alkblobs/tasks/ops-json-ops.md

---
id: ops-json-ops
name: the JSON control plane — blobs/stat, blobs/have (+ the token-renewal form), blobs/delete
status: completed
depends_on: [ops-foundation, ops-call-harness]
scope: moderate
risk: medium
impact: component
level: implementation
tags: [wave-7, ops, json, acl, tokens]
---

## Description

The three JSON control ops (ops-surface.md §Op family), each exported
as a spec/handler pair the embedder assembles — riding alkcall's
`OperationSpec` + JSON Schema validation (alkcall ADR-016) and its ACL
machinery at op entry (convention 6: this module never re-implements
an authorization check):

- **`blobs/stat`** `{namespace, digest}` → `{len}` — Query; the
  **read** action; the handler calls `Store::stat` (the fall-through
  general rule, ADR-012 §6.1); a miss is the typed missing-error
  schema (not a `{len: null}`).
- **`blobs/have`** `{namespace, digests[], token?}` → `{present[]}` —
  Query; **read-gated** (an existence probe over arbitrary digests is
  a discovery surface — gated exactly like fetch, not public);
  `present[]` corresponds to `digests[]` by index; content never
  traverses this op (hashes only). **The renewal form** (ADR-012 §2):
  when `token` is present, exactly one digest accompanies it — the
  handler verifies the token maps to that digest's pin row (the
  foundation's token layer), calls the crate-internal `pin_renew(key,
  owner)` via the foundation's store-core access, and answers
  `present[]` as usual; an expired or foreign row answers
  `present: false` and no renewal occurs — the putter's backstop is
  re-put. Without `token`, the pure existence probe (ADR-008's `has`
  discipline) over the facade's `has`. **The non-fleet renewal form**:
  the token is the held guard's handle — the probe answers present
  from the custody (nothing expires; ADR-012 §2's generalization);
  the custody/conversion lifecycle is the foundation's.
- **`blobs/delete`** `{namespace, digests[]}` — Mutation;
  **`Visibility::Internal`**, evaluated under the internal authority
  context per alkcall ADR-017 (internal calls switch authority
  context, never skip ACL): requires the embedder's operator/admin
  authority context, **not a namespace grant**; the `namespace` field
  exists for audit/triage scoping, not gating. The handler calls
  `Store::delete` (the arbitration-then-delete path; a `GcRefuse`
  refusal surfaces as the typed error schema). External discovery of
  an Internal op returns NOT_FOUND (alkcall ADR-017's visibility
  discipline).
- **The ACL mapping** (ops-surface.md §ACL mapping; OQ-09's
  resolution): **namespace = resource** — `resource_type:
  "blob-namespace"`, `resource_id_path` selecting the payload's
  `namespace` field; stat/have = the **read** action; **unlisted
  namespaces deny by default** (closed-by-default: no ACL entry ⇒ no
  read, no write — a grant per namespace is the deferred cost,
  deliberately paid over accidental exposure).
- **Schemas** (alkcall ADR-016): input/output JSON Schema per op +
  typed error schemas; the namespace field's syntax (non-empty UTF-8
  string, embedder-validated — the minting of namespaces is the
  embedder's act); the digest wire form is **hex** (the canonical
  digest hex — the same form `blobs/put`'s response returns; parsed
  via the key layer's hex ingress, malformed → the typed invalid
  error, rejects-never-guesses).
- **Tests through the harness** (`ops-call-harness`): stat round-trip
  + the miss shape; have's index correspondence (present/absent
  mixed); the renewal form's three answers (live row renews →
  present: true; expired row → present: false, no renewal; foreign
  token → present: false); delete under the internal authority
  context (an external caller gets NOT_FOUND; an internal
  operator-context call deletes); the closed-by-default ACL matrix
  (an unlisted namespace denies read; a granted identity reads).

