note**: The entire `LoggingConfig` (including `log_file_path`) is static and
 requires a process restart to change. Log file path changes require reopening
 file handles, which is complex and low-value for Phase 1. Log rotation (Phase 2)
@@ -110,16 +114,23 @@ will be handled via signal-based or built-in rotation.
 | Field | Type | Description |
 |-------|------|-------------|
 | `bind_addr` | `String` | IP address to bind to (must be explicit, no `0.0.0.0`; see ADR-016) |
-| `http_port` | `u16` | Port for HTTP→HTTPS redirect (default: `80`; set to `0` to disable) |
+| `http_port` | `u16` | Port for HTTP→HTTPS redirect (default: `80`; set to `0` to disable; valid values: 0 or 1–65535). Note: the implementation currently uses `u32`; this must be changed to `u16` to match the architecture spec (see Security Review W12). |
 | `https_port` | `u16` | Port for TLS listener (default: `443`) |
 | `tls.mode` | `"acme"` or `"manual"` | Certificate provisioning mode |
 | `tls.acme_domains` | `Vec<String>` | Domains for ACME SAN certificate (ACME mode only) |
 | `tls.acme_cache_dir` | `String` | ACME state cache directory |
 | `tls.acme_directory` | `"production"` or `"staging"` | Let's Encrypt directory |
-| `tls.acme_contact` | `String` | Contact email for ACME registration (e.g., `"mailto:admin@example.com"`). Required for production; Let's Encrypt rejects registrations without a contact email. See OQ-10. |
+| `tls.acme_contact` | `String` | Contact email for ACME registration (e.g., `"mailto:admin@example.com"`). Required for production; Let's Encrypt rejects registrations without a contact email. Must contain a non-empty email after `mailto:` with an `@` sign. See OQ-10, OQ-13. |
 | `tls.cert_path` | `String` | Certificate file path (manual mode only) |
 | `tls.key_path` | `String` | Private key file path (manual mode only) |
 
+**Note on `X-Forwarded-Proto`**: The `X-Forwarded-Proto` header is derived
+from which listener port received the request: `https` for requests on the
+listener's `https_port`, `http` for requests on the `http_port`. In practice,
+since the HTTP listener sends a 301 redirect rather than proxying,
+`X-Forwarded-Proto` is always `"https"` for proxied requests. See proxy.md and
+OQ-11.
+
 **Why listeners are static:** Each listener requires binding a TCP socket and
 constructing a TLS acceptor — operations that fundamentally require a restart.
 Changing a listener's bind address, TLS mode, or certificate configuration
@@ -397,14 +408,23 @@ On startup, the config is validated:
 16. Site `host` values must be valid hostnames (not IP addresses, not
     including ports). Hostnames are normalized to lowercase during validation.
 17. `upstream` must be in `host:port` format where `port` is a required integer
-    1–65535. Examples: `gitea:3000`, `127.0.0.1:3000`, `[::1]:3000`. Invalid
-    examples: `gitea` (missing port), `http://gitea:3000` (includes scheme),
-    `10.0.0.5` (missing port). The `upstream_scheme` field handles the protocol.
+    1–65535 and the host part must be a valid DNS hostname or IP address.
+    IPv6 addresses must use bracket notation (e.g., `[::1]:3000`). Values
+    like `!!!bad!!!:3000` or `@#$%:8080` are rejected. The host part is
+    validated as follows: bracket-enclosed values are parsed as IPv6
+    addresses; otherwise the host part must parse as a valid `IpAddr` or
+    pass `is_valid_hostname` validation (same rules as site `host` values).
+    Examples: `gitea:3000`, `127.0.0.1:3000`, `[::1]:3000`. Invalid examples:
+    `gitea` (missing port), `http://gitea:3000` (includes scheme), `10.0.0.5`
+    (missing port), `!!!bad!!!:3000` (invalid host part). The
+    `upstream_scheme` field handles the protocol.
 18. `upstream_scheme` values are case-sensitive: only `"http"` or `"https"`
     (lowercase). Default is `"http"`.
-19. In ACME mode, `tls.acme_contact` must be a valid `mailto:` URI
-    (e.g., `"mailto:admin@example.com"`). Let's Encrypt requires a contact
-    email for production certificate requests.
+19. In ACME mode, `tls.acme_contact` must be a valid `mailto:` URI with a
+    non-empty email address containing an `@` sign
+    (e.g., `"mailto:admin@example.com"`). Values like `"mailto:"` (empty
+    email) or `"mailto:user"` (no `@`) are rejected. Let's Encrypt requires
+    a contact email for production certificate requests.
 
 On SIGHUP reload, the same validation applies. If the new config fails
 validation, the reload is rejected and the old config remains active. An error
@@ -430,6 +450,8 @@ All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
 | [016](decisions/016-explicit-bind-address.md) | Explicit bind address required | Rejects `0.0.0.0` to prevent accidental exposure |
 | [019](decisions/019-multi-config-listeners.md) | Multi-config listeners | `[[listeners]]` supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models |
 | [020](decisions/020-container-deployment.md) | Container deployment model | Flexible upstream addressing; `allow_wildcard_bind` override for containers |
+| [026](decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md) | Connector timeout ceiling | 30s ceiling on connector, per-site timeout via tokio::time::timeout |
+| [027](decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md) | Admin socket resource limits | 5s read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit |
 
 ## Open Questions
 
@@ -439,4 +461,8 @@ questions affecting this document:
 - ~~**OQ-04**: Should config reload support a Unix domain socket API in addition
   to SIGHUP?~~ (resolved — ADR-014: Unix domain socket admin API added)
 - ~~**OQ-07**: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual
-  domains?~~ (resolved — ADR-019: `[[listeners]]` with per-listener TLS config)
+  domains?~~ (resolved — ADR-019: `[[listeners]]` with per-listener TLS config)
+- **OQ-13**: Should `acme_contact` support multiple email addresses? (see
+  [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))
+- **OQ-14**: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable?
+  (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))

docs/architecture/decisions/023-http2-client-facing.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# ADR-023: HTTP/2 Client-Facing Support
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+The original architecture spec excluded HTTP/2 proxying from scope, stating "HTTP/2
+or HTTP/3 proxying (services that need these run their own native Rust servers)."
+This was interpreted as excluding HTTP/2 entirely — both for client connections
+and upstream connections.
+
+During deployment testing, we discovered that modern browsers and HTTP clients
+negotiate HTTP/2 via ALPN during the TLS handshake. The initial implementation
+used `hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder` which failed to properly detect
+HTTP/2 over TLS connections because its `ReadVersion` mechanism doesn't work
+reliably with `tokio-rustls` `TlsStream` wrappers.
+
+This caused two problems:
+1. HTTP/2 clients received degraded performance (no multiplexing) or connection
+   failures
+2. In HTTP/2, the host is conveyed via the `:authority` pseudo-header, which
+   hyper represents as the URI host rather than a `Host` header — causing 400
+   errors for HTTP/2 clients
+
+## Decision
+
+The proxy now supports HTTP/2 on the **client-facing** side (between the client
+and the proxy). This is distinct from HTTP/2 proxying to upstream services,
+which remains out of scope.
+
+**Implementation:**
+
+1. **ALPN-based protocol detection**: After the TLS handshake, the proxy reads
+   the negotiated ALPN protocol from `tls_stream.get_ref().1.alpn_protocol()`.
+   If the ALPN is `h2`, the connection uses
+   `hyper::server::conn::http2::Builder`; otherwise, it uses
+   `hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder` with HTTP/1.1 + upgrade support.
+
+2. **Host header fallback**: The proxy handler now falls back to
+   `req.uri().host()` when the `Host` header is absent. In HTTP/2, the
+   `:authority` pseudo-header is represented as the URI host in hyper, so this
+   correctly handles both HTTP/1.1 (where `Host` is always present) and HTTP/2
+   (where `:authority` maps to URI host).
+
+3. **ALPN advertisement**: The TLS `ServerConfig` advertises `h2` and
+   `http/1.1` as ALPN protocols, plus `acme-tls/1` for ACME challenges.
+
+**Upstream connections remain HTTP/1.1.** The proxy communicates with upstream
+services over HTTP/1.1 (or HTTPS/1.1 when `upstream_scheme = "https"`). HTTP/2
+to upstreams is out of scope for Phase 1.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- Modern browsers and HTTP/2 clients work correctly with the proxy
+- HTTP/2 multiplexing improves client-facing performance (multiple requests over
+  a single connection)
+- ALPN-based detection is the standard mechanism for HTTP/2 negotiation over TLS
+- Host header fallback correctly handles both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
+
+**Negative:**
+- Slightly more complex TLS listener code (ALPN protocol detection, dual
+  builder paths)
+- The distinction between "HTTP/2 to the proxy" and "HTTP/2 to upstream" must
+  be clearly documented to avoid confusion
+- `ConnectInfoService` is typed to `Request<Incoming>` rather than the generic
+  `Request<B>`, which is a correct but slightly less flexible implementation
+
+## References
+
+- [proxy.md](../proxy.md) — request flow and host-based routing
+- [tls.md](../tls.md) — TLS termination and ALPN configuration
+- [overview.md](../overview.md) — scope and out-of-scope items

docs/architecture/decisions/024-ansi-disabled-logging.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# ADR-024: ANSI-Disabled Logging for Container Deployments
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+During deployment, the proxy's log output contained ANSI escape codes (color
+codes) because `tracing-subscriber`'s default `fmt::layer()` enables ANSI
+output when connected to a terminal. In a Docker container, `docker logs`
+captures stdout/stderr, and the log file written to
+`/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log` is also a plain text file.
+
+ANSI escape codes in logs cause two problems:
+1. **fail2ban regex failure**: The fail2ban filter regex expects plain text with
+   a `RATE_LIMIT` prefix. ANSI codes embedded in the log line before the prefix
+   break pattern matching, causing fail2ban to miss rate limit events entirely.
+2. **Docker log readability**: `docker logs` output is cluttered with escape
+   sequences when not running in a terminal that supports them.
+
+## Decision
+
+All `tracing-subscriber` fmt layers now use `with_ansi(false)`:
+
+- **File layer**: Always plain text, no ANSI codes
+- **Stdout layer**: Always plain text, no ANSI codes
+- **JSON layer**: Always plain text (JSON format doesn't benefit from colors)
+
+This applies to both text and JSON log formats, in both file and stdout
+destinations.
+
+Additionally, the fail2ban regex was corrected: the `^` anchor was removed from
+the `failregex` pattern because log lines have a timestamp/level prefix before
+the `RATE_LIMIT` keyword. The corrected pattern matches `RATE_LIMIT` anywhere
+in the line rather than only at the start.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- fail2ban regex matching works reliably in all environments
+- Log output is clean and parseable regardless of environment
+- No behavioral difference between Docker, systemd, and terminal environments
+
+**Negative:**
+- Loss of color-coding in terminal output during development (acceptable
+  trade-off for reliability; developers can use `RUST_LOG` filtering instead)
+
+## References
+
+- [operations.md](../operations.md) — logging and fail2ban integration
+- [ADR-007](007-custom-log-format.md) — custom structured log format
+- [ADR-020](020-container-deployment.md) — container deployment model

docs/architecture/decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# ADR-025: Rate Limiter IP Source Must Be ConnectInfo Only
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+The rate limiter identifies clients by IP address to enforce per-IP token bucket
+limits. The question is: what is the authoritative source of the client IP for
+rate limiting?
+
+Two potential sources exist:
+
+1. **`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`**: The TCP peer address, extracted from
+   `TcpStream::peer_addr()` before TLS handshake and propagated to axum via
+   `ConnectInfoService`. This is the real client IP at the TCP level.
+
+2. **`X-Forwarded-For` header**: A client-supplied HTTP header that may contain
+   an IP address. This header is set by the proxy handler *after* rate limiting
+   (the rate limiter runs as middleware before the handler), so the value
+   present during rate limit checks is whatever the client sent — completely
+   untrusted.
+
+ADR-021 already establishes that the proxy is an edge proxy and client-supplied
+`X-Forwarded-For` headers are untrusted. The proxy handler replaces
+`X-Forwarded-For` with the `ConnectInfo` IP before forwarding upstream
+specifically to prevent spoofing. However, ADR-021 only addresses the proxy
+handler's header injection — it does not specify the rate limiter's IP source.
+
+The current implementation checks `X-Forwarded-For` *first* and falls back to
+`ConnectInfo`, which creates two attack vectors:
+
+- **Rate limit bypass**: A client sends each request with a different random
+  `X-Forwarded-For` value. Every request appears to come from a different IP,
+  evading the per-IP token bucket entirely.
+- **Denial-of-service via IP spoofing**: A client sends requests with
+  `X-Forwarded-For: <victim IP>`. The victim's bucket is depleted and their
+  legitimate requests receive 429 responses.
+
+## Decision
+
+The rate limiter must use `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` as the **sole** source of
+client IP addresses. `X-Forwarded-For` must not be consulted for rate limiting
+purposes.
+
+The rate limiter runs as middleware before the proxy handler. At that point in
+the request lifecycle, no proxy headers have been injected — any `X-Forwarded-For`
+header present is from the client and is untrusted (ADR-021).
+
+`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` is always present because each listener populates it
+via `into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>()`. If `ConnectInfo` is
+absent (which should not happen in normal operation), the request should be
+rejected rather than falling back to an untrusted header.
+
+## Rationale
+
+- The proxy is the edge proxy (ADR-021). Client-supplied headers are
+  untrusted at the edge.
+- Rate limiting is a security mechanism — it must use the most trustworthy
+  IP source available. `ConnectInfo` is set by the kernel's TCP stack, not by
+  the client.
+- The rate limiter's position in the middleware stack (before the handler)
+  means it sees raw client headers, not the replaced `X-Forwarded-For` that the
+  proxy handler injects.
+- Falling back to `X-Forwarded-For` when `ConnectInfo` is absent creates a
+  downgrade attack — an attacker could potentially strip `ConnectInfo` from
+  extensions to force the fallback path. Better to reject than to accept an
+  untrusted IP.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- Rate limiting cannot be bypassed via header spoofing
+- Rate limiting cannot be weaponized to DoS legitimate clients
+- Consistent with ADR-021's edge proxy trust model
+- No ambiguity about the IP source — one source, one code path
+
+**Negative:**
+- If the proxy is ever placed behind a trusted CDN or load balancer,
+  `ConnectInfo` will reflect the CDN's IP, not the end client's. This would
+  require a "trusted proxies" configuration (already noted as a Phase 2
+  consideration in ADR-021).
+- Requests without `ConnectInfo` are rejected. This should not happen in
+  normal operation but adds a hard failure mode.
+
+## References
+
+- [proxy.md](../proxy.md) — Proxy header injection, request flow
+- [operations.md](../operations.md) — Rate limiting design
+- ADR-006 — Token bucket rate limiting
+- ADR-021 — X-Forwarded-For edge proxy model
+- Security Review C1 — Rate limiter X-Forwarded-For spoofing vulnerability

docs/architecture/decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# ADR-026: Connector Timeout Ceiling for Per-Site Timeouts
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+ADR-015 specifies per-site upstream connect timeout configuration with a default
+of 5 seconds. The proxy enforces connect timeouts using two mechanisms:
+
+1. **`tokio::time::timeout`**: Wraps the entire `client.request()` call with the
+   per-site `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` value.
+2. **`HttpConnector::set_connect_timeout()`**: Sets the TCP-level connect timeout
+   on the hyper `HttpConnector` inside the shared client.
+
+The problem: the HTTP connector's `set_connect_timeout()` is set once at client
+creation time and applies to all requests through that client. The current
+implementation hardcodes this to 5 seconds. Since the connector's internal
+timeout fires before `tokio::time::timeout`, any per-site connect timeout
+greater than 5 seconds is silently capped — the connector times out at 5s
+regardless of the configured value.
+
+Three approaches exist:
+
+1. **Raise the connector timeout to a high ceiling**: Set the connector's
+   `set_connect_timeout` to a value higher than any reasonable per-site timeout
+   (e.g., 30s). Let `tokio::time::timeout` enforce the actual per-site limit.
+   The connector timeout becomes a safety ceiling, not the primary enforcement
+   mechanism.
+
+2. **Remove the connector timeout entirely**: Set `set_connect_timeout` to
+   `None` and rely solely on `tokio::time::timeout`. This removes one layer
+   of timeout enforcement but simplifies the model.
+
+3. **Create per-site client instances**: Each site gets its own hyper Client
+   with its own connector configured with the site's connect timeout. This is
+   the most precise approach but creates many client instances and connection
+   pools, increasing resource usage.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use approach 1: set the connector timeout to a high ceiling value (30 seconds)
+and let `tokio::time::timeout` enforce the actual per-site connect timeout.
+
+The connector timeout serves as a safety ceiling — it ensures that even if the
+`tokio::time::timeout` wrapper fails or is misconfigured, TCP connections
+cannot hang indefinitely. The ceiling of 30s is well above the default 5s and
+any reasonable per-site override.
+
+The `tokio::time::timeout` wrapper with the per-site value is the primary
+enforcement mechanism. It fires at the correct per-site threshold.
+
+## Rationale
+
+- The shared client architecture (ADR-017) means one connector timeout for all
+  sites. Creating per-site clients would undermine connection pooling and
+  increase resource usage.
+- A ceiling approach preserves the defense-in-depth benefit of two timeout
+  layers while allowing per-site values to actually work.
+- 30s is a reasonable ceiling — no legitimate upstream connect should take
+  longer than 30s. Sites that need a higher connect timeout can set the ceiling
+  even higher if needed, but 30s covers all practical cases.
+- Removing the connector timeout (approach 2) removes the safety ceiling
+  entirely. If `tokio::time::timeout` has a bug or is misapplied, TCP connects
+  could hang indefinitely. The ceiling provides a backstop.
+- The HTTPS client uses `HttpsConnector<HttpConnector>`, which wraps the
+  `HttpConnector`. The same ceiling applies to both HTTP and HTTPS clients.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- Per-site connect timeouts work as documented (ADR-015)
+- Maintains defense-in-depth with two timeout layers
+- No change to the shared client / connection pooling architecture
+- Simple implementation: change one constant
+
+**Negative:**
+- The connector timeout no longer matches the default connect timeout (5s
+  default vs. 30s ceiling). Operators who read the connector timeout might
+  be confused — documentation must make the ceiling role clear.
+- If a site needs a connect timeout > 30s, the ceiling must be raised. This
+  is unlikely in practice but creates a hidden upper bound.
+
+## References
+
+- [proxy.md](../proxy.md) — Upstream connection, per-site timeouts
+- ADR-015 — Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults
+- ADR-017 — Upstream connection defaults
+- Security Review C3 — Connect timeout silently capped at 5s

docs/architecture/decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# ADR-027: Admin Socket Resource Limits
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+The admin Unix domain socket (ADR-014) accepts connections from local
+processes and reads one newline-terminated command per connection. The current
+implementation has no read timeout and no line length limit.
+
+Two attack vectors exist for processes with access to the admin socket
+(controlled by Unix file permissions):
+
+1. **Connection hold**: A client connects and sends no data, keeping a
+   connection and tokio task open indefinitely. An attacker with socket access
+   can open many such connections to exhaust file descriptors or task slots.
+
+2. **Unbounded memory allocation**: A client sends data without a newline,
+   causing `read_line` to buffer indefinitely. This allows unbounded memory
+   consumption from a single connection.
+
+While the admin socket is protected by Unix file permissions (only processes
+with access to the socket file can connect), defense-in-depth warrants basic
+resource limits. The socket is a local diagnostic interface, not a
+high-performance endpoint — strict limits are appropriate.
+
+## Decision
+
+Apply two resource limits to admin socket connections:
+
+1. **Read timeout**: 5 seconds per connection. If no complete command is
+   received within 5 seconds, the connection is closed and a timeout error
+   is logged at `debug` level.
+
+2. **Line length limit**: 4096 bytes per command. If a client sends more
+   than 4096 bytes without a newline, the connection is closed and the event
+   is logged at `warn` level. The longest valid command (`reload`) is 6 bytes —
+   4096 bytes provides ample room for future commands while preventing abuse.
+
+Both limits apply per connection. The admin socket creates one tokio task per
+connection, so the limits also bound per-connection resource usage.
+
+## Rationale
+
+- Defense-in-depth: even with Unix permission protection, basic resource
+  limits prevent accidental or deliberate resource exhaustion.
+- 5 seconds is generous for a local socket — a local process should be able
+  to send a command within milliseconds. The timeout handles stuck clients and
+  network issues on tunnel-mounted sockets.
+- 4096 bytes is 600x the longest current command. It accommodates future
+  multi-field commands without allowing abuse.
+- These limits have no impact on legitimate admin socket usage — the current
+  commands (`reload`, `status`) are tiny and complete instantly.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- No unbounded memory allocation from admin socket connections
+- No indefinite connection holding
+- Simple implementation: `tokio::time::timeout` + `tokio::io::take` (or
+  `read_until` with a byte limit)
+- No impact on legitimate usage
+
+**Negative:**
+- If a future admin command requires more than 4096 bytes (unlikely), the
+  limit must be raised.
+- A 5-second timeout could cause issues if the admin socket is accessed via
+  a slow network tunnel. In practice, this is unlikely — admin socket access
+  is typically local.
+
+## References
+
+- ADR-014 — Unix domain socket config reload API
+- [operations.md](../operations.md) — Admin socket protocol
+- Security Review W4 — Admin socket has no read timeout or line length limit

docs/architecture/open-questions.md

@@ -111,19 +111,21 @@ last_updated: 2026-06-12
 
 ### ~~OQ-09: How should `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` be enforced?~~
 
-- **Origin**: Implementation review finding W4, ADR-015, ADR-017
+- **Origin**: Implementation review finding W4, ADR-015, ADR-017, Security
+  Review C3
 - **Status**: resolved
 - **Priority**: medium
-- **Resolution**: This is an implementation gap, not an architectural unknown.
-  The architecture already specifies a 5-second default connect timeout
-  separate from the request timeout (ADR-015, ADR-017), and `SiteConfig`
-  already includes `upstream_connect_timeout_secs`. The implementation must
-  wire this field to hyper's `connect_timeout` parameter. If hyper's API
-  doesn't expose a separate connect timeout, a two-phase `tokio::time::timeout`
-  approach should be used for Phase 2. For Phase 1, the connect timeout field
-  exists in config but is not enforced — this is a documented known gap. No ADR
-  needed; the decision was already made in ADR-015.
-- **Cross-references**: ADR-015, ADR-017
+- **Resolution**: Implemented using a two-phase `tokio::time::timeout` approach.
+  The inner timeout uses the per-site `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` (default
+  5s) for the connect + first-byte phase, and the outer timeout uses
+  `upstream_request_timeout_secs` (default 60s) for the full request/response
+  cycle. The shared `HttpConnector` uses a 30-second connect timeout ceiling
+  via `set_connect_timeout()` — this is a safety backstop, not the primary
+  enforcement mechanism. The per-site `tokio::time::timeout` enforces the
+  actual connect timeout. This ensures per-site values >5s work correctly
+  (previously the hardcoded 5s connector timeout silently capped them). See
+  ADR-026.
+- **Cross-references**: ADR-015, ADR-017, ADR-026
 
 ### ~~OQ-10: Should ACME contact email be a required config field?~~
 
@@ -134,9 +136,10 @@ last_updated: 2026-06-12
   specifies `acme_contact` as a required field in ACME mode (config.md
   validation rule 19). The field is defined in the `ListenerConfig` table and
   shown in TOML examples. Let's Encrypt requires a contact email for production
-  certificate requests. The implementation bug (C2: `contact: vec![]`) must be
-  fixed to use the configured `acme_contact` value. No new ADR needed — the
-  decision is already documented in config.md and tls.md.
+  certificate requests. The implementation bug (C2: `contact: vec![]`) has been
+  fixed — `acme_contact` is now correctly wired from config to the ACME state
+  machine. No new ADR needed — the decision is already documented in config.md
+  and tls.md.
 - **Cross-references**: ADR-004
 
 ### ~~OQ-11: How should `X-Forwarded-Proto` be derived per-listener?~~
@@ -168,4 +171,33 @@ last_updated: 2026-06-12
   disable access logging." The `log_request!` macro exists in the codebase
   but is not called — this is an implementation gap (W13), not an
   architectural question. No ADR needed; ADR-007 already covers the log format.
-- **Cross-references**: ADR-007
+- **Cross-references**: ADR-007
+
+## Configuration
+
+### OQ-13: Should `acme_contact` support multiple email addresses?
+
+- **Origin**: Security Review S9, [config.md](config.md), [tls.md](tls.md)
+- **Status**: open
+- **Priority**: low
+- **Details**: `acme_contact` is currently a single `String`, but ACME supports
+  multiple contact emails. The `AcmeTlsConfig.contact` field in the
+  implementation is already `Vec<String>`, and the single config value is
+  wrapped in `vec![...]`. Changing `acme_contact` to `Vec<String>` in the
+  config schema would provide consistency with the ACME protocol. However,
+  this is a config format change that requires migration documentation and
+  backward compatibility considerations. For Phase 1, a single email is
+  sufficient.
+- **Cross-references**: ADR-004
+
+### OQ-14: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable?
+
+- **Origin**: Security Review S2, [operations.md](operations.md)
+- **Status**: open
+- **Priority**: low
+- **Details**: The eviction task interval (60s) and max age (300s) are
+  currently hardcoded. In high-traffic deployments, a shorter interval or
+  longer max age might be desirable. These would be dynamic config fields
+  (hot-reloadable via ArcSwap) if added. For Phase 1, the hardcoded values
+  are reasonable defaults.
+- **Cross-references**: ADR-006

docs/architecture/operations.md

@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The rate limiter runs as axum middleware before the proxy handler. It uses a
 token bucket algorithm per client IP, matching nginx's `limit_req burst`
 semantics.
 
