Add three ADRs (025-027) and update five spec documents to close gaps identified in the security and bug review: - ADR-025: Rate limiter IP source must be ConnectInfo only (C1 fix) - ADR-026: Connector timeout ceiling of 30s for per-site timeouts (C3 fix) - ADR-027: Admin socket resource limits — 5s timeout, 4096 byte line limit (W4 fix) Spec changes: - proxy.md: add rate limiter IP source section, URI error handling constraint, connector ceiling description, renumber sections - operations.md: add ConnectInfo-only IP source, in-flight counter architectural requirement (C2), JSON format guarantee (C4), admin socket resource limits, 100ms drain polling interval - config.md: fix http_port type u32→u16 (W12), tighten upstream host validation (W1), tighten ACME contact validation (W2), add X-Forwarded-Proto cross-reference, clarify alknet ADR-030 reference - overview.md: fix ambiguous C1 reference, add ADR/OQ cross-references - open-questions.md: update OQ-09 resolution, add OQ-13 (acme_contact Vec) and OQ-14 (eviction configurability) - README.md: add ADR-025/026/027 and OQ-13/14, update doc statuses to draft Also fix reviewer findings: alknet ADR-030 scope clarification, RFC 2616 reference updated to RFC 7230.
21 KiB
status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-06-12 |
Configuration
What It Is
The configuration system defines how the proxy is configured, how configuration is loaded, and how dynamic configuration can be reloaded without restarting the process.
Why It Exists
The proxy needs to be configurable without hard-coding domains, upstream
addresses, or TLS settings. The configuration system separates immutable
startup parameters (bind addresses, TLS mode) from runtime-adjustable
parameters (site definitions, rate limits) using the ArcSwap pattern proven
in the alknet project.
Architecture
config.toml
│
▼
┌──────────────────────┐
│ serde::Deserialize │
│ (TOML → Config) │
└──────────┬───────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────┐
│ StaticConfig │
│ (immutable) │
│ │
│ health_check_port │
│ admin_socket_path │
│ log_level │
│ log_format │
│ │
│ listeners[] │
│ ┌────────────────┐ │
│ │ Listener 1 │ │
│ │ bind_addr │ │
│ │ http_port │ │
│ │ https_port │ │
│ │ tls.mode │ │
│ │ tls.acme_domains│ │
│ │ tls.acme_cache_dir│ │
│ │ tls.acme_directory│ │
│ │ tls.cert_path │ │
│ │ tls.key_path │ │
│ └────────────────┘ │
│ ┌────────────────┐ │
│ │ Listener N │ │
│ │ ... │ │
│ └────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────┐
│ DynamicConfig │
│ (hot-reloadable) │
│ │
│ sites[] │
│ rate_limit │
│ body_limit │
│ │
│ ← ArcSwap → │
│ ConfigReloadHandle │
│ .reload(new_config) │
└───────────────────────┘
Static vs Dynamic Configuration
This split follows the pattern established in alknet (alknet ADR-030, not
this project) and adapted for our simpler use case. See ADR-019 for the
rationale behind the [[listeners]] configuration format.
StaticConfig
Immutable after startup. Changes require a process restart.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
listeners |
Vec<ListenerConfig> |
Independent TLS endpoints, each with its own bind address and TLS config (see ADR-019) |
allow_wildcard_bind |
bool |
Allow 0.0.0.0 as a bind address. Required for container deployments. Default: false (see ADR-016, ADR-020) |
health_check_port |
u16 |
Port for local health check endpoint (default: 9900; set to 0 to disable; bound to 127.0.0.1 only; see ADR-013, ADR-022) |
admin_socket_path |
String |
Unix domain socket path for admin API (default: /run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock; empty string to disable; see ADR-014) |
shutdown_timeout_secs |
u64 |
Maximum seconds to wait for in-flight requests during graceful shutdown (default: 30) |
logging |
LoggingConfig |
Logging configuration (see below) |
LoggingConfig (nested in [logging] TOML section):
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
level |
"trace", "debug", "info", "warn", "error" |
Logging verbosity |
format |
"text" or "json" |
Log output format |
log_file_path |
String |
Path to log file. When set, structured logs are written to this file in addition to stdout/stderr. Strongly recommended for fail2ban integration in container deployments (see ADR-020). Default: not set (file logging disabled) |
Note: All log output uses with_ansi(false) to disable ANSI escape codes.
This is critical for fail2ban regex matching and Docker log output (see ADR-024).
Both text and JSON formats produce plain-text output without color codes.
Note: The entire LoggingConfig (including log_file_path) is static and
requires a process restart to change. Log file path changes require reopening
file handles, which is complex and low-value for Phase 1. Log rotation (Phase 2)
will be handled via signal-based or built-in rotation.