## Acceptance Criteria

- [x] Three spec/handler pairs exported (stat, have, delete); input/
      output schemas + typed error schemas per alkcall ADR-016
- [x] The ACL mapping: namespace-as-resource with the
      resource_id_path; the read action on stat/have;
      closed-by-default verified by test (unlisted namespace denies)
- [x] delete: `Visibility::Internal`, the internal-authority-context
      requirement (not namespace-gated), external discovery NOT_FOUND
- [x] have's renewal form: one digest + token; verify-mapping →
      `pin_renew`; expired/foreign → `present: false` with no
      renewal; the non-fleet form answers from the held custody
- [x] The handlers touch only the store facade + the foundation's
      crate-internal renewal access (no backend side-door — the
      ADR-001 §4 rule)
- [x] Harness tests green; `cargo test` (default) green;
      `cargo test --features ops` green; clippy/fmt green on both
      shapes; `cargo doc --no-deps` clean

## References

- docs/architecture/ops-surface.md (§Op family — the three JSON ops;
  §ACL mapping)
- docs/architecture/decisions/001-substrate-posture-and-ops-placement.md
  §2/§4
- docs/architecture/decisions/012-pre-decomposition-consistency-rulings.md
  §2 (the have payload shape + the renewal form's three-step handler
  duty)
- docs/architecture/decisions/008-trait-size-probe-fleet-gc-and-large-engines.md
  (the `has` discipline the non-token form preserves)
- docs/architecture/open-questions.md OQ-09 (closed-by-default, the
  risk-asymmetry rationale)
- alkcall (upstream checkout): ADR-016 (operation error schemas),
  ADR-017 (the privilege model — internal switches context, never
  skips ACL), `src/registry/spec.rs` (`AccessControl`,
  `resource_id_path`)
- tasks/ops-foundation.md (the token layer + the renewal access the
  have handler rides), tasks/ops-call-harness.md (the harness)

## Notes

> Landed in `src/ops.rs` (the ops module's "JSON control plane"
> section, appended to the foundation's substrate) + `src/lib.rs`
> re-exports (`stat_pair`/`have_pair`/`delete_pair` and the four
> domain codes `BLOB_MISSING`/`INVALID_DIGEST`/`INVALID_RENEWAL_FORM`/
> `GC_REFUSED`). Each export is `pub fn X_pair(ctx: Arc<OpsContext>) ->
> (OperationSpec, Handler)` — the embedder assembles; the harness's
> assembly (extended: `assemble_registrations` now carries the
> registration-side composition authority and scoped composition env,
> ADR-017/019 — the pair-level `assemble` shape is unchanged).
>
> **Schemas (alkcall ADR-016):** input/output JSON Schema per op — the
> namespace field's syntax enforced at the schema (`minLength: 1`, the
> non-empty-UTF-8 rule); the digest wire form hex with the canonical
> pattern (`^[0-9a-f]{40}$|^[0-9a-f]{64}$`, the key layer's
> lowercase-only ingress also enforced at the handlers —
> rejects-never-guesses). The have schema carries the renewal form's
> arity as `if`/`then` (token ⇒ digests minItems/maxItems 1) — verified
> live at the wire (`INVALID_INPUT` on the two-digest+token shape) —
> and re-enforced at the handler (`INVALID_RENEWAL_FORM`, the
> typed error for non-registry dispatch paths, exercised by direct
> handler invocation). Typed error schemas: `BLOB_MISSING`
> (stat's miss — details `{digest}`; a `{len: null}` was never an
> option), `INVALID_DIGEST` (the ingress), `INVALID_RENEWAL_FORM`
> (have's arity), `GC_REFUSED` (delete's `Error::GcRefuse`).
>
> **The ACL mapping (OQ-09's resolution, verified by test):**
> namespace-as-resource — `resource_type: "blob-namespace"`,
> `resource_id_path: "$.namespace"`, the read action on stat/have;
> closed-by-default proven on the wire (an unlisted namespace denies
> the granted identity's probe; a granted namespace reads; the
> anonymous call answers the authentication required gate). delete:
> `Visibility::Internal`, `AccessControl` left un-gated (not
> namespace-gated — the field is audit/triage scoping), the
> operator-admin authority context realized as the **composition
> authority the embedder declares at registration** (the pair exports
> it authority-agnostic); external discovery is the registry's
> NOT_FOUND (tested); the internal path proven through a composant op
> (`blobs/compose-delete` test stub, scoped env → delete) whose
> grantless caller composes — the check ran against the declared
> operator authority, the namespace grant not the gate. GcRefuse and
> Missing surface as the typed errors (fail-fast; no atomic multi-
> delete was specced — the preceding digests' deletions stand, and the
> doc says so).
>
> **The renewal form** (ADR-012 §2's three-step duty, riding the
> foundation's `OpsContext::renew` — no new store access, no backend
> side-door): the non-fleet arms answer from custody (renew →
> present: true; unknown/foreign/mismatched → present: false, never an
> error; the malformed-token ingress maps to the unknown-token answer);
> the fleet arms ran against the harness server (env-driven
> `ALKBLOBS_PG_HOST/...`, skipping cleanly server-less — the fleet
> column's SKIP posture adapted in-crate): the live row renews with
> the row's expiry observed moving (the independent `gc_pins`
> instrument), the expired row answers `present: false` with the
> expiry frozen at the last renewal (no renewal occurred — the
> never-resurrect discipline), and the peer mint's foreign token
> answers `present: false` the same way (the validity domain = the
> minting node). The foundation's noted `mint_custodial`-refused-under-
> fleet arm is asserted in the same test. The put-side arms (mint the
> token from a wire-carried put) ride the put's handler (ops-put).

