reverse-proxy/docs/reviews/010-emfile-accept-loop-flood.md

status, last_updated, reviewed_code, reviewer, based_on, trigger, fixes

status	last_updated	reviewed_code	reviewer	based_on	trigger	fixes
mitigated	2026-09-13	src/server.rs src/config/static_config.rs /opt/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.yml (dev1 deploy) /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml (dev1 deploy)	code-reviewer	docs/reviews/009-fix-never-deployed-and-streaming-body-bug.md	Production incident on dev1 (2026-09-11 ~21:00-23:00 UTC) — EMFILE busy-loop wrote ~6M ERROR lines (~1.9 GB log) in 2 hours	M1: MITIGATED in production 2026-09-12 — container RLIMIT_NOFILE raised to 8192 (compose ulimits) and max_connections lowered 1024 → 800. Code fixes (C1 backoff, C2 validation) remained open. C1: FIXED 2026-09-13 — accept-loop error classification + backoff + signature-keyed log de-duplication (src/server.rs). C3: FIXED 2026-09-13 — TLS handshake timeout (tls_handshake_timeout_secs, default 10s) wraps tls_acceptor.accept() in src/server.rs; stalled handshakes release FD + permit. C4: FIXED 2026-09-13 — connection semaphore is shared across all listeners (ConnectionSemaphore, src/server.rs); max_connections is now a process-wide cap, not max_connections × listeners. C2: OPEN — no startup cross-check that max_connections fits under RLIMIT_NOFILE with headroom. Sequenced after C3/C4.

Review #010 — EMFILE Accept-Loop Flood (6M ERROR lines, 1.9 GB log in 2 hours)

Summary

On 2026-09-11, between approximately 21:00 and 23:00 UTC, the production reverse proxy on dev1 hit EMFILE ("No file descriptors available", os error 24) and its accept loop busy-spun, emitting ~6M ERROR log lines (~1.9 GB) in roughly 2 hours — approximately 460K ERROR lines in the 22:00 hour alone, sustained at ~127 lines/second.

The accept loop has no error backoff: tcp_listener.accept() fails instantly and repeatedly when the process is out of file descriptors, and the continue on error turns that into a hot spin. Every iteration writes an error! line both to stdout (Docker json-file, unbounded by rotation) and to the access log file. The access log grew to 1.9 GB in a day (vs. ~60 MB on normal days); 99% of it was the EMFILE flood. This is the same failure shape as a task leak: an unbounded resource (log bytes) with no circuit breaker.

Two contributing design gaps made the EMFILE reachable at all:

1. C1: the accept loop treats accept errors as transient ("log and continue"), which is correct for EINTR/EAGAIN but catastrophic for persistent errors like EMFILE/ENFILE — retry-without-delay on those is a busy loop.
2. C2: max_connections = 1024 (the semaphore cap on concurrent TLS connections) equals the container's Docker-default RLIMIT_NOFILE = 1024 — zero headroom for the listener sockets, health/admin listener, log file FD, ACME renewal sockets, stdin/out/err, and epoll instances. The semaphore therefore admits connections right up to (and past, counting non-connection FDs) the FD ceiling.

Production mitigation applied (2026-09-12)

• /opt/reverse-proxy/docker-compose.yml: added ulimits: nofile: {soft: 8192, hard: 8192}.
• /etc/reverse-proxy/config.toml: max_connections 1024 → 800.
• Container restarted; verified: process limit shows 8192, health green, h2 traffic normal, zero EMFILE lines since.

With nofile = 8192 and max_connections = 800, the semaphore now caps connection FDs at ~10% of the limit, leaving ample headroom. This removes the trigger, not the failure mode — see C1/C2 for the code fixes that remain open.

Evidence

Timeline (from /var/log/reverse-proxy/access.log.1, since rotated)

• 20:00 hour: 54 ERROR lines (baseline noise all day was 8–18/2h block)
• 21:00 hour: 5,558,249 ERROR lines (grep count) — flood begins
• 22:00 hour: 457,419 ERROR lines (flood tail)
• First ERROR overall: 2026-09-11T00:15:37Z; last: 2026-09-12T07:30:27Z (the 07:30 last line is the deploy restart cutting off the tail)

Error line shape:

2026-09-11T22:00:00.000011Z ERROR reverse_proxy::server: failed to accept TCP connection error=No file descriptors available (os error 24)
2026-09-11T22:00:00.000024Z ERROR ... (repeat, ~80 µs apart)

Note the ~13 µs spacing between consecutive EMFILE lines at 22:00:00.000 — a pure busy loop, no backoff, no yield.

