- ADR-020: Document defense-in-depth rationale for running in a minimal Docker container (memory-safe language + container isolation), flexible upstream addressing (Docker DNS, loopback, LAN, tunnel endpoints), file-primary logging for fail2ban, and volume mount strategy - ADR-016: Add allow_wildcard_bind override for container deployments where 0.0.0.0 is correct inside the container network namespace - operations.md: Add container deployment section with Docker Compose example, networking table, volume mounts, and health check integration; flip logging to file-primary for fail2ban reliability; note systemd as alternative to container deployment - config.md: Restructure logging fields into nested LoggingConfig (matching TOML [logging] section), add allow_wildcard_bind, shutdown_timeout_secs, and log_file_path fields; clarify upstream addressing supports Docker DNS and tunnel endpoints; update validation rule for 0.0.0.0 override - overview.md: Update architecture diagram for container model with Docker networking and volume mounts; add ADR-020 reference - proxy.md: Clarify X-Forwarded-Proto is determined by listener port, not hardcoded 80/443 - ADR-013: Fix health_check_port default contradiction (default is 9900, not 0/disabled as previously stated)
12 KiB
status, last_updated
| status | last_updated |
|---|---|
| draft | 2026-06-11 |
Overview
Vision
A memory-safe, minimal reverse proxy that replaces our vulnerable nginx instance for forwarding requests to backend services. The proxy terminates TLS, injects standard proxy headers, enforces rate limits, and forwards requests to upstream services — supporting multiple domains from initial release.
This project is open source under dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0, consistent with standard Rust project licensing.
Why This Exists
Our nginx 1.24.0 installation is vulnerable to multiple actively-exploited
CVEs, including CVE-2026-42945 (unauthenticated RCE via rewrite/set
directives). The broader threat landscape is worsening: LLM-assisted fuzzing
is accelerating bug discovery in nginx's C codebase, and security researchers
report additional undisclosed vulnerabilities. Upgrading nginx patches known
CVEs but does not address the structural problem — memory corruption bugs are
endemic to C, and the discovery rate is accelerating.
Rust's memory safety eliminates the entire class of buffer overflow, use-after-free, and double-free bugs that constitute 6 of 7 recent nginx CVEs. Combined with rustls (pure Rust TLS, no OpenSSL dependency), this provides a fundamentally safer baseline.
See threat-landscape.md for full vulnerability details.
Scope
In Scope
-
Phase 1: Multi-site reverse proxy with TLS termination
- Multiple independent TLS listeners via
[[listeners]]configuration - Each listener has its own bind address, TLS config, and site routing
- Supports both dedicated-IP (1 IP = 1 cert = 1 domain) and shared-IP (SAN certificate) deployment models (ADR-019)
- TLS termination with ACME (Let's Encrypt) and manual certificate management
- Cipher suite restriction matching nginx scope (ECDHE-AES-GCM + TLS 1.3)
- HTTP → HTTPS redirect
- Host-based routing to multiple upstream services
- Reverse proxy to Gitea at
127.0.0.1:3000(git.alk.dev) - Reverse proxy to Deno/Fresh container for alk.dev (simple pass-through)
- Proxy header injection (Host, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto)
- Per-site upstream timeouts with sensible defaults (5s connect, 60s request)
- Request rate limiting with fail2ban-compatible logging (global per-IP)
- 100 MB body size limit (global)
- Configurable bind addresses (must be explicit, no
0.0.0.0) - Local health check endpoint on separate port (default: 9900, localhost only)
- Unix domain socket admin API for config reload with feedback
- Graceful shutdown (SIGTERM handling)
- Systemd unit file
- Dual licensing: MIT OR Apache-2.0
- Multiple independent TLS listeners via
-
Phase 2: Operational hardening
- Per-site rate limits and body limits
- Metrics endpoint (Prometheus-compatible)
- Connection limits and timeouts
- Log rotation
-
Phase 3: Future enhancements
- Wildcard subdomain support
Out of Scope
- HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 proxying (services that need these run their own native
Rust servers — e.g.,
api.alk.devruns its own HTTP/2+ server) - Load balancing or round-robin upstream selection
- WebSocket proxying (can be added later if needed)
- Static file serving
- Access control beyond rate limiting (no auth, no IP allowlists in Phase 1)
- CGI, SCGI, uWSGI, FastCGI
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────┐
│ reverse-proxy container (Rust/axum)│
config.toml ───────► │ StaticConfig + DynamicConfig │
(volume mount) │ (ArcSwap for hot-reload) │
│ │
│ ┌─ Listener 1 ─────────────────┐ │
bind_addr:80 ────► │ │ HTTP → 301 redirect │ │
(published) │ └────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
bind_addr:443 ────► │ │ TLS listener (tokio-rustls) │ │
(published) │ │ ├─ ACME or Manual TLS config │ │
│ │ └─ axum router │ │
│ │ ├─ Host-based routing │ │
│ │ ├─ git.alk.dev → gitea:3000 │ │
│ │ └─ Rate limiting, headers │ │
│ └────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─ Listener N ─────────────────┐ │
bind_addr_N:80 ───► │ │ HTTP → 301 redirect │ │
│ └────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
bind_addr_N:443 ───► │ │ TLS listener (tokio-rustls) │ │
│ │ ├─ Manual TLS cert │ │
│ │ └─ axum router │ │
│ │ ├─ alk.dev → app:8080 │ │
│ │ └─ Rate limiting, headers │ │
│ └────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ /health → 200 OK (port 9900) │
└────────────────────────────────────┘
│ │
┌──────┘ └──────┐
│ │
Docker network Volume mounts:
(upstream DNS) ├─ config (ro)
├─ gitea:3000 ├─ ACME cache (rw)
├─ app:8080 ├─ log dir (rw, fail2ban)
└─ admin socket (rw)
In container deployments (ADR-020), the proxy runs in a minimal container with
0.0.0.0 bind address and Docker port publishing. Upstream addresses use Docker
DNS names for same-host containers (e.g., gitea:3000) but also support
loopback, LAN, and tunnel endpoints for multi-host deployments.