## Summary

> Completed 2026-10-13 (wave 7). The JSON control plane's three
> spec/handler pairs landed in `src/ops.rs` under feature `ops`:
> `blobs/stat` (Query/read — `Store::stat`, the miss as the typed
> `BLOB_MISSING`), `blobs/have` (Query/read — the pure existence probe
> over `Store::has` with index-corresponded `present[]`, engine
> failures folding to present: false, and the token-renewal form
> riding `OpsContext::renew` with the one-digest arity enforced at the
> schema (`if`/`then`) and the handler), and `blobs/delete`
> (Mutation/`Visibility::Internal` — external discovery NOT_FOUND; the
> operator authority context via the registration-time composition
> authority; not namespace-gated; `Store::delete` with `GC_REFUSED`/
> `BLOB_MISSING` as the typed errors, fail-fast). ACL: namespace-as-
> resource, the read action, closed-by-default (verified by test);
> digests wire-form hex parsed via the key layer's ingress
> (rejects-never-guesses); domain error codes `BLOB_MISSING`/
> `INVALID_DIGEST`/`INVALID_RENEWAL_FORM`/`GC_REFUSED` declared per op
> with their details schemas. Five harness tests added (stat
> round-trip/miss/ingress, have's index correspondence + closed-by-
> default matrix, the renewal form's arms incl. the arity gate at both
> the wire and the handler, delete's NOT_FOUND + internal composition
> + refusal arms) plus one fleet harness-server test (the three
> renewal answers with the row-expiry instrument; the foreign token;
> the custodial-mint refusal under fleet) — env-driven, skipping
> cleanly server-less (SKIP posture). Gates green: `cargo test`
> (default 73/19/3), `cargo test --features ops` (92/19/3),
> `cargo test --all-features` against the harness server (246/125/4 —
> one pre-existing fleet-timing row flaked once under full-suite load
> and passed on the isolated + full reruns, untouched by this task's
> diff: the fleet column reads no ops code), clippy
> `--all-targets -- -D warnings` on the default/ops/all-features
> shapes plus the pg-pure checks, `cargo fmt --check`,
> `cargo doc --no-deps` clean on the default and ops builds.