---
status: draft
last_updated: 2026-06-14
---

# Operations

## What It Is

The operations component covers everything related to running the proxy in
production: rate limiting, logging (fail2ban integration), health checks,
systemd integration, and graceful shutdown.

## Why It Exists

A reverse proxy that can't be monitored, rate-limited, or gracefully restarted
is not production-ready. These concerns are cross-cutting — they affect the
proxy handler, the TLS layer, and the config system.

## Rate Limiting

### Requirements

- Limit requests per IP address (replacing nginx's `limit_req_zone`)
- Default: 10 requests/second with burst of 20 (matching current nginx config)
- Configurable via DynamicConfig (no restart needed)
- Must produce logs that fail2ban can consume

### Design

The rate limiter runs as axum middleware before the proxy handler. It uses a
token bucket algorithm per client IP, matching nginx's `limit_req burst`
semantics.

The client IP for rate limiting is determined **exclusively** from
`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` — the TCP peer address set before TLS handshake.
Client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` headers must not be consulted because the
rate limiter runs before the proxy handler injects trusted headers. See
ADR-025.

Rate limits are global per-IP in Phase 1 (not per-site). A request from IP
address X counts against the same bucket regardless of which site it targets.
Per-site rate limits may be added in Phase 2.

The token bucket uses **nodelay** semantics matching nginx's `limit_req burst
nodelay`: when the bucket is empty, the request is immediately rejected with
429 — requests are not queued. Tokens are added at a rate of
`requests_per_second` (1 token every 1000ms / requests_per_second), and the
bucket capacity is the `burst` value.

When a request exceeds the rate limit, the middleware returns `429 Too Many
Requests` and logs the event with structured fields.

### State Eviction

The per-IP token bucket state grows over time as new IPs are seen. A
background task runs every 60 seconds (configurable) and removes entries
whose last access timestamp is older than a configurable eviction age
(default: 300 seconds / 5 minutes). This prevents unbounded memory growth
while preserving recent entries that may still receive traffic.

### Config Reload Behavior

When rate limit parameters change (e.g., from 10 req/s burst 20 to 20 req/s
burst 40), the behavior is:

1. New `DynamicConfig` is swapped in via ArcSwap.
2. On the next request from an existing IP, the rate limiter reads the current
   `DynamicConfig` for rate/burst parameters.
3. The token bucket refills using the new rate, and its capacity is set to the
   new burst maximum.
4. If the current token count exceeds the new burst maximum, it is capped to
   the new burst maximum.

The HashMap is **not** cleared — this avoids creating a rate-limiting gap.
Existing buckets adopt new parameters on their next request. The eviction task
continues removing stale entries independently.

### IPv6 Rate Limiting

IPv6 addresses have a vastly larger address space than IPv4. Rate limiting per
individual IPv6 address (`/128`) is ineffective against attackers who can
generate many addresses within a `/64` prefix.

- **IPv4**: Rate limited per individual address (`/32`).
- **IPv6**: Rate limited per `/64` prefix. All addresses in the same `/64` share
  the same token bucket. This matches RFC 4941 privacy extension boundaries and
  common anti-abuse practice.

The rate limiter normalizes IPv6 addresses to their `/64` prefix before
bucket lookup.

### Fail2ban Integration

Rate limit events are logged in a structured format that a custom fail2ban
filter can parse. See [ADR-007](decisions/007-custom-log-format.md) for the
format decision.

The log format uses `key=value` pairs with a `RATE_LIMIT` prefix:

```
RATE_LIMIT client_ip=203.0.113.50 host=Y.Z path=/W status=429
```

A corresponding fail2ban filter and jail configuration are provided as part
of the deployment documentation.

## Logging

### Structure

All logs use `tracing` with structured fields. The proxy outputs two types of
log entries:

1. **Access logs**: Every proxied request is logged at `info` level with
   structured fields. Access logging is **always-on** — it is the primary
   observability mechanism for the proxy and is required for fail2ban
   integration. There is no configuration option to disable access logging.

```
REQUEST client_ip=203.0.113.50 host=git.alk.dev method=GET path=/user/repo status=200 upstream=127.0.0.1:3000 duration_ms=45
```

2. **Event logs**: Rate limits, TLS errors, upstream failures, config reloads,
   etc.