+The client IP for rate limiting is determined **exclusively** from
+`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` — the TCP peer address set before TLS handshake.
+Client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` headers must not be consulted because the
+rate limiter runs before the proxy handler injects trusted headers. See
+ADR-025.
+
 Rate limits are global per-IP in Phase 1 (not per-site). A request from IP
 address X counts against the same bucket regardless of which site it targets.
 Per-site rate limits may be added in Phase 2.
@@ -134,9 +140,19 @@ Logs are written to two destinations simultaneously:
 - **stdout/stderr**: Always-on, for `docker logs`, `journalctl`, and
   development use. Structured in the same format as the file output.
 
+Both output destinations use `with_ansi(false)` to disable ANSI escape codes.
+This is critical for fail2ban log parsing (ANSI codes break regex matching) and
+for clean output in Docker containers where a terminal is not attached. See
+ADR-024.
+
 The `tracing-subscriber` layer configuration supports both simultaneously via
 `Layer` composition.
 
+Both output destinations must respect the `format` config value: when
+`format = "json"`, both file and stdout output must use JSON formatting.
+When `format = "text"`, both use text formatting. The format must not be
+silently ignored in any output path (see Security Review C4).
+
 ### File Logging and fail2ban
 
 File logging is the primary integration point for fail2ban. A log file on a
@@ -155,6 +171,12 @@ volumes:
 A corresponding fail2ban filter definition and jail configuration are provided
 as part of the deployment documentation.
 
+**Filter regex note**: The fail2ban `failregex` pattern matches `RATE_LIMIT`
+without a `^` anchor because log lines have a timestamp/level prefix before the
+`RATE_LIMIT` keyword. The pattern `RATE_LIMIT client_ip=<HOST> host=\S+ path=\S+ status=\d+`
+matches the rate limit event anywhere in the line, which correctly handles the
+structured log format.
+
 ### Log Levels
 
 | Level | Use |
@@ -275,6 +297,11 @@ rationale.
   one newline-terminated command, receives one newline-terminated JSON
   response, then the server closes the connection.
 - **Message framing**: Newline-delimited (`\n`). Responses end with `\n`.
+- **Resource limits** (see ADR-027):
+  - Read timeout: 5 seconds. Connections that send no complete command within
+    5 seconds are closed. The timeout is logged at `debug` level.
+  - Line length limit: 4096 bytes. Connections that send more than 4096 bytes
+    without a newline are closed. The event is logged at `warn` level.
 - **Commands**:
   - `reload` — Re-read config file, validate, and swap DynamicConfig. Returns
     `{"status": "ok"}` or `{"status": "error", "message": "..."}`.
@@ -298,9 +325,17 @@ On SIGTERM or SIGINT, the proxy performs a graceful shutdown:
 2. **Close idle keep-alive connections** — Send `Connection: close` on any idle
    connections in the keep-alive pool.
 3. **Wait for in-flight requests** — Up to `shutdown_timeout_secs` (default: 30)
-   for active requests to complete. Server tasks are joined (not aborted) so
-   that in-flight requests can drain normally. Only after the timeout expires
-   are remaining tasks aborted.
+   for active requests to complete. The proxy tracks in-flight requests using
+   an atomic counter: each request **must** increment the counter when it
+   begins and decrement when it completes (via guard drop). The increment
+   must happen before the request task is spawned — if the counter is not
+   incremented, the drain logic is broken (see Security Review C2). During
+   drain, the proxy polls the counter every 100ms and exits early
+   when it reaches zero. If the timeout expires before all requests complete,
+   the proxy logs how many in-flight requests remain and proceeds to
+   force-close. Server tasks are joined (not aborted) so that in-flight
+   requests can drain normally. Only after the timeout expires are remaining
+   tasks aborted.
 4. **Force-close remaining connections** — After the timeout, any remaining
    connections are forcefully closed via TCP RST.
 5. **Cancel background tasks** — ACME renewal tasks, rate limiter eviction task,
@@ -580,11 +615,14 @@ All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
 | [013](decisions/013-health-check-port.md) | Health check on separate local port | Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port |
 | [014](decisions/014-unix-socket-reload.md) | Unix domain socket config reload API | Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback |
 | [020](decisions/020-container-deployment.md) | Container deployment model | Defense-in-depth via container isolation; file-primary logging |
+| [024](decisions/024-ansi-disabled-logging.md) | ANSI-disabled logging | All log output uses `with_ansi(false)` for fail2ban and Docker compatibility |
+| [025](decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md) | Rate limiter IP source | ConnectInfo only, never client-supplied X-Forwarded-For |
+| [027](decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md) | Admin socket resource limits | 5s read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit |
 
 ## Open Questions
 
-Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). All
-questions affecting this document have been resolved:
+Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). Key
+questions affecting this document:
 
 - ~~**OQ-03**: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port?~~ (resolved
   — ADR-013: separate local port, default 9900, localhost only)
@@ -593,4 +631,6 @@ questions affecting this document have been resolved:
   9900 and admin socket only)
 - ~~**OQ-12**: Should request access logging be mandatory or optional?~~ (resolved
   — access logging is mandatory and always-on at `info` level; no configuration
-  option to disable it)
+  option to disable it)
+- **OQ-14**: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable?
+  (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))

docs/architecture/overview.md

@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ details.
     (SAN certificate) deployment models (ADR-019)
   - TLS termination with ACME (Let's Encrypt) and manual certificate management
   - Cipher suite restriction matching nginx scope (ECDHE-AES-GCM + TLS 1.3)
+  - HTTP/2 support on the client-facing side (between client and proxy),
+    with ALPN-based protocol detection (ADR-023). Upstream connections
+    remain HTTP/1.1.
   - HTTP → HTTPS redirect
   - Host-based routing to multiple upstream services
   - Reverse proxy to Gitea at `127.0.0.1:3000` (git.alk.dev)
@@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ details.
   - Configurable bind addresses (must be explicit, no `0.0.0.0`)
   - Local health check endpoint on separate port (default: 9900, localhost only)
   - Unix domain socket admin API for config reload with feedback
-  - Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM handling)
+  - Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM handling with in-flight request drain)
   - Systemd unit file
   - Dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0
 
@@ -70,8 +73,10 @@ details.
 
 ### Out of Scope
 
-- HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 proxying (services that need these run their own native
-  Rust servers — e.g., `api.alk.dev` runs its own HTTP/2+ server)
+- HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 **proxying to upstreams** — the proxy communicates with
+  upstreams over HTTP/1.1 (or HTTPS/1.1). HTTP/2 **from clients** is supported
+  (see ADR-023). Services that need HTTP/2+ to their backends can handle
+  termination themselves.
 - Load balancing or round-robin upstream selection
 - WebSocket proxying (can be added later if needed)
 - Static file serving
@@ -128,7 +133,8 @@ but all routers share `Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>>` and
 `Arc<Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, TokenBucket>>>` via axum State. Site routing is
 global: the `Host` header is matched against a single routing table collected
 from all listeners' site definitions. Hostnames must be unique across all
-listeners — see C1 resolution in the architecture review.
+listeners. Hostnames must be unique across all listeners — see Security & Bug
+Review #003, finding C1, resolved by ADR-025.
 
 In container deployments (ADR-020), the proxy runs in a minimal container with
 `0.0.0.0` bind address and Docker port publishing. Upstream addresses use Docker
@@ -143,11 +149,14 @@ loopback, LAN, and tunnel endpoints for multi-host deployments.
 |-------|---------|---------|-------|
 | `axum` | 0.8 | HTTP framework | Routing, middleware, extractors |
 | `tokio` | 1 (full) | Async runtime | Multi-threaded runtime |
-| `hyper` | 1 | HTTP protocol | Used via axum, and directly for proxy `Client` |
+| `hyper` | 1 | HTTP protocol | Used via axum, and directly for HTTP/2 server builder |
+| `hyper-util` | 0.1 | Hyper utilities | Client builder, TokioExecutor, auto::Builder |
 | `tower` | 0.5 | Middleware ecosystem | Service trait, layers |
 | `rustls` | 0.23 | TLS implementation | `aws_lc_rs` crypto provider |
 | `tokio-rustls` | 0.26 | Async TLS I/O | Wraps TCP with TLS |
 | `rustls-acme` | 0.12 | ACME client | Let's Encrypt auto-provisioning and renewal |
+| `hyper-rustls` | 0.27 | HTTPS client | Upstream HTTPS connections with rustls TLS |
+| `rustls-native-certs` | 0.8 | Native cert loading | System root certificates for upstream HTTPS validation |
 
 ### Supporting
 
@@ -206,6 +215,12 @@ All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
 | [019](decisions/019-multi-config-listeners.md) | Multi-config listeners | `[[listeners]]` supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models |
 | [020](decisions/020-container-deployment.md) | Container deployment model | Defense-in-depth via container isolation; file-primary logging; flexible upstream addressing |
 | [021](decisions/021-x-forwarded-for-edge-proxy.md) | X-Forwarded-For edge proxy model | Replace, don't append — proxy is the edge, no trusted upstream proxies |
+| [022](decisions/022-health-check-scope.md) | Health check scope — local port and admin socket only | No `/health` route on main listener; health check is port 9900/admin socket only |
+| [023](decisions/023-http2-client-facing.md) | HTTP/2 client-facing support | ALPN-based protocol detection; HTTP/2 to clients, HTTP/1.1 to upstreams |
+| [024](decisions/024-ansi-disabled-logging.md) | ANSI-disabled logging | All log output uses `with_ansi(false)` for fail2ban and Docker compatibility |
+| [025](decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md) | Rate limiter IP source | ConnectInfo only, never client-supplied X-Forwarded-For |
+| [026](decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md) | Connector timeout ceiling | 30s ceiling on connector, per-site timeout via tokio::time::timeout |
+| [027](decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md) | Admin socket resource limits | 5s read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit |
 
 ## Open Questions
 
@@ -216,4 +231,6 @@ questions affecting this document have been resolved:
 - ~~**OQ-03**: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port?~~ (resolved — ADR-013)
 - ~~**OQ-05**: Should the proxy bind to multiple addresses?~~ (resolved — single `bind_addr` per listener)
 - ~~**OQ-07**: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains?~~ (resolved — ADR-019: `[[listeners]]` with per-listener TLS config)
-- ~~**OQ-08**: Should `/health` use a less common path?~~ (resolved — ADR-022: no `/health` route on main listener; health check is port 9900/admin socket only)
+- ~~**OQ-08**: Should `/health` use a less common path?~~ (resolved — ADR-022: no `/health` route on main listener; health check is port 9900/admin socket only)
+- **OQ-13**: Should `acme_contact` support multiple email addresses? (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))
+- **OQ-14**: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable? (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))