Crate Dependencies
Core
| Crate | Version | Purpose | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
axum |
0.8 | HTTP framework | Routing, middleware, extractors |
tokio |
1 (full) | Async runtime | Multi-threaded runtime |
hyper |
1 | HTTP protocol | Used via axum, and directly for proxy Client |
tower |
0.5 | Middleware ecosystem | Service trait, layers |
rustls |
0.23 | TLS implementation | aws_lc_rs crypto provider |
tokio-rustls |
0.26 | Async TLS I/O | Wraps TCP with TLS |
rustls-acme |
0.12 | ACME client | Let's Encrypt auto-provisioning and renewal |
Supporting
| Crate | Version | Purpose | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
serde |
1 | Serialization | TOML config deserialization |
toml |
0.8 | Config format | Declarative site definitions |
arc-swap |
1 | Atomic config swap | Lock-free DynamicConfig reload |
tracing |
0.1 | Structured logging | fail2ban-compatible output |
tracing-subscriber |
0.3 | Log output | File + journald support |
rustls-pemfile |
2 | PEM parsing | Manual cert loading |
rustls-pki-types |
1 | TLS types | CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer |
clap |
4 | CLI arguments | Server startup options |
signal-hook |
0.3 | Signal handling | SIGTERM/SIGINT for shutdown, SIGHUP for config reload |
Versions listed are minimum major versions. Implementation should pin exact
versions in Cargo.toml per standard Rust practice.
Exports
This is a single-binary deployment. There are no library exports. The product
is the reverse-proxy binary plus a systemd unit file and a config file.
Dependencies on Other Projects
- alknet: The
ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>pattern,tokio-rustlsTLS acceptor construction,rustls-acmeintegration, andServerConfigbuilder patterns are adapted from alknet's transport and config layers. These patterns are referenced as validation that the approaches work in production; all code in this project is written from scratch.
Design Decisions
All design decisions are documented as ADRs in decisions/.
| ADR | Decision | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 001 | Rust with axum | Memory safety eliminates the bug class causing nginx CVEs; axum provides ergonomic tower integration |
| 002 | Custom proxy handler | Single upstream per domain — simpler than a general proxy library |
| 003 | TOML configuration format | Rust-native, unambiguous, excellent serde support |
| 004 | ACME-primary certificate management | Eliminates certbot dependency; automatic provisioning and renewal |
| 005 | tokio-rustls directly, not axum-server | Full control over TLS config, ACME resolver integration, cipher suite configuration |
| 006 | Token bucket rate limiting | In-memory per-IP token bucket matching nginx burst semantics |
| 007 | Custom structured log format | key=value pairs with RATE_LIMIT prefix for fail2ban |
| 008 | Static/dynamic config with ArcSwap | Immutable StaticConfig, hot-reloadable DynamicConfig via ArcSwap |
| 009 | Signal handling strategy | signal-hook for SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP |
| 010 | Multi-site in Phase 1 | Multiple domains from initial release; avoids config migration later |
| 011 | Multi-domain TLS config | Single SAN certificate covering all domains via rustls-acme |
| 012 | Restrict cipher suites | Match nginx scope: ECDHE-AES-GCM for TLS 1.2, all TLS 1.3 |
| 013 | Health check on separate local port | Localhost-only HTTP health check, configurable port |
| 014 | Unix domain socket config reload API | Programmatic reload with success/failure feedback |
| 015 | Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults | 5s connect / 60s request defaults, per-site overrides |
| 016 | Explicit bind address required | Rejects 0.0.0.0 to prevent accidental exposure |
| 017 | Upstream connection defaults | HTTP/1.1, no redirects, connection pooling |
| 018 | Request body size limit | 100 MB default matching nginx, Gitea push compatibility |
| 019 | Multi-config listeners | [[listeners]] supporting both dedicated-IP and shared-IP deployment models |
| 020 | Container deployment model | Defense-in-depth via container isolation; file-primary logging; flexible upstream addressing |
Open Questions
Open questions are tracked in open-questions.md. Key questions affecting this document:
OQ-01: Should cipher suites be restricted beyond rustls defaults?(resolved — ADR-012)OQ-03: Should the health check endpoint be on a separate port?(resolved — ADR-013)OQ-07: Should per-site TLS overrides be supported for mixed ACME/manual domains?(resolved — ADR-019:[[listeners]]with per-listener TLS config)