Rotated-log size comparison

File	Size	Notes
access.log.2.gz (Sep 11→12)	55 MB gz / 1.9 GB raw	flood day
access.log.3–7.gz (Sep 6→11)	4.9–8.1 MB gz each	normal days

Trigger conditions

The EMFILE state was reachable because concurrent TLS connections (throttled only by the 1024 semaphore) plus the proxy's own FDs exceeded the container's Docker-default RLIMIT_NOFILE = 1024. Verified live on dev1 before mitigation:

Max open files   1024  519288  files      (containerized process)

Traffic context: the flood hour followed sustained crawler load (~77K requests from a 63-IP crawler fleet that day, plus a 30K-request poller from 74.7.242.34). A burst of slow/held TLS connections (e.g. crawlers opening connections and stalling handshakes) suffices to exhaust 1024 FDs; TLS handshakes in progress each hold an FD, and connection_idle_timeout only frees them after 60 s.

After mitigation (nofile 8192, max_connections 800): 0 EMFILE lines, 21 FDs in use at idle, health checks green.

Finding C1: Accept loop busy-spins on persistent accept errors [server]

Status: FIXED 2026-09-13. The accept loop in serve_https_listener() now classifies accept errors and backs off (see "C1 fix" below).

Severity: High — turns any FD/socket exhaustion into a log flood that burns disk and I/O (1.9 GB in 2 hours observed) and starves the accept loop entirely.

Location: src/server.rs, serve_https_listener() (lines ~255–264):

loop {
    tokio::select! {
        accept_result = tcp_listener.accept() => {
            let (tcp_stream, remote_addr) = match accept_result {
                Ok(conn) => conn,
                Err(e) => {
                    error!(error = %e, "failed to accept TCP connection");
                    continue;   // <- busy spin on EMFILE/ENFILE
                }
            };
            ...

Why it matters: accept() fails immediately with EMFILE — there is no blocking wait between retries, so continue yields a ~13 µs error-log cycle. The log write itself (to file + stdout) makes the spin slower and more destructive.

C1 fix (landed): src/server.rs implements:

• is_transient_accept_error() — WouldBlock/Interrupted retry immediately with no log and no sleep (correct under load).
• is_resource_accept_error() — ConnectionAborted, EMFILE, ENFILE, ENOBUFS, ENOMEM → log + 1 s backoff.
• Everything else → log + 100 ms backoff.
• AcceptErrorReporter — de-duplicates by error signature: first occurrence logs at error!, repeats within a 10 s window are counted, and each window close emits one summary line with suppressed=N backoff_ms=1000. The 6M-line incident shape would now produce ~720 log lines over 2 hours instead of 6M.
• The conn_sem.acquire_owned() error path (semaphore closed) also sleeps 100 ms instead of spinning.

Notes from implementation:

• The redirect (:80) and health (:9900) listeners use axum::serve, which already applies the hyper-style 1 s backoff on non-connection accept errors (axum 0.8.9 src/serve/listener.rs → handle_accept_error). No change needed there; the busy-spin existed only in the custom HTTPS loop.
• Two follow-up findings surfaced while fixing C1 (tracked in "Recommended next steps"):
  • C3 (new) — FIXED 2026-09-13: tls_acceptor.accept() had no timeout, so a stalled TLS handshake held an FD and a semaphore permit indefinitely (the idle watchdog only starts after the handshake completes). Fixed via tls_handshake_timeout_secs (default 10s) wrapping the accept in tokio::time::timeout. This was the likely actual FD-exhaustion vector for slow/held crawler handshakes, and a slowloris amplifier.
  • C4 (open) — FIXED 2026-09-13: conn_sem was per-listener (main.rs spawns one serve_https_listener per listener, each creating its own semaphore), so the effective connection cap was max_connections × listeners. Fixed via a single ConnectionSemaphore (Arc<Semaphore> wrapper, src/server.rs) created in main.rs and shared by every listener; max_connections is now a process-wide cap. This is the topology the C2 RLIMIT cross-check should assume.

Original finding (pre-fix, preserved for context)

Location: src/server.rs, serve_https_listener() (lines ~255–264):

loop {
    tokio::select! {
        accept_result = tcp_listener.accept() => {
            let (tcp_stream, remote_addr) = match accept_result {
                Ok(conn) => conn,
                Err(e) => {
                    error!(error = %e, "failed to accept TCP connection");
                    continue;   // <- busy spin on EMFILE/ENFILE
                }
            };
            ...

Why it matters: accept() fails immediately with EMFILE — there is no blocking wait between retries, so continue yields a ~13 µs error-log cycle. The log write itself (to file + stdout) makes the spin slower and more destructive.

Options worth considering while fixing:

• Log the first N occurrences of a repeated accept error at error!, then demote to a periodic (e.g. once/10s) summary until the error clears — bounds log damage from any repeating accept failure.
• On EMFILE specifically, a small sleep (500 ms–1 s) is both correct and cheap: the process cannot make progress on accepts until FDs are released anyway.