docs/architecture/proxy.md

@@ -21,7 +21,16 @@ general-purpose proxy library (ADR-002, ADR-010).
 ## Architecture
 
 ```
-Incoming HTTPS request
+Incoming HTTPS request (HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2)
+        │
+        ▼
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  TLS Listener                                │
+│  ALPN protocol detection:                    │
+│  - h2  → hyper http2::Builder                │
+│  - http/1.1 (or none) → auto::Builder        │
+│  ConnectInfo<SocketAddr> from peer_addr       │
+└───────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
         │
         ▼
 ┌─────────────────┐
@@ -29,14 +38,15 @@ Incoming HTTPS request
 │  (Host-based)    │
 │                  │
 │  match Host      │
-│  header on       │
-│  incoming req    │
+│  header or       │
+│  URI :authority  │
+│  on incoming req │
 └───────┬─────────┘
         │
         ▼
 ┌─────────────────┐
 │ Rate Limiting    │  ← tower middleware layer
-│ Middleware        │
+│ Middleware        │  ← IP from ConnectInfo only (ADR-025)
 └───────┬─────────┘
         │
         ▼
@@ -45,9 +55,9 @@ Incoming HTTPS request
 │ Injection        │
 │                  │
 │ X-Real-IP        │  ← connect_info remote_addr
-│ X-Forwarded-For  │  ← append to existing or set
-│ X-Forwarded-Proto │  ← "https" (or "http" on port 80)
-│ Host             │  ← original host header (already set)
+│ X-Forwarded-For  │  ← replace (edge proxy model)
+│ X-Forwarded-Proto │  ← "https" (always, on TLS listener)
+│ Host             │  ← original host (already set)
 └───────┬─────────┘
         │
         ▼
@@ -66,6 +76,7 @@ Incoming HTTPS request
 │    original req   │
 │ 2. Forward req   │
 │    to upstream    │
+│    (HTTP/1.1)    │
 │ 3. Stream        │
 │    response back  │
 └─────────────────┘
@@ -75,19 +86,27 @@ Incoming HTTPS request
 
 ### 1. Host-Based Routing
 
-The axum router uses a `Host` extractor to match incoming requests to site
-definitions from `DynamicConfig`. Sites are defined per-listener in the TOML
-configuration for organizational purposes, but at runtime they are collected
-into a single global routing table. The proxy looks up the `Host` header in
-this global table and either proxies to the upstream or returns 404.
+The axum router matches incoming requests to site definitions from
+`DynamicConfig`. Sites are defined per-listener in the TOML configuration for
+organizational purposes, but at runtime they are collected into a single global
+routing table. The proxy looks up the host in this global table and either
+proxies to the upstream or returns 404.
 
-Host matching is **case-insensitive** per RFC 7230 §2.7.3. The `Host` header
-is normalized to lowercase before matching. Site `host` values in
-configuration are normalized to lowercase during validation.
+Host matching is **case-insensitive** per RFC 7230 §2.7.3. The host is
+normalized to lowercase before matching. Site `host` values in configuration are
+normalized to lowercase during validation.
 
 The `Host` header port component (e.g., `git.alk.dev:443`) is stripped before
 matching. Site `host` values must not include ports.
 
+**HTTP/2 host resolution**: In HTTP/2, the host is conveyed via the
+`:authority` pseudo-header rather than the `Host` header. Hyper represents this
+as the URI host. The proxy handler resolves the host by first checking the
+`Host` header, then falling back to `req.uri().host()`. This correctly handles
+both HTTP/1.1 (which always has a `Host` header) and HTTP/2 (which uses
+`:authority`/URI host). If neither is present, the proxy returns 400 Bad
+Request. See ADR-023.
+
 The proxy does not filter or restrict paths. All paths and query strings on a
 known host are forwarded to the upstream without modification.
 
@@ -97,7 +116,21 @@ port (default: 9900, bound to `127.0.0.1` only) and the admin socket's `status`
 command — not by intercepting traffic on the public-facing proxy. See ADR-013
 and ADR-022.
 
-### 2. Proxy Header Injection
+### 2. Rate Limiter IP Source
+
+The rate limiting middleware runs **before** the proxy handler. At that point,
+no proxy headers have been injected — any `X-Forwarded-For` header present is
+from the client and is untrusted. The rate limiter must use
+`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` as the **sole** source of client IP addresses.
+Client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` headers must not be consulted for rate
+limiting. See ADR-025.
+
+`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` is always present because each listener populates it
+via `into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>()`. If `ConnectInfo`
+is absent, the request must be rejected rather than falling back to an
+untrusted header.
+
+### 3. Proxy Header Injection
 
 Headers are injected before forwarding. The proxy is an **edge proxy** — it
 sits directly in front of the internet with no trusted proxies upstream. This
@@ -116,16 +149,21 @@ extracting `TcpStream::peer_addr()` before wrapping the connection in
 `TlsStream`. Each listener provides this information to its axum Router via
 `axum::ServiceExt::into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>()`.
 
-### 3. Request Forwarding
+### 4. Request Forwarding
 
 The proxy handler constructs a new request to the upstream:
 
 1. Build the upstream URI using the site's `upstream_scheme` and `upstream`
-   address, preserving the original path and query string
+   address, preserving the original path and query string. **If URI
+   construction fails** (e.g., the resulting URI is malformed), the proxy must
+   return 502 Bad Gateway and log the error at `warn` level. The proxy must
+   never silently drop parts of the URI (such as the query string) — a
+   malformed upstream URI is an error, not a recoverable condition.
 2. Copy the request method, headers, and body from the original
 3. Inject proxy headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto)
-4. Send the request via a shared hyper Client instance
-5. Stream the response back to the client (chunk-by-chunk, not buffered)
+4. Remove hop-by-hop headers (Connection, Keep-Alive, Transfer-Encoding, etc.)
+5. Send the request via a shared hyper Client instance
+6. Stream the response back to the client (chunk-by-chunk, not buffered)
 
    If the client disconnects while the upstream is still sending, the upstream
    connection is closed and the event is logged at `debug` level. If the
@@ -135,19 +173,30 @@ The proxy handler constructs a new request to the upstream:
 The hyper Client is created once at startup and shared via axum's `State`. It
 must be configured with (see ADR-017 for rationale):
 - Connection pooling (hyper default behavior)
-- HTTP/1.1 only for upstream connections (HTTP/2 proxying is out of scope)
+- HTTP/1.1 only for upstream connections (HTTP/2 proxying to upstreams is out
+  of scope; see ADR-023 for the distinction between client-facing HTTP/2 and
+  upstream HTTP/2)
 - No redirect following (proxies should not follow redirects)
+- Separate connect timeout and request timeout (see ADR-015, ADR-017)
+
+Two client instances are created at startup:
+- **HTTP client**: For upstream connections using `http://` scheme
+- **HTTPS client**: For upstream connections using `https://` scheme (using
+  `hyper-rustls` with system native TLS root certificates for certificate
+  validation)
 
 Per-site timeout overrides are available via `upstream_connect_timeout_secs`
 and `upstream_request_timeout_secs` in `SiteConfig` (see ADR-015). When not
-specified, defaults of 5s connect and 60s request are used.
+specified, defaults of 5s connect and 60s request are used. Both timeouts are
+enforced using `tokio::time::timeout`, with the connect timeout nested inside
+the request timeout to ensure the overall deadline is respected.
 
-### 4. Header Handling
+### 5. Header Handling
 
 The proxy must handle request and response headers correctly to avoid security
 issues and protocol violations.
 
-**Headers removed before forwarding (hop-by-hop headers per RFC 2616 §13.5.1):**
+**Headers removed before forwarding (hop-by-hop headers per RFC 7230 §6.1):**
 
 - `Connection`
 - `Keep-Alive`
@@ -162,6 +211,12 @@ These headers are connection-specific and must not be forwarded to the
 upstream. Removing `Proxy-Authorization` and `Proxy-Authenticate` prevents
 credential leakage.
 
+**Response headers removed:**
+
+- `Server`: The upstream's `Server` header is intentionally removed as a
+  defense-in-depth measure. The proxy does not add its own `Server` header
+  either. This hides upstream server identity from clients.
+
 **Headers added or modified:**
 
 See the Proxy Header Injection section above for the full list of proxy headers
@@ -174,12 +229,13 @@ See the Proxy Header Injection section above for the full list of proxy headers
 
 **Response headers:**
 
-Upstream response headers are forwarded as-is to the client, with the following
+Upstream response headers are forwarded to the client with the following
 exceptions:
 - Hop-by-hop headers listed above are removed
+- The `Server` header is removed (defense-in-depth: hiding upstream identity)
 - The proxy does not add a `Server` header to responses
 
-### 5. Error Handling
+### 6. Error Handling
 
 All error responses use plain text bodies with no proxy version or identity
 information. No upstream error details are included. Response format:
@@ -189,15 +245,17 @@ information. No upstream error details are included. Response format:
 
 | Upstream Condition | Response | Body | Notes |
 |-------------------|----------|------|-------|
-| Upstream reachable | Stream response as-is | (upstream body) | Headers, status, body all forwarded |
+| Upstream reachable | Stream response as-is | (upstream body) | Headers, status, body all forwarded (minus hop-by-hop and Server headers) |
 | Upstream unreachable | 502 Bad Gateway | `Bad Gateway` | Logged at `warn` level |
-| Upstream timeout | 504 Gateway Timeout | `Gateway Timeout` | Logged at `warn` level |
+| Upstream connect timeout | 504 Gateway Timeout | `Gateway Timeout` | Connect phase timed out; logged at `warn` level |
+| Upstream request timeout | 504 Gateway Timeout | `Gateway Timeout` | Full request timed out; logged at `warn` level |
+| Upstream TLS validation failure | 502 Bad Gateway | `Bad Gateway` | Upstream HTTPS cert validation failed |
 | Request body too large | 413 Payload Too Large | `Payload Too Large` | From `DefaultBodyLimit` middleware |
 | Rate limit exceeded | 429 Too Many Requests | `Too Many Requests` | Logged at `info` level |
 | Unknown Host header | 404 Not Found | `Not Found` | No matching site definition |
-| Missing Host header | 400 Bad Request | `Bad Request` | Required for routing |
+| Missing Host header (and no URI host) | 400 Bad Request | `Bad Request` | Required for routing; HTTP/2 clients use `:authority` |
 
-### 6. HTTP → HTTPS Redirect
+### 7. HTTP → HTTPS Redirect
 
 A separate HTTP listener on port 80 (per listener) handles redirect. It reads
 the `Host` header from the incoming request and returns a 301 Permanent Redirect
@@ -219,18 +277,34 @@ Each listener has its own HTTP redirect on its own bind address.
 ## Upstream Connection
 
 The upstream connection scheme defaults to `http://` since the proxy and backend
-services typically run on the same host (e.g., `127.0.0.1:3000`). The
-`upstream_scheme` field in each site's configuration allows specifying `https://`
-for upstreams that require TLS (e.g., separate hosts or secure internal services).
+services typically run on the same host (e.g., `127.0.0.1:3000`) or the same
+Docker network (e.g., `gitea:3000`). The `upstream_scheme` field in each site's
+configuration allows specifying `https://` for upstreams that require TLS
+(e.g., separate hosts or secure internal services).
 
 For the initial deployment, upstream connections use plain HTTP (e.g.,
-`git.alk.dev` → `127.0.0.1:3000`, `alk.dev` → `127.0.0.1:8080`) since TLS
-between the proxy and backend services on loopback is unnecessary.
+`git.alk.dev` → `gitea:3000`, `alk.dev` → `app:8080`) since TLS between the
+proxy and backend services on the same Docker network or loopback is
+unnecessary.
 
 When `upstream_scheme` is `"https"`, the proxy validates the upstream's TLS
 certificate using the system's native TLS root certificates (via `rustls` root
-cert store). Certificate validation failures result in a 502 Bad Gateway
-response. No certificate pinning or custom CA support is provided in Phase 1.
+cert store loaded by `rustls-native-certs`). Certificate validation failures
+result in a 502 Bad Gateway response. No certificate pinning or custom CA
+support is provided in Phase 1.
+
+Two shared hyper Client instances handle upstream connections:
+- **HTTP client** (`Client<HttpConnector, Body>`): For `http://` upstreams
+- **HTTPS client** (`Client<HttpsConnector<HttpConnector>, Body>`): For
+  `https://` upstreams, using `hyper-rustls` with system native certificates
+
+Both clients use a shared `HttpConnector` with a connect timeout ceiling
+(30 seconds) set via `HttpConnector::set_connect_timeout()`. This ceiling
+ensures TCP connections cannot hang indefinitely even if the per-site
+`tokio::time::timeout` wrapper fails. The per-site connect timeout (default
+5s) is enforced by `tokio::time::timeout`, which fires at the correct
+per-site threshold. The connector ceiling is a safety backstop, not the
+primary enforcement mechanism. See ADR-026.
 
 ## Body Size Limit
 
@@ -253,14 +327,22 @@ All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
 | [017](decisions/017-upstream-connection-defaults.md) | Upstream connection defaults | HTTP/1.1, no redirects, connection pooling |
 | [018](decisions/018-body-size-limit.md) | Request body size limit | 100 MB default matching nginx, Gitea push compatibility |
 | [021](decisions/021-x-forwarded-for-edge-proxy.md) | X-Forwarded-For edge proxy model | Replace, don't append — proxy is the edge, no trusted upstream proxies |
+| [023](decisions/023-http2-client-facing.md) | HTTP/2 client-facing support | ALPN-based protocol detection; HTTP/2 to clients, HTTP/1.1 to upstreams |
+| [025](decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md) | Rate limiter IP source | ConnectInfo only, never client-supplied X-Forwarded-For |
+| [026](decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md) | Connector timeout ceiling | 30s ceiling on connector, per-site timeout via tokio::time::timeout |
 
 ## Open Questions
 
-Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). All
-questions affecting this document have been resolved:
+Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). Key
+questions affecting this document:
 
 - ~~**OQ-06**: Should upstream timeouts be configurable per-site?~~ (resolved —
   ADR-015: per-site timeout overrides with defaults)
 - ~~**OQ-08**: Should the `/health` path use a less common endpoint to avoid
   upstream collision?~~ (resolved — ADR-022: no `/health` route on the main
-  listener; health checking is via port 9900 and admin socket only)
+  listener; health checking is via port 9900 and admin socket only)
+- ~~**OQ-09**: How should `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` be enforced?~~
+  (resolved — ADR-026: 30s connector ceiling, per-site timeout via
+  `tokio::time::timeout`)
+- **OQ-13**: Should `acme_contact` support multiple email addresses? (see
+  [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))

docs/architecture/tls.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
-status: draft
-last_updated: 2026-06-11
+status: reviewed
+last_updated: 2026-06-12
 ---
 
 # TLS Termination
@@ -175,15 +175,33 @@ maps SNI hostnames to certificate/key pairs loaded from disk.
 For ACME mode, the `ServerConfig` is built with `with_cert_resolver()`, passing
 the `ResolvesServerCertAcme` resolver. The ACME configuration includes the
 domains listed in that listener's `acme_domains`, and the resolver manages the
-certificate. The ACME TLS-ALPN-01 protocol identifier (`acme-tls/1`) must be
-registered in the `alpn_protocols` list so the server can respond to
-TLS-ALPN-01 challenges.
+certificate.
+
+The TLS `ServerConfig` advertises ALPN protocols to enable HTTP/2 negotiation.
+The ALPN configuration differs by TLS mode:
+
+- **ACME mode**: `h2`, `http/1.1`, and `acme-tls/1`. The `acme-tls/1` entry is
+  required for TLS-ALPN-01 challenge verification during certificate provisioning.
+- **Manual mode** (single-cert and multi-domain/SNI): `h2` and `http/1.1` only.
+  The `acme-tls/1` entry is not included because manual mode does not use ACME
+  challenges.
+
+After the TLS handshake, the proxy inspects the negotiated ALPN protocol to
+select the appropriate HTTP server: `h2` triggers
+`hyper::server::conn::http2::Builder`, while `http/1.1` (or no ALPN) triggers
+`hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder`. See ADR-023 for details.
 
 Both modes use the `aws_lc_rs` crypto provider with safe default protocol
 versions (TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3).
 
 ## SNI-Based Certificate Selection
 
+After the TLS handshake, the proxy inspects the negotiated ALPN protocol to
+determine whether to serve the connection as HTTP/2 or HTTP/1.1. If the client
+negotiated `h2` via ALPN, the proxy uses `hyper::server::conn::http2::Builder`;
+otherwise, it uses `hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder` with HTTP/1.1
+and upgrade support. See ADR-023 for details.
+
 ### Dedicated-IP Single-Domain (Multi-Config)
 
 In the dedicated-IP model, each listener binds to its own IP address and serves
@@ -305,6 +323,7 @@ All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
 | [011](decisions/011-multi-domain-tls.md) | Multi-domain TLS config | Single SAN certificate covering all domains via rustls-acme |
 | [012](decisions/012-cipher-suite-restriction.md) | Restrict cipher suites | Match nginx scope: four ECDHE-AES-GCM suites for TLS 1.2, all TLS 1.3 suites |
 | [019](decisions/019-multi-config-listeners.md) | Multi-config listeners | `[[listeners]]` supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models |
+| [023](decisions/023-http2-client-facing.md) | HTTP/2 client-facing support | ALPN-based protocol detection; `h2` and `http/1.1` advertised |
 
 ## Open Questions
 

docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,705 @@
+---
+status: draft
+last_updated: 2026-06-12
+reviewed_code:
+  - src/main.rs
+  - src/server.rs
+  - src/cli.rs
+  - src/lib.rs
+  - src/shutdown.rs
+  - src/health.rs
+  - src/utils.rs
+  - src/config/static_config.rs
+  - src/config/dynamic_config.rs
+  - src/config/validation.rs
+  - src/config/test_fixtures.rs
+  - src/config/mod.rs
+  - src/proxy/handler.rs
+  - src/proxy/headers.rs
+  - src/proxy/body_limit.rs
+  - src/proxy/error.rs
+  - src/proxy/mod.rs
+  - src/rate_limit/mod.rs
+  - src/rate_limit/bucket.rs
+  - src/admin/socket.rs
+  - src/admin/mod.rs
+  - src/logging/mod.rs
+  - src/logging/format.rs
+  - src/tls/acceptor.rs
+  - src/tls/acme.rs
+  - src/tls/config.rs
+  - src/tls/redirect.rs
+  - src/tls/mod.rs
+  - tests/integration_test.rs
+  - tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs
+  - tests/helpers/tls_test_helper.rs
+  - tests/helpers/mod.rs
+reviewer: code-reviewer
+---
+
+# Security & Bug Review #003
+
+## Purpose
+
+Third review of the codebase, focused on security vulnerabilities, logic bugs,
+and correctness issues that survived the first two reviews. Also flags dead code,
+code smells, and test gaps.
+
+## Severity Definitions
+
+| Severity | Meaning |
+|----------|---------|
+| **Critical** | Will cause incorrect behavior or security issues in production |
+| **Warning** | Could cause issues under specific conditions or represents a missed edge case |
+| **Suggestion** | Code quality, style, or minor improvement opportunity |
+
+---
+
+## Critical Findings
+
+### C1. Rate Limiter Uses Client-Supplied X-Forwarded-For for IP Identification
+
+**File**: `src/rate_limit/mod.rs:66-76`
+
+**Problem**: The `rate_limit_middleware` extracts the client IP by checking the
+`X-Forwarded-For` header **first**, then falling back to `ConnectInfo`:
+
+```rust
+let client_ip = req
+    .headers()
+    .get("x-forwarded-for")   // <-- checked FIRST
+    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+    .and_then(|v| v.split(',').next())
+    .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
+    .or_else(|| {
+        req.extensions()
+            .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
+            .map(|ci| ci.ip())
+    });
+```
+
+The middleware runs **before** the proxy handler. At that point,
+`inject_proxy_headers` has not yet run, so `X-Forwarded-For` is whatever the
+**client** sent — completely untrusted. This creates two attack vectors:
+
+1. **Rate limit bypass**: Attacker sends each request with
+   `X-Forwarded-For: <random IP>`. Every request appears to come from a
+   different IP, evading the per-IP token bucket entirely.
+2. **Denial-of-service via IP spoofing**: Attacker sends requests with
+   `X-Forwarded-For: <victim IP>`. The victim's IP gets rate-limited and their
+   legitimate requests receive 429s.
+
+The proxy is the **edge** — it terminates TLS directly from the internet. The
+only trustworthy source of client IP is `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`, which
+`ConnectInfoService` sets from the TCP peer address before TLS handshake
+(`src/server.rs:171-173`).
+
+**Solution**: Swap the priority: check `ConnectInfo` first, and only fall back
+to `X-Forwarded-For` if `ConnectInfo` is absent (which shouldn't happen in the
+current deployment). The `X-Forwarded-For` header from the client is untrusted
+at the edge.
+
+```rust
+let client_ip = req
+    .extensions()
+    .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
+    .map(|ci| ci.ip())
+    .or_else(|| {
+        req.headers()
+            .get("x-forwarded-for")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|v| v.split(',').next())
+            .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
+    });
+```
+
+---
+
+### C2. InFlightCounter Never Increments — Drain Logic Is Completely Broken
+
+**File**: `src/server.rs:17-46,73-74`
+
+**Problem**: `InFlightCounter` has an `increment()` method that is **never
+called** anywhere in the codebase. The `InFlightGuard` only calls `decrement()`
+on drop:
+
+```rust
+struct InFlightGuard(Arc<InFlightCounter>);
+
+impl Drop for InFlightGuard {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.0.decrement();  // only decrements!
+    }
+}
+```
+
+The guard is created in `serve_https_listener`:
+
+```rust
+tokio::spawn(async move {
+    let _guard = InFlightGuard(in_flight.clone());
+    // ...
+});
+```
+
+Since `increment()` is never called, `count` stays at 0. When the first guard
+drops, `fetch_sub(1)` on an `AtomicUsize` with value 0 wraps to `usize::MAX`.
+`is_zero()` checks `count == 0`, which will never be true again. The drain loop
+in `main.rs:250` will always time out and report `usize::MAX` remaining
+connections.
+
+**Solution**: Call `in_flight.increment()` before spawning the connection task:
+
+```rust
+in_flight.increment();
+tokio::spawn(async move {
+    let _guard = InFlightGuard(in_flight.clone());
+    // ...
+});
+```
+
+Or fold the increment into `InFlightGuard::new()`:
+
+```rust
+impl InFlightGuard {
+    fn new(counter: Arc<InFlightCounter>) -> Self {
+        counter.increment();
+        Self(counter)
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### C3. Per-Site `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` Silently Capped at 5 Seconds
+
+**File**: `src/proxy/handler.rs:86-98,218-224,226-229`
+
+**Problem**: The proxy handler applies a per-site connect timeout via
+`tokio::time::timeout`:
+
+```rust
+let connect_timeout = Duration::from_secs(site.upstream_connect_timeout_secs);
+// ...
+tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, state.http_client.request(upstream_req)).await
+```
+
+But the HTTP connector inside the client has its own hardcoded connect timeout:
+
+```rust
+pub fn create_http_client() -> Client<HttpConnector, Body> {
+    let mut connector = HttpConnector::new();
+    connector.set_connect_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)));  // hardcoded
+    // ...
+}
+```
+
+The connector's internal timeout takes precedence — if
+`upstream_connect_timeout_secs` is set to 10s, the connector still times out at
+5s. The `tokio::time::timeout` wrapper can only make the effective timeout
+**shorter**, not longer. Per-site connect timeout values > 5s are silently
+ignored.
+
+**Solution**: Set the connector's connect timeout to match (or exceed) the
+per-site value, or remove the hardcoded connector timeout and rely solely on
+the `tokio::time::timeout` wrapper. Since the client is shared across all sites,
+the simplest fix is to set the connector timeout to a high value (e.g., 30s)
+and let the per-site `tokio::time::timeout` enforce the actual limit:
+
+```rust
+connector.set_connect_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(30)));
+```
+
+Or make the connector timeout configurable per-site by creating clients lazily.
+
+---
+
+### C4. `init_json` Without Log File Doesn't Enable JSON Format
+
+**File**: `src/logging/mod.rs:54-59`
+
+**Problem**: When `format = "json"` is configured but no `log_file_path` is set,
+the `None` branch of `init_json` creates a layer **without** calling `.json()`:
+
+```rust
+None => {
+    let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+        .with_ansi(false)
+        .with_filter(env_filter);
+    tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer).try_init()?;
+}
+```
+
+The output is plain text, not JSON. The `format = "json"` config value is
+silently ignored. The `Some(path)` branch correctly calls `.json()` on both
+layers.
+
+**Solution**: Add `.json()` to the `None` branch:
+
+```rust
+None => {
+    let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+        .json()
+        .with_ansi(false)
+        .with_filter(env_filter);
+    tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer).try_init()?;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Warning Findings
+
+### W1. `is_valid_upstream` Doesn't Validate the Host Part
+
+**File**: `src/config/validation.rs:309-327`
+
+**Problem**: `is_valid_upstream` checks that the upstream has a `host:port`
+format with a valid port number, but performs **no validation on the host
+part** beyond checking it's non-empty and doesn't start with `http://` or
+`https://`. Values like `!!!bad!!!:3000` or `@#$%:8080` pass validation.
+
+**Solution**: Validate the host part is a valid DNS name or IP address. Reuse
+`is_valid_hostname` for DNS names and add an IP address parse check for the
+host portion (handling IPv6 bracket notation):
+
+```rust
+fn is_valid_upstream(upstream: &str) -> bool {
+    if let Some(idx) = upstream.rfind(':') {
+        let host_part = &upstream[..idx];
+        let port_str = &upstream[idx + 1..];
+        if host_part.is_empty() { return false; }
+        if upstream.starts_with("http://") || upstream.starts_with("https://") { return false; }
+        let port: u16 = match port_str.parse() { Ok(p) => p, Err(_) => return false };
+        if port == 0 { return false; }
+        // Validate host part
+        if host_part.starts_with('[') && host_part.ends_with(']') {
+            let inner = &host_part[1..host_part.len()-1];
+            inner.parse::<std::net::Ipv6Addr>().is_ok()
+        } else {
+            host_part.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_ok() || is_valid_hostname(host_part)
+        }
+    } else {
+        false
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### W2. ACME Contact Validation Only Checks `mailto:` Prefix
+
+**File**: `src/config/validation.rs:149`
+
+**Problem**: The validation checks `contact.starts_with("mailto:")` but doesn't
+verify there's an actual email address after the prefix. `acme_contact =
+"mailto:"` (empty email) passes validation but will fail at the Let's Encrypt
+API with a 400-level error at certificate provisioning time — after the proxy
+has already started.
+
+**Solution**: Validate that the string after `mailto:` is non-empty and contains
+an `@` sign:
+
+```rust
+if contact.is_empty() || !contact.starts_with("mailto:") {
+    errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid { ... });
+} else {
+    let email = &contact[7..]; // after "mailto:"
+    if email.is_empty() || !email.contains('@') {
+        errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid { ... });
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### W3. `build_upstream_uri` Silently Drops Query String on Parse Failure
+
+**File**: `src/proxy/handler.rs:190-202`
+
+**Problem**: If the full upstream URI (with query string) fails to parse, the
+fallback drops the query string entirely and `.unwrap()`s the result:
+
+```rust
+uri_string.parse::<Uri>().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+    format!("{}://{}{}", scheme, upstream, path)  // query dropped!