   ```
   RATE_LIMIT client_ip=203.0.113.50 host=git.alk.dev path=/login status=429
   UPSTREAM_ERROR host=git.alk.dev upstream=127.0.0.1:3000 error="connection refused"
   CONFIG_RELOAD status=success sites=1
   ```

### Output

Logs are written to two destinations simultaneously:
- **File** (primary): `/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log` — the authoritative
  source for fail2ban consumption. File logging is always enabled when the
  `log_file_path` config is set. See ADR-020 for the rationale behind
  file-primary logging.
- **stdout/stderr**: Always-on, for `docker logs`, `journalctl`, and
  development use. Structured in the same format as the file output.

Both output destinations use `with_ansi(false)` to disable ANSI escape codes.
This is critical for fail2ban log parsing (ANSI codes break regex matching) and
for clean output in Docker containers where a terminal is not attached. See
ADR-024.

The `tracing-subscriber` layer configuration supports both simultaneously via
`Layer` composition.

Both output destinations must respect the `format` config value: when
`format = "json"`, both file and stdout output must use JSON formatting.
When `format = "text"`, both use text formatting. The format must not be
silently ignored in any output path (see Security Review C4).

### File Logging and fail2ban

File logging is the primary integration point for fail2ban. A log file on a
volume mount is simpler and more reliable than parsing Docker log drivers or
journald — no log driver configuration, no format conversion, no risk of
dropping events.

In container deployments, the log directory is volume-mounted so fail2ban on
the host can read it directly:

```yaml
volumes:
  - /var/log/reverse-proxy:/var/log/reverse-proxy
```

A corresponding fail2ban filter definition and jail configuration are provided
as part of the deployment documentation.

**Filter regex note**: The fail2ban `failregex` pattern matches `RATE_LIMIT`
without a `^` anchor because log lines have a timestamp/level prefix before the
`RATE_LIMIT` keyword. The pattern `RATE_LIMIT client_ip=<HOST> host=\S+ path=\S+ status=\d+`
matches the rate limit event anywhere in the line, which correctly handles the
structured log format.

### Log Levels

| Level | Use |
|-------|-----|
| `error` | Unrecoverable failures (TLS handshake failure, config validation) |
| `warn` | Rate limit exceeded, upstream unreachable, upstream timeout |
| `info` | Access logs, config reloads, ACME events, startup/shutdown |
| `debug` | Request/response headers, connection details |
| `trace` | Detailed protocol-level information |

Configurable via `log_level` in StaticConfig.

## Health Check

### Local Health Check Port

The health check endpoint is served on a separate local port (default: 9900),
bound to `127.0.0.1` only. It is not served on the main HTTPS listener —
health checking is an operational concern that does not belong on the
public-facing proxy. See ADR-013 and ADR-022.

```
GET http://127.0.0.1:9900/health → 200 OK (empty body)
```

The port is configurable via `health_check_port` in StaticConfig. Setting it
to `0` disables the health check listener entirely.

The admin HTTP endpoint's `status` command provides an additional health/status
mechanism that returns process information:

```
GET http://127.0.0.1:9900/admin/status
Authorization: Bearer <admin-key>

→ {"status": "ok", "uptime_secs": 1234, "sites": 2}
```

Requires Bearer token authentication. See ADR-028 for details.

### What It Checks

- Process is running and the tokio runtime is responsive
- Config is loaded (StaticConfig and DynamicConfig are initialized)

It does **not** check upstream reachability. The health check answers "is the
proxy process healthy?", not "is the upstream reachable?" — upstream health is
a separate concern that would produce 502/504 responses in the proxy handler.

It also does **not** verify TLS configuration — that is the responsibility of
external monitoring tools that connect to the public HTTPS port directly.

### Future Extensions

- `/health/ready` — readiness check that includes upstream reachability
- Prometheus metrics at `/metrics`

## Systemd Integration

The proxy can also run as a bare binary via systemd (alternative to container
deployment). The systemd unit file is provided for this use case.

