Files
reverse-proxy/docs/architecture/overview.md
glm-5.1 346754fb2b Resolve OQ-07: add multi-config listener support (ADR-019)
Introduce [[listeners]] configuration to support both dedicated-IP
(1 IP = 1 cert = 1 domain) and shared-IP (SAN certificate) deployment
models. Each listener is an independent TLS endpoint with its own bind
address, TLS config, and site routing. OQ-07 is now resolved.

Changes:
- Add ADR-019 for multi-config listener support
- Update config format from [server] to [[listeners]] entries
- Update tls.md for per-listener TLS and certificate provisioning
- Update overview.md architecture diagram and scope
- Update proxy.md for per-listener HTTP redirect
- Fix stale references in ADR-010, ADR-011, ADR-016
- Update OQ-05 resolution (per-listener bind_addr supersedes)
- Add unique-host rationale to config validation rules
- Architecture review: fix all 3 critical and 6 warning issues
2026-06-11 09:35:24 +00:00

11 KiB

status, last_updated
status last_updated
draft 2026-06-11

Overview

Vision

A memory-safe, minimal reverse proxy that replaces our vulnerable nginx instance for forwarding requests to backend services. The proxy terminates TLS, injects standard proxy headers, enforces rate limits, and forwards requests to upstream services — supporting multiple domains from initial release.

This project is open source under dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0, consistent with standard Rust project licensing.

Why This Exists

Our nginx 1.24.0 installation is vulnerable to multiple actively-exploited CVEs, including CVE-2026-42945 (unauthenticated RCE via rewrite/set directives). The broader threat landscape is worsening: LLM-assisted fuzzing is accelerating bug discovery in nginx's C codebase, and security researchers report additional undisclosed vulnerabilities. Upgrading nginx patches known CVEs but does not address the structural problem — memory corruption bugs are endemic to C, and the discovery rate is accelerating.

Rust's memory safety eliminates the entire class of buffer overflow, use-after-free, and double-free bugs that constitute 6 of 7 recent nginx CVEs. Combined with rustls (pure Rust TLS, no OpenSSL dependency), this provides a fundamentally safer baseline.

See threat-landscape.md for full vulnerability details.

Scope

In Scope

  • Phase 1: Multi-site reverse proxy with TLS termination

    • Multiple independent TLS listeners via [[listeners]] configuration
    • Each listener has its own bind address, TLS config, and site routing
    • Supports both dedicated-IP (1 IP = 1 cert = 1 domain) and shared-IP (SAN certificate) deployment models (ADR-019)
    • TLS termination with ACME (Let's Encrypt) and manual certificate management
    • Cipher suite restriction matching nginx scope (ECDHE-AES-GCM + TLS 1.3)
    • HTTP → HTTPS redirect
    • Host-based routing to multiple upstream services
    • Reverse proxy to Gitea at 127.0.0.1:3000 (git.alk.dev)
    • Reverse proxy to Deno/Fresh container for alk.dev (simple pass-through)
    • Proxy header injection (Host, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto)
    • Per-site upstream timeouts with sensible defaults (5s connect, 60s request)
    • Request rate limiting with fail2ban-compatible logging (global per-IP)
    • 100 MB body size limit (global)
    • Configurable bind addresses (must be explicit, no 0.0.0.0)
    • Local health check endpoint on separate port (default: 9900, localhost only)
    • Unix domain socket admin API for config reload with feedback
    • Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM handling)
    • Systemd unit file
    • Dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0
  • Phase 2: Operational hardening

    • Per-site rate limits and body limits
    • Metrics endpoint (Prometheus-compatible)
    • Connection limits and timeouts
    • Log rotation
  • Phase 3: Future enhancements

    • Wildcard subdomain support

Out of Scope

  • HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 proxying (services that need these run their own native Rust servers — e.g., api.alk.dev runs its own HTTP/2+ server)
  • Load balancing or round-robin upstream selection
  • WebSocket proxying (can be added later if needed)
  • Static file serving
  • Access control beyond rate limiting (no auth, no IP allowlists in Phase 1)
  • CGI, SCGI, uWSGI, FastCGI