ListenerConfig (per-listener static config):
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
bind_addr |
String |
IP address to bind to (must be explicit, no 0.0.0.0; see ADR-016) |
http_port |
u16 |
Port for HTTP→HTTPS redirect (default: 80; set to 0 to disable; valid values: 0 or 1–65535). Note: the implementation currently uses u32; this must be changed to u16 to match the architecture spec (see Security Review W12). |
https_port |
u16 |
Port for TLS listener (default: 443) |
tls.mode |
"acme" or "manual" |
Certificate provisioning mode |
tls.acme_domains |
Vec<String> |
Domains for ACME SAN certificate (ACME mode only) |
tls.acme_cache_dir |
String |
ACME state cache directory |
tls.acme_directory |
"production" or "staging" |
Let's Encrypt directory |
tls.acme_contact |
String |
Contact email for ACME registration (e.g., "mailto:admin@example.com"). Required for production; Let's Encrypt rejects registrations without a contact email. Must contain a non-empty email after mailto: with an @ sign. See OQ-10, OQ-13. |
tls.cert_path |
String |
Certificate file path (manual mode only) |
tls.key_path |
String |
Private key file path (manual mode only) |
Note on X-Forwarded-Proto: The X-Forwarded-Proto header is derived
from which listener port received the request: https for requests on the
listener's https_port, http for requests on the http_port. In practice,
since the HTTP listener sends a 301 redirect rather than proxying,
X-Forwarded-Proto is always "https" for proxied requests. See proxy.md and
OQ-11.
Why listeners are static: Each listener requires binding a TCP socket and constructing a TLS acceptor — operations that fundamentally require a restart. Changing a listener's bind address, TLS mode, or certificate configuration cannot be done without creating new listeners. See ADR-008 and ADR-019.
DynamicConfig
Hot-reloadable at runtime via ArcSwap. Changes take effect for new
connections immediately.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
sites |
Vec<SiteConfig> |
Site definitions (hostname → upstream mapping) |
rate_limit.requests_per_second |
u32 |
Rate limit per IP (global in Phase 1) |
rate_limit.burst |
u32 |
Burst capacity (global in Phase 1) |
body_limit_bytes |
u64 |
Max request body size in bytes (global in Phase 1) |
SiteConfig:
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
host |
String |
Hostname to match (e.g., "git.alk.dev") |
upstream |
String |
Upstream address. Supports Docker DNS (gitea:3000), loopback (127.0.0.1:3000), LAN IPs, and tunnel endpoints. No assumption about upstream locality (see ADR-020) |
upstream_scheme |
"http" or "https" |
Protocol for upstream connection (default: "http") |
upstream_connect_timeout_secs |
u64 |
TCP connect timeout in seconds (default: 5; see ADR-015, ADR-017) |
upstream_request_timeout_secs |
u64 |
Full request timeout in seconds (default: 60; see ADR-015, ADR-017) |
Sites are defined per listener in the [[listeners]] entries for organizational
purposes, but at runtime they are collected into a single global routing table
in DynamicConfig. The proxy looks up the Host header in this global table to
route requests. Hostnames must be unique across all listeners — a Host header
can only match one site definition, regardless of which listener received the
request. See ADR-019 for the rationale behind the [[listeners]] configuration
format.
Why these are dynamic: See ADR-008 for the rationale. Site definitions and rate limits are per-request concerns that should not require restarting the proxy or dropping active connections. Rate limits and body limits are global settings in Phase 1; per-site configuration for these is deferred to Phase 2.
Default Values
| Field | Type | Default | Required |
|---|---|---|---|
allow_wildcard_bind |
bool |
false |
No |
health_check_port |
u16 |
9900 |
No |
admin_socket_path |
String |
/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock |
No |
shutdown_timeout_secs |
u64 |
30 |
No |
logging.level |
String |
"info" |
No |
logging.format |
String |
"text" |
No |
logging.log_file_path |
String |
(not set) | No |
listeners[].http_port |
u16 |
80 |
No |
listeners[].https_port |
u16 |
443 |
No |
listeners[].tls.acme_directory |
String |
"production" |
No |
listeners[].tls.acme_contact |
String |
— | Yes (ACME mode only) |
sites[].upstream_scheme |
String |
"http" |
No |
sites[].upstream_connect_timeout_secs |
u64 |
5 |
No |
sites[].upstream_request_timeout_secs |
u64 |
60 |
No |
rate_limit.requests_per_second |
u32 |
— | Yes |
rate_limit.burst |
u32 |
— | Yes |
body.limit_bytes |
u64 |
— | Yes |
Fields without defaults are required and must be specified in the config file.