### Unit File

```ini
[Unit]
Description=Reverse Proxy
After=network.target
Wants=network-online.target

[Service]
Type=notify
NotifyAccess=all
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/reverse-proxy --config /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5

# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/reverse-proxy /var/log/reverse-proxy

# ACME challenge cache directory
StateDirectory=reverse-proxy

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```

The proxy signals readiness to systemd via `sd_notify` after binding listeners
and completing the initial configuration load.

## Graceful Shutdown

### Signal Handling

The proxy handles three signals via `signal-hook` (see [ADR-009](decisions/009-signal-handling.md)):

- **SIGTERM / SIGINT**: Graceful shutdown. Stop accepting new connections, wait
  for in-flight requests to complete (up to a configurable timeout), then exit.
- **SIGHUP**: Config reload. Re-read the config file, validate, and swap
  DynamicConfig if valid. No feedback on success or failure.
- **Admin HTTP endpoint**: Send `POST /admin/reload` with a Bearer token to the
  health check listener (`http://127.0.0.1:9900/admin/reload`). Returns
  structured response indicating success or failure. See ADR-028 for details.

### SIGHUP for Config Reload

SIGHUP triggers config reload (see [config.md](config.md) for details). The
process does not exit on SIGHUP.

### Admin HTTP Endpoint for Config Reload

The admin HTTP endpoint provides programmatic config reload with feedback
and authentication. This is useful for CI/CD pipelines and automation tools.
See ADR-028 for the rationale and security model.

**Authentication**: All `/admin/*` endpoints require a Bearer token in the
`Authorization` header. The token is compared against a SHA-256 hash of the
admin key file contents using constant-time comparison (`subtle::ConstantTimeEq`)
to prevent timing attacks.

**Key management**: The admin key is stored in a file on disk (specified by
`admin_key_path` in StaticConfig, default: `/etc/reverse-proxy/admin-key`).
The proxy reads this file once at startup, hashes its contents with SHA-256,
and stores only the hash in memory. The plaintext key is never held in memory
after startup. Setting `admin_key_path` to an empty string disables all admin
endpoints.

**Endpoints**:

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| POST | `/admin/reload` | Trigger config reload. Returns `{"status": "ok"}` or `{"status": "error", "message": "..."}` |
| GET | `/admin/status` | Return process info: `{"status": "ok", "uptime_secs": N, "sites": N}` |
| POST | `/admin/rotate-key` | Generate new random key, return it, replace stored hash |

**Error responses**: Admin endpoint errors return generic messages — no
filesystem paths, no config structure details. Full error information is
logged server-side only. When admin endpoints are disabled (empty
`admin_key_path`), `/admin/*` returns 404 (endpoint appears not to exist).
Wrong or missing Bearer token returns 401.

**Key rotation**: `/admin/rotate-key` generates a new 256-bit random key,
returns the plaintext key in the response, and replaces the stored SHA-256
hash in memory. In-memory rotation does **not** persist across restarts — on
restart, the proxy re-reads the key file. To make rotation permanent, the
operator must also update the key file on disk.

**Concurrency**: Reload operations are serialized (see Config Reload section
in config.md). Multiple concurrent `/admin/reload` requests are handled
correctly.

**Config file TOCTOU protection**: Both SIGHUP and admin HTTP reload compare
the config file's modification timestamp before and after reading. If the
file changed during the read, the reload is rejected with a "please retry"
message. Operators should use atomic file replacement (write to a temp file,
then `rename()` over the target) for safe config rotation. See ADR-029.

**Reload validation consistency**: The `cli_allow_wildcard_bind` flag is
stored in `ConfigReloadHandle` at startup, ensuring that reload validation
uses the same flag as startup validation. If the proxy was started with
`--allow-wildcard-bind`, reload will also allow wildcard bind addresses.
See ADR-030.

### Shutdown Sequence

On SIGTERM or SIGINT, the proxy performs a graceful shutdown:

1. **Stop accepting new connections** — Close all TCP listening sockets. No new
   connections are accepted.
2. **Close idle keep-alive connections** — Send `Connection: close` on any idle
   connections in the keep-alive pool.
3. **Wait for in-flight requests** — Up to `shutdown_timeout_secs` (default: 30)
   for active requests to complete. The proxy tracks in-flight requests using
   an atomic counter: each request **must** increment the counter when it
   begins and decrement when it completes (via guard drop). The increment
   must happen before the request task is spawned — if the counter is not
   incremented, the drain logic is broken (see Security Review C2). During
   drain, the proxy polls the counter every 100ms and exits early
   when it reaches zero. If the timeout expires before all requests complete,
   the proxy logs how many in-flight requests remain and proceeds to
   force-close. Server tasks are joined (not aborted) so that in-flight
   requests can drain normally. Only after the timeout expires are remaining
   tasks aborted.
4. **Force-close remaining connections** — After the timeout, any remaining
   connections are forcefully closed via TCP RST.
5. **Cancel background tasks** — ACME renewal tasks, rate limiter eviction task,
   and rate limiter eviction task are all cancelled.
6. **Exit with code 0**.

The `shutdown_timeout_secs` is configurable in StaticConfig (default: 30
seconds). See config.md for details.

## File Descriptor Budget

The connection semaphore (shared across all listeners, review #010 C4) caps
concurrent client TLS connections at exactly `max_connections` process-wide.
Each connection holds one FD, and the process needs additional FDs for the
HTTPS/HTTP/health listener sockets, the log file, ACME renewal sockets,
epoll/timer FDs, and stdin/stdout/stderr.

At startup and on config reload, the proxy reads the process's soft
`RLIMIT_NOFILE` (Unix; skipped when the limit is `RLIM_INFINITY`) and rejects
the configuration if:

```
max_connections + 64 (reserved FDs) > soft RLIMIT_NOFILE
```

This guard exists because the semaphore is the intended protection against
FD exhaustion — but before review #010 C2, nothing stopped it from being
configured at or above the real ceiling, guaranteeing `EMFILE` under load
(the review #010 incident shape).

A soft limit at or below the Docker default (1024) also triggers a prominent
startup warning even when the budget fits.

### Recommended baselines

| Environment | nofile | max_connections | Rationale |
|-------------|--------|-----------------|-----------|
| Docker / docker-compose | 8192 (`ulimits.nofile`) | 800–1024 | Working production baseline from review #010 M1: connection FDs ≈ 10% of the limit |
| systemd | 8192 (`LimitNOFILE=`) | 800–1024 | Same headroom; set in the unit file's `[Service]` section |
| Bare metal (high traffic) | ≥ 2 × max_connections | sized to traffic | Keep ≥ 50% headroom for non-connection FDs and bursts |

Check what the running process actually sees:

```bash
cat /proc/$(pidof reverse-proxy)/limits | grep "open files"
```

## Deployment

### Binary

Single static binary, no runtime dependencies:

```bash
cargo build --release
# Produces: target/release/reverse-proxy
```

The binary is self-contained — no system libraries beyond libc for DNS
resolution. The `aws_lc_rs` crypto provider is statically linked.

### Configuration

```bash
# Config file
/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml

# ACME cache directory
/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache/

# Log directory (optional, for fail2ban)
/var/log/reverse-proxy/
```

### CLI

```bash
reverse-proxy [OPTIONS]