Note: the redirect (HTTP:80) listener and health listener use a different loop shape (axum::serve) which already backs off; see the implementation notes above.

Finding C2: max_connections is not cross-checked against RLIMIT_NOFILE [config]

Severity: Medium — the semaphore is the intended protection against FD exhaustion, but it can be configured at/above the process's real ceiling, making it a false safety net.

Location: src/config/static_config.rs (default_max_connections() = 1024) and validation in src/config/validation.rs.

Why it matters: max_connections counts only TLS connections; the process also needs FDs for: HTTPS + HTTP + health-check listener sockets, the log file, stdin/stdout/stderr, epoll/timer FDs, and ACME renewal outbound sockets (rustls-acme opens TCP + TLS per ACME interaction). With max_connections == RLIMIT_NOFILE (the dev1 situation, both 1024), the semaphore guarantees the ceiling can be hit under load.

Recommended fix: at startup (and reload), read the process soft RLIMIT_NOFILE (via rlimit crate or getrlimit) and reject config (or warn + clamp) if:

max_connections + reserved_fds > soft_limit

with reserved_fds ~64 (listeners + log + ACME + epoll headroom). Warn prominently when the soft limit is the Docker default 1024; better, the project's Docker/systemd docs should recommend nofile 8192 alongside max_connections = 1024 (or vice versa: derive a sane default from the observed limit).

Finding M1 (mitigation): raise nofile + lower max_connections [deploy]

Status: Applied 2026-09-12 (see Summary). Backups: docker-compose.yml.bak.20260912-080241, config.toml.bak.20260912-080241.

Residual risk after mitigation: none identified for FD exhaustion at current traffic (peak concurrent connections observed ≪ 800); the code findings C2 remains the durable fix (C1 + C3 + C4 landed 2026-09-13).

Traffic-analysis side note (from the same investigation)

The EMFILE hunt began as a traffic-volume estimate for Gitea, which surfaced the flood because yesterday's rotated log was 1.9 GB vs ~60 MB normal. Traffic profile (2026-09-11, 204K REQUEST lines):

• ~77K requests from a 63-IP crawler fleet (57.141.20.x — GitHub's published crawler range), ~1.3K req/IP, commit/blame/raw pages
• ~30K requests from 74.7.242.34 (Microsoft) polling /pulls + /issues on 3 repos (alkdev/alktunnels, alkdev/alktls, alkdev/alkgen) plus 56 on alkdev/typemap; all GET, no POSTs — dashboard-style monitoring, first seen that day
• ~20 HTTPS git fetches, ~22 API calls, zero HTTPS pushes
• Zero POSTs to /user/login; zero 401/403 that day — no credential attacks over HTTPS

None of this traffic is hostile per se, but it does mean the "1024 concurrent connections" ceiling is reachable from ordinary crawler behavior, which is exactly what made the EMFILE state reachable.

Recommended next steps

1. Land C1 (accept-loop error backoff + log de-duplication) — DONE 2026-09-13 (see Finding C1).
2. Land C3 (TLS handshake timeout) — DONE 2026-09-13. New static config tls_handshake_timeout_secs (default 10s, must be > 0) wraps tls_acceptor.accept() in tokio::time::timeout (accept_tls_with_timeout(), src/server.rs). On timeout the handshake future is dropped, releasing the TCP FD and the semaphore permit; the idle watchdog never needs to run for a stalled handshake. Closes the crawler slow-handshake vector described under "Trigger conditions".
3. Land C4 (shared connection semaphore across listeners) so max_connections is a global cap rather than per-listener — DONE 2026-09-13. serve_https_listener() no longer creates its own semaphore; it receives an Arc<ConnectionSemaphore> (new public wrapper in src/server.rs) built once in main.rs and cloned into every listener task. max_connections is now the process-wide concurrent TLS connection cap; the effective cap no longer scales with listener count. This is the topology C2's RLIMIT cross-check should assume.
4. Land C2 (RLIMIT cross-check at startup) with a prominent warning or hard validation error. The FD budget assumes a shared semaphore (landed, see step 3): connection FDs are capped at max_connections process-wide. Lower urgency after M1: with the deploy baseline (nofile 8192, max_connections 800) the ceiling is ~10% of the limit, so C2 is a validation guard, not an active exposure.
5. Consider a doc note in docs/architecture/operations.md describing the nofile/max_connections relationship (the mitigation values above are a working baseline: nofile 8192, max_connections 800).
6. Docker image: the deployment Dockerfile on dev1 is a two-line stub (FROM + COPY); if the project's own deploy/Dockerfile is ever used, it should also set ulimits guidance or rely on compose as done here. The repo's own deploy/docker-compose.yml still lacks the ulimits block applied to dev1, and deploy/reverse-proxy.service lacks LimitNOFILE.