+        .parse::<Uri>()
+        .unwrap()  // panics if this also fails
+})
+```
+
+This silently corrupts requests — the upstream receives the wrong URL with no
+query parameters, and neither the client nor operator is notified. The
+`.unwrap()` on the fallback parse could also panic (though unlikely since
+`scheme://host:port/path` should always parse).
+
+**Solution**: Log a warning and return a 502 Bad Gateway instead of silently
+dropping data:
+
+```rust
+fn build_upstream_uri(scheme: &str, upstream: &str, original_uri: &Uri) -> Result<Uri, ()> {
+    let path = original_uri.path();
+    let query = original_uri.query().map(|q| format!("?{}", q)).unwrap_or_default();
+    let uri_string = format!("{}://{}{}{}", scheme, upstream, path, query);
+    uri_string.parse::<Uri>().map_err(|e| {
+        warn!(error = %e, uri = %uri_string, "failed to parse upstream URI");
+    })
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### W4. Admin Socket Has No Read Timeout or Line Length Limit
+
+**File**: `src/admin/socket.rs:166-210`
+
+**Problem**: `handle_connection` reads one newline-terminated line with
+`reader.read_line(&mut line)` but sets no timeout and no length limit. A
+malicious client with access to the admin socket (Unix permissions permitting)
+can:
+
+- Connect and send no data, holding a connection and task open indefinitely
+- Send gigabytes of data without a newline, causing unbounded memory allocation
+
+**Solution**: Wrap the read in `tokio::time::timeout` and use
+`read_until` with a reasonable limit, or use `take` to cap the stream:
+
+```rust
+let mut reader = BufReader::new(tokio::io::take(reader, 4096)); // 4KB limit
+let read_result = tokio::time::timeout(
+    Duration::from_secs(5),
+    reader.read_line(&mut line),
+).await;
+```
+
+---
+
+### W5. `TlsMode` Wildcard Match Could Cause Listener/Acceptor Mismatch
+
+**File**: `src/main.rs:170-194,209-210`
+
+**Problem**: The `match tls_mode` has a wildcard `_` arm that logs a warning
+and pushes **no** acceptor. Then `bound_listeners.into_iter().zip(tls_acceptors.into_iter())`
+uses `zip`, which silently stops at the shorter iterator. If the wildcard arm
+were ever reached, some listeners would have no TLS acceptor and would be
+silently dropped with no error.
+
+`setup_tls` already rejects unknown modes with `bail!`, so the wildcard is
+unreachable in practice. But it's a latent bug waiting for a future refactor.
+
+**Solution**: Either remove the wildcard arm (since `TlsMode` only has two
+variants and `setup_tls` already validates), or make the mismatch explicit:
+
+```rust
+if bound_listeners.len() != tls_acceptors.len() {
+    anyhow::bail!("listener/acceptor count mismatch");
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### W6. `RawConfig` and `FullConfig` Are Duplicated
+
+**Files**: `src/cli.rs:49-65`, `src/config/mod.rs:15-31`
+
+**Problem**: `RawConfig` (used at startup in `cli.rs`) and `FullConfig` (used
+at reload in `config/mod.rs`) have identical fields and identical serde
+attributes. They exist because the initial load path manually constructs
+`StaticConfig` + `SerializableDynamicConfig`, while the reload path uses
+`FullConfig::into_static_and_dynamic()`. This duplication means any new config
+field must be added in two places.
+
+**Solution**: Delete `RawConfig` and use `FullConfig` in `load_config`:
+
+```rust
+let full: FullConfig = toml::from_str(&config_content)?;
+let (static_config, dynamic_config) = full.into_static_and_dynamic();
+```
+
+Then `collect_sites` can also be removed since `into_static_and_dynamic`
+already collects sites from all listeners.
+
+---
+
+### W7. `cleanup_stale_socket` Connects to Verify Liveness — Side Effect on Other Process
+
+**File**: `src/admin/socket.rs:142-160,162-164`
+
+**Problem**: `is_socket_active` checks whether another process owns the socket
+by **connecting to it**:
+
+```rust
+async fn is_socket_active(path: &str) -> bool {
+    tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(path).await.is_ok()
+}
+```
+
+If another process is listening, this creates a real connection that the other
+process will `accept()`, read nothing, and close. This is a harmless but
+unnecessary side effect on the other process.
+
+**Solution**: Check for liveness by inspecting `/proc/net/unix` or by attempting
+a zero-byte `sendmsg` with `MSG_PEEK`. For Phase 1, the current approach is
+acceptable since the admin socket is a local diagnostic interface.
+
+---
+
+### W8. `test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero` Test Name Is Misleading
+
+**File**: `tests/integration_test.rs:82-88`
+
+**Problem**: The test is named `test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero` but
+port 0 means "OS picks a random port" — the health check listener still starts
+and binds successfully. The actual "disabled" logic is in `main.rs:94` where
+`health_check_port > 0` gates the call to `start_health_check_listener`. The
+test verifies that `start_health_check_listener(0)` works (binds to a random
+port), which is correct but the name implies it tests the disable path.
+
+**Solution**: Rename to `test_health_check_binds_random_port_when_zero` or add
+a separate test that verifies the `main.rs` gating logic.
+
+---
+
+### W9. `test_dynamic_config_with_limit` Has Empty `routing_table`
+
+**File**: `tests/integration_test.rs:618-635`
+
+**Problem**: The helper constructs `DynamicConfig` directly with
+`routing_table: Default::default()` (empty HashMap), bypassing
+`DynamicConfig::from_sites()` which would normally build the routing table.
+The body limit tests only read `body.limit_bytes` so the empty table doesn't
+matter, but it's a latent trap for anyone who copies this pattern for tests
+that need routing.
+
+**Solution**: Use `DynamicConfig::from_sites()` to construct the config, or at
+minimum add a comment warning that the routing table is intentionally empty.
+
+---
+
+### W10. `TokenBucket` Fields Are `pub` Despite Internal-Only Use
+
+**File**: `src/rate_limit/bucket.rs:4-9`
+
+**Problem**: All `TokenBucket` fields are `pub`:
+
+```rust
+pub struct TokenBucket {
+    pub tokens: f64,
+    pub last_refill: Instant,
+    pub rate: f64,
+    pub max: u32,
+    pub last_access: Instant,
+}
+```
+
+Only `last_access` is read externally (by `evict_stale`). The other fields
+should be private to prevent accidental direct mutation that bypasses
+`try_consume`/`refill` logic.
+
+**Solution**: Make `tokens`, `last_refill`, `rate`, and `max` private. Keep
+`last_access` pub(crate) for `evict_stale`.
+
+---
+
+### W11. Admin Socket Exposes `reload_mutex` for Testing
+
+**File**: `src/admin/socket.rs:71-73`
+
+**Problem**: `AdminSocket::reload_mutex()` is a public method that exists solely
+for the `test_reload_serialized_with_mutex` test. It exposes an internal
+synchronization primitive, and the test acquires the mutex before sending a
+reload command to verify serialization — coupling the test to implementation
+details.
+
+**Solution**: Remove the method and test serialization through observable
+behavior (e.g., send two rapid reload requests and verify the final config
+state reflects the last one), or make the method `#[cfg(test)]`-gated.
+
+---
+
+### W12. `http_port` Type Is `u32` While `https_port` Is `u16`
+
+**File**: `src/config/static_config.rs:34,36`
+
+**Problem**: `http_port` is declared as `u32` but `https_port` is `u16`. Both
+represent TCP port numbers (valid range 1–65535). The type inconsistency means
+comparisons require casting (`listener.http_port == listener.https_port as u32`
+at `validation.rs:133`) and `http_port` could theoretically hold values >
+65535 that are caught by validation rather than the type system.
+
+**Solution**: Change `http_port` to `u16` for consistency. Port 0 (disabled)
+fits in `u16`. Update all `as u32` casts in validation and `main.rs`.
+
+---
+
+## Suggestions
+
+### S1. Remove Dead Code Before Release
+
+**Files**: Multiple
+
+The following items are defined but never called in production code:
+
+| Item | File | Note |
+|------|------|------|
+| `log_rate_limit!` macro | `src/logging/format.rs:72-83` | Rate limiter uses `warn!` directly |
+| `log_config_reload!` macro | `src/logging/format.rs:97-106` | Reload uses `info!`/`warn!` directly |
+| `format_event_fields()` | `src/logging/format.rs:50-54` | Never called |
+| `ProxyError::BadGateway` (struct variant) | `src/proxy/error.rs:8` | Code uses `UpstreamConnection` instead |
+| `ProxyError::GatewayTimeout` (struct variant) | `src/proxy/error.rs:10` | Code uses `UpstreamTimeout` instead |
+| `ProxyError::PayloadTooLarge` | `src/proxy/error.rs:12` | Body limit returns tuple directly |
+| `ProxyError::NotFound` | `src/proxy/error.rs:20` | Code uses `UnknownHost` instead |
+| `ProxyError::BadRequest` | `src/proxy/error.rs:22` | Code uses `MissingHost` instead |
+| `ProxyError::UpstreamTls` | `src/proxy/error.rs:28` | Never constructed |
+| `build_multi_domain_server_config()` | `src/tls/config.rs:78-102` | Never called |
+| `SniCertResolver` | `src/tls/config.rs:104-126` | Only used by above |
+| `AcmeTlsConfig::directory_url()` | `src/tls/acme.rs:53-59` | Only used in tests |
+| `TestUpstream::url()` | `tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs:39-41` | `#[allow(dead_code)]` |
+| `TestUpstream::upstream_addr()` | `tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs:43-46` | `#[allow(dead_code)]` |
+
+Either wire these up or remove them. Dead code increases audit surface and
+creates confusion about what's actually active.
+
+---
+
+### S2. Make Eviction Interval and Max Age Configurable
+
+**File**: `src/main.rs:196-201`
+
+**Problem**: The eviction task interval (60s) and max age (300s) are hardcoded.
+In high-traffic deployments, a shorter interval or longer max age might be
+desirable.
+
+**Suggestion**: Add `rate_limit.eviction_interval_secs` and
+`rate_limit.bucket_max_age_secs` to `RateLimitConfig` with defaults of 60 and
+300. These are dynamic config fields so they can be hot-reloaded.
+
+---
+
+### S3. Log Root Certificate Count at Startup
+
+**File**: `src/proxy/handler.rs:246-258`
+
+**Problem**: `root_certs()` loads native certificates silently (only logs
+errors). If the system has zero root certificates (misconfigured CA bundle),
+all HTTPS upstream connections will fail with opaque TLS errors.
+
+**Suggestion**: Log the number of loaded certificates at info level:
+
+```rust
+let cert_count = result.certs.len();
+info!(certs_loaded = cert_count, errors = result.errors.len(), "loaded system root certificates");
+if cert_count == 0 {
+    warn!("no system root certificates loaded — HTTPS upstream connections will fail");
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### S4. Add Read Timeout and Line Length Limit to Admin Socket
+
+**File**: `src/admin/socket.rs:166-210`
+
+See W4 for the problem. Even if the admin socket is only accessible via Unix
+permissions, defense-in-depth warrants basic resource limits.
+
+---
+
+### S5. Consolidate `RawConfig` and `FullConfig`
+
+**Files**: `src/cli.rs:49-65`, `src/config/mod.rs:15-31`
+
+See W6. Using a single `FullConfig` type for both startup and reload eliminates
+duplication and ensures both paths stay in sync.
+
+---
+
+### S6. Add `#[non_exhaustive]` to `TokenBucket` (or Make Fields Private)
+
+**File**: `src/rate_limit/bucket.rs:4-9`
+
+See W10. Making fields private prevents accidental direct mutation. If external
+crates need to construct `TokenBucket`, add a `new()` constructor (which
+already exists).
+
+---
+
+### S7. Add More Status Info to Admin Socket `status` Command
+
+**File**: `src/admin/socket.rs:265-275`
+
+**Suggestion**: The `status` response currently returns `uptime_secs` and
+`sites`. Consider adding:
+- `rate_limit` (requests_per_second, burst)
+- `body_limit_bytes`
+- `listeners` count
+- `in_flight_requests` (if InFlightCounter is fixed per C2)
+
+This gives operators a quick health snapshot without reading logs.
+
+---
+
+### S8. Consider Making `upstream_connect_timeout_secs` Actually Work
+
+**File**: `src/proxy/handler.rs:216-229`
+
+See C3. The hardcoded 5s connector timeout caps the per-site connect timeout.
+Either remove the connector timeout or set it to a high ceiling value.
+
+---
+
+### S9. `acme_contact` Config Field Should Be `Vec<String>` for Multiple Contacts
+
+**File**: `src/config/static_config.rs:60`
+
+**Problem**: `acme_contact` is a single `String` but ACME supports multiple
+contact emails. The `AcmeTlsConfig.contact` field is already `Vec<String>` and
+the config value is wrapped in `vec![...]` at `src/tls/acceptor.rs:70`.
+
+**Suggestion**: Change `acme_contact` to `Vec<String>` in `TlsConfig` for
+consistency with the ACME protocol. This is a config format change — document
+the migration.
+
+---
+
+### S10. Add Integration Test for Rate Limiter Using `ConnectInfo`
+
+**File**: `tests/integration_test.rs:90-163`
+
+**Problem**: All rate limit integration tests pass the client IP via
+`X-Forwarded-For` header. No test verifies the `ConnectInfo` extraction path,
+which is the primary path after C1 is fixed.
+
+**Suggestion**: Add a test that sets `ConnectInfo` on the request extensions
+(like `make_request_with_connect_info` in `src/proxy/handler.rs` tests) and
+verifies rate limiting works without the `X-Forwarded-For` header.
+
+---
+
+## Summary Statistics
+
+| Severity | Count | Status |
+|----------|-------|--------|
+| Critical | 4 | Must fix before production |
+| Warning | 12 | Should fix — correctness and robustness |
+| Suggestion | 10 | Consider for code quality |
+
+## Recommended Fix Priority
+
+1. **C1 (rate limiter X-Forwarded-For spoofing)** — Active security vulnerability.
+   Any external attacker can bypass rate limiting entirely.
+2. **C2 (InFlightCounter never increments)** — Graceful shutdown drain logic is
+   completely non-functional. The drain always times out.
+3. **C3 (connect timeout capped at 5s)** — Per-site timeout configuration is
+   silently ignored for values > 5s.
+4. **C4 (JSON format not applied without log file)** — Format config is silently
+   ignored in a common deployment mode (stdout-only JSON logging).
+5. **W1 (upstream host validation gap)** — Invalid upstream addresses pass config
+   validation.
+6. **W2 (ACME contact validation gap)** — Empty email after `mailto:` passes
+   validation, fails at runtime.
+7. **W3 (query string silently dropped)** — Data corruption on URI parse failure.
+8. **W4 (admin socket resource limits)** — DoS vector for local socket access.
+9. **W5 (TlsMode wildcard mismatch)** — Latent bug for future refactors.
+10. **W6 (RawConfig/FullConfig duplication)** — Maintenance burden.
+11. **Remaining W and S findings** — Fix opportunistically.

src/admin/socket.rs

@@ -9,9 +9,12 @@ use tokio::net::UnixListener;
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 use tracing::{info, warn};
 
+use crate::shutdown::GracefulShutdown;
+
 use crate::config::ConfigReloadHandle;
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum AdminSocketError {
     #[error("admin socket disabled (empty path)")]
     Disabled,
@@ -65,12 +68,16 @@ impl AdminSocket {
         }
     }
 
+    #[cfg(test)]
     pub fn reload_mutex(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
         self.reload_mutex.clone()
     }
 }
 
-pub async fn start_admin_socket(admin_socket: Arc<AdminSocket>) -> Result<(), AdminSocketError> {
+pub async fn start_admin_socket(
+    admin_socket: Arc<AdminSocket>,
+    shutdown: Arc<GracefulShutdown>,
+) -> Result<(), AdminSocketError> {
     if admin_socket.socket_path.is_empty() {
         info!("admin socket disabled (empty path)");
         return Err(AdminSocketError::Disabled);
@@ -96,19 +103,41 @@ pub async fn start_admin_socket(admin_socket: Arc<AdminSocket>) -> Result<(), Ad
 
     info!("admin socket listening on {}", socket_path);
 
+    let mut shutdown_rx = shutdown.subscribe();
+
     loop {
-        match listener.accept().await {
-            Ok((stream, _addr)) => {
-                let admin_socket = admin_socket.clone();
-                tokio::spawn(async move {
-                    handle_connection(stream, admin_socket).await;
-                });
+        tokio::select! {
+            result = listener.accept() => {
+                match result {
+                    Ok((stream, _addr)) => {
+                        let admin_socket = admin_socket.clone();
+                        tokio::spawn(async move {
+                            handle_connection(stream, admin_socket).await;
+                        });
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        warn!("failed to accept admin socket connection: {}", e);
+                    }
+                }
             }
-            Err(e) => {
-                warn!("failed to accept admin socket connection: {}", e);
+            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                info!("admin socket shutting down");
+                break;
             }
         }
     }
+
+    cleanup_socket_file(socket_path).await;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn cleanup_socket_file(path: &str) {
+    if Path::new(path).exists() {
+        if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::remove_file(path).await {
+            warn!("failed to remove admin socket file {}: {}", path, e);
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 async fn cleanup_stale_socket(path: &str) -> Result<(), AdminSocketError> {
@@ -136,14 +165,20 @@ async fn is_socket_active(path: &str) -> bool {
 }
 
 async fn handle_connection(stream: tokio::net::UnixStream, admin_socket: Arc<AdminSocket>) {
-    use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
 
     let (reader, mut writer) = stream.into_split();
-    let mut reader = BufReader::new(reader);
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(reader.take(4096));
     let mut line = String::new();
 
-    match reader.read_line(&mut line).await {
-        Ok(0) | Err(_) => {
+    let read_result = tokio::time::timeout(
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
+        reader.read_line(&mut line),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    match read_result {
+        Ok(Ok(0)) | Ok(Err(_)) => {
             let _ = writer
                 .write_all(
                     format!(
@@ -159,7 +194,42 @@ async fn handle_connection(stream: tokio::net::UnixStream, admin_socket: Arc<Adm
                 .await;
             return;
         }
-        _ => {}
+        Err(_) => {
+            tracing::debug!("admin socket connection timed out");
+            let _ = writer
+                .write_all(
+                    format!(
+                        "{}\n",
+                        serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
+                            status: "error",
+                            message: "read timeout".to_string(),
+                        })
+                        .unwrap()
+                    )
+                    .as_bytes(),
+                )
+                .await;
+            return;
+        }
+        Ok(Ok(n)) => {
+            if !line.ends_with('\n') && n > 0 {
+                tracing::warn!("admin socket command exceeded 4096 byte limit");
+                let _ = writer
+                    .write_all(
+                        format!(
+                            "{}\n",
+                            serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
+                                status: "error",
+                                message: "command too long".to_string(),
+                            })
+                            .unwrap()
+                        )
+                        .as_bytes(),
+                    )
+                    .await;
+                return;
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     let command = line.trim();
@@ -508,7 +578,7 @@ upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
             dir.path().join("config.toml").to_string_lossy().to_string(),
         ));
 
-        let result = start_admin_socket(admin_socket).await;
+        let result = start_admin_socket(admin_socket, Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30))).await;
         assert!(matches!(result, Err(AdminSocketError::Disabled)));
     }
 
@@ -531,7 +601,7 @@ upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
             dir.path().join("config.toml").to_string_lossy().to_string(),
         ));
 
-        let result = start_admin_socket(admin_socket).await;
+        let result = start_admin_socket(admin_socket, Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30))).await;
         assert!(matches!(result, Err(AdminSocketError::SocketInUse(_))));
     }
 
@@ -652,4 +722,105 @@ upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
         assert_eq!(parsed["sites"], 1);
         assert!(parsed["uptime_secs"].is_number());
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_read_timeout() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let admin_socket = Arc::new(create_test_admin_socket(dir.path()));
+        let socket_path = dir.path().join("admin.sock");
+
+        let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket_path).unwrap();
+
+        let admin_socket_clone = admin_socket.clone();
+        let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            handle_connection(stream, admin_socket_clone).await;
+        });
+
+        let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&socket_path).await.unwrap();
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, BufReader};
+
+        let mut response = String::new();
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
+
+        let result =
+            tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), reader.read_line(&mut response)).await;
+
+        handle.await.unwrap();
+
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+        let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(response.trim()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parsed["status"], "error");
+        assert_eq!(parsed["message"], "read timeout");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_command_too_long() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let admin_socket = Arc::new(create_test_admin_socket(dir.path()));
+        let socket_path = dir.path().join("admin.sock");
+
+        let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket_path).unwrap();
+
+        let admin_socket_clone = admin_socket.clone();
+        let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            handle_connection(stream, admin_socket_clone).await;
+        });
+
+        let mut stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&socket_path).await.unwrap();
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
+
+        let long_data = "A".repeat(5000);
+        stream.write_all(long_data.as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+        stream.shutdown().await.unwrap();
+
+        let mut response = String::new();
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
+        reader.read_line(&mut response).await.unwrap();
+
+        handle.await.unwrap();
+
+        let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(response.trim()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parsed["status"], "error");
+        assert_eq!(parsed["message"], "command too long");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_command_at_limit_boundary() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let admin_socket = Arc::new(create_test_admin_socket(dir.path()));
+        let socket_path = dir.path().join("admin.sock");
+
+        let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket_path).unwrap();
+
+        let admin_socket_clone = admin_socket.clone();
+        let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            handle_connection(stream, admin_socket_clone).await;
+        });
+
+        let mut stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&socket_path).await.unwrap();
+        use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
+
+        let at_limit = format!("{}\n", "A".repeat(4095));
+        stream.write_all(at_limit.as_bytes()).await.unwrap();
+        stream.shutdown().await.unwrap();
+
+        let mut response = String::new();
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
+        reader.read_line(&mut response).await.unwrap();
+
+        handle.await.unwrap();
+
+        let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(response.trim()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parsed["status"], "error");
+        assert_eq!(
+            parsed["message"]
+                .as_str()
+                .unwrap()
+                .starts_with("unknown command:"),
+            true
+        );
+    }
 }

src/cli.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ use std::path::Path;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::Parser;
 
-use crate::config::dynamic_config::{
-    BodyConfig, DynamicConfig, RateLimitConfig, SerializableDynamicConfig,
-};
+use crate::config::dynamic_config::DynamicConfig;
 use crate::config::static_config::StaticConfig;
 use crate::config::validation::validate;
 
@@ -46,48 +44,15 @@ where
     Cli::parse_from(args)
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
-struct RawConfig {
-    #[serde(default)]
-    listeners: Vec<crate::config::static_config::ListenerConfig>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    allow_wildcard_bind: bool,
-    #[serde(default = "crate::config::static_config::default_health_check_port")]
-    health_check_port: u16,
-    #[serde(default = "crate::config::static_config::default_admin_socket_path")]
-    admin_socket_path: String,
-    #[serde(default = "crate::config::static_config::default_shutdown_timeout_secs")]
-    shutdown_timeout_secs: u64,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    logging: crate::config::static_config::LoggingConfig,
-    rate_limit: RateLimitConfig,
-    body: BodyConfig,
-}
-
 pub fn load_config(cli: &Cli) -> Result<LoadedConfig> {
     let config_path = Path::new(&cli.config);
     let config_content = std::fs::read_to_string(config_path)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to read config file: {}", cli.config))?;
 
-    let raw: RawConfig = toml::from_str(&config_content)
+    let full_config = crate::config::FullConfig::parse(&config_content)
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to parse config file: {}", cli.config))?;
 
-    let static_config = StaticConfig {
-        listeners: raw.listeners,
-        allow_wildcard_bind: raw.allow_wildcard_bind,
-        health_check_port: raw.health_check_port,
-        admin_socket_path: raw.admin_socket_path,
-        shutdown_timeout_secs: raw.shutdown_timeout_secs,
-        logging: raw.logging,
-    };
-
-    let serializable_dynamic = SerializableDynamicConfig {
-        sites: collect_sites(&static_config),
-        rate_limit: raw.rate_limit,
-        body: raw.body,
-    };
-
-    let dynamic_config: DynamicConfig = serializable_dynamic.into();
+    let (static_config, dynamic_config) = full_config.into_static_and_dynamic();
 
     let allow_wildcard_bind = static_config.allow_wildcard_bind || cli.allow_wildcard_bind;
 
@@ -109,14 +74,6 @@ pub fn load_config(cli: &Cli) -> Result<LoadedConfig> {
     })
 }
 
-fn collect_sites(static_config: &StaticConfig) -> Vec<crate::config::dynamic_config::SiteConfig> {
-    let mut sites = Vec::new();
-    for listener in &static_config.listeners {
-        sites.extend(listener.sites.clone());
-    }
-    sites
-}
-
 pub fn run_validate(cli: &Cli) -> Result<()> {
     match load_config(cli) {
         Ok(_) => {

src/config/static_config.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct StaticConfig {
     pub listeners: Vec<ListenerConfig>,
@@ -28,12 +27,11 @@ pub fn default_shutdown_timeout_secs() -> u64 {
     30
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct ListenerConfig {
     pub bind_addr: String,
     #[serde(default = "default_http_port")]
-    pub http_port: u32,
+    pub http_port: u16,
     #[serde(default = "default_https_port")]
     pub https_port: u16,
     pub tls: TlsConfig,
@@ -41,17 +39,14 @@ pub struct ListenerConfig {
     pub sites: Vec<crate::config::dynamic_config::SiteConfig>,
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-fn default_http_port() -> u32 {
+fn default_http_port() -> u16 {
     80
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn default_https_port() -> u16 {
     443
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct TlsConfig {
     pub mode: String,
@@ -69,12 +64,10 @@ pub struct TlsConfig {
     pub key_path: String,
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn default_acme_directory() -> String {
     "production".to_string()
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct LoggingConfig {
     #[serde(default = "default_log_level")]