Architecture

                     ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
                     │     reverse-proxy (Rust/axum)       │
config.toml ───────► │  StaticConfig + DynamicConfig       │
                     │  (ArcSwap for hot-reload)            │
                     │                                      │
                     │  ┌─ Listener 1 ─────────────────┐   │
bind_addr_1:80  ───► │  │  HTTP → 301 redirect           │   │
                     │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
bind_addr_1:443 ───► │  │  TLS listener (tokio-rustls)    │   │
                     │  │  ├─ ACME or Manual TLS config    │   │
                     │  │  └─ axum router                  │   │
                     │  │     ├─ Host-based routing         │   │
                     │  │     ├─ git.alk.dev → :3000       │   │
                     │  │     └─ Rate limiting, headers     │   │
                     │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                     │                                      │
                     │  ┌─ Listener N ─────────────────┐   │
bind_addr_N:80  ───► │  │  HTTP → 301 redirect           │   │
                     │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
bind_addr_N:443 ───► │  │  TLS listener (tokio-rustls)    │   │
                     │  │  ├─ Manual TLS cert             │   │
                     │  │  └─ axum router                  │   │
                     │  │     ├─ alk.dev → :8080           │   │
                     │  │     └─ Rate limiting, headers     │   │
                     │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                     │                                      │
                     │  /health → 200 OK (port 9900)        │
                     └────────────────────────────────────┘

Crate Dependencies

Core

Crate Version Purpose Notes
axum 0.8 HTTP framework Routing, middleware, extractors
tokio 1 (full) Async runtime Multi-threaded runtime
hyper 1 HTTP protocol Used via axum, and directly for proxy Client
tower 0.5 Middleware ecosystem Service trait, layers
rustls 0.23 TLS implementation aws_lc_rs crypto provider
tokio-rustls 0.26 Async TLS I/O Wraps TCP with TLS
rustls-acme 0.12 ACME client Let's Encrypt auto-provisioning and renewal

Supporting

Crate Version Purpose Notes
serde 1 Serialization TOML config deserialization
toml 0.8 Config format Declarative site definitions
arc-swap 1 Atomic config swap Lock-free DynamicConfig reload
tracing 0.1 Structured logging fail2ban-compatible output
tracing-subscriber 0.3 Log output File + journald support
rustls-pemfile 2 PEM parsing Manual cert loading
rustls-pki-types 1 TLS types CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer
clap 4 CLI arguments Server startup options
signal-hook 0.3 Signal handling SIGTERM/SIGINT for shutdown, SIGHUP for config reload

Versions listed are minimum major versions. Implementation should pin exact versions in Cargo.toml per standard Rust practice.

Exports

This is a single-binary deployment. There are no library exports. The product is the reverse-proxy binary plus a systemd unit file and a config file.

Dependencies on Other Projects

  • alknet: The ArcSwap<DynamicConfig> pattern, tokio-rustls TLS acceptor construction, rustls-acme integration, and ServerConfig builder patterns are adapted from alknet's transport and config layers. These patterns are referenced as validation that the approaches work in production; all code in this project is written from scratch.

Design Decisions

All design decisions are documented as ADRs in decisions/.

ADR Decision Summary
001 Rust with axum Memory safety eliminates the bug class causing nginx CVEs; axum provides ergonomic tower integration
002 Custom proxy handler Single upstream per domain — simpler than a general proxy library
003 TOML configuration format Rust-native, unambiguous, excellent serde support
004 ACME-primary certificate management Eliminates certbot dependency; automatic provisioning and renewal
005 tokio-rustls directly, not axum-server Full control over TLS config, ACME resolver integration, cipher suite configuration
006 Token bucket rate limiting In-memory per-IP token bucket matching nginx burst semantics
007 Custom structured log format key=value pairs with RATE_LIMIT prefix for fail2ban
008 Static/dynamic config with ArcSwap Immutable StaticConfig, hot-reloadable DynamicConfig via ArcSwap
009 Signal handling strategy signal-hook for SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP
010 Multi-site in Phase 1 Multiple domains from initial release; avoids config migration later
011 Multi-domain TLS config Single SAN certificate covering all domains via rustls-acme
012 Restrict cipher suites Match nginx scope: ECDHE-AES-GCM for TLS 1.2, all TLS 1.3
013 Health check on separate local port Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port
014 Unix domain socket config reload API Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback
015 Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults 5s connect / 60s request defaults, per-site overrides
016 Explicit bind address required Rejects 0.0.0.0 to prevent accidental exposure
017 Upstream connection defaults HTTP/1.1, no redirects, connection pooling
018 Request body size limit 100 MB default matching nginx, Gitea push compatibility
019 Multi-config listeners [[listeners]] supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models

Open Questions

Open questions are tracked in open-questions.md. Key questions affecting this document:

  • OQ-01: Should cipher suites be restricted beyond rustls defaults? (resolved — ADR-012)
  • OQ-03: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port? (resolved — ADR-013)
  • OQ-07: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains? (resolved — ADR-019: [[listeners]] with per-listener TLS config)