Options:
  --config <PATH>      Path to config file [default: /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml]
  --validate          Validate config and exit
  --allow-wildcard-bind  Permit 0.0.0.0 as a bind address (for container deployments)
  --help              Show help
  --version           Show version
```

## Container Deployment

### Rationale

The proxy runs in a minimal Docker container for defense-in-depth. Even if an
attacker finds a logic-level vulnerability, they must also escape the container
boundary. Combined with Rust's memory safety, this provides two independent
barriers against exploitation. See ADR-020 for the full rationale.

### Container Image

Multi-stage build: compile in `rust:alpine`, run in `alpine` (or `scratch` for
absolute minimum). The final image contains only the static binary and
necessary runtime files. No shell, no package manager, no unnecessary tools.

The binary is compiled against the `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` target for
static linking. The `aws_lc_rs` crypto provider is statically linked — no
OpenSSL dependency.

### Networking

The proxy supports flexible upstream addressing — no assumption about upstream
localality:

| Deployment | Upstream Address | Example |
|------------|-----------------|---------|
| Same-host, shared Docker network | Docker DNS name | `gitea:3000` |
| Same-host, host networking | Loopback | `127.0.0.1:3000` |
| Different host, LAN | LAN IP | `10.0.0.5:3000` |
| Different host, VPN/tunnel | Tunnel endpoint | Varies by tunnel config |

In container deployments, the proxy binds `0.0.0.0` inside the container and
Docker publishes specific ports to the host IP. The `allow_wildcard_bind`
override is required for this configuration (see ADR-016, ADR-020).

### Volume Mounts

| Container Path | Host Path | Purpose |
|---------------|-----------|---------|
| `/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml` | Config file (read-only) | Proxy configuration |
| `/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache/` | ACME state directory | Certificate persistence across restarts |
| `/var/log/reverse-proxy/` | Log directory | fail2ban reads from host |
| `/etc/reverse-proxy/admin-key` | Admin key file | Bearer token for admin endpoints (read-only) |

### Docker Compose Example

This example shows the reverse proxy alongside a Gitea container on a shared
Docker network. Real IPs, secrets, and domain names are replaced with
placeholders.

```yaml
services:
  reverse-proxy:
    build: .
    container_name: reverse-proxy
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
      - "203.0.113.10:80:80"     # HTTP redirect
      - "203.0.113.10:443:443"   # HTTPS
    volumes:
      - /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml:/etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml:ro
      - /var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache:/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache
      - /var/log/reverse-proxy:/var/log/reverse-proxy
      - /etc/reverse-proxy/admin-key:/etc/reverse-proxy/admin-key:ro
    networks:
      - proxy-net
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "--spider", "http://127.0.0.1:9900/health"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 3

  gitea:
    image: gitea/gitea:latest
    container_name: gitea
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
      - "203.0.113.10:22:2222"    # Git SSH
    volumes:
      - /opt/gitea:/data
    networks:
      - proxy-net
      - gitea-db-net

  gitea-db:
    image: postgres:16-alpine
    container_name: gitea-db
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      POSTGRES_USER: admin
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD}
      POSTGRES_DB: gitea
    volumes:
      - gitea-db:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    networks:
      - gitea-db-net

networks:
  proxy-net:
  gitea-db-net:

volumes:
  gitea-db:
```

Corresponding proxy config (inside the container):

```toml
allow_wildcard_bind = true
health_check_port = 9900
admin_key_path = "/etc/reverse-proxy/admin-key"

[logging]
level = "info"
format = "text"
log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log"

[rate_limit]
requests_per_second = 10
burst = 20

[body]
limit_bytes = 104857600

[[listeners]]
bind_addr = "0.0.0.0"
http_port = 80
https_port = 443

[listeners.tls]
mode = "acme"
acme_domains = ["git.example.com"]
acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
acme_directory = "production"
acme_contact = "mailto:admin@example.com"

[[listeners.sites]]
host = "git.example.com"
upstream = "gitea:3000"    # Docker DNS resolves this
```

### fail2ban Integration

In container deployments, fail2ban runs on the host and reads the proxy's log
file from the volume mount:

```
/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log  →  fail2ban filter  →  iptables/nftables
```

This is simpler and more reliable than parsing Docker log drivers. The log
file is the authoritative source for rate limit events and access logs.

### Health Check

Docker's native `HEALTHCHECK` uses the local health endpoint:

```dockerfile
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --retries=3 \
  CMD wget -q --spider http://127.0.0.1:9900/health || exit 1
```

No port publishing is needed — the health check runs inside the container.
There is no `/health` route on the main HTTPS listener.

### SSH Traffic

SSH traffic for Git operations is not proxied through the reverse proxy. It
continues to be routed directly to the Gitea container via Docker port
publishing (e.g., `203.0.113.10:22:2222`), matching the current deployment
pattern.

## Startup Sequence

The proxy starts components in a specific order to ensure fail-fast behavior
and correct dependency initialization:

1. **Parse and validate config** — Read the TOML config file, deserialize into
   `StaticConfig` and `DynamicConfig`, and validate all rules. If validation
   fails, exit with non-zero code and log errors. No ports are bound.

2. **Initialize DynamicConfig** — Load sites, rate limits, and body limits into
   `ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>`.

3. **Initialize shared state** — Create the rate limiter
   `HashMap<IpAddr, TokenBucket>`, the shared `hyper::Client`, and the
   `tracing-subscriber` with file and stdout layers.

4. **Bind health check port** (if enabled) — Bind `127.0.0.1:{health_check_port}`.
   Fail-fast if bind fails.

5. **Read admin key** (if enabled) — Read the admin key file, compute SHA-256
   hash, and store the hash in memory for Bearer token authentication. If the
   file is not readable, log a warning and disable admin endpoints (but
   continue starting — admin endpoints are non-critical).

6. **Bind all listener ports** — For each listener: bind HTTP port (if enabled)
   and HTTPS port. If any bind fails, fail-fast and exit. All ports are bound
   before proceeding.

7. **Load TLS configuration** — For each listener: load manual certificates or
   initialize ACME state machine. If manual certificate loading fails, fail-fast
   and exit. For ACME: if no cached certificate exists and ACME provisioning
   fails, fail-fast and exit.

8. **Start TCP listeners** — Begin accepting connections on all bound ports.

9. **Start background tasks** — ACME renewal tasks (per listener in ACME mode),
   rate limiter eviction task, signal handler task.

10. **Signal readiness** — Send `sd_notify("READY=1")` to systemd (if running
    under systemd).

**Failure semantics**: **Fail-fast**. If any step fails, the process exits with
a non-zero code. The proxy does not partially start. All ports are bound before
any connections are accepted.

## Design Decisions

All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).

| ADR | Decision | Summary |
|-----|----------|---------|
| [001](decisions/001-rust-axum.md) | Rust with axum | Memory safety; single binary deployment |
| [006](decisions/006-rate-limiting-approach.md) | Token bucket rate limiting | In-memory per-IP token bucket matching nginx burst semantics |
| [007](decisions/007-custom-log-format.md) | Custom structured log format | key=value pairs with RATE_LIMIT prefix for fail2ban |
| [009](decisions/009-signal-handling.md) | Signal handling strategy | signal-hook for SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP |
| [013](decisions/013-health-check-port.md) | Health check on separate local port | Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port |
| [014](decisions/014-unix-socket-reload.md) | ~~Unix domain socket config reload API~~ | ~~Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback~~ (Superseded by ADR-028) |
| [020](decisions/020-container-deployment.md) | Container deployment model | Defense-in-depth via container isolation; file-primary logging |
| [024](decisions/024-ansi-disabled-logging.md) | ANSI-disabled logging | All log output uses `with_ansi(false)` for fail2ban and Docker compatibility |
| [025](decisions/025-rate-limiter-ip-source.md) | Rate limiter IP source | ConnectInfo only, never client-supplied X-Forwarded-For |
| [027](decisions/027-admin-socket-resource-limits.md) | ~~Admin socket resource limits~~ | ~~5s read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit~~ (Deprecated by ADR-028) |
| [028](decisions/028-admin-http-api.md) | Authenticated HTTP admin API | Bearer token auth on health check port; replaces Unix domain socket |
| [029](decisions/029-config-reload-toctou.md) | Config file TOCTOU mitigation | mtime check before and after config read; reject reload if file changed |
| [030](decisions/030-wildcard-flag-consistency.md) | Store cli_allow_wildcard_bind in ConfigReloadHandle | Consistent validation between startup and reload |

## Open Questions

Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). Key
questions affecting this document:

- ~~**OQ-03**: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port?~~ (resolved
  — ADR-013: separate local port, default 9900, localhost only)
- ~~**OQ-08**: Should `/health` use a less common path?~~ (resolved — ADR-022:
  no `/health` route on the main listener at all; health checking is via port
  9900 and admin HTTP endpoint only)
- ~~**OQ-12**: Should request access logging be mandatory or optional?~~ (resolved
  — access logging is mandatory and always-on at `info` level; no configuration
  option to disable it)
- **OQ-14**: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable?
  (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))
- **OQ-15**: Should admin key rotation persist across restarts?
  (see [open-questions.md](open-questions.md))