@@ -85,12 +78,10 @@ pub struct LoggingConfig {
     pub log_file_path: Option<String>,
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn default_log_level() -> String {
     "info".to_string()
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn default_log_format() -> String {
     "text".to_string()
 }

src/config/validation.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use super::dynamic_config::DynamicConfig;
 use super::static_config::StaticConfig;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum ValidationError {
     #[error("at least one listener must be defined")]
     NoListeners,
@@ -41,19 +42,19 @@ pub enum ValidationError {
     #[error("body.limit_bytes must be > 0, got {value}")]
     BodyLimitBytesZero { value: u64 },
     #[error("duplicate bind_addr:http_port combination: {bind_addr}:{http_port}")]
-    DuplicateHttpBind { bind_addr: String, http_port: u32 },
+    DuplicateHttpBind { bind_addr: String, http_port: u16 },
     #[error(
         "listener {bind_addr}: http_port ({http_port}) and https_port ({https_port}) must differ"
     )]
     HttpsAndHttpPortSame {
         bind_addr: String,
-        http_port: u32,
+        http_port: u16,
         https_port: u16,
     },
     #[error("listener {bind_addr}: https_port must be 1-65535, got {https_port}")]
     HttpsPortInvalid { bind_addr: String, https_port: u16 },
     #[error("listener {bind_addr}: http_port must be 0 (disabled) or 1-65535, got {http_port}")]
-    HttpPortInvalid { bind_addr: String, http_port: u32 },
+    HttpPortInvalid { bind_addr: String, http_port: u16 },
     #[error("health_check_port {health_check_port} conflicts with listener {bind_addr}:{port}")]
     HealthCheckPortConflict {
         health_check_port: u16,
@@ -122,14 +123,7 @@ pub fn validate(
             });
         }
 
-        if listener.http_port > 65535 {
-            errors.push(ValidationError::HttpPortInvalid {
-                bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
-                http_port: listener.http_port,
-            });
-        }
-
-        if listener.http_port > 0 && listener.http_port == listener.https_port as u32 {
+        if listener.http_port > 0 && listener.http_port == listener.https_port {
             errors.push(ValidationError::HttpsAndHttpPortSame {
                 bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
                 http_port: listener.http_port,
@@ -149,6 +143,13 @@ pub fn validate(
                     errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid {
                         bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
                     });
+                } else {
+                    let email = &contact[7..];
+                    if email.is_empty() || !email.contains('@') {
+                        errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid {
+                            bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
+                        });
+                    }
                 }
             }
             "manual" => {
@@ -181,6 +182,10 @@ pub fn validate(
         }
     }
 
+    // Health check always binds to 127.0.0.1 (hardcoded in src/health.rs), so this
+    // conflict check is conservative — it warns even when the health check port
+    // wouldn't actually conflict (e.g., health check on 127.0.0.1:80 vs listener
+    // on 203.0.113.10:80). This is acceptable for Phase 1.
     if static_config.health_check_port > 0 {
         for listener in &static_config.listeners {
             if static_config.health_check_port == listener.https_port {
@@ -190,14 +195,11 @@ pub fn validate(
                     port: listener.https_port,
                 });
             }
-            if listener.http_port > 0
-                && listener.http_port <= 65535
-                && static_config.health_check_port as u32 == listener.http_port
-            {
+            if listener.http_port > 0 && static_config.health_check_port == listener.http_port {
                 errors.push(ValidationError::HealthCheckPortConflict {
                     health_check_port: static_config.health_check_port,
                     bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
-                    port: listener.http_port as u16,
+                    port: listener.http_port,
                 });
             }
         }
@@ -315,7 +317,15 @@ fn is_valid_upstream(upstream: &str) -> bool {
             Ok(p) => p,
             Err(_) => return false,
         };
-        port != 0
+        if port == 0 {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if host_part.starts_with('[') && host_part.ends_with(']') {
+            let inner = &host_part[1..host_part.len() - 1];
+            inner.parse::<std::net::Ipv6Addr>().is_ok()
+        } else {
+            host_part.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_ok() || is_valid_hostname(host_part)
+        }
     } else {
         false
     }
@@ -733,20 +743,6 @@ mod tests {
             .any(|e| matches!(e, ValidationError::HttpsPortInvalid { .. })));
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn rule13_http_port_invalid() {
-        let mut config = valid_static_config();
-        config.listeners[0].http_port = 65536;
-        config.listeners[0].tls = make_acme_tls();
-        let dynamic = valid_dynamic_config();
-        let result = validate(&config, &dynamic, false);
-        assert!(result.is_err());
-        let errors = result.unwrap_err();
-        assert!(errors
-            .iter()
-            .any(|e| matches!(e, ValidationError::HttpPortInvalid { .. })));
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn rule13_http_port_disabled_valid() {
         let mut config = valid_static_config();
@@ -1004,6 +1000,58 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.is_ok());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn rule19_acme_contact_mailto_empty_email() {
+        let mut config = valid_static_config();
+        config.listeners[0].tls = TlsConfig {
+            mode: "acme".to_string(),
+            acme_domains: vec!["test.local".to_string()],
+            acme_cache_dir: "/tmp/cache".to_string(),
+            acme_directory: "production".to_string(),
+            acme_contact: "mailto:".to_string(),
+            cert_path: String::new(),
+            key_path: String::new(),
+        };
+        config.listeners[0].sites = vec![SiteConfig {
+            host: "test.local".to_string(),
+            upstream: "127.0.0.1:8080".to_string(),
+            ..valid_dynamic_config().sites[0].clone()
+        }];
+        let dynamic = valid_dynamic_config();
+        let result = validate(&config, &dynamic, false);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        let errors = result.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(errors
+            .iter()
+            .any(|e| matches!(e, ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid { .. })));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule19_acme_contact_mailto_no_at_sign() {
+        let mut config = valid_static_config();
+        config.listeners[0].tls = TlsConfig {
+            mode: "acme".to_string(),
+            acme_domains: vec!["test.local".to_string()],
+            acme_cache_dir: "/tmp/cache".to_string(),
+            acme_directory: "production".to_string(),
+            acme_contact: "mailto:user".to_string(),
+            cert_path: String::new(),
+            key_path: String::new(),
+        };
+        config.listeners[0].sites = vec![SiteConfig {
+            host: "test.local".to_string(),
+            upstream: "127.0.0.1:8080".to_string(),
+            ..valid_dynamic_config().sites[0].clone()
+        }];
+        let dynamic = valid_dynamic_config();
+        let result = validate(&config, &dynamic, false);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        let errors = result.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(errors
+            .iter()
+            .any(|e| matches!(e, ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid { .. })));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn valid_config_passes() {
         let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
@@ -1096,4 +1144,49 @@ mod tests {
             .iter()
             .any(|e| matches!(e, ValidationError::KeyPathNotReadable { .. })));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_valid_hostname() {
+        assert!(is_valid_upstream("gitea:3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_valid_ipv4() {
+        assert!(is_valid_upstream("127.0.0.1:3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_valid_ipv6_bracket() {
+        assert!(is_valid_upstream("[::1]:3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_valid_ipv6_bracket_full() {
+        assert!(is_valid_upstream("[2001:db8::1]:8080"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_invalid_hostname_chars() {
+        assert!(!is_valid_upstream("!!!bad!!!:3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_invalid_special_chars() {
+        assert!(!is_valid_upstream("@#$%:8080"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_empty_host() {
+        assert!(!is_valid_upstream(":3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_invalid_ipv6_bracket() {
+        assert!(!is_valid_upstream("[notipv6]:3000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rule17_upstream_hostname_with_dots() {
+        assert!(is_valid_upstream("app.example.com:8080"));
+    }
 }

src/logging/format.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
+#[cfg(test)]
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct KvVisitor {
     pairs: Vec<(String, String)>,
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
 impl KvVisitor {
     fn format(&self) -> String {
         let parts: Vec<String> = self
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ impl KvVisitor {
     }
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
 impl tracing::field::Visit for KvVisitor {
     fn record_str(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, value: &str) {
         self.pairs
@@ -47,12 +50,6 @@ impl tracing::field::Visit for KvVisitor {
     }
 }
 
-pub fn format_event_fields(event: &tracing::Event<'_>) -> String {
-    let mut visitor = KvVisitor::default();
-    event.record(&mut visitor);
-    visitor.format()
-}
-
 #[macro_export]
 macro_rules! log_request {
     ($client_ip:expr, $host:expr, $method:expr, $path:expr, $status:expr, $upstream:expr, $duration_ms:expr) => {
@@ -69,19 +66,6 @@ macro_rules! log_request {
     };
 }
 
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! log_rate_limit {
-    ($client_ip:expr, $host:expr, $path:expr, $status:expr) => {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            prefix = "RATE_LIMIT",
-            client_ip = %$client_ip,
-            host = %$host,
-            path = %$path,
-            status = %$status,
-        )
-    };
-}
-
 #[macro_export]
 macro_rules! log_upstream_error {
     ($host:expr, $upstream:expr, $error:expr) => {
@@ -94,17 +78,6 @@ macro_rules! log_upstream_error {
     };
 }
 
-#[macro_export]
-macro_rules! log_config_reload {
-    ($status:expr, $sites:expr) => {
-        tracing::info!(
-            prefix = "CONFIG_RELOAD",
-            status = %$status,
-            sites = %$sites,
-        )
-    };
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -180,8 +153,6 @@ mod tests {
             "127.0.0.1:3000",
             45u64
         );
-        log_rate_limit!("10.0.0.1", "example.com", "/login", 429u16);
         log_upstream_error!("git.alk.dev", "127.0.0.1:3000", "connection refused");
-        log_config_reload!("success", 1u32);
     }
 }

src/logging/mod.rs

@@ -39,9 +39,11 @@ fn init_json(env_filter: EnvFilter, log_file_path: &Option<String>, level: Level
             let file_env_filter = make_env_filter(level);
             let stdout_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
                 .json()
+                .with_ansi(false)
                 .with_filter(env_filter);
             let file_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
                 .json()
+                .with_ansi(false)
                 .with_writer(file_writer)
                 .with_filter(file_env_filter);
             tracing_subscriber::registry()
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ fn init_json(env_filter: EnvFilter, log_file_path: &Option<String>, level: Level
         None => {
             let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
                 .json()
+                .with_ansi(false)
                 .with_filter(env_filter);
             tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer).try_init()?;
         }
@@ -72,8 +75,11 @@ fn init_text(env_filter: EnvFilter, log_file_path: &Option<String>, level: Level
             let file_writer = Arc::new(file);
 
             let file_env_filter = make_env_filter(level);
-            let stdout_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_filter(env_filter);
+            let stdout_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+                .with_ansi(false)
+                .with_filter(env_filter);
             let file_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+                .with_ansi(false)
                 .with_writer(file_writer)
                 .with_filter(file_env_filter);
             tracing_subscriber::registry()
@@ -82,7 +88,9 @@ fn init_text(env_filter: EnvFilter, log_file_path: &Option<String>, level: Level
                 .try_init()?;
         }
         None => {
-            let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_filter(env_filter);
+            let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+                .with_ansi(false)
+                .with_filter(env_filter);
             tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer).try_init()?;
         }
     }

src/main.rs

@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
     let dynamic_config: DynamicConfig = loaded_config.dynamic_config;
     let config_arc = Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(dynamic_config));
 
+    let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(
+        loaded_config.static_config.shutdown_timeout_secs,
+    ));
+
     let rate_limiter = Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(config_arc.clone()));
 
     let http_client = create_http_client();
@@ -81,6 +85,12 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
         loaded_config.static_config.clone(),
     ));
 
+    reverse_proxy::shutdown::register_signal_handlers(
+        shutdown.clone(),
+        reload_handle.clone(),
+        config_path.to_string(),
+    )?;
+
     if loaded_config.static_config.health_check_port > 0 {
         let (health_addr, _health_handle) =
             health::start_health_check_listener(loaded_config.static_config.health_check_port)
@@ -96,8 +106,9 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
             config_path.to_string(),
         ));
         let admin_socket_clone = admin_socket.clone();
+        let shutdown_for_admin = shutdown.clone();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
-            if let Err(e) = start_admin_socket(admin_socket_clone).await {
+            if let Err(e) = start_admin_socket(admin_socket_clone, shutdown_for_admin).await {
                 match e {
                     AdminSocketError::Disabled => {}
                     AdminSocketError::SocketInUse(path) => {
@@ -109,6 +120,7 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
                     AdminSocketError::Io(e) => {
                         error!("admin socket IO error: {}", e);
                     }
+                    _ => {}
                 }
             }
         });
@@ -150,7 +162,7 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
 
     let mut tls_acceptors = Vec::new();
     for (listener_config, _) in &bound_listeners {
-        let tls_mode = setup_tls(&listener_config.tls).context(format!(
+        let tls_mode = setup_tls(&listener_config.tls, shutdown.clone()).context(format!(
             "failed to setup TLS for listener {}",
             listener_config.bind_addr
         ))?;
@@ -175,20 +187,19 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
         }
     }
 
-    let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(
-        loaded_config.static_config.shutdown_timeout_secs,
-    ));
-
-    reverse_proxy::shutdown::register_signal_handlers(
-        shutdown.clone(),
-        reload_handle.clone(),
-        config_path.to_string(),
-    )?;
+    if bound_listeners.len() != tls_acceptors.len() {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "listener/acceptor count mismatch: {} listeners, {} acceptors",
+            bound_listeners.len(),
+            tls_acceptors.len()
+        );
+    }
 
     let _eviction_handle = start_eviction_task(
         rate_limiter.clone(),
         std::time::Duration::from_secs(60),
         std::time::Duration::from_secs(300),
+        shutdown.subscribe(),
     );
 
     let app = build_router(proxy_state.clone(), config_arc.clone(), rate_limiter);
@@ -230,8 +241,12 @@ async fn run_server(loaded_config: cli::LoadedConfig, config_path: &str) -> Resu
 
     info!("shutdown signal received, starting graceful shutdown");
 
+    let shutdown_timeout = shutdown.shutdown_timeout();
     for handle in https_server_handles {
-        handle.abort();
+        let result = tokio::time::timeout(shutdown_timeout, handle).await;
+        if result.is_err() {
+            warn!("shutdown timeout expired, aborting listener task");
+        }
     }
 
     let remaining = drain_in_flight(&in_flight, shutdown.shutdown_timeout()).await;

src/proxy/body_limit.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ pub async fn body_limit_middleware(
         limit
     };
 
+    // Early rejection: if Content-Length is present and exceeds the limit, reject
+    // immediately without reading the body. For requests without Content-Length
+    // (chunked, HTTP/2), the Limited body wrapper below enforces the limit during
+    // streaming. This is a two-layer defense.
     if let Some(content_length) = request.headers().get("content-length") {
         if let Ok(length_str) = content_length.to_str() {
             if let Ok(length) = length_str.parse::<u64>() {

src/proxy/error.rs

@@ -2,29 +2,22 @@ use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum ProxyError {
     #[error("Bad Gateway")]
     BadGateway { host: String, upstream: String },
     #[error("Gateway Timeout")]
     GatewayTimeout { host: String, upstream: String },
-    #[error("Payload Too Large")]
-    PayloadTooLarge,
     #[error("Too Many Requests")]
     TooManyRequests {
         client_ip: String,
         host: String,
         path: String,
     },
-    #[error("Not Found")]
-    NotFound,
-    #[error("Bad Request")]
-    BadRequest,
     #[error("upstream connection failed")]
     UpstreamConnection(#[source] hyper_util::client::legacy::Error),
     #[error("upstream timeout")]
     UpstreamTimeout,
-    #[error("upstream tls certificate validation failed")]
-    UpstreamTls(#[source] std::io::Error),
     #[error("no matching site for host")]
     UnknownHost,
     #[error("missing host header")]
@@ -36,13 +29,11 @@ impl ProxyError {
         match self {
             Self::BadGateway { .. } => StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
             Self::GatewayTimeout { .. } => StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
-            Self::PayloadTooLarge => StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
             Self::TooManyRequests { .. } => StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
-            Self::NotFound | Self::UnknownHost => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-            Self::BadRequest | Self::MissingHost => StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
             Self::UpstreamConnection(_) => StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
             Self::UpstreamTimeout => StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
-            Self::UpstreamTls(_) => StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            Self::UnknownHost => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
+            Self::MissingHost => StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
         }
     }
 
@@ -50,13 +41,11 @@ impl ProxyError {
         match self {
             Self::BadGateway { .. } => "Bad Gateway",
             Self::GatewayTimeout { .. } => "Gateway Timeout",
-            Self::PayloadTooLarge => "Payload Too Large",
             Self::TooManyRequests { .. } => "Too Many Requests",
-            Self::NotFound | Self::UnknownHost => "Not Found",
-            Self::BadRequest | Self::MissingHost => "Bad Request",
             Self::UpstreamConnection(_) => "Bad Gateway",
             Self::UpstreamTimeout => "Gateway Timeout",
-            Self::UpstreamTls(_) => "Bad Gateway",
+            Self::UnknownHost => "Not Found",
+            Self::MissingHost => "Bad Request",
         }
     }
 }
@@ -98,9 +87,6 @@ impl IntoResponse for ProxyError {
             Self::UpstreamTimeout => {
                 tracing::warn!(status = 504, "upstream timeout");
             }
-            Self::UpstreamTls(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(error = %e, status = 502, "upstream TLS error");
-            }
             _ => {}
         }
 
@@ -175,23 +161,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn payload_too_large_response() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::PayloadTooLarge);
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE);
-        let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(&body[..], b"Payload Too Large");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn payload_too_large_content_type() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::PayloadTooLarge);
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers().get("content-type").unwrap(),
-            "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn too_many_requests_response() {
         let resp = into_response(ProxyError::TooManyRequests {
@@ -217,40 +186,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn not_found_response() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::NotFound);
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
-        let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(&body[..], b"Not Found");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn not_found_content_type() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::NotFound);
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers().get("content-type").unwrap(),
-            "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn bad_request_response() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::BadRequest);
-        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
-        let body = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1024).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(&body[..], b"Bad Request");
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn bad_request_content_type() {
-        let resp = into_response(ProxyError::BadRequest);
-        assert_eq!(
-            resp.headers().get("content-type").unwrap(),
-            "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
-        );
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn error_display_matches_body() {
         assert_eq!(
@@ -269,7 +204,6 @@ mod tests {
             .to_string(),
             "Gateway Timeout"
         );
-        assert_eq!(ProxyError::PayloadTooLarge.to_string(), "Payload Too Large");
         assert_eq!(
             ProxyError::TooManyRequests {
                 client_ip: String::new(),
@@ -279,7 +213,5 @@ mod tests {
             .to_string(),
             "Too Many Requests"
         );
-        assert_eq!(ProxyError::NotFound.to_string(), "Not Found");
-        assert_eq!(ProxyError::BadRequest.to_string(), "Bad Request");
     }
 }

src/proxy/handler.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use axum::Router;
 use hyper_util::client::legacy::connect::HttpConnector;
 use hyper_util::client::legacy::Client;
 use hyper_util::rt::TokioExecutor;
-use tracing::warn;
+use tracing::{info, warn};
 
 use crate::config::dynamic_config::DynamicConfig;
 use crate::log_request;
@@ -39,11 +39,14 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
     let host = req
         .headers()
         .get(axum::http::header::HOST)
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .or_else(|| req.uri().host())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
 
-    let host = match host {
-        Some(h) => h,
-        None => return ProxyError::MissingHost.into_response(),
+    let host = if host.is_empty() {
+        return ProxyError::MissingHost.into_response();
+    } else {
+        host
     };
 
     let config = state.config.load();
@@ -59,7 +62,23 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
     let upstream_scheme = site.upstream_scheme.clone();
     let upstream = site.upstream.clone();
     let upstream_addr = format!("{}://{}", upstream_scheme, upstream);
-    let upstream_uri = build_upstream_uri(&upstream_scheme, &upstream, req.uri());
+    let upstream_uri = match build_upstream_uri(&upstream_scheme, &upstream, req.uri()) {
+        Ok(uri) => uri,
+        Err(()) => {
+            log_upstream_error!(&host_owned, &upstream_addr, "malformed upstream URI");
+            let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
+            log_request!(
+                &client_ip,
+                &host_owned,
+                &method,
+                &path,
+                502u16,
+                &upstream,
+                duration_ms
+            );
+            return StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY.into_response();
+        }
+    };
 
     let upstream_req = match build_upstream_request(req, &upstream_uri) {
         Ok(r) => r,
@@ -80,23 +99,23 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
         }
     };
 
+    let connect_timeout = Duration::from_secs(site.upstream_connect_timeout_secs);
     let request_timeout = Duration::from_secs(site.upstream_request_timeout_secs);
-    // The timeout covers the entire HTTP round-trip including response body
-    // streaming. For large file downloads or slow upstreams, this means the
-    // timeout kills the response even if the upstream is actively sending data.
-    // A more precise timeout would apply only to connect + first-byte, then
-    // stream the body without a timeout. The `upstream_connect_timeout_secs`
-    // field in SiteConfig exists for a separate connect timeout (see W4).
-    // For Phase 1, this full-request timeout is acceptable.
 
     let result = if upstream_scheme == "https" {
-        tokio::time::timeout(request_timeout, state.https_client.request(upstream_req)).await
+        tokio::time::timeout(request_timeout, async {
+            tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, state.https_client.request(upstream_req)).await
+        })
+        .await
     } else {
-        tokio::time::timeout(request_timeout, state.http_client.request(upstream_req)).await
+        tokio::time::timeout(request_timeout, async {
+            tokio::time::timeout(connect_timeout, state.http_client.request(upstream_req)).await
+        })
+        .await
     };
 
     match result {
-        Ok(Ok(upstream_resp)) => {
+        Ok(Ok(Ok(upstream_resp))) => {
             let status = upstream_resp.status().as_u16();
             let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
             log_request!(
@@ -110,11 +129,14 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
             );
             let (mut parts, body) = upstream_resp.into_parts();
             remove_hop_by_hop(&mut parts.headers);
+            // The upstream Server header is intentionally removed. As a security-focused
+            // reverse proxy, we hide upstream server identity as a defense-in-depth measure.
+            // The proxy does not add its own Server header either. See W8 in review #002.
             parts.headers.remove("server");
             let body = Body::new(body);
             Response::from_parts(parts, body)
         }
-        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+        Ok(Ok(Err(e))) => {
             let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
             if e.is_connect() {
                 log_upstream_error!(&host_owned, &upstream_addr, &format!("{}", e));
@@ -148,6 +170,21 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
                 resp
             }
         }
+        Ok(Err(_)) => {
+            let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
+            log_upstream_error!(&host_owned, &upstream_addr, "upstream connect timeout");
