Files
reverse-proxy/tasks/fix/upstream-host-validation.md
glm-5.1 54f1725173 Decompose security review #003 findings into 17 fix tasks and 1 review task
Address 4 critical, 8 warning, and 5 suggestion findings from the
security and bug review by creating atomic, dependency-ordered tasks:

Critical fixes (C1-C4): rate limiter IP source (ADR-025), InFlightCounter
increment + drain interval, connector timeout ceiling (ADR-026), JSON format
without log file.

Validation tightening (W1, W2): upstream host validation, ACME contact email
validation.

Robustness (W3, W4, W5, W12): upstream URI error handling (502 not silent
drop), admin socket resource limits (ADR-027), TlsMode wildcard mismatch,
http_port u32→u16.

Code quality (W6, W10, W11, S1, S3, W8/W9): config type consolidation,
TokenBucket field visibility, reload_mutex #[cfg(test)], dead code removal,
root cert count logging, misleading test names.

Test coverage (S10): rate limiter ConnectInfo tests (depends on C1 fix).

Review: post-security-fix-review checkpoint covering all critical fixes
and sensitive config consolidation path.
2026-06-12 13:42:37 +00:00

3.0 KiB

id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level, review_findings
id name status depends_on scope risk impact level review_findings
fix/upstream-host-validation Validate host part of upstream address in config (W1) pending
narrow low component implementation
W1

Description

is_valid_upstream checks that the upstream has a host:port format with a valid port number, but performs no validation on the host part beyond checking it's non-empty and doesn't start with http:// or https://. Values like !!!bad!!!:3000 or @#$%:8080 pass validation.

The spec (config.md validation rule 17) now requires: "the host part must parse as a valid IpAddr or pass is_valid_hostname validation." Bracket-enclosed values must be parsed as IPv6 addresses.

Changes Required

src/config/validation.rsis_valid_upstream function (lines 309-327):

  • After validating the port, validate the host part:

    fn is_valid_upstream(upstream: &str) -> bool {
        if let Some(idx) = upstream.rfind(':') {
            let host_part = &upstream[..idx];
            let port_str = &upstream[idx + 1..];
            if host_part.is_empty() { return false; }
            if upstream.starts_with("http://") || upstream.starts_with("https://") { return false; }
            let port: u16 = match port_str.parse() { Ok(p) => p, Err(_) => return false };
            if port == 0 { return false; }
            // Validate host part per config.md rule 17
            if host_part.starts_with('[') && host_part.ends_with(']') {
                let inner = &host_part[1..host_part.len()-1];
                inner.parse::<std::net::Ipv6Addr>().is_ok()
            } else {
                host_part.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_ok() || is_valid_hostname(host_part)
            }
        } else {
            false
        }
    }
    
  • Note: is_valid_hostname already exists in the same file and is used for site host validation. It rejects IP addresses, which is correct for site hosts but wrong for upstream hosts — upstream hosts CAN be IPs. The upstream validation must check IpAddr::parse first, then fall back to is_valid_hostname for DNS names.

  • Add tests for:

    • Valid: gitea:3000, 127.0.0.1:3000, [::1]:3000
    • Invalid: !!!bad!!!:3000, @#$%:8080, :3000 (empty host)

Acceptance Criteria

  • is_valid_upstream validates the host part as IP address or valid hostname
  • IPv6 bracket notation is handled (e.g., [::1]:3000)
  • Invalid host characters like !!!bad!!!:3000 are rejected
  • Valid upstream formats still pass: gitea:3000, 127.0.0.1:3000
  • New unit tests for valid and invalid upstream host parts
  • cargo test passes
  • cargo clippy passes with no warnings

References

  • docs/architecture/config.md — validation rule 17
  • docs/reviews/003-security-and-bug-review.md — W1 finding
  • src/config/validation.rs — is_valid_upstream, is_valid_hostname

Notes

is_valid_hostname currently rejects IP addresses (intentional for site hosts). The upstream validation must handle IPs separately before falling back to is_valid_hostname.

Summary

To be filled on completion