reverse-proxy/docs/architecture/overview.md

status, last_updated

status	last_updated
draft	2026-06-11

Overview

Vision

A memory-safe, minimal reverse proxy that replaces our vulnerable nginx instance for forwarding requests to backend services. The proxy terminates TLS, injects standard proxy headers, enforces rate limits, and forwards requests to upstream services — supporting multiple domains from initial release.

This project is open source under dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0, consistent with standard Rust project licensing.

Why This Exists

Our nginx 1.24.0 installation is vulnerable to multiple actively-exploited CVEs, including CVE-2026-42945 (unauthenticated RCE via rewrite/set directives). The broader threat landscape is worsening: LLM-assisted fuzzing is accelerating bug discovery in nginx's C codebase, and security researchers report additional undisclosed vulnerabilities. Upgrading nginx patches known CVEs but does not address the structural problem — memory corruption bugs are endemic to C, and the discovery rate is accelerating.

Rust's memory safety eliminates the entire class of buffer overflow, use-after-free, and double-free bugs that constitute 6 of 7 recent nginx CVEs. Combined with rustls (pure Rust TLS, no OpenSSL dependency), this provides a fundamentally safer baseline.

See threat-landscape.md for full vulnerability details.

Scope

In Scope

• Phase 1: Multi-site reverse proxy with TLS termination

  • Multiple independent TLS listeners via [[listeners]] configuration
  • Each listener has its own bind address, TLS config, and site routing
  • Supports both dedicated-IP (1 IP = 1 cert = 1 domain) and shared-IP (SAN certificate) deployment models (ADR-019)
  • TLS termination with ACME (Let's Encrypt) and manual certificate management
  • Cipher suite restriction matching nginx scope (ECDHE-AES-GCM + TLS 1.3)
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect
  • Host-based routing to multiple upstream services
  • Reverse proxy to Gitea at 127.0.0.1:3000 (git.alk.dev)
  • Reverse proxy to Deno/Fresh container for alk.dev (simple pass-through)
  • Proxy header injection (Host, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto)
  • Per-site upstream timeouts with sensible defaults (5s connect, 60s request)
  • Request rate limiting with fail2ban-compatible logging (global per-IP)
  • 100 MB body size limit (global)
  • Configurable bind addresses (must be explicit, no 0.0.0.0)
  • Local health check endpoint on separate port (default: 9900, localhost only)
  • Unix domain socket admin API for config reload with feedback
  • Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM handling)
  • Systemd unit file
  • Dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0

• Phase 2: Operational hardening

  • Per-site rate limits and body limits
  • Metrics endpoint (Prometheus-compatible)
  • Connection limits and timeouts
  • Log rotation

• Phase 3: Future enhancements

  • Wildcard subdomain support

Out of Scope

• HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 proxying (services that need these run their own native Rust servers — e.g., api.alk.dev runs its own HTTP/2+ server)
• Load balancing or round-robin upstream selection
• WebSocket proxying (can be added later if needed)
• Static file serving
• Access control beyond rate limiting (no auth, no IP allowlists in Phase 1)
• CGI, SCGI, uWSGI, FastCGI

Architecture

                      ┌────────────────────────────────────┐
                      │  reverse-proxy container (Rust/axum)│
 config.toml ───────► │  StaticConfig + DynamicConfig       │
 (volume mount)       │  (ArcSwap for hot-reload)            │
                      │                                      │
                       │  ┌─ Listener 1 ─────────────────┐   │
  bind_addr:80  ────►  │  │  HTTP → 301 redirect           │   │
  (published)          │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                       │                                      │
  bind_addr:443 ────►  │  │  TLS listener (tokio-rustls)    │   │
  (published)          │  │  ├─ ACME or Manual TLS config    │   │
                       │  │  └─ axum router (per-listener)   │   │
                       │  │     ├─ /health → 200 OK (any)    │   │
                       │  │     ├─ Host → global site lookup  │   │
                       │  │     ├─ git.alk.dev → gitea:3000  │   │
                       │  │     └─ Rate limiting, headers     │   │
                       │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                       │                                      │
                       │  ┌─ Listener N ─────────────────┐   │
  bind_addr_N:80  ───► │  │  HTTP → 301 redirect           │   │
                       │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                       │                                      │
  bind_addr_N:443 ───► │  │  TLS listener (tokio-rustls)    │   │
                       │  │  ├─ Manual TLS cert             │   │
                       │  │  └─ axum router (per-listener)   │   │
                       │  │     ├─ /health → 200 OK (any)    │   │
                       │  │     ├─ Host → global site lookup  │   │
                       │  │     ├─ alk.dev → app:8080       │   │
                       │  │     └─ Rate limiting, headers     │   │
                       │  └────────────────────────────────┘   │
                       │                                      │
                       │  /health → 200 OK (port 9900)        │
                       │  Admin socket (Unix domain)           │
                       └────────────────────────────────────┘
                            │              │
                     ┌──────┘              └──────┐
                     │                             │
              Docker network              Volume mounts:
              (upstream DNS)            ├─ config (ro)
              ├─ gitea:3000              ├─ ACME cache (rw)
              ├─ app:8080                ├─ log dir (rw, fail2ban)
                                         └─ admin socket (rw)

Each listener has its own axum::Router instance with its own middleware stack, but all routers share Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>> and Arc<Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, TokenBucket>>> via axum State. Site routing is global: the Host header is matched against a single routing table collected from all listeners' site definitions. Hostnames must be unique across all listeners — see C1 resolution in the architecture review.