+            let resp = ProxyError::UpstreamTimeout.into_response();
+            log_request!(
+                &client_ip,
+                &host_owned,
+                &method,
+                &path,
+                504u16,
+                &upstream,
+                duration_ms
+            );
+            resp
+        }
         Err(_) => {
             let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
             log_upstream_error!(&host_owned, &upstream_addr, "upstream timeout");
@@ -166,17 +203,15 @@ async fn proxy_handler(
     }
 }
 
-fn build_upstream_uri(scheme: &str, upstream: &str, original_uri: &Uri) -> Uri {
+fn build_upstream_uri(scheme: &str, upstream: &str, original_uri: &Uri) -> Result<Uri, ()> {
     let path = original_uri.path();
     let query = original_uri
         .query()
         .map(|q| format!("?{}", q))
         .unwrap_or_default();
     let uri_string = format!("{}://{}{}{}", scheme, upstream, path, query);
-    uri_string.parse::<Uri>().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
-        format!("{}://{}{}", scheme, upstream, path)
-            .parse::<Uri>()
-            .unwrap()
+    uri_string.parse::<Uri>().map_err(|e| {
+        warn!(error = %e, uri = %uri_string, "failed to parse upstream URI");
     })
 }
 
@@ -192,13 +227,21 @@ fn build_upstream_request(req: Request<Body>, upstream_uri: &Uri) -> anyhow::Res
     builder.body(req.into_body()).map_err(Into::into)
 }
 
+const CONNECT_TIMEOUT_CEILING_SECS: u64 = 30;
+
 pub fn create_http_client() -> Client<HttpConnector, Body> {
+    let mut connector = HttpConnector::new();
+    connector.set_connect_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONNECT_TIMEOUT_CEILING_SECS)));
     Client::builder(TokioExecutor::new())
         .pool_idle_timeout(Duration::from_secs(90))
-        .build_http()
+        .build(connector)
 }
 
 pub fn create_https_client() -> Client<hyper_rustls::HttpsConnector<HttpConnector>, Body> {
+    let mut http_connector = HttpConnector::new();
+    http_connector.set_connect_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONNECT_TIMEOUT_CEILING_SECS)));
+    http_connector.enforce_http(false);
+
     let tls_config = rustls::ClientConfig::builder()
         .with_root_certificates(root_certs())
         .with_no_client_auth();
@@ -207,7 +250,7 @@ pub fn create_https_client() -> Client<hyper_rustls::HttpsConnector<HttpConnecto
         .with_tls_config(tls_config)
         .https_or_http()
         .enable_http1()
-        .build();
+        .wrap_connector(http_connector);
 
     Client::builder(TokioExecutor::new())
         .pool_idle_timeout(Duration::from_secs(90))
@@ -220,10 +263,23 @@ fn root_certs() -> rustls::RootCertStore {
     for cert in result.certs {
         roots.add(cert).ok();
     }
-    if !result.errors.is_empty() {
-        for err in &result.errors {
-            warn!(error = %err, "failed to load native certificate");
-        }
+    let cert_count = roots.len();
+    let error_count = result.errors.len();
+    if cert_count == 0 {
+        warn!(
+            certs_loaded = cert_count,
+            errors = error_count,
+            "no system root certificates loaded — HTTPS upstream connections will fail"
+        );
+    } else {
+        info!(
+            certs_loaded = cert_count,
+            errors = error_count,
+            "loaded system root certificates"
+        );
+    }
+    for err in &result.errors {
+        warn!(error = %err, "failed to load native certificate");
     }
     roots
 }
@@ -317,21 +373,21 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_build_upstream_uri_with_query() {
         let uri: Uri = "/path?foo=bar".parse().unwrap();
-        let result = build_upstream_uri("http", "127.0.0.1:8080", &uri);
+        let result = build_upstream_uri("http", "127.0.0.1:8080", &uri).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(result.to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:8080/path?foo=bar");
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_build_upstream_uri_without_query() {
         let uri: Uri = "/path".parse().unwrap();
-        let result = build_upstream_uri("http", "127.0.0.1:8080", &uri);
+        let result = build_upstream_uri("http", "127.0.0.1:8080", &uri).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(result.to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:8080/path");
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn test_build_upstream_uri_https() {
         let uri: Uri = "/secure".parse().unwrap();
-        let result = build_upstream_uri("https", "upstream.example.com", &uri);
+        let result = build_upstream_uri("https", "upstream.example.com", &uri).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(result.to_string(), "https://upstream.example.com/secure");
     }
 }

src/proxy/headers.rs

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ pub fn inject_proxy_headers(headers: &mut HeaderMap, remote_addr: SocketAddr) {
 
     headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("x-real-ip"), ip_value.clone());
 
+    // X-Forwarded-For is SET (not appended) because this proxy is the outermost
+    // edge proxy. Any existing X-Forwarded-For from the client is untrusted and
+    // must be replaced with the actual client IP from ConnectInfo.
+    // See ADR-021 for the edge proxy model rationale.
     headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("x-forwarded-for"), ip_value);
 
     // X-Forwarded-Proto is always "https" because this proxy only forwards requests

src/rate_limit/bucket.rs

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv6Addr};
 use std::time::Instant;
 
 pub struct TokenBucket {
-    pub tokens: f64,
-    pub last_refill: Instant,
-    pub rate: f64,
-    pub max: u32,
-    pub last_access: Instant,
+    tokens: f64,
+    last_refill: Instant,
+    rate: f64,
+    max: u32,
+    pub(crate) last_access: Instant,
 }
 
 impl TokenBucket {

src/rate_limit/mod.rs

@@ -64,19 +64,12 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_middleware(
     next: Next,
 ) -> axum::response::Response {
     let client_ip = req
-        .headers()
-        .get("x-forwarded-for")
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-        .and_then(|v| v.split(',').next())
-        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
-        .or_else(|| {
-            req.extensions()
-                .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
-                .map(|ci| ci.ip())
-        });
+        .extensions()
+        .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
+        .map(|ci| ci.ip());
 
     let Some(ip) = client_ip else {
-        return next.run(req).await;
+        return (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "Too Many Requests").into_response();
     };
 
     let host = req
@@ -102,12 +95,20 @@ pub fn start_eviction_task(
     limiter: Arc<RateLimiter>,
     interval: Duration,
     max_age: Duration,
+    mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
 ) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         let mut interval_timer = tokio::time::interval(interval);
         loop {
-            interval_timer.tick().await;
-            limiter.evict_stale(max_age);
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = interval_timer.tick() => {
+                    limiter.evict_stale(max_age);
+                }
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                    tracing::info!("rate limiter eviction task shutting down");
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
         }
     })
 }
@@ -205,4 +206,108 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(limiter.check_and_consume(IpAddr::from([192, 168, 1, 1])));
         assert!(!limiter.check_and_consume(IpAddr::from([192, 168, 1, 1])));
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_uses_connect_info_without_xff_header() {
+        let limiter = make_limiter(10, 5);
+
+        let app = axum::Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+                limiter,
+                rate_limit_middleware,
+            ))
+            .into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>();
+
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+
+        tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        for _ in 0..5 {
+            let resp = client
+                .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+        }
+
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_rejects_without_connect_info() {
+        let limiter = make_limiter(10, 20);
+
+        let app = axum::Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+                limiter,
+                rate_limit_middleware,
+            ));
+
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+
+        tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_ignores_xff_header_same_bucket() {
+        let limiter = make_limiter(10, 2);
+
+        let app = axum::Router::new()
+            .route("/", axum::routing::get(|| async { "ok" }))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+                limiter,
+                rate_limit_middleware,
+            ))
+            .into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>();
+
+        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+
+        tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });
+
+        let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+            .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.1")
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+            .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.2")
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+            .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.3")
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
 }

src/server.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
 use axum::http::Request;
 use axum::response::Response;
 use axum::Router;
+use hyper::body::Incoming;
 use hyper_util::rt::TokioExecutor;
 use hyper_util::service::TowerToHyperService;
 use tokio::net::TcpListener;
@@ -19,6 +20,13 @@ pub struct InFlightCounter {
 
 struct InFlightGuard(Arc<InFlightCounter>);
 
+impl InFlightGuard {
+    fn new(counter: Arc<InFlightCounter>) -> Self {
+        counter.increment();
+        Self(counter)
+    }
+}
+
 impl Drop for InFlightGuard {
     fn drop(&mut self) {
         self.0.decrement();
@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ pub async fn serve_https_listener(
                 let in_flight = in_flight.clone();
 
                 tokio::spawn(async move {
-                    let _guard = InFlightGuard(in_flight.clone());
+                    let _guard = InFlightGuard::new(in_flight.clone());
 
                     let tls_stream = match tls_acceptor.accept(tcp_stream).await {
                         Ok(stream) => stream,
@@ -80,24 +88,40 @@ pub async fn serve_https_listener(
                         }
                     };
 
+                    let alpn = tls_stream.get_ref().1.alpn_protocol();
+                    let is_h2 = alpn == Some(b"h2");
+
                     let svc = ConnectInfoService {
-                        inner: router.into_service::<hyper::body::Incoming>(),
+                        inner: router.into_service::<Incoming>(),
                         remote_addr,
                     };
-
                     let svc = TowerToHyperService::new(svc);
+
                     let io = hyper_util::rt::TokioIo::new(tls_stream);
 
-                    if let Err(e) = hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder::new(TokioExecutor::new())
-                        .serve_connection_with_upgrades(io, svc)
-                        .await
-                    {
-                        if let Some(hyper_err) = e.downcast_ref::<hyper::Error>() {
-                            if hyper_err.is_incomplete_message() {
-                                return;
-                            }
+                    if is_h2 {
+                        let mut builder = hyper::server::conn::http2::Builder::new(TokioExecutor::new());
+                        if let Err(e) = builder
+                            .enable_connect_protocol()
+                            .serve_connection(io, svc)
+                            .await
+                        {
+                            error!(error = %e, "HTTPS/2 connection error");
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        let mut builder = hyper_util::server::conn::auto::Builder::new(TokioExecutor::new());
+                        builder.http2().enable_connect_protocol();
+                        if let Err(e) = builder
+                            .serve_connection_with_upgrades(io, svc)
+                            .await
+                        {
+                            if let Some(hyper_err) = e.downcast_ref::<hyper::Error>() {
+                                if hyper_err.is_incomplete_message() {
+                                    return;
+                                }
+                            }
+                            error!(error = %e, "HTTPS connection error");
                         }
-                        error!(error = %e, "HTTPS connection error");
                     }
                 });
             }
@@ -125,7 +149,7 @@ pub async fn drain_in_flight(
         if start.elapsed() >= timeout {
             return in_flight.count.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
         }
-        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
     }
 }
 
@@ -135,11 +159,10 @@ struct ConnectInfoService<S> {
     remote_addr: SocketAddr,
 }
 
-impl<S, B> Service<Request<B>> for ConnectInfoService<S>
+impl<S> Service<Request<Incoming>> for ConnectInfoService<S>
 where
-    S: Service<Request<B>, Response = Response> + Clone + Send + 'static,
+    S: Service<Request<Incoming>, Response = Response> + Clone + Send + 'static,
     S::Future: Send + 'static,
-    B: Send + 'static,
 {
     type Response = S::Response;
     type Error = S::Error;
@@ -152,7 +175,7 @@ where
         self.inner.poll_ready(cx)
     }
 
-    fn call(&mut self, mut req: Request<B>) -> Self::Future {
+    fn call(&mut self, mut req: Request<Incoming>) -> Self::Future {
         req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(self.remote_addr));
         self.inner.call(req)
     }

src/tls/acceptor.rs

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ use tracing::info;
 use super::acme::{spawn_acme_state, AcmeTlsConfig};
 use super::config::crypto_provider;
 use crate::config::static_config::TlsConfig;
+use crate::shutdown::GracefulShutdown;
 
 const ACME_TLS_ALPN_01: &[u8] = b"acme-tls/1";
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 fn build_acme_server_config(
     resolver: Arc<rustls_acme::ResolvesServerCertAcme>,
 ) -> Result<Arc<ServerConfig>> {
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ fn build_acme_server_config(
     Ok(Arc::new(config))
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum TlsMode {
     Manual(Arc<ServerConfig>),
@@ -40,8 +39,7 @@ pub enum TlsMode {
     },
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-pub fn setup_tls(tls_config: &TlsConfig) -> Result<TlsMode> {
+pub fn setup_tls(tls_config: &TlsConfig, shutdown: Arc<GracefulShutdown>) -> Result<TlsMode> {
     match tls_config.mode.as_str() {
         "manual" => {
             if tls_config.cert_path.is_empty() {
@@ -75,7 +73,7 @@ pub fn setup_tls(tls_config: &TlsConfig) -> Result<TlsMode> {
 
             let default_config = build_acme_server_config(resolver.clone())?;
 
-            spawn_acme_state(state, tls_config.acme_domains.clone());
+            spawn_acme_state(state, tls_config.acme_domains.clone(), shutdown);
 
             info!(
                 domains = ?tls_config.acme_domains,
@@ -136,7 +134,8 @@ mod tests {
             cert_path: String::new(),
             key_path: "/some/key.pem".to_string(),
         };
-        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config);
+        let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30));
+        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config, shutdown);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
         assert!(err.contains("cert_path"));
@@ -153,7 +152,8 @@ mod tests {
             cert_path: "/some/cert.pem".to_string(),
             key_path: String::new(),
         };
-        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config);
+        let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30));
+        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config, shutdown);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
         assert!(err.contains("key_path"));
@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ mod tests {
             cert_path: String::new(),
             key_path: String::new(),
         };
-        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config);
+        let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30));
+        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config, shutdown);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
         assert!(err.contains("acme_domains"));
@@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ mod tests {
             cert_path: String::new(),
             key_path: String::new(),
         };
-        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config);
+        let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30));
+        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config, shutdown);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
         assert!(err.contains("acme_cache_dir"));
@@ -204,7 +206,8 @@ mod tests {
             cert_path: String::new(),
             key_path: String::new(),
         };
-        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config);
+        let shutdown = Arc::new(GracefulShutdown::new(30));
+        let result = setup_tls(&tls_config, shutdown);
         assert!(result.is_err());
         let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
         assert!(err.contains("unknown TLS mode"));

src/tls/acme.rs

@@ -6,13 +6,12 @@ use rustls_acme::caches::DirCache;
 use rustls_acme::{AcmeConfig, AcmeState, EventError, EventOk, ResolvesServerCertAcme};
 use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
+use crate::shutdown::GracefulShutdown;
+
 const LETS_ENCRYPT_PRODUCTION_DIRECTORY: &str = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory";
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 const LETS_ENCRYPT_STAGING_DIRECTORY: &str =
     "https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory";
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub struct AcmeTlsConfig {
     pub domains: Vec<String>,
     pub cache_dir: PathBuf,
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ pub struct AcmeTlsConfig {
     pub contact: Vec<String>,
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub struct AcmeTlsSetup {
     pub resolver: Arc<ResolvesServerCertAcme>,
     pub state: AcmeState<std::io::Error, std::io::Error>,
@@ -52,7 +50,7 @@ impl AcmeTlsConfig {
         Ok(AcmeTlsSetup { resolver, state })
     }
 
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    #[cfg(test)]
     pub fn directory_url(&self) -> &str {
         match self.directory.as_str() {
             "production" => LETS_ENCRYPT_PRODUCTION_DIRECTORY,
@@ -62,97 +60,109 @@ impl AcmeTlsConfig {
     }
 }
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn spawn_acme_state(
     state: AcmeState<std::io::Error, std::io::Error>,
     domains: Vec<String>,
+    shutdown: Arc<GracefulShutdown>,
 ) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         use futures::StreamExt;
         let mut state = state;
+        let mut shutdown_rx = shutdown.subscribe();
         loop {
-            match state.next().await {
-                Some(Ok(event)) => match event {
-                    EventOk::DeployedCachedCert => {
-                        info!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            "ACME: deployed cached certificate"
-                        );
+            tokio::select! {
+                event = state.next() => {
+                    match event {
+                        Some(Ok(event)) => match event {
+                            EventOk::DeployedCachedCert => {
+                                info!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    "ACME: deployed cached certificate"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventOk::DeployedNewCert => {
+                                info!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    "ACME: deployed new certificate"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventOk::CertCacheStore => {
+                                info!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    "ACME: certificate stored to cache"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventOk::AccountCacheStore => {
+                                info!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    "ACME: account stored to cache"
+                                );
+                            }
+                        },
+                        Some(Err(err)) => match &err {
+                            EventError::CertCacheLoad(e) => {
+                                error!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: certificate cache load failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::AccountCacheLoad(e) => {
+                                error!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: account cache load failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::CertCacheStore(e) => {
+                                warn!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: certificate cache store failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::AccountCacheStore(e) => {
+                                warn!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: account cache store failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::CachedCertParse(e) => {
+                                error!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: cached certificate parse failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::Order(e) => {
+                                warn!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: certificate order failed, will retry"
+                                );
+                            }
+                            EventError::NewCertParse(e) => {
+                                error!(
+                                    domains = ?domains,
+                                    error = ?e,
+                                    "ACME: new certificate parse failed"
+                                );
+                            }
+                        },
+                        None => {
+                            info!(
+                                domains = ?domains,
+                                "ACME: state machine ended"
+                            );
+                            break;
+                        }
                     }
-                    EventOk::DeployedNewCert => {
-                        info!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            "ACME: deployed new certificate"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventOk::CertCacheStore => {
-                        info!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            "ACME: certificate stored to cache"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventOk::AccountCacheStore => {
-                        info!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            "ACME: account stored to cache"
-                        );
-                    }
-                },
-                Some(Err(err)) => match &err {
-                    EventError::CertCacheLoad(e) => {
-                        error!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: certificate cache load failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::AccountCacheLoad(e) => {
-                        error!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: account cache load failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::CertCacheStore(e) => {
-                        warn!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: certificate cache store failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::AccountCacheStore(e) => {
-                        warn!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: account cache store failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::CachedCertParse(e) => {
-                        error!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: cached certificate parse failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::Order(e) => {
-                        warn!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: certificate order failed, will retry"
-                        );
-                    }
-                    EventError::NewCertParse(e) => {
-                        error!(
-                            domains = ?domains,
-                            error = ?e,
-                            "ACME: new certificate parse failed"
-                        );
-                    }
-                },
-                None => {
+                }
+                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
                     info!(
                         domains = ?domains,
-                        "ACME: state machine ended"
+                        "ACME: state machine shutting down"
                     );
                     break;
                 }

src/tls/config.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::fs::File;
 use std::io::BufReader;
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -7,14 +6,11 @@ use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::cipher_suite;
 use rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::{default_provider, kx_group};
 use rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer};
-use rustls::server::{ClientHello, ResolvesServerCert};
-use rustls::sign::CertifiedKey;
 use rustls::version::{TLS12, TLS13};
 use rustls::ServerConfig;
 use rustls::SupportedCipherSuite;
 use rustls_pemfile;
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 static RESTRICTED_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
     cipher_suite::TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
     cipher_suite::TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
@@ -68,54 +64,14 @@ pub fn build_manual_server_config(cert_path: &str, key_path: &str) -> Result<Ser
         .with_single_cert(certs, key)
         .with_context(|| "failed to configure certificate/key pair")?;
 
-    Ok(config)
-}
-
-pub fn build_multi_domain_server_config(
-    domain_certs: &HashMap<String, (Vec<CertificateDer<'static>>, PrivateKeyDer<'static>)>,
-) -> Result<ServerConfig> {
-    let provider = crypto_provider();
-
-    let mut resolver = SniCertResolver::new();
-    for (domain, (certs, key)) in domain_certs {
-        let certified_key = CertifiedKey::from_der(certs.clone(), key.clone_key(), &provider)
-            .with_context(|| format!("failed to load cert/key for domain {domain}"))?;
-        resolver.add(domain, Arc::new(certified_key));
-    }
-
-    let config = ServerConfig::builder_with_provider(provider)
-        .with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS12, &TLS13])
-        .with_context(|| "failed to set protocol versions")?
-        .with_no_client_auth()
-        .with_cert_resolver(Arc::new(resolver));
+    let mut config = config;
+    // Advertise HTTP/2 and HTTP/1.1 via ALPN so clients can negotiate HTTP/2.
+    // Note: acme-tls/1 is NOT included here — it's only needed for ACME mode.
+    config.alpn_protocols = vec![b"h2".to_vec(), b"http/1.1".to_vec()];
 
     Ok(config)
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug)]
-struct SniCertResolver {
-    entries: HashMap<String, Arc<CertifiedKey>>,
-}
-
-impl SniCertResolver {
-    fn new() -> Self {
-        Self {
-            entries: HashMap::new(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn add(&mut self, domain: &str, certified_key: Arc<CertifiedKey>) {
-        self.entries.insert(domain.to_lowercase(), certified_key);
-    }
-}
-
-impl ResolvesServerCert for SniCertResolver {
-    fn resolve(&self, client_hello: ClientHello<'_>) -> Option<Arc<CertifiedKey>> {
-        let server_name = client_hello.server_name()?;
-        self.entries.get(&server_name.to_lowercase()).cloned()
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -255,55 +211,6 @@ mod tests {
             .unwrap();
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn test_sni_resolver_known_domain() {
-        let (certs, key) = generate_test_cert("example.com");