Config Reload
ArcSwap Pattern
DynamicConfig is wrapped in Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>>. This provides:
- Lock-free reads: Every handler reads the current config via a single
Arcdereference — no lock contention on the request hot path. - Atomic writes:
ConfigReloadHandle::reload(new_config)swaps the entire config atomically. All new requests see the new config immediately. - No partial updates: The entire config is swapped at once. There's no risk of reading a half-updated config.
See ADR-008 for the rationale behind this split.
Reload Trigger
Config reload is triggered by two mechanisms:
-
SIGHUP: Re-reads the config file, validates, and swaps DynamicConfig if valid. Simple and well-understood, but provides no feedback on success or failure.
-
Admin socket: The
reloadcommand via the admin Unix domain socket performs the same action as SIGHUP but returns a structured response indicating success or failure with an error message. See ADR-014 for details.
Both mechanisms converge on the same code path:
- Re-read the config file from disk
- Deserialize into
DynamicConfig - Validate (check upstream reachability is optional)
- Call
ConfigReloadHandle::reload(new_config)
Static Config Changes During Reload
When the config file is reloaded (via SIGHUP or admin socket), the entire file is read and validated — both static and dynamic portions. This provides early error detection for misconfigurations that would prevent a restart from succeeding.
If the full config fails validation, the reload is rejected and the old DynamicConfig remains active.
If the full config passes validation but static fields have changed, the DynamicConfig is swapped normally and a warning is logged listing the changed static fields and noting that a restart is required for those changes to take effect. This gives operators early feedback about config drift.
Only the DynamicConfig portion is swapped via ArcSwap. StaticConfig changes require a process restart to take effect.
Important: The ConfigReloadHandle must track the last-known StaticConfig
so that it can correctly detect changes on subsequent reloads. After each
successful reload, the stored StaticConfig is updated with the new value (via
ArcSwap<StaticConfig> or similar interior mutability). This prevents stale
warnings: if the same static config change is present on two consecutive
reloads, the operator should see the warning only once, not on every reload.
Reload Serialization
Reload operations are serialized using a tokio::sync::Mutex on the reload
code path. If a reload is in progress (triggered by SIGHUP or admin socket) and
a second reload is requested, the second request waits for the first to
complete, then re-reads the config file (getting the latest version) and
proceeds. This prevents race conditions where two concurrent reloads could apply
an older config over a newer one.
Out of Scope: File Watching
Automatic file watching (inotify, fsnotify, etc.) is out of scope for Phase 1. Config reload is triggered explicitly by SIGHUP or admin socket command. File watching adds complexity (debouncing, handling atomic renames, handling editor swap files) that is not justified for a single-instance proxy with infrequent config changes.
TOML Config Format
Multi-Config (Dedicated-IP Per Domain)
The primary deployment model — each listener on its own IP with its own TLS certificate:
# reverse-proxy config
# Global settings
health_check_port = 9900 # Local health check (0 to disable)
admin_socket_path = "/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock" # Empty string to disable
[logging]
level = "info"
format = "text" # "text" or "json"
# log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log" # Optional; always-on when set
[rate_limit]
requests_per_second = 10
burst = 20
[body]
limit_bytes = 104857600 # 100 MB
# Listener 1: git.alk.dev on its own IP
[[listeners]]
bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
http_port = 80
https_port = 443
[listeners.tls]
mode = "acme"
acme_domains = ["git.alk.dev"]
acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache-git"
acme_directory = "production"
acme_contact = "mailto:admin@alk.dev"
[[listeners.sites]]
host = "git.alk.dev"
upstream = "127.0.0.1:3000"
upstream_scheme = "http"
# upstream_connect_timeout_secs = 5 # Default: 5s
# upstream_request_timeout_secs = 60 # Default: 60s
# Listener 2: alk.dev on its own IP with a manual certificate
[[listeners]]
bind_addr = "203.0.113.11"
http_port = 80
https_port = 443
[listeners.tls]
mode = "manual"
cert_path = "/etc/ssl/alk.dev/fullchain.pem"
key_path = "/etc/ssl/alk.dev/privkey.pem"
[[listeners.sites]]
host = "alk.dev"
upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
upstream_scheme = "http"
Shared-IP Multi-Domain (SAN Certificate)
A single listener serving multiple domains with one SAN certificate:
# Global settings
health_check_port = 9900
admin_socket_path = "/run/reverse-proxy/admin.sock"
[logging]
level = "info"
format = "text"
# log_file_path = "/var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log" # Optional; always-on when set
[rate_limit]
requests_per_second = 10
burst = 20
[body]
limit_bytes = 104857600
# Single listener with multi-domain SAN certificate
[[listeners]]