In container deployments (ADR-020), the proxy runs in a minimal container with 0.0.0.0 bind address and Docker port publishing. Upstream addresses use Docker DNS names for same-host containers (e.g., gitea:3000) but also support loopback, LAN, and tunnel endpoints for multi-host deployments.

Crate Dependencies

Core

Crate	Version	Purpose	Notes
axum	0.8	HTTP framework	Routing, middleware, extractors
tokio	1 (full)	Async runtime	Multi-threaded runtime
hyper	1	HTTP protocol	Used via axum, and directly for proxy Client
tower	0.5	Middleware ecosystem	Service trait, layers
rustls	0.23	TLS implementation	aws_lc_rs crypto provider
tokio-rustls	0.26	Async TLS I/O	Wraps TCP with TLS
rustls-acme	0.12	ACME client	Let's Encrypt auto-provisioning and renewal

Supporting

Crate	Version	Purpose	Notes
serde	1	Serialization	TOML config deserialization
toml	0.8	Config format	Declarative site definitions
arc-swap	1	Atomic config swap	Lock-free DynamicConfig reload
tracing	0.1	Structured logging	fail2ban-compatible output
tracing-subscriber	0.3	Log output	File + journald support
rustls-pemfile	2	PEM parsing	Manual cert loading
rustls-pki-types	1	TLS types	CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer
clap	4	CLI arguments	Server startup options
signal-hook	0.3	Signal handling	SIGTERM/SIGINT for shutdown, SIGHUP for config reload

Versions listed are minimum major versions. Implementation should pin exact versions in Cargo.toml per standard Rust practice.

Exports

This is a single-binary deployment. There are no library exports. The product is the reverse-proxy binary plus a systemd unit file and a config file.

Dependencies on Other Projects

• alknet: The ArcSwap<DynamicConfig> pattern, tokio-rustls TLS acceptor construction, rustls-acme integration, and ServerConfig builder patterns are adapted from alknet's transport and config layers. These patterns are referenced as validation that the approaches work in production; all code in this project is written from scratch.

Design Decisions

All design decisions are documented as ADRs in decisions/.

ADR	Decision	Summary
001	Rust with axum	Memory safety eliminates the bug class causing nginx CVEs; axum provides ergonomic tower integration
002	Custom proxy handler	Single upstream per domain — simpler than a general proxy library
003	TOML configuration format	Rust-native, unambiguous, excellent serde support
004	ACME-primary certificate management	Eliminates certbot dependency; automatic provisioning and renewal
005	tokio-rustls directly, not axum-server	Full control over TLS config, ACME resolver integration, cipher suite configuration
006	Token bucket rate limiting	In-memory per-IP token bucket matching nginx burst semantics
007	Custom structured log format	key=value pairs with RATE_LIMIT prefix for fail2ban
008	Static/dynamic config with ArcSwap	Immutable StaticConfig, hot-reloadable DynamicConfig via ArcSwap
009	Signal handling strategy	signal-hook for SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP
010	Multi-site in Phase 1	Multiple domains from initial release; avoids config migration later
011	Multi-domain TLS config	Single SAN certificate covering all domains via rustls-acme
012	Restrict cipher suites	Match nginx scope: ECDHE-AES-GCM for TLS 1.2, all TLS 1.3
013	Health check on separate local port	Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port
014	Unix domain socket config reload API	Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback
015	Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults	5s connect / 60s request defaults, per-site overrides
016	Explicit bind address required	Rejects 0.0.0.0 to prevent accidental exposure
017	Upstream connection defaults	HTTP/1.1, no redirects, connection pooling
018	Request body size limit	100 MB default matching nginx, Gitea push compatibility
019	Multi-config listeners	[[listeners]] supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models
020	Container deployment model	Defense-in-depth via container isolation; file-primary logging; flexible upstream addressing
021	X-Forwarded-For edge proxy model	Replace, don't append — proxy is the edge, no trusted upstream proxies

Open Questions

Open questions are tracked in open-questions.md. Key questions affecting this document:

• OQ-01: Should cipher suites be restricted beyond rustls defaults? (resolved — ADR-012)
• OQ-03: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port? (resolved — ADR-013)
• OQ-07: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains? (resolved — ADR-019: [[listeners]] with per-listener TLS config)