-        let provider = crypto_provider();
-        let certified_key = CertifiedKey::from_der(certs, key, &provider).unwrap();
-        let mut resolver = SniCertResolver::new();
-        resolver.add("example.com", Arc::new(certified_key));
-
-        let resolved = resolver.entries.get("example.com");
-        assert!(resolved.is_some());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_sni_resolver_unknown_domain_returns_none() {
-        let (certs, key) = generate_test_cert("example.com");
-        let provider = crypto_provider();
-        let certified_key = CertifiedKey::from_der(certs, key, &provider).unwrap();
-        let mut resolver = SniCertResolver::new();
-        resolver.add("example.com", Arc::new(certified_key));
-
-        let resolved = resolver.entries.get("unknown.com");
-        assert!(resolved.is_none());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_sni_resolver_case_insensitive() {
-        let (certs, key) = generate_test_cert("Example.COM");
-        let provider = crypto_provider();
-        let certified_key = CertifiedKey::from_der(certs, key, &provider).unwrap();
-        let mut resolver = SniCertResolver::new();
-        resolver.add("Example.COM", Arc::new(certified_key));
-
-        assert!(resolver.entries.contains_key("example.com"));
-        assert!(!resolver.entries.contains_key("Example.COM"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_build_multi_domain_server_config() {
-        let (certs1, key1) = generate_test_cert("site1.example.com");
-        let (certs2, key2) = generate_test_cert("site2.example.com");
-
-        let mut domain_certs = HashMap::new();
-        domain_certs.insert("site1.example.com".to_string(), (certs1, key1));
-        domain_certs.insert("site2.example.com".to_string(), (certs2, key2));
-
-        let config = build_multi_domain_server_config(&domain_certs).unwrap();
-        assert!(!config.ignore_client_order);
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn test_load_certs_empty_file() {
         let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();

tasks/fix/acme-contact-validation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+id: fix/acme-contact-validation
+name: Validate ACME contact email has non-empty address with @ sign (W2)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W2]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The ACME contact validation only checks that `contact.starts_with("mailto:")`
+but doesn't verify there's an actual email address after the prefix. Values
+like `mailto:` (empty email) pass validation but will fail at the Let's Encrypt
+API at certificate provisioning time — after the proxy has already started.
+
+The spec (config.md validation rule 19) now requires: "a valid `mailto:` URI
+with a non-empty email address containing an `@` sign."
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/config/validation.rs`** — ACME contact validation (lines 148-153):
+- After checking `starts_with("mailto:")`, validate the email part:
+  ```rust
+  let contact = &listener.tls.acme_contact;
+  if contact.is_empty() || !contact.starts_with("mailto:") {
+      errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid {
+          bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
+      });
+  } else {
+      let email = &contact[7..]; // after "mailto:"
+      if email.is_empty() || !email.contains('@') {
+          errors.push(ValidationError::AcmeContactInvalid {
+              bind_addr: listener.bind_addr.clone(),
+          });
+      }
+  }
+  ```
+- Add tests for:
+  - Valid: `mailto:admin@example.com`
+  - Invalid: `mailto:` (empty), `mailto:user` (no @), empty string, non-mailto
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `mailto:` (empty email) is rejected by validation
+- [ ] `mailto:user` (no @ sign) is rejected by validation
+- [ ] `mailto:admin@example.com` still passes validation
+- [ ] Non-mailto values still rejected
+- [ ] New unit tests for the tightened validation
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/config.md — validation rule 19
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W2 finding
+- src/config/validation.rs — ACME contact validation, existing tests
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/add-code-comments.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: fix/add-code-comments
 name: Add clarifying code comments for correct-but-non-obvious behaviors
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: [fix/remove-health-and-hardcode-https]
 scope: narrow
 risk: trivial

tasks/fix/admin-socket-reload-mutex-visibility.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+id: fix/admin-socket-reload-mutex-visibility
+name: Gate AdminSocket::reload_mutex with #[cfg(test)] (W11)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W11]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`AdminSocket::reload_mutex()` is a public method that exists solely for the
+`test_reload_serialized_with_mutex` test. It exposes an internal synchronization
+primitive, and the test acquires the mutex before sending a reload command —
+coupling the test to implementation details.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/admin/socket.rs`**:
+- Gate `reload_mutex()` with `#[cfg(test)]`:
+  ```rust
+  #[cfg(test)]
+  pub fn reload_mutex(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
+      self.reload_mutex.clone()
+  }
+  ```
+- The existing test `test_reload_serialized_with_mutex` already uses this
+  method, so it will continue to work.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `reload_mutex()` is only available in test builds (`#[cfg(test)]`)
+- [ ] The `test_reload_serialized_with_mutex` test still compiles and passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings in non-test build
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W11 finding
+- src/admin/socket.rs — `AdminSocket::reload_mutex()`, test
+
+## Notes
+
+> The review suggests alternatively removing the method entirely and testing
+> serialization through observable behavior. For Phase 1, gating with
+> `#[cfg(test)]` is the simpler fix that preserves the existing test.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/admin-socket-resource-limits.md

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+---
+id: fix/admin-socket-resource-limits
+name: Add read timeout and line length limit to admin socket (ADR-027)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W4, S4]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The admin socket's `handle_connection` reads one newline-terminated line with
+`reader.read_line(&mut line)` but sets no timeout and no length limit. This
+allows:
+1. A client to connect and send no data, holding a connection indefinitely
+2. A client to send unbounded data without a newline, causing OOM
+
+ADR-027 specifies: 5-second read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/admin/socket.rs`** — `handle_connection` function (lines 166-210):
+- Wrap the `BufReader` with `tokio::io::take` to limit read size to 4096 bytes:
+  ```rust
+  let (reader, mut writer) = stream.into_split();
+  let mut reader = BufReader::new(tokio::io::take(reader, 4096));
+  let mut line = String::new();
+  ```
+- Wrap the `read_line` call in a `tokio::time::timeout`:
+  ```rust
+  use std::time::Duration;
+  let read_result = tokio::time::timeout(
+      Duration::from_secs(5),
+      reader.read_line(&mut line),
+  ).await;
+  ```
+- Handle timeout and line-too-long cases:
+  ```rust
+  match read_result {
+      Ok(Ok(0)) | Ok(Err(_)) => {
+          // existing "invalid input" handling
+      }
+      Err(_) => {
+          // timeout
+          tracing::debug!("admin socket connection timed out");
+          let _ = writer.write_all(
+              format!("{}\n", serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
+                  status: "error",
+                  message: "read timeout".to_string(),
+              }).unwrap()).as_bytes()
+          ).await;
+          return;
+      }
+      Ok(Ok(n)) => {
+          // Check if line was truncated (no newline found within limit)
+          if !line.ends_with('\n') && n > 0 {
+              tracing::warn!("admin socket command exceeded 4096 byte limit");
+              let _ = writer.write_all(
+                  format!("{}\n", serde_json::to_string(&ErrorResponse {
+                      status: "error",
+                      message: "command too long".to_string(),
+                  }).unwrap()).as_bytes()
+              ).await;
+              return;
+          }
+          // ... existing command handling
+      }
+  }
+  ```
+- Update existing tests and add new tests for timeout and line length limit.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Read timeout of 5 seconds applied to admin socket connections
+- [ ] Line length limit of 4096 bytes applied (via `tokio::io::take`)
+- [ ] Timeout logged at `debug` level per ADR-027
+- [ ] Line-too-long logged at `warn` level per ADR-027
+- [ ] Both conditions return appropriate error JSON to the client
+- [ ] Legitimate commands (`reload`, `status`) still work
+- [ ] New tests for timeout and line length limit behavior
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md — ADR-027
+- docs/architecture/operations.md — admin socket resource limits
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W4, S4 findings
+- src/admin/socket.rs — `handle_connection`
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/clean-dead-code.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: fix/clean-dead-code
 name: Remove dead_code annotations and add #[non_exhaustive] to public enums
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: [fix/acme-contact-and-challenge]
 scope: narrow
 risk: low

tasks/fix/connect-timeout.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: fix/connect-timeout
 name: Wire upstream_connect_timeout_secs to enforce separate connect timeout
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: []
 scope: narrow
 risk: medium

tasks/fix/connector-timeout-ceiling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+id: fix/connector-timeout-ceiling
+name: Raise connector timeout ceiling to 30s per ADR-026
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [C3]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The HTTP connector's `set_connect_timeout` is hardcoded to 5 seconds. Per-site
+connect timeout values > 5s are silently capped because the connector's internal
+timeout fires before the `tokio::time::timeout` wrapper.
+
+ADR-026 establishes a 30-second ceiling on the connector. The per-site
+`tokio::time::timeout` enforces the actual per-site connect timeout. The
+connector ceiling is a safety backstop, not the primary enforcement mechanism.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/proxy/handler.rs`**:
+- Change `DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS` from 5 to 30:
+  ```rust
+  const CONNECT_TIMEOUT_CEILING_SECS: u64 = 30;
+  ```
+- Rename the constant to make its role clear (ceiling, not the default connect
+  timeout for sites).
+- Update both `create_http_client` and `create_https_client` to use the renamed
+  constant.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Connector `set_connect_timeout` is set to 30 seconds
+- [ ] Constant is named to reflect its ceiling role (not "default")
+- [ ] Per-site connect timeout (default 5s) via `tokio::time::timeout` is unchanged
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md — ADR-026
+- docs/architecture/proxy.md — Upstream connection section
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — C3 finding
+- src/proxy/handler.rs — `create_http_client`, `create_https_client`
+
+## Notes
+
+> The previous `fix/connect-timeout` task wired the two-phase timeout approach.
+> This task completes that work by raising the connector ceiling so per-site
+> timeouts > 5s actually work.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/consolidate-config-types.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+---
+id: fix/consolidate-config-types
+name: Delete RawConfig and use FullConfig in load_config (W6, S5)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W6, S5]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`RawConfig` (in `src/cli.rs`) and `FullConfig` (in `src/config/mod.rs`) have
+identical fields and identical serde attributes. They exist because the initial
+load path manually constructs `StaticConfig` + `SerializableDynamicConfig`,
+while the reload path uses `FullConfig::into_static_and_dynamic()`. Any new
+config field must be added in two places.
+
+The fix is to delete `RawConfig` and use `FullConfig` in `load_config`. The
+`collect_sites` helper can also be removed since `into_static_and_dynamic`
+already collects sites from all listeners.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/cli.rs`**:
+- Delete the `RawConfig` struct (lines 49-65)
+- Rewrite `load_config` to use `FullConfig`:
+  ```rust
+  pub fn load_config(cli: &Cli) -> Result<LoadedConfig> {
+      let config_path = Path::new(&cli.config);
+      let config_content = std::fs::read_to_string(config_path)
+          .with_context(|| format!("failed to read config file: {}", cli.config))?;
+
+      let full_config = crate::config::FullConfig::parse(&config_content)
+          .with_context(|| format!("failed to parse config file: {}", cli.config))?;
+
+      let (static_config, dynamic_config) = full_config.into_static_and_dynamic();
+
+      let allow_wildcard_bind = static_config.allow_wildcard_bind || cli.allow_wildcard_bind;
+
+      validate(&static_config, &dynamic_config, cli.allow_wildcard_bind).map_err(|errors| {
+          anyhow::anyhow!(
+              "config validation failed:\n{}",
+              errors.iter()
+                  .map(|e| format!("  - {}", e))
+                  .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                  .join("\n")
+          )
+      })?;
+
+      Ok(LoadedConfig {
+          static_config,
+          dynamic_config,
+          allow_wildcard_bind,
+      })
+  }
+  ```
+- Delete the `collect_sites` helper function (lines 112-118)
+- Remove the now-unused imports: `SerializableDynamicConfig`, `BodyConfig`,
+  `RateLimitConfig` (if they're only used via `RawConfig`)
+
+**`src/config/mod.rs`**:
+- No changes needed — `FullConfig` already has `into_static_and_dynamic()`
+- Verify `FullConfig::parse` and `into_static_and_dynamic` produce identical
+  results to the old `RawConfig` path
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `RawConfig` struct deleted from `src/cli.rs`
+- [ ] `collect_sites` function deleted from `src/cli.rs`
+- [ ] `load_config` uses `FullConfig::parse` + `into_static_and_dynamic`
+- [ ] Startup config loading produces same results as before
+- [ ] Config validation still runs on both startup and reload
+- [ ] All existing `cli.rs` tests pass
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/config.md — config reload, FullConfig
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W6, S5 findings
+- src/cli.rs — RawConfig, load_config, collect_sites
+- src/config/mod.rs — FullConfig, into_static_and_dynamic
+
+## Notes
+
+> This changes the startup config parsing path. While the behavior should be
+> identical (same fields, same serde attributes), this is a sensitive area. A
+> review task follows the code quality generation.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/graceful-shutdown.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 id: fix/graceful-shutdown
 name: Fix shutdown to drain listeners and stop background tasks cleanly
-status: pending
+status: completed
 depends_on: []
 scope: moderate
 risk: medium

tasks/fix/http-port-type-u16.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+id: fix/http-port-type-u16
+name: Change http_port type from u32 to u16 per spec (W12)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W12]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`http_port` is declared as `u32` in `ListenerConfig` but `https_port` is `u16`.
+Both represent TCP port numbers (valid range 1–65535). The type inconsistency
+means comparisons require casting (`listener.http_port == listener.https_port as
+u32`) and `http_port` could theoretically hold values > 65535 caught by
+validation rather than the type system.
+
+The spec (config.md) now declares `http_port` as `u16`.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/config/static_config.rs`**:
+- Change `http_port` field type from `u32` to `u16` in `ListenerConfig`
+- Update `default_http_port()` return type to `u16`
+
+**`src/config/validation.rs`**:
+- Change `DuplicateHttpBind` error type: `http_port: u32` → `http_port: u16`
+- Change `HttpsAndHttpPortSame` error type: `http_port: u32` → `http_port: u16`
+- Change `HttpPortInvalid` error type: `http_port: u32` → `http_port: u16`
+- Remove `as u32` casts — both `http_port` and `https_port` are now `u16`
+- Remove the `http_port > 65535` check (impossible with `u16`, but keep `http_port > 0`
+  for the "disabled" check)
+- Update comparison: `listener.http_port == listener.https_port` (no cast needed)
+- Update health check port comparison: remove `as u32` cast
+
+**`src/main.rs`**:
+- Update any `http_port` references that assume `u32`
+
+**`src/cli.rs`**:
+- Update `RawConfig.http_port` type from `u32` to `u16` (if `RawConfig` still
+  exists after `fix/consolidate-config-types`; if not, this file is unaffected)
+
+**`src/config/test_fixtures.rs`**:
+- Update any test fixture `http_port` values from `u32` to `u16`
+
+**`tests/integration_test.rs`**:
+- Update any hardcoded `http_port` values
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `http_port` is `u16` in `ListenerConfig`
+- [ ] All `as u32` casts on `http_port` removed
+- [ ] `http_port > 65535` validation check removed (impossible with u16)
+- [ ] `http_port == https_port` comparison works without casting
+- [ ] All validation tests pass
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/config.md — `http_port` type declaration
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W12 finding
+- src/config/static_config.rs — `ListenerConfig` struct
+- src/config/validation.rs — validation rules, error types
+
+## Notes
+
+> If `fix/consolidate-config-types` runs first and removes `RawConfig`, the
+> `src/cli.rs` changes in this task are reduced. The two tasks are independent
+> in terms of the type change itself.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/inflight-counter-increment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+---
+id: fix/inflight-counter-increment
+name: Fix InFlightCounter to increment before spawning task (C2 + drain interval)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [C2]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`InFlightCounter::increment()` is never called anywhere in the codebase. The
+`InFlightGuard` only decrements on drop. Since `count` stays at 0, the first
+guard drop does `fetch_sub(1)` on an `AtomicUsize` with value 0, which wraps to
+`usize::MAX`. `is_zero()` checks `count == 0`, which never becomes true again.
+The drain logic in `drain_in_flight` always times out.
+
+The spec (operations.md shutdown sequence) states: "each request **must**
+increment the counter when it begins and decrement when it completes (via guard
+drop). The increment must happen before the request task is spawned."
+
+Additionally, the spec states the drain polls every 100ms, but the current
+implementation uses 50ms. Align with the spec.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/server.rs`**:
+- Fold the increment into `InFlightGuard::new()` so it's impossible to forget:
+  ```rust
+  impl InFlightGuard {
+      fn new(counter: Arc<InFlightCounter>) -> Self {
+          counter.increment();
+          Self(counter)
+      }
+  }
+  ```
+- Update `serve_https_listener` to use `InFlightGuard::new(in_flight.clone())`
+  instead of `InFlightGuard(in_flight.clone())`.
+- Make `InFlightGuard`'s tuple struct private (if it isn't already) so callers
+  must use `new()`.
+
+**`src/server.rs` — `drain_in_flight`**:
+- Change polling interval from 50ms to 100ms per the spec (operations.md):
+  ```rust
+  tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
+  ```
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `InFlightGuard::new()` calls `counter.increment()` before returning
+- [ ] `InFlightGuard` is constructed via `new()` only, not the tuple struct
+- [ ] `serve_https_listener` uses `InFlightGuard::new(in_flight.clone())`
+- [ ] `drain_in_flight` polls every 100ms (not 50ms)
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/operations.md — shutdown sequence, in-flight counter
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — C2 finding
+- src/server.rs — InFlightCounter, InFlightGuard, drain_in_flight
+- src/main.rs — drain_in_flight caller
+
+## Notes
+
+> The previous `fix/graceful-shutdown` task addressed the abort-vs-join logic
+> but did not fix the increment bug. This task completes that work.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/json-format-without-logfile.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+id: fix/json-format-without-logfile
+name: Fix JSON format not applied when no log file is configured (C4)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [C4]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+When `format = "json"` is configured but no `log_file_path` is set, the `None`
+branch of `init_json` creates a layer **without** calling `.json()`. The output
+is plain text, not JSON. The `format = "json"` config value is silently ignored.
+
+The spec (operations.md) states: "Both output destinations must respect the
+`format` config value: when `format = "json"`, both file and stdout output must
+use JSON formatting."
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/logging/mod.rs`** — `init_json` function, `None` branch (lines 54-58):
+- Add `.json()` to the stdout-only layer:
+  ```rust
+  None => {
+      let layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
+          .json()
+          .with_ansi(false)
+          .with_filter(env_filter);
+      tracing_subscriber::registry().with(layer).try_init()?;
+  }
+  ```
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `.json()` is called in the `None` branch of `init_json`
+- [ ] `format = "json"` with no `log_file_path` produces JSON output on stdout
+- [ ] `format = "json"` with `log_file_path` still produces JSON on both outputs
+- [ ] `format = "text"` paths are unchanged
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/operations.md — logging output, format guarantee
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — C4 finding
+- src/logging/mod.rs — `init_json` function
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/log-root-cert-count.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+id: fix/log-root-cert-count
+name: Log system root certificate count at startup (S3)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [S3]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`root_certs()` loads native certificates silently — only logs errors. If the
+system has zero root certificates (misconfigured CA bundle), all HTTPS upstream
+connections will fail with opaque TLS errors and no diagnostic message.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/proxy/handler.rs`** — `root_certs()` function (lines 246-258):
+- Add an info-level log with cert count and warn if zero:
+  ```rust
+  fn root_certs() -> rustls::RootCertStore {
+      let mut roots = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+      let result = rustls_native_certs::load_native_certs();
+      for cert in result.certs {
+          roots.add(cert).ok();
+      }
+      let cert_count = roots.len();
+      let error_count = result.errors.len();
+      if cert_count == 0 {
+          warn!(certs_loaded = cert_count, errors = error_count,
+              "no system root certificates loaded — HTTPS upstream connections will fail");
+      } else {
+          info!(certs_loaded = cert_count, errors = error_count,
+              "loaded system root certificates");
+      }
+      for err in &result.errors {
+          warn!(error = %err, "failed to load native certificate");
+      }
+      roots
+  }
+  ```
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Info-level log with cert count when certs > 0
+- [ ] Warn-level log when cert count is 0
+- [ ] Error count included in log output
+- [ ] Individual cert load errors still logged at warn level
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — S3 finding
+- src/proxy/handler.rs — `root_certs()` function
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+id: fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests
+name: Update rate limiter tests to use ConnectInfo instead of X-Forwarded-For (S10)
+status: completed
+depends_on: [fix/rate-limiter-ip-source]
+scope: narrow
+risk: medium
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [S10]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+After `fix/rate-limiter-ip-source` removes X-Forwarded-For parsing from the rate
+limiter, existing integration tests that pass client IPs via `X-Forwarded-For`
+headers will no longer work correctly. The rate limiter now reads exclusively
+from `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`, so tests must provide `ConnectInfo` in request
+extensions.
+
+This task also addresses review finding S10: "No test verifies the ConnectInfo
+extraction path, which is the primary path after C1 is fixed."
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`tests/integration_test.rs`**:
+- Find all rate limit integration tests (lines 90-163 and any others) that set
+  `X-Forwarded-For` headers for rate limiting purposes
+- Update those tests to set `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` in request extensions
+  instead of (or in addition to) `X-Forwarded-For`
+- Verify that `X-Forwarded-For` headers are now **ignored** by the rate limiter
+  — add a test that sends requests with different `X-Forwarded-For` values from
+  the same `ConnectInfo` IP and confirms they all count against the same bucket
+- Add a test that verifies requests **without** `ConnectInfo` are rejected with
+  429 (per ADR-025)
+
+**`src/rate_limit/mod.rs`** (test module):
+- Update any unit tests that rely on `X-Forwarded-For` extraction
+- Add a test that verifies `ConnectInfo`-based rate limiting works without any
+  `X-Forwarded-For` header
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] All rate limit integration tests use `ConnectInfo` for client IP
+- [ ] Tests verify `X-Forwarded-For` headers are ignored by rate limiter
+- [ ] New test: requests without `ConnectInfo` are rejected with 429
+- [ ] New test: different `X-Forwarded-For` values from same `ConnectInfo` IP
+      count against the same bucket (proving XFF is ignored)
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md — ADR-025
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — S10 finding
+- tests/integration_test.rs — rate limit tests
+- src/rate_limit/mod.rs — rate limiter middleware and tests
+
+## Notes
+
+> This task depends on `fix/rate-limiter-ip-source` because the code changes
+> must be in place before the tests can be updated. Attempting this before the
+> C1 fix would require writing tests for the old (broken) behavior.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/rate-limiter-ip-source.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+id: fix/rate-limiter-ip-source
+name: Fix rate limiter to use ConnectInfo only (ADR-025)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: high
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [C1]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The rate limiter currently extracts the client IP by checking the `X-Forwarded-For`
+header **first**, then falling back to `ConnectInfo`. This is a security
+vulnerability: since the rate limiter runs as middleware before the proxy
+handler injects trusted headers, the `X-Forwarded-For` value is whatever the
+client sent — completely untrusted. This enables two attack vectors:
+
+1. **Rate limit bypass**: Attacker sends each request with a different random
+   `X-Forwarded-For` value, evading per-IP token buckets entirely.
+2. **DoS via IP spoofing**: Attacker sends requests with `X-Forwarded-For:
+   <victim IP>`, depleting the victim's bucket.
+
+ADR-025 establishes that the rate limiter must use `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` as
+the **sole** source of client IP. If `ConnectInfo` is absent, the request must
+be **rejected** (not fall back to an untrusted header).
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/rate_limit/mod.rs`**:
+- Replace the current IP extraction logic in `rate_limit_middleware` (lines 66-76)
+  with ConnectInfo-first, no fallback:
+  ```rust
+  let client_ip = req
+      .extensions()
+      .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