bind_addr = "203.0.113.10"
http_port = 80
https_port = 443
[listeners.tls]
mode = "acme"
acme_domains = ["git.alk.dev", "alk.dev"]
acme_cache_dir = "/var/lib/reverse-proxy/acme-cache"
acme_directory = "production"
acme_contact = "mailto:admin@alk.dev"
[[listeners.sites]]
host = "git.alk.dev"
upstream = "127.0.0.1:3000"
[[listeners.sites]]
host = "alk.dev"
upstream = "127.0.0.1:8080"
Validation
On startup, the config is validated:
- At least one
[[listeners]]entry must exist - Each listener's
bind_addris not0.0.0.0unlessallow_wildcard_bindis enabled. This can be enabled via config (allow_wildcard_bind = true) or CLI flag (--allow-wildcard-bind). Either source enables it — it is an OR relationship, not AND. The CLI flag does not override the config value; if either is set, wildcard binding is allowed. - Each listener's
bind_addrandhttps_portcombination must be unique - In ACME mode,
acme_domainsmust be non-empty - In manual mode,
cert_pathandkey_pathmust both be set and the files must be readable - Each site must have a
hostandupstream - Site
hostvalues must be unique across all listeners (no duplicate hostnames, even across different listeners). Duplicate hostnames would create ambiguous routing — the proxy would not know which listener's upstream to route a request to when theHostheader matches multiple sites. rate_limit.requests_per_secondmust be > 0body.limit_bytesmust be > 0- Each listener's
bind_addrandhttp_portcombination must be unique (prevents bind-time errors, same as rule 3 forhttps_port) - Within a listener,
http_portandhttps_portmust differ https_portmust be 1–65535 (required — TLS needs a port)http_portmust be 0 (disabled) or 1–65535health_check_portmust not conflict with any listener'shttp_portorhttps_porton the same bind address- Site
hostvalues must not include a port number (e.g.,git.alk.dev, notgit.alk.dev:443) - Site
hostvalues must be valid hostnames (not IP addresses, not including ports). Hostnames are normalized to lowercase during validation. upstreammust be inhost:portformat whereportis a required integer 1–65535 and the host part must be a valid DNS hostname or IP address. IPv6 addresses must use bracket notation (e.g.,[::1]:3000). Values like!!!bad!!!:3000or@#$%:8080are rejected. The host part is validated as follows: bracket-enclosed values are parsed as IPv6 addresses; otherwise the host part must parse as a validIpAddror passis_valid_hostnamevalidation (same rules as sitehostvalues). Examples:gitea:3000,127.0.0.1:3000,[::1]:3000. Invalid examples:gitea(missing port),http://gitea:3000(includes scheme),10.0.0.5(missing port),!!!bad!!!:3000(invalid host part). Theupstream_schemefield handles the protocol.upstream_schemevalues are case-sensitive: only"http"or"https"(lowercase). Default is"http".- In ACME mode,
tls.acme_contactmust be a validmailto:URI with a non-empty email address containing an@sign (e.g.,"mailto:admin@example.com"). Values like"mailto:"(empty email) or"mailto:user"(no@) are rejected. Let's Encrypt requires a contact email for production certificate requests.
On SIGHUP reload, the same validation applies. If the new config fails validation, the reload is rejected and the old config remains active. An error is logged.
On startup: If config validation fails, the process exits with a non-zero code and logs the validation errors. The proxy will not start with an invalid configuration.
Design Decisions
All design decisions are documented as ADRs in decisions/.
| ADR | Decision | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 003 | TOML configuration format | Rust-native, unambiguous, excellent serde support |
| 008 | Static/dynamic config split | Immutable StaticConfig, hot-reloadable DynamicConfig via ArcSwap |
| 010 | Multi-site in Phase 1 | Multiple domains from initial release |
| 011 | Multi-domain TLS config | Single SAN certificate covering all domains |
| 013 | Health check on separate local port | Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port |
| 014 | Unix domain socket config reload API | Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback |
| 015 | Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults | 5s connect / 60s request defaults, per-site overrides |
| 016 | Explicit bind address required | Rejects 0.0.0.0 to prevent accidental exposure |
| 019 | Multi-config listeners | [[listeners]] supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models |
| 020 | Container deployment model | Flexible upstream addressing; allow_wildcard_bind override for containers |
| 026 | Connector timeout ceiling | 30s ceiling on connector, per-site timeout via tokio::time::timeout |
| 027 | Admin socket resource limits | 5s read timeout, 4096 byte line length limit |
Open Questions
Open questions are tracked in open-questions.md. Key questions affecting this document:
OQ-04: Should config reload support a Unix domain socket API in addition to SIGHUP?(resolved — ADR-014: Unix domain socket admin API added)OQ-07: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains?(resolved — ADR-019:[[listeners]]with per-listener TLS config)- OQ-13: Should
acme_contactsupport multiple email addresses? (see open-questions.md) - OQ-14: Should rate limiter eviction interval and max age be configurable? (see open-questions.md)