+      .map(|ci| ci.ip());
+  ```
+- When `ConnectInfo` is absent, return 429 (reject the request) rather than
+  passing through without rate limiting. Per ADR-025: "If ConnectInfo is absent,
+  the request must be rejected rather than falling back to an untrusted header."
+  ```rust
+  let Some(ip) = client_ip else {
+      return (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "Too Many Requests").into_response();
+  };
+  ```
+- Remove all `X-Forwarded-For` header parsing from the rate limiter middleware.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Rate limiter extracts client IP from `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` only
+- [ ] No `X-Forwarded-For` header parsing in the rate limiter middleware
+- [ ] Requests without `ConnectInfo` are rejected with 429 (not passed through)
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes (note: integration tests that pass `X-Forwarded-For`
+      for rate limiting will need to be updated in the separate test task
+      `fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests`)
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md — ADR-025
+- docs/architecture/operations.md — Rate limiting design, IP source section
+- docs/architecture/proxy.md — Rate limiter IP source section
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — C1 finding
+- src/rate_limit/mod.rs — current implementation (lines 61-104)
+
+## Notes
+
+> This is the highest-priority security fix. After this change, the integration
+> tests in `tests/integration_test.rs` that rely on `X-Forwarded-For` for rate
+> limiting will need to be updated. That work is tracked separately in
+> `fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests`.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/remove-dead-code-remnants.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+---
+id: fix/remove-dead-code-remnants
+name: Remove dead code items identified in security review #003 (S1)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: trivial
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [S1]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Security review #003 identifies the following dead code items that survived the
+previous `fix/clean-dead-code` task. These items are defined but never called in
+production code:
+
+| Item | File | Note |
+|------|------|------|
+| `log_rate_limit!` macro | `src/logging/format.rs:72-83` | Rate limiter uses `warn!` directly |
+| `log_config_reload!` macro | `src/logging/format.rs:97-106` | Reload uses `info!`/`warn!` directly |
+| `format_event_fields()` | `src/logging/format.rs:50-54` | Never called |
+| `ProxyError::PayloadTooLarge` | `src/proxy/error.rs:12` | Body limit returns tuple directly |
+| `ProxyError::NotFound` | `src/proxy/error.rs:20` | Code uses `UnknownHost` instead |
+| `ProxyError::BadRequest` | `src/proxy/error.rs:22` | Code uses `MissingHost` instead |
+| `ProxyError::UpstreamTls` | `src/proxy/error.rs:28` | Never constructed |
+| `build_multi_domain_server_config()` | `src/tls/config.rs:78-102` | Never called |
+| `SniCertResolver` | `src/tls/config.rs:104-126` | Only used by above |
+| `AcmeTlsConfig::directory_url()` | `src/tls/acme.rs:53-59` | Only used in tests |
+
+### Changes Required
+
+For each item, either wire it up (if it should be used) or remove it:
+
+**Logging macros** (`src/logging/format.rs`):
+- `log_rate_limit!`: The rate limiter middleware now uses `warn!` directly.
+  Remove the macro and its test invocation in `log_macros_compile`.
+- `log_config_reload!`: The admin socket reload uses `info!`/`warn!` directly.
+  Remove the macro and its test invocation.
+- `format_event_fields()`: Never called externally. Remove it.
+
+**ProxyError variants** (`src/proxy/error.rs`):
+- `PayloadTooLarge`: Not used by body limit middleware (returns tuple directly).
+  Keep for now with a comment explaining it's reserved for future use, OR remove
+  if no plan to use it. The `#[non_exhaustive]` attribute means removing a variant
+  is not a breaking change for external consumers.
+- `NotFound`: Superseded by `UnknownHost`. Remove and update `status_code()` and
+  `body()` match arms.
+- `BadRequest`: Superseded by `MissingHost`. Remove and update match arms.
+- `UpstreamTls`: Never constructed. Remove and update match arms.
+- Update unit tests that reference removed variants.
+
+**TLS dead code** (`src/tls/config.rs`, `src/tls/acme.rs`):
+- `build_multi_domain_server_config()`: Remove function.
+- `SniCertResolver`: Remove struct and impl (only used by above function).
+- `AcmeTlsConfig::directory_url()`: Check if it's used in tests. If only in
+  tests, gate with `#[cfg(test)]`. If truly unused, remove.
+
+**Test helpers** (`tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs`):
+- `TestUpstream::url()`, `TestUpstream::upstream_addr()`: Currently annotated
+  `#[allow(dead_code)]`. If not used in any test, remove. If used, remove the
+  `#[allow(dead_code)]` annotation.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `log_rate_limit!` and `log_config_reload!` macros removed
+- [ ] `format_event_fields()` removed
+- [ ] Unused `ProxyError` variants removed (`NotFound`, `BadRequest`, `UpstreamTls`)
+- [ ] `PayloadTooLarge` either removed or documented with a TODO comment
+- [ ] `build_multi_domain_server_config()` and `SniCertResolver` removed
+- [ ] `directory_url()` either `#[cfg(test)]`-gated or removed
+- [ ] Dead test helper methods removed or `#[allow(dead_code)]` removed
+- [ ] All match arms in `ProxyError` methods updated for removed variants
+- [ ] All unit tests updated for removed variants
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — S1 finding
+- src/logging/format.rs — dead macros and function
+- src/proxy/error.rs — unused ProxyError variants
+- src/tls/config.rs — dead TLS functions
+- src/tls/acme.rs — directory_url method
+- tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs — dead_code-annotated helpers
+
+## Notes
+
+> The previous `fix/clean-dead-code` task added `#[non_exhaustive]` and removed
+> some dead code. This task addresses the items that survived that round or were
+> newly identified in review #003.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/rename-misleading-test.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+id: fix/rename-misleading-test
+name: Rename misleading health check test and fix dynamic config test (W8, W9)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W8, W9]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Two test quality issues in `tests/integration_test.rs`:
+
+**W8**: `test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero` is misleading — port 0 means
+"OS picks a random port" not "disabled". The test verifies that
+`start_health_check_listener(0)` works (binds to a random port), which is
+correct but the name implies it tests the disable path. The actual disable
+logic is in `main.rs:94` where `health_check_port > 0` gates the call.
+
+**W9**: `test_dynamic_config_with_limit` constructs `DynamicConfig` directly
+with `routing_table: Default::default()` (empty HashMap), bypassing
+`DynamicConfig::from_sites()`. The body limit tests only read
+`body.limit_bytes` so it doesn't matter, but it's a latent trap for anyone
+copying this pattern.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`tests/integration_test.rs`**:
+- Rename `test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero` to
+  `test_health_check_binds_random_port_when_zero`
+- Update `test_dynamic_config_with_limit` to use `DynamicConfig::from_sites()`
+  instead of directly constructing with an empty routing table, OR add a
+  comment explaining why the routing table is intentionally empty for this test
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Test renamed to `test_health_check_binds_random_port_when_zero`
+- [ ] `test_dynamic_config_with_limit` either uses `from_sites()` or has a
+      comment explaining the intentional empty routing table
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W8, W9 findings
+- tests/integration_test.rs — test names and implementations
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/tls-mode-wildcard-mismatch.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+id: fix/tls-mode-wildcard-mismatch
+name: Add explicit listener/acceptor count check or remove TlsMode wildcard (W5)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W5]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+The `match tls_mode` in `main.rs` has a wildcard `_` arm that logs a warning
+and pushes **no** acceptor. Then `bound_listeners.into_iter().zip(tls_acceptors.into_iter())`
+uses `zip`, which silently stops at the shorter iterator. If the wildcard arm
+were ever reached, some listeners would have no TLS acceptor and would be
+silently dropped.
+
+`setup_tls` already rejects unknown modes with `bail!`, so the wildcard is
+unreachable in practice. But it's a latent bug for future refactors.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/main.rs`** (lines 170-194):
+- Option A (preferred): Remove the wildcard `_` arm entirely. Since `TlsMode`
+  only has two variants (`Manual` and `Acme`) and `setup_tls` already validates,
+  the wildcard is dead code. Removing it means the compiler will catch future
+  `TlsMode` additions.
+
+- Option B: Add an explicit count check after the match loop:
+  ```rust
+  if bound_listeners.len() != tls_acceptors.len() {
+      anyhow::bail!("listener/acceptor count mismatch: {} listeners, {} acceptors",
+          bound_listeners.len(), tls_acceptors.len());
+  }
+  ```
+
+  If removing the wildcard, this check is redundant but harmless as a
+  defense-in-depth assertion.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] Wildcard `_` arm removed from the `match tls_mode` block, OR
+- [ ] Explicit count mismatch check added after the acceptor construction loop
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W5 finding
+- src/main.rs — TLS acceptor construction loop (lines 170-194)
+- src/tls/acceptor.rs — `setup_tls`, `TlsMode` enum
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/token-bucket-field-visibility.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+id: fix/token-bucket-field-visibility
+name: Make TokenBucket fields private except last_access (W10, S6)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: single
+risk: trivial
+impact: isolated
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W10, S6]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+All `TokenBucket` fields are `pub` but only `last_access` is read externally (by
+`evict_stale` in `rate_limit/mod.rs`). The other fields (`tokens`, `last_refill`,
+`rate`, `max`) should be private to prevent accidental direct mutation that
+bypasses `try_consume`/`refill` logic.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/rate_limit/bucket.rs`**:
+- Make `tokens`, `last_refill`, `rate`, `max` private (remove `pub`)
+- Keep `last_access` as `pub(crate)` for `evict_stale` access
+- `TokenBucket::new()` already exists as a constructor, so no changes needed there
+- Update any unit tests that directly access private fields. The tests in
+  `bucket.rs` are in the same module so they have access to private fields.
+  Tests in `mod.rs` may need adjustment if they access `bucket.tokens` etc.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `tokens`, `last_refill`, `rate`, `max` fields are private
+- [ ] `last_access` is `pub(crate)`
+- [ ] `new()` constructor is the only way to create a `TokenBucket` externally
+- [ ] `evict_stale` still compiles and works (uses `last_access`)
+- [ ] All unit tests pass (in-module tests can still access private fields)
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W10, S6 findings
+- src/rate_limit/bucket.rs — TokenBucket struct
+- src/rate_limit/mod.rs — evict_stale
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/upstream-host-validation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+---
+id: fix/upstream-host-validation
+name: Validate host part of upstream address in config (W1)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W1]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`is_valid_upstream` checks that the upstream has a `host:port` format with a
+valid port number, but performs **no validation on the host part** beyond
+checking it's non-empty and doesn't start with `http://` or `https://`. Values
+like `!!!bad!!!:3000` or `@#$%:8080` pass validation.
+
+The spec (config.md validation rule 17) now requires: "the host part must parse
+as a valid IpAddr or pass is_valid_hostname validation." Bracket-enclosed values
+must be parsed as IPv6 addresses.
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/config/validation.rs`** — `is_valid_upstream` function (lines 309-327):
+- After validating the port, validate the host part:
+  ```rust
+  fn is_valid_upstream(upstream: &str) -> bool {
+      if let Some(idx) = upstream.rfind(':') {
+          let host_part = &upstream[..idx];
+          let port_str = &upstream[idx + 1..];
+          if host_part.is_empty() { return false; }
+          if upstream.starts_with("http://") || upstream.starts_with("https://") { return false; }
+          let port: u16 = match port_str.parse() { Ok(p) => p, Err(_) => return false };
+          if port == 0 { return false; }
+          // Validate host part per config.md rule 17
+          if host_part.starts_with('[') && host_part.ends_with(']') {
+              let inner = &host_part[1..host_part.len()-1];
+              inner.parse::<std::net::Ipv6Addr>().is_ok()
+          } else {
+              host_part.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_ok() || is_valid_hostname(host_part)
+          }
+      } else {
+          false
+      }
+  }
+  ```
+- Note: `is_valid_hostname` already exists in the same file and is used for site
+  `host` validation. It rejects IP addresses, which is correct for site hosts
+  but wrong for upstream hosts — upstream hosts CAN be IPs. The upstream
+  validation must check `IpAddr::parse` first, then fall back to
+  `is_valid_hostname` for DNS names.
+
+- Add tests for:
+  - Valid: `gitea:3000`, `127.0.0.1:3000`, `[::1]:3000`
+  - Invalid: `!!!bad!!!:3000`, `@#$%:8080`, `:3000` (empty host)
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `is_valid_upstream` validates the host part as IP address or valid hostname
+- [ ] IPv6 bracket notation is handled (e.g., `[::1]:3000`)
+- [ ] Invalid host characters like `!!!bad!!!:3000` are rejected
+- [ ] Valid upstream formats still pass: `gitea:3000`, `127.0.0.1:3000`
+- [ ] New unit tests for valid and invalid upstream host parts
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/config.md — validation rule 17
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W1 finding
+- src/config/validation.rs — `is_valid_upstream`, `is_valid_hostname`
+
+## Notes
+
+> `is_valid_hostname` currently rejects IP addresses (intentional for site
+> hosts). The upstream validation must handle IPs separately before falling
+> back to `is_valid_hostname`.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/fix/upstream-uri-error-handling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+id: fix/upstream-uri-error-handling
+name: Return 502 on upstream URI parse failure instead of dropping query string (W3)
+status: completed
+depends_on: []
+scope: narrow
+risk: low
+impact: component
+level: implementation
+review_findings: [W3]
+---
+
+## Description
+
+`build_upstream_uri` silently drops the query string on parse failure and
+`.unwrap()`s the fallback. This corrupts requests — the upstream receives the
+wrong URL with no query parameters, and neither the client nor operator is
+notified. The `.unwrap()` on the fallback could also panic.
+
+The spec (proxy.md request forwarding step 1) states: "If URI construction
+fails (e.g., the resulting URI is malformed), the proxy must return 502 Bad
+Gateway and log the error at warn level. The proxy must never silently drop
+parts of the URI."
+
+### Changes Required
+
+**`src/proxy/handler.rs`**:
+- Change `build_upstream_uri` to return `Result<Uri, ()>`:
+  ```rust
+  fn build_upstream_uri(scheme: &str, upstream: &str, original_uri: &Uri) -> Result<Uri, ()> {
+      let path = original_uri.path();
+      let query = original_uri
+          .query()
+          .map(|q| format!("?{}", q))
+          .unwrap_or_default();
+      let uri_string = format!("{}://{}{}{}", scheme, upstream, path, query);
+      uri_string.parse::<Uri>().map_err(|e| {
+          warn!(error = %e, uri = %uri_string, "failed to parse upstream URI");
+      })
+  }
+  ```
+- Update `proxy_handler` to handle the `Err` case:
+  ```rust
+  let upstream_uri = match build_upstream_uri(&upstream_scheme, &upstream, req.uri()) {
+      Ok(uri) => uri,
+      Err(()) => {
+          log_upstream_error!(&host_owned, &upstream_addr, "malformed upstream URI");
+          let duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
+          log_request!(&client_ip, &host_owned, &method, &path, 502u16, &upstream, duration_ms);
+          return StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY.into_response();
+      }
+  };
+  ```
+- Update the existing unit tests for `build_upstream_uri` to handle the
+  `Result` return type.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] `build_upstream_uri` returns `Result<Uri, ()>` instead of `Uri`
+- [ ] URI parse failure logs a warning with the malformed URI string
+- [ ] URI parse failure returns 502 Bad Gateway to the client
+- [ ] No `.unwrap()` calls in `build_upstream_uri`
+- [ ] Query strings are never silently dropped
+- [ ] Existing unit tests updated for `Result` return type
+- [ ] `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+
+## References
+
+- docs/architecture/proxy.md — request forwarding step 1, URI error handling
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W3 finding
+- src/proxy/handler.rs — `build_upstream_uri`, `proxy_handler`
+
+## Notes
+
+> To be filled on completion
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tasks/review/post-security-fix-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+id: review/post-security-fix-review
+name: Review security fix implementations before production consideration
+status: completed
+depends_on:
+  - fix/rate-limiter-ip-source
+  - fix/inflight-counter-increment
+  - fix/connector-timeout-ceiling
+  - fix/json-format-without-logfile
+  - fix/upstream-host-validation
+  - fix/acme-contact-validation
+  - fix/upstream-uri-error-handling
+  - fix/admin-socket-resource-limits
+  - fix/consolidate-config-types
+  - fix/rate-limiter-connectinfo-tests
+scope: moderate
+risk: low
+impact: project
+level: review
+---
+
+## Description
+
+Review all security and bug fix implementations from Review #003 before
+considering them production-ready. Verify that the fixes correctly implement
+the architecture decisions (ADR-025, ADR-026, ADR-027) and the updated spec
+documents.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- [ ] C1 fix: Rate limiter uses ConnectInfo only, rejects without it (ADR-025)
+- [ ] C2 fix: InFlightCounter increments before task spawn, drain polls 100ms
+- [ ] C3 fix: Connector ceiling is 30s, per-site timeouts work >5s (ADR-026)
+- [ ] C4 fix: JSON format applied in stdout-only path
+- [ ] W1 fix: Upstream host part validated (DNS name or IP, IPv6 brackets)
+- [ ] W2 fix: ACME contact email validated (non-empty, contains @)
+- [ ] W3 fix: URI parse failure returns 502, never drops query string silently
+- [ ] W4 fix: Admin socket has 5s timeout and 4096 byte line limit (ADR-027)
+- [ ] W6 fix: RawConfig eliminated, FullConfig used in both paths
+- [ ] S10 fix: Rate limit tests use ConnectInfo, verify XFF is ignored
+- [ ] All `cargo test` passes
+- [ ] All `cargo clippy` passes with no warnings
+- [ ] No regressions in integration tests
+
+## References
+
+- docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — all findings
+- docs/architecture/decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md — ADR-025
+- docs/architecture/decisions/026-connector-timeout-ceiling.md — ADR-026
+- docs/architecture/decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md — ADR-027
+
+## Notes
+
+> This review covers the critical security fixes and the sensitive config
+> consolidation. It should be the last task before the generation 4+ code
+> quality items are considered final.
+
+## Summary
+
+> To be filled on completion

tests/helpers/http_test_helper.rs

@@ -34,14 +34,4 @@ impl TestUpstream {
     pub async fn spawn_ok() -> Self {
         Self::spawn(|| Router::new().route("/", get(|| async { "ok" }))).await
     }
-
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub fn url(&self) -> String {
-        format!("http://{}", self.addr)
-    }
-
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    pub fn upstream_addr(&self) -> String {
-        format!("127.0.0.1:{}", self.addr.port())
-    }
 }

tests/integration_test.rs

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ async fn test_health_check_local_port_binds_localhost() {
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
-async fn test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero() {
+async fn test_health_check_binds_random_port_when_zero() {
     let result = reverse_proxy::health::start_health_check_listener(0).await;
     assert!(result.is_ok());
     let (addr, handle) = result.unwrap();
@@ -87,13 +87,16 @@ async fn test_health_check_disabled_when_port_zero() {
     handle.abort();
 }
 
-fn make_rate_limit_app(limiter: Arc<reverse_proxy::rate_limit::RateLimiter>) -> Router {
+fn make_rate_limit_app(
+    limiter: Arc<reverse_proxy::rate_limit::RateLimiter>,
+) -> axum::extract::connect_info::IntoMakeServiceWithConnectInfo<Router, std::net::SocketAddr> {
     Router::new()
         .route("/", get(|| async { "ok" }))
         .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
             limiter,
             reverse_proxy::rate_limit::rate_limit_middleware,
         ))
+        .into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>()
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
@@ -116,7 +119,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_allows_within_burst() {
     for _ in 0..5 {
         let resp = client
             .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-            .header("x-forwarded-for", "192.168.1.1")
             .send()
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -144,7 +146,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_rejects_above_burst() {
     for _ in 0..2 {
         let resp = client
             .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-            .header("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.50")
             .send()
             .await
             .unwrap();
@@ -153,7 +154,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_rejects_above_burst() {
 
     let resp = client
         .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-        .header("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.50")
         .send()
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_429_response_body() {
     let client = reqwest::Client::new();
     let resp = client
         .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-        .header("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.50")
         .send()
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -189,7 +188,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_429_response_body() {
 
     let resp = client
         .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-        .header("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.50")
         .send()
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -217,7 +215,6 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_per_ip_independent() {
     let client = reqwest::Client::new();
     let resp = client
         .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-        .header("x-forwarded-for", "192.168.1.1")
         .send()
         .await
         .unwrap();
@@ -225,11 +222,85 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_per_ip_independent() {
 
     let resp2 = client
         .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
-        .header("x-forwarded-for", "192.168.1.2")
         .send()
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(resp2.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+    assert_eq!(resp2.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_rate_limit_without_connect_info_rejected_with_429() {
+    let mut config = reverse_proxy::config::test_fixtures::test_dynamic_config();
+    config.rate_limit = reverse_proxy::config::RateLimitConfig {
+        requests_per_second: 10,
+        burst: 20,
+    };
+    let config_arc = Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(config));
+    let limiter = Arc::new(reverse_proxy::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(config_arc));
+
+    let app = Router::new().route("/", get(|| async { "ok" })).layer(
+        axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            limiter,
+            reverse_proxy::rate_limit::rate_limit_middleware,
+        ),
+    );
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+
+    tokio::spawn(async { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });
+
+    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+    let resp = client
+        .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    let body = resp.text().await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(body, "Too Many Requests");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn test_rate_limit_xff_header_ignored_same_bucket() {
+    let mut config = reverse_proxy::config::test_fixtures::test_dynamic_config();
+    config.rate_limit = reverse_proxy::config::RateLimitConfig {
+        requests_per_second: 10,
+        burst: 2,
+    };
+    let config_arc = Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(config));
+    let limiter = Arc::new(reverse_proxy::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(config_arc));
+
+    let app = make_rate_limit_app(limiter);
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+
+    tokio::spawn(async { axum::serve(listener, app).await.unwrap() });
+
+    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+
+    let resp = client
+        .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+        .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.1")
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let resp = client
+        .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+        .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.2")
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let resp = client
+        .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/", addr.port()))
+        .header("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.3")
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
@@ -244,10 +315,12 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_eviction_task() {
 
     limiter.check_and_consume(std::net::IpAddr::from([192, 168, 1, 1]));
 
+    let shutdown = Arc::new(reverse_proxy::shutdown::GracefulShutdown::new(30));
     let handle = reverse_proxy::rate_limit::start_eviction_task(
         limiter.clone(),
         Duration::from_millis(50),
         Duration::from_millis(100),
+        shutdown.subscribe(),
     );
 
     tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
@@ -259,7 +332,7 @@ async fn test_rate_limit_eviction_task() {
 
 fn make_redirect_listener_config(
     bind_addr: &str,
-    http_port: u32,
+    http_port: u16,
     https_port: u16,
 ) -> reverse_proxy::config::static_config::ListenerConfig {
     reverse_proxy::config::static_config::ListenerConfig {
@@ -614,21 +687,21 @@ fn test_validate_wildcard_bind_via_cli_flag() {
 }
 
 fn test_dynamic_config_with_limit(limit_bytes: u64) -> Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>> {
-    let config = DynamicConfig {
-        sites: vec![SiteConfig {
-            host: "test.local".to_string(),
-            upstream: "127.0.0.1:8080".to_string(),
-            upstream_scheme: "http".to_string(),
-            upstream_connect_timeout_secs: 5,
-            upstream_request_timeout_secs: 60,
-        }],
-        rate_limit: RateLimitConfig {
+    let sites = vec![SiteConfig {
+        host: "test.local".to_string(),
+        upstream: "127.0.0.1:8080".to_string(),
+        upstream_scheme: "http".to_string(),
+        upstream_connect_timeout_secs: 5,
+        upstream_request_timeout_secs: 60,
+    }];
+    let config = DynamicConfig::from_sites(
+        sites,
+        RateLimitConfig {
             requests_per_second: 10,
             burst: 20,
         },
-        body: BodyConfig { limit_bytes },
-        routing_table: Default::default(),
-    };
+        BodyConfig { limit_bytes },
+    );
     Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